Editing World War I reparations (section)

====Hyperinflation====
{{further|Hyperinflation in the Weimar Republic}}
[[File:Germany Hyperinflation.svg|thumb|alt=A chart with a black line depicting the rapid increase of hyperinflation.|A logarithmic scale depicting Weimar hyperinflation to 1923. One paper Mark per Gold Mark increased to one trillion paper Marks per Gold Mark.]]

Historians and economists differ on the subject of whether, and to what extent, reparations were a cause of hyper-inflation in the Weimar republic.

Amongst those stating that it was a cause, Erik Goldstein wrote that in 1921, the payment of reparations caused a crisis and that the [[occupation of the Ruhr]] had a disastrous effect on the German economy, resulting in the German Government printing more money as the currency collapsed. Hyperinflation began and printing presses worked overtime to print Reichsbank notes; by November 1923 one US dollar was worth {{nowrap|4,200,000,000,000 marks.}}{{sfn|Martel|2010|p=156}} Ferguson writes that the policy of the Economics Minister [[Robert Schmidt (German politician)|Robert Schmidt]] led Germany to avoid economic collapse from 1919 to 1920, but that reparations accounted for most of Germany's budget deficit in 1921 and 1922 and that reparations were the cause of the hyperinflation.{{sfn|Boemeke|Feldman|Glaser|1998|pp=409–410, 425}}

Several historians counter the argument that reparations caused the inflation and collapse of the mark, particular on the grounds that reparations payments, and particularly hard-cash payments, were in large part not made during the period of hyper-inflation and so could not be the cause of it. Gerhard Weinberg writes that Germany refused to pay, and by doing so destroyed their own currency.{{sfn|Weinberg|1994|p=16}} Anthony Lentin agrees and writes that inflation was "a consequence of the war rather than of the peace" and that hyperinflation was a result of the "German government's reckless issue of paper money" during the Allied occupation of the Ruhr.{{sfn|Lentin|2012|p=26}}

Contemporary British and French experts believed that the Mark was being sabotaged to avoid budgetary and currency reform and to evade reparations, a view supported by Reich Chancellery records. Historian [[Sally Marks]] endorsed that view, writing that historians who say reparations caused hyperinflation have overlooked "that the inflation long predated reparations" and the way "inflation mushroomed" between mid-1921 and the end of 1922 "when Germany was actually paying very little in reparations" and have failed to explain why "the period of least inflation coincided with the period of largest reparation payments&nbsp;...&nbsp;or why Germans claimed after 1930 that reparations were causing deflation". She writes "there is no doubt that British and French suspicions late in 1922 were sound".{{sfn|Marks|1978|p=239}} Marks also writes that the "astronomic inflation which ensued was a result of German policy", whereby the government paid for passive resistance in the Ruhr "from an empty exchequer" and paid off its domestic and war debts with worthless marks.{{sfn|Marks|1978|p=245}}{{sfn|Martel|1999|p=24}} Bell agrees and writes that "inflation had little direct connection with reparation payments themselves, but a great deal to do with the way the German government chose to subsidize industry and to pay the costs of passive resistance to the occupation [of the Ruhr] by extravagant use of the printing press". Bell also writes that hyperinflation was not an inevitable consequence of the Treaty of Versailles, but was among the actual results.{{sfn|Bell|1997|p=25}}