Editing Materialism (section)

===Philosophical objections===
In the ''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]'', [[Immanuel Kant]] argued against materialism in defending his [[transcendental idealism]] (as well as offering arguments against [[subjective idealism]] and [[mind–body dualism]]).<ref>Kant, Immanuel. "The refutation of idealism." pp. 345–52 in ''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]'' (1st ed.), edited by [[Norman Kemp Smith|N. K. Smith]]. (2nd ed., pp. 244–7).</ref><ref>Kant, Immanuel. "The refutation of idealism." pp. 345–52 in ''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]'' (1st ed.), edited by [[Norman Kemp Smith|N. K. Smith]]. A379, p. 352: "If, however, as commonly happens, we seek to extend the concept of dualism, and take it in the transcendental sense, neither it nor the two counter-alternatives — pneumatism [idealism] on the one hand, materialism on the other — would have any sort of basis. … Neither the transcendental object which underlies outer appearances nor that which underlies inner intuition, is in itself either matter or a thinking being, but a ground (to us unknown)…"</ref> But Kant argues that change and time require an enduring substrate.<ref>[http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/DB047SECT7 ''Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy'']. {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070206102552/http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/DB047SECT7|date=6 February 2007}}: "Kant argues that we can determine that there has been a change in the objects of our perception, not merely a change in our perceptions themselves, only by conceiving of what we perceive as successive states of enduring substances (see Substance)."</ref><ref>Kant, Immanuel. "The refutation of idealism." pp. 345–52 in ''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]'' (1st ed.), edited by [[Norman Kemp Smith|N. K. Smith]]. B274, p. 245:

"All determination of time presupposes something permanent in perception. This permanent cannot, however, be something in me…"</ref>

[[Postmodern]]/[[poststructuralist]] thinkers also express skepticism about any all-encompassing metaphysical scheme. Philosopher [[Mary Midgley]]<ref>[[Mary Midgley|Midgley, Mary]]. 1990. ''The Myths We Live By''.</ref> argues that materialism is a [[self-refuting idea]], at least in its [[Eliminative materialism|eliminative materialist]] form.<ref>Baker, L. 1987. ''Saving Belief''. Princeton: Princeton University Press</ref><ref>Reppert, V. 1992. "Eliminative Materialism, Cognitive Suicide, and Begging the Question." ''[[Metaphilosophy (journal)|Metaphilosophy]]'' 23:378–92.</ref><ref>Seidner, Stanley S. 10 June 2009. "A Trojan Horse: Logotherapeutic Transcendence and its Secular Implications for Theology." [[Mater Dei Institute of Education|Mater Dei Institute]]. p. 5.</ref><ref>[[Peter Boghossian|Boghossian, Peter]]. 1990. "The Status of Content." ''[[The Philosophical Review|Philosophical Review]]'' 99:157–84; and 1991. "The Status of Content Revisited." ''[[Pacific Philosophical Quarterly]]'' 71:264–78.</ref>

====Varieties of idealism====
Arguments for [[idealism]], such as those of [[Hegel]] and [[George Berkeley|Berkeley]], often take the form of an argument against materialism; indeed, Berkeley's idealism was called ''[[immaterialism]]''. Now, matter can be argued to be redundant, as in [[bundle theory]], and mind-independent properties can, in turn, be reduced to subjective [[percept]]s. Berkeley gives an example of the latter by pointing out that it is impossible to gather direct evidence of matter, as there is no direct experience of matter; all that is experienced is perception, whether internal or external. As such, matter's existence can only be inferred from the apparent (perceived) stability of perceptions; it finds absolutely no evidence in direct experience.<ref>{{cite journal|title=Having an Idea of Matter: A Peircean Refutation of Berkeleyan Immaterialism|last=de Waal|first=Cornelis|author-link=Cornelis de Waal|journal=[[Journal of the History of Ideas]]|date=April 2006|volume=67|issue=2|pages=292–293, 302–303|jstor=30141879}}</ref>

If matter and energy are seen as necessary to explain the physical world, but incapable of explaining mind, [[dualism (philosophy of mind)|dualism]] results. [[Emergence]], [[holism]] and [[process philosophy]] seek to ameliorate the perceived shortcomings of traditional (especially [[mechanism (philosophy)|mechanistic]]) materialism without abandoning materialism entirely.{{Citation needed|date=June 2019}}