Editing Suez Crisis (section)

=== Nasser-US negotiations ===
In January 1956, to end the incipient arms race in the Middle East (set off by the Soviet Union selling Egypt arms on a scale unlimited by the Tripartite Declaration and with France doing likewise with Israel), which he saw as opening the Near East to Soviet influence, Eisenhower launched a major effort to make peace between Egypt and Israel. Eisenhower sent out his close friend [[Robert B. Anderson (Texas politician)|Robert B. Anderson]] to serve as a secret envoy who would permanently end the Arab–Israeli dispute.<ref>{{Harvnb|Neff|1981|pp=130–131}}</ref> During his meetings with Nasser, Anderson offered large quantities of American aid in exchange for a peace treaty with Israel. Nasser demanded Palestinian refugees be given the opportunity to choose between repatriation or resettlement in Arab countries, wanted to annex the southern half of Israel and rejected direct talks with Israel.<ref name="Alteras1993p166">{{Harvnb|Alteras|1993|loc=pp. 169 "Nasser's personal security and that of his government were at stake. Several times during the conversation Nasser mentioned the murder of King Abdullah."}}</ref> Given Nasser's territorial and refugee-related demands, the Israeli Prime Minister [[David Ben-Gurion]] suspected that Nasser was not interested in a settlement, insteading demanding face-to-face negotiations with Nasser, starting with lower-level negotiations, and weapons from the US.<ref>{{Harvnb|Neff|1981|pp=135–136}}</ref> Nasser was unwilling to accept direct negotiations, citing possible assassinations such as the assassination of [[Abdullah I of Jordan|King Abduallah]].<ref name="Alteras1993p166" />

A second round of secret diplomacy by Anderson in February 1956 was equally unsuccessful.<ref>{{Harvnb|Neff|1981|pp=168–169}}</ref> Nasser sometimes suggested during his talks with Anderson that he was interested in peace with Israel if only the Americans would supply him with unlimited quantities of military and economic aid. In case of Israeli acceptance to the [[Palestinian right of return]] and to Egypt annexing the southern half of Israel, Egypt would not accept a peace settlement. The United States or the [[United Nations]] would have to present the Israeli acceptance to all Arabs as a basis for peace settlements.<ref name="Alteras1993p169">{{Harvnb|Alteras|1993|p=169}}</ref> It is not clear if Nasser was sincerely interested in peace, or just merely saying what the Americans wanted to hear in the hope of obtaining American funding for the Aswan high dam and American weapons.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Yahel |first=Ido |date=October 2016 |title=Covert Diplomacy Between Israel and Egypt During Nasser Rule: 1952–1970 |journal=SAGE Open |language=en |volume=6 |issue=4 |pages=215824401666744 |doi=10.1177/2158244016667449 |issn=2158-2440 |quote="Although Nasser may have wanted to reach some agreement with Israel, his suspicion and distrust prevented doing so."|doi-access=free }}</ref> The truth will likely never be known as Nasser was an intensely secretive man, who managed to hide his true opinions on most issues from both contemporaries and historians.<ref>{{Harvnb|Vatikiotis|1978|pp=306–307}}</ref> However, the British historian P. J. Vatikitos noted that Nasser's determination to promote Egypt as the world's foremost anti-Zionist state as a way of reinforcing his claim to Arab leadership meant that peace was unlikely.<ref>{{Harvnb|Vatikiotis|1978|p=252}}</ref>

Hasan Afif El-Hasan says that in 1955–1956 the Americans proposed to Nasser that he solve the Arab–Israeli conflict peacefully in exchange for American finance of the High Dam on the Nile river, but Nasser rejected the offer because it would mean siding with the West (as opposed to remaining neutral) in the Cold War. Since the alternative to a peace agreement was a war with unpredictable consequences, Nasser's refusal to accept the proposal was irrational, according to el-Hasan.<ref name="El-Hasan2010p156">{{Cite book |last=El-Hasan |first=Hasan Afif |title=Israel Or Palestine? Is the Two-state Solution Already Dead?: A Political and Military History of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict |date=1 January 2010 |publisher=Algora Publishing |isbn=978-0-8758-6794-6 |page=[https://books.google.com/books?id=qywm7XKcRvgC&pg=PA156 156] |quote="in 1955...The U.S offered to finance the High Dam on the Nile river...in exchange for Egypt's help to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict peacefully...But Nasser rejected the offer because it would mean siding with the West in the Cold War.... was the quasi alliance with the soviets more important than solving the Palestinian issue peacefully?...since the alternative to a negotiated settlement was a war with unpredictable consequences, Nasser's refusal to accept the Negotiation offer was irrational. "}}</ref>