Editing Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird (section)

===Initial retirement===
The two most widely proposed reasons for the SR-71's retirement in 1989, offered by the Air Force to Congress, were that the plane was too expensive to build and maintain, and had been rendered redundant by other evolving reconnaissance methods, such as unmanned vehicles (UAVs) and satellites. Another view held by officers and legislators is that the SR-71 was terminated due to [[United States Department of Defense|Pentagon]] politics.{{citation needed|date=September 2024}}

In 1996, a former 1st-SRS and 9th-SRW commander, Graham, presented a strongly supported opinion that the SR-71 provided some intelligence capabilities that none of its alternatives could provide in the 1990s, when the SR-71 was retired.<ref>{{harvp|Graham|1996|pp=205–217}}</ref> Opinion remained divided as to how crucial, or disposable, those unique advantages properly were.

Graham noted that in the 1970s and early 1980s, to be selected into the SR-71 program, a pilot or navigator (RSO) had to be a top-quality USAF officer, so SR-71 squadron and wing commanders often pursued career advancement with promotion into higher positions within the USAF and the Pentagon. These generals were adept at communicating the value of the SR-71 to a USAF command staff and a Congress who often lacked a basic understanding of how the SR-71 worked and what it did. However, by the mid-1980s, these "SR-71 generals" all had retired, and a new generation of USAF generals had come to believe that the SR-71 had become redundant, and wanted to pursue newer, top secret programs like the new [[B-2 Spirit]] [[strategic bomber]] program.<ref name="harvp|Graham|1996">{{harvp|Graham|1996}}</ref> Graham said that the last-mentioned one was only a sales pitch, not a fact, at the time in the 1990s.<!--Graham 1996 states this clearly: there was no secret replacement that had even started development yet (in the 1985-1995 decade), let alone being close to finished. Have to find the page number.{{rp|000}}-->

The USAF may have seen the SR-71 as a bargaining chip to ensure the survival of other priorities. Also, the SR-71 program's "product", which was operational and strategic intelligence, was not seen by these generals as being very valuable to the USAF. The primary consumers of this intelligence were the CIA, NSA, and DIA. A general misunderstanding of the nature of aerial reconnaissance and a lack of knowledge about the SR-71 in particular (due to its secretive development and operations) was used by detractors to discredit the aircraft, with the assurance given that a replacement was under development.<ref name="harvp|Graham|1996">{{harvp|Graham|1996}}</ref> [[Dick Cheney]] told the Senate Appropriations Committee that the SR-71 cost $85,000 per hour to operate.<ref>Marshall, Eliot, "The Blackbird's Wake", Air & Space, October/November 1990, p. 35.</ref> Opponents estimated the aircraft's support cost at $400 to $700&nbsp;million per year, though the cost was actually closer to $300&nbsp;million.<ref name="harvp|Graham|1996">{{harvp|Graham|1996}}</ref>

The SR-71, while much more capable than the Lockheed U-2 in terms of range, speed, and survivability, suffered the lack of a [[data link]], which the U-2 had been upgraded to carry. This meant that much of the SR-71's imagery and radar data could not be used in real time, but had to wait until the aircraft returned to base. This lack of immediate real-time capability was used as one of the justifications to close down the program. The counterargument was that the longer the SR-71 was not upgraded as aggressively as it ought to have been, the more people could say that it was obsolescent, which was in their interest as champions of other programs (a self-fulfilling bias). Attempts to add a datalink to the SR-71 were stymied early on by the same factions in the Pentagon and Congress who were already set on the program's demise, even in the early 1980s. These same factions also forced expensive sensor upgrades to the SR-71, which did little to increase its mission capabilities, but could be used as justification for complaining about the cost of the program.<ref name="harvp|Graham|1996">{{harvp|Graham|1996}}</ref>

In 1988, Congress was convinced to allocate $160,000 to keep six SR-71s and a trainer model in flyable storage that could become flightworthy within 60 days. However, the USAF refused to spend the money.<ref>{{harvp|Graham|1996|p=204}}</ref> While the SR-71 survived attempts to retire it in 1988, partly due to the unmatched ability to provide high-quality coverage of the [[Kola Peninsula]] for the [[United States Navy|US Navy]],<ref>{{harvp|Crickmore|1997|pp=84-85}}</ref><ref>{{harvp|Graham|1996|p=194–195}}</ref> the decision to retire the SR-71 from active duty came in 1989, with the last missions flown in October that year.<ref>{{harvp|Crickmore|1997|p=81}}</ref> Four months after the plane's retirement, General [[Norman Schwarzkopf Jr.]], was told that the expedited reconnaissance, which the SR-71 could have provided, was unavailable during [[Operation Desert Storm]].<ref name="Remak">Remak and Ventolo 2001, {{page needed|date=August 2014}}</ref>

The SR-71 program's main operational capabilities came to a close at the end of fiscal year 1989 (October 1989). The 1st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron (1 SRS) kept its pilots and aircraft operational and active, and flew some operational reconnaissance missions through the end of 1989 and into 1990, due to uncertainty over the timing of the final termination of funding for the program. The squadron finally closed in mid-1990, and the aircraft were distributed to static display locations, with a number kept in reserve storage.<ref name="harvp|Graham|1996">{{harvp|Graham|1996}}</ref>