Editing Richard Helms (section)

===The ruler and Iran===
Most important for his effectiveness would be to establish a good working relationship with the ruler. All the while, the shah's terminal illness of prostate cancer remained a well-kept secret from everyone.<ref>Azimi, ''The Quest for Democracy in Iran'' (Harvard Univ. 2008, 2010) p. 292: "The Shah had been terminally ill since 1974, although this fact was kept a secret for a considerable time from his closest confidants, foreign allies, and even from himself."</ref><ref>Milani, ''The Shah'' (2008, 2010) pp. 370–371. Of symptoms discovered in 1973, the shah's fatal cancer in 1974 was confirmed, and kept secret.</ref> Helms found himself satisfied with his "as much as might be asked for" dealings with the Shah. The monarch was notorious for an "I speak, you listen" approach to dialogue.<ref>Shawcross, ''The Shah's Last Ride'' (1988) p. 209 ("I speak" quote), p. 270 (meeting with the Shah as his monologue).</ref> Yet Helms describes lively conversations with "polite give-and-take" in which the shah never forgot his majesty; these discussions could end with an agreement to disagree. The shah allowed that they by happenstance might meet at a social function and then "talk shop". Usually they met in private offices, the two alone, where it was "tête à tête with no note-takers or advisors."<ref>Helms (2003) p. 417 ("tête à tête"), p. 419 ("as much" quote, "give-and-take" quote, "talk shop"). Helms commented that the shah was well disposed to CIA officials.</ref><ref>Shawcross, ''The Shah's Last Ride'' (1988) p. 367. Helms remembered, "Dean Rusk used to say that [the Shah] was the best-informed man in the world save for the U.S. President. Maybe that's a slight exaggeration."</ref>

[[File:Iran (orthographic projection).svg|thumb|left|150px]]

British author and journalist [[William Shawcross]] several times makes the point that the shah prohibited foreign governments from any contact with his domestic political opposition. Replying to one such request for access, by the [[Secretary-General of the United Nations]], an 'irritated' shah replied "I will not have any guest of mine waste a moment on these ridiculous people." As with other ambassadors before and during his tenure, Helms was reluctant to cross the shah on this point because of the fear of "being PNG'ed (made [[persona non grata]])." For any ambassador to do so "would at the very least have jeopardized his country's export opportunities in Iran." Consequently, "American and other diplomats swam in a shallow pool of courtiers, industrialists, lawyers, and others who were somehow benefiting from the material success of the regime. ¶ ... people more or less licensed by the Shah." About the immediate court, however, a U.N. official wrote, "There was an atmosphere of overwhelming nouveau-riche, meretricious chi-chi and sycophancy ..."<ref>Shawcross, ''The Shah's Last Ride: The Fate of an Ally'' (Simon and Schuster 1988) pp. 264–265 (no contact with opposition), p. 270 (Shah "guest" quote); p. 265 ("jeopardized" quote, "shallow pool" quote), p. 268 (Helms' "PNG" quote), p. 271 (U.N.'s [[Brian Urquhart]]'s quote).</ref><ref>Azimi, ''The Quest for Democracy in Iran'' (Harvard Univ. 2008, 2010) p. 285: "In the twilight years of the monarchy it was increasingly clear that the shah and his elite had cacooned themselves in an impenetrable web of collective self-deception."</ref> Helms himself managed to circulate widely among the traditional elites, e.g., becoming a "close friend" of the aristocrat Ahmad Goreishi.<ref>Abbas Milani, ''The Shah'' (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) p. 386.</ref>

The shah's policy of keeping foreign agents and officials away from his domestic foes applied equally to the CIA. In fact, the Agency remained somewhat uninformed about his foes, but for what information SAVAK (Iran's state security) gave it.{{citation needed|reason=Alleged statement of fact|date=September 2023}} The CIA evidently did not even closely monitor the shah's activities. During Helms' last year this situation was being reviewed, but the State Department seemed complacent and willing to rely on the shah's soliloquies and its own diplomatic queries.<ref>Shawcross, ''The Shah's Last Ride'' (1988) p. 271 (CIA excluded), pp. 271–272 (CIA not monitoring shah), p. 272 (State Dept.), p. 273 (depending on Savak), 272–273 (CIA review). "The Shah would never have tolerated the necessary investigations" (p. 270).</ref><ref>Yet "coded confidential telegrams" between the shah and the Iranian embassy in Washington were "regularly intercepted" and read by the USG. Milani, ''The Shah'' (Harvard 2008, 2010) p. 370.</ref> While Helms' 'notorious' connection to the CIA might have been considered an asset by the shah and his circle, many Iranians viewed the American embassy and its spy Agency as distressing reminders of active foreign meddling in their country's affairs, and of the CIA's [[1953 Iranian coup d'état|1953 coup]] against the civil democrat [[Mohammad Mossadegh]].<ref>Cf., Shawcross (1988) at 249, 333, 351–352. <blockquote>Helms' appointment to Tehran inevitably gave rise to lurid speculations about the nature of CIA control over the Shah. For the shah's enemies it was clear confirmation that the shah was merely a CIA puppet." Shawcross (1988) at 266.</blockquote></ref><ref>Weiner (2007) p. 368.</ref><ref>Azimi, ''The Quest for Democracy in Iran'' (Harvard Univ. 2008, 2010) pp. 144, 146, 149, 158 (CIA and 1953 coup); pp. 260–264 (America and CIA in Iran). "The Iranian public increasingly resented the U.S. predominance" (p. 260).</ref><ref>See above section "Iran: Mossadegh" for the coup and for Helms' reflections on the CIA and the subsequent Islamic revolution in Iran.</ref> "[F]ew politically minded Iranians doubted that the American embassy was deeply involved in Iranian domestic politics and in promoting particular individuals or agendas" including actions by "the CIA station chief in Tehran".<ref>Azimi, ''The Quest for Democracy in Iran'' (Harvard Univ. 2008, 2010) p. 262.</ref>