Editing Politics of Iraq (section)

=== Elite cartel ruling Iraq by ''muhasasa'' ===
{{Further|Iraq#Post-Saddam (2003 – present)}}
During the [[Ba'athist Iraq|regime]] of [[Saddam Hussein]] (1979–2003), several Iraqi opposition groups created a quota system by which [[Sunni Islam]]ic, [[Shia Islam]]ic, [[Kurds#Iraq|Kurdish]] and other religious or ethnic groups would be proportionally represented in a future new government. The U.S. in July 2003 selected the members of the [[Iraqi Governing Council]], the forerunner of the first post–Hussein sovereign [[Iraqi Interim Government|Iraqi (interim) government]], according to that ethno-sectarian quota system.<ref name=Arwa,Ibr>{{Cite web |last=Ibrahim |first=Arwa |date=4 Dec 2019 |title=Muhasasa, the political system reviled by Iraqi protesters |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/4/muhasasa-the-political-system-reviled-by-iraqi-protesters |access-date=2022-10-19 |website=www.aljazeera.com |language=en |archive-date=2022-10-18 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221018224019/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/4/muhasasa-the-political-system-reviled-by-iraqi-protesters |url-status=live }}</ref>

Also in 2003, a "pact" (''muhasasa ta’ifa'') was struck by "the elite", holding that after a national election, the winning parties divide the ministerial positions in direct relationship to their success at the ballot box.<ref name=chatham,2019>{{Cite web|date=1 October 2019|title=Corruption Continues to Destabilize Iraq|url=https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/corruption-continues-destabilize-iraq|url-status=live|access-date=2019-11-04|website=Chatham House|language=en|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200328190454/https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/corruption-continues-destabilize-iraq |archive-date=2020-03-28 }}</ref> After 2003, a second agreement (''muhasasa'') was made, holding that ministries and their budgets and other political positions must be proportionally placed under the "control" of "religious [or sectarian or ethnic] groups", "depending mostly on a group's size", presuming such "groups" to be fully represented by one or several parties or lists taking part in the elections,<ref name=U4,muhas,trench>{{Cite web |last=Schöberlein |first=Jennifer |date=2020-12-10 |title=Iraq: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption (sections 'Drivers of corruption', 'The Muhasasa power-sharing agreement' and 'Entrenched but diminishing sectarianism') |url=https://www.u4.no/publications/iraq-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-2020 |access-date=2022-10-19 |website=U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre |language=en |agency=[[Transparency International]] |archive-date=2022-10-19 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221019104212/https://www.u4.no/publications/iraq-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-2020 |url-status=live }}</ref> or that national governments should "represent the different ethnic, religious and sectarian identities that make up the Iraqi society", presuming that such "identities" are expressed or represented by existing political parties.<ref name="al-Hasan2015">{{cite web|url=http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2015/08/20158307585163273.html|title=Social Protest in Iraq and Reality of the Internal Shia Dispute (section: 'Roots of the quota system') |publisher=Al Jazeera|author=Harith al-Hasan|date=30 August 2015|access-date=2020-04-18 |archive-date=2020-07-26 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200726005317/https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2015/08/20158307585163273.html|url-status=live}}</ref> Such agreements between members of the [[elite]] to [[Collusion|collude]] in order to avoid competition, improve their own profits, and dominate the market (of voters in a democracy), have been labeled "elite [[cartel]]".<ref name="al-Hasan2015"/> The political parties themselves, once they win any ministry through the ''muhasasa'' system, benefit financially from state contracts awarded by them to companies run by their party members (see below, section [[#Clientelism, patronage|Clientelism, patronage]]) what makes it even harder for them to step out of the ''muhasasa'' arrangements.<ref name=chatham,2019/> Or, as a researcher phrased it in 2020: "Such elite pacts are notoriously resistant to reform, particularly if any proposed change is perceived to undermine elite interests (…)".<ref name=U4,muhas/>

Although the system functions informally, a group of Norwegian researchers in late 2020 asserted—while citing other researchers but not a basic source—that 54% of the ministry posts would 'normally' go to the Shia, 24% to the Sunni, 18% to the Kurds, and 4% to minorities including the Christians.<ref name=U4>{{Cite web |last=Schöberlein |first=Jennifer |date=2020-12-10 |title=Iraq: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption |url=https://www.u4.no/publications/iraq-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-2020 |access-date=2022-10-19 |website=U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre |language=en |agency=[[Transparency International]] |archive-date=2022-10-19 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221019104212/https://www.u4.no/publications/iraq-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-2020 |url-status=live }}</ref> They suggested that the ''muhasasa'' system leads to "a closed system of elite rule… recycling the political elites irrespective of their performance", not urging or inciting the Iraqi politicians to act transparently or accountably or to respond to citizen demands and deliver benefits to the Iraqi population as a whole, but instead making them easily susceptible to corruption, nepotism, clientelism and patronage while focusing on their own (group's) interests and (elite's) survival and consolidation.<ref name=U4/>

This ''muhasasa'' elite cartel (and connected problems) led to massive protests in Iraq in [[2011 Iraqi protests|2011]], [[2012–2013 Iraqi protests|2012–2013]], [[2015–2018 Iraqi protests|2015, 2016, 2018]] and [[2019–2021 Iraqi protests|2019–2021]]. Analysts have seen this ''muhasasa'' system to exist until at least late 2020.<ref name=U4-/> The [[Abdul Mahdi Government]] of 2018 broke with elements of ''muhasasa''. Although his anti-''muhasasa'' [[Sadrist Movement]] retained plurality in the 2021 election, [[2021–2022 Iraqi political crisis|inability to form a government]] eventually led to the party's withdrawal from Parliament, allowing the rival parties to form another ''muhasasa''-based government.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Ottaway |first1=Marina |title=Iraq and the Problem of Democracy |url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/iraq-and-problem-democracy |website=Wilson Center |language=en |date=January 13, 2023 |access-date=July 13, 2023 |archive-date=July 13, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230713114715/https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/iraq-and-problem-democracy |url-status=live }}</ref>

==== Incompetent government ====
Those two ''muhasasa'' agreements in and after 2003 (see [[#Elite cartel ruling Iraq by muhasasa|above]]) had the effect that, starting with the first [[Al Maliki I Government|post–2003 Iraqi government after elections]] in 2006, if a party "controlled" a ministry, it appointed also the top positions in their civil services to their party followers and faction members;<ref name=chatham,2019/> also the positions for senior public service were distributed on the basis of "ethnic, religious and/or party affiliation" rather than merit,<ref name=U4,client.>{{Cite web |last=Schöberlein |first=Jennifer |date=2020-12-10 |title=Iraq: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption (section 'Clientelism and patronage') |url=https://www.u4.no/publications/iraq-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-2020 |access-date=2022-10-19 |website=U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre |language=en |agency=[[Transparency International]] |archive-date=2022-10-19 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221019104212/https://www.u4.no/publications/iraq-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-2020 |url-status=live }}</ref> professional competence or experience.<ref name="al-Hasan2015"/> This incompetence caused mismanagement in the successive Iraqi governments of [[Nouri al-Maliki|Al-Maliki (2006–2014)]], [[Haider al-Abadi|Al-Abadi (2014–2018)]],<ref name="al-Hasan2015_economy"/><ref name=U4,muhas/> and also [[Adil Abdul-Mahdi|Abdul-Mahdi (2018–2020)]],<ref name=U4->{{Cite web |last=Schöberlein |first=Jennifer |date=2020-12-10 |title=Iraq: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption |url=https://www.u4.no/publications/iraq-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-2020 |access-date=2022-10-19 |website=U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre |language=en |agency=[[Transparency International]] |archive-date=2022-10-19 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221019104212/https://www.u4.no/publications/iraq-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-2020 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name=chatham,2019/> leading to hundreds of billions of dollars being wasted on failed projects and the neglect of electricity networks, the transportation sector, economic legislation, and other infrastructure,<ref name="al-Hasan2015_economy">{{cite web|url=http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2015/08/20158307585163273.html|title=Social Protest in Iraq and Reality of the Internal Shia Dispute (section: 'Economic crisis') |publisher=Al Jazeera|author=Harith al-Hasan|date=30 August 2015|access-date=2020-04-18 |archive-date=2020-07-26 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200726005317/https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2015/08/20158307585163273.html|url-status=live}}</ref> as well as citizen demands not being responded to.<ref name=U4,muhas/> Such incompetence – next to other forms of political turmoil like corruption (see [[#Clientelism, patronage|next subsection]]) and instability – is considered by many analysts to have also fostered [[Iraq#2014–2017: War against the Islamic State|the rise of ISIL, in 2014]].<ref name="vox2016">{{cite web|url=https://www.vox.com/2016/4/19/11451550/iraq-protests-sadr|title=The political crisis rocking Baghdad and why it matters for the war on ISIS|publisher=vox.com|access-date=2016-04-30|date=19 April 2016| archive-date=2016-04-22 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160422165545/http://www.vox.com/2016/4/19/11451550/iraq-protests-sadr|url-status=live}}</ref> (During the [[Abdul Mahdi Government#Background|formation of the Abdul Mahdi Government in 2018]], this new prime minister attempted to break through the traditional ''muhasasa'' procedures, but there's no clear information as to how far he succeeded in that, or whether the Iraqi governments since 2018 worked more competently or less corruptly.)

==== Clientelism, patronage ====
Civil services being staffed – under these ''muhasasa'' agreements (see [[#Elite cartel ruling Iraq by muhasasa|above]]) – according to party loyalty had the effect that state contracts would only be awarded by them to "party-affiliated companies and businesspeople",<ref name="al-Hasan2015"/> who would be paid handsomely for their contracted services; even if they hardly, or not at all, actually delivered those services. Such manner of spending state finances has been labeled governmental contracting fraud and structural political corruption: not the general public but privileged companies were being served by the government.<ref name=chatham,2019/> This culture of [[clientelism]]<ref name="al-Hasan2015_economy"/> and "systemic political [[patronage]]"<ref name=bbc26Apr16>[https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36138283 'Iraq: Sadr supporters in mass protest for political reform'] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230419174523/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36138283 |date=2023-04-19 }}. [[BBC]], 26 April 2016. Retrieved 14 April 2023.</ref><ref name=Arwa,Ibr/> produced a new class of entrepreneurs, getting rich through close relations with government officials and their lush government contracts.<ref name="al-Hasan2015_economy"/> Meanwhile, politicians themselves lived in wealth, self-enrichment and massive personal protection.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2015/08/20158307585163273.html|title=Social Protest in Iraq and Reality of the Internal Shia Dispute (sections: 'Roots of the quota system' and 'Economic crisis') |publisher=Al Jazeera|author=Harith al-Hasan|date=30 August 2015|access-date=2020-04-18 |archive-date=2020-07-26 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200726005317/https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2015/08/20158307585163273.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=Arwa,Ibr/>

==== Stagnant economy ====
The infrastructure not being maintained or modernized due to governmental incompetence and mismanagement (see [[#Incompetent government|above]]) severely hampered the development of [[Economy of Iraq|private economic activity]], therefore meaning the private sector could not absorb the half million of young people entering the job market every year.<ref name="al-Hasan2015_economy"/> This ''muhasasa''-style 'cartel' government, due to its lack of accountability – politicians being "recycled ... irrespective of their performance" – provided too little incentives for those politicians to build a diversified and competitive economy or "deliver benefits to the population".<ref name=U4,muhas>{{Cite web |last=Schöberlein |first=Jennifer |date=2020-12-10 |title=Iraq: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption (section 'The Muhasasa power-sharing agreement') |url=https://www.u4.no/publications/iraq-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-2020 |access-date=2022-10-19 |website=U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre |language=en |agency=[[Transparency International]] |archive-date=2022-10-19 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221019104212/https://www.u4.no/publications/iraq-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-2020 |url-status=live }}</ref>