Editing Luftwaffe (section)

===Personnel and leadership===
The bomber arm was given preference and received the "better" pilots. Later, fighter pilot leaders were few in numbers as a result of this. As with the late shift to fighter production, the Luftwaffe pilot schools did not give the fighter pilot schools preference soon enough. The Luftwaffe, the OKW argued, was still an offensive weapon, and its primary focus was on producing bomber pilots. This attitude prevailed until the second half of 1943.<ref name="Caldwell and Muller 2007, p. 287"/> During the Defence of the Reich campaign in 1943 and 1944, there were not enough commissioned fighter pilots and leaders to meet attrition rates;<ref name="Caldwell and Muller 2007, p. 287"/> as the need arose to replace aircrew (as attrition rates increased), the quality of [[Defence of the Reich#Pilot selection and training|pilot training deteriorated]] rapidly. Later this was made worse by fuel shortages for pilot training caused by the [[Oil campaign of World War II|Allied strategic bombing campaign against German oil production]]. Overall this meant reduced training on operational types, formation flying, gunnery training, and combat training, and a total lack of instrument training.<ref name="Caldwell and Muller 2007, p. 287"/>

At the beginning of the war, commanders were replaced with younger commanders too quickly. These younger commanders had to learn "in the field" rather than entering a front-line post fully qualified. Training of formation leaders was not systematic until 1943, which was far too late, with the Luftwaffe already stretched. The Luftwaffe thus lacked a cadre of staff officers to set up new combat units with carefully selected and skilled combat personnel, and pass on experience.<ref name="Caldwell and Muller 2007, p. 287"/>

Moreover, Luftwaffe leadership from the start poached the training command, which undermined its ability to replace losses,<ref name="Ketley and Rolfe, p. 4" /> while also planning for "short sharp campaigns",<ref name="Ketley and Rolfe, p. 8">{{harvnb|Ketley|Rolfe |1996|p=8}}</ref> which did not pertain. Moreover, no plans were laid for [[night fighter]]s.<ref name="Ketley and Rolfe, p. 8"/> In fact, when protests were raised, [[Hans Jeschonnek]], Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe, said, "First we've got to beat Russia, then we can start training!"<ref>{{harvnb|Ketley|Rolfe |1996|loc=quoted p. 4}}</ref>