Editing Karl Popper (section)

==== Free will ====
Popper and [[John Eccles (neurophysiologist)|John Eccles]] speculated on the problem of [[free will]] for many years, generally agreeing on an [[Interactionist dualism|interactionist dualist]] theory of mind. However, although Popper was a body-mind dualist, he did not think that the mind is [[substance dualism|a substance separate from the body]]: he thought that mental or psychological properties or aspects of people [[property dualism|are distinct from physical ones]].<ref>Popper, K. R. "Of Clouds and Clocks," in his Objective Knowledge, corrected edition, pp. 206–255, Oxford, Oxford University Press (1973), p. 231 footnote 43, & p. 252; also Popper, K. R. ''[http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/popper/natural_selection_and_the_emergence_of_mind.html "Natural Selection and the Emergence of Mind"]'', 1977.</ref>

When he gave the second [[Arthur Holly Compton]] Memorial Lecture in 1965, Popper revisited the idea of [[quantum indeterminacy]] as a source of human freedom. Eccles had suggested that "critically poised neurons" might be influenced by the mind to assist in a decision. Popper criticised Compton's idea of amplified quantum events affecting the decision. He wrote:

{{blockquote|The idea that the only alternative to determinism is just sheer chance was taken over by [[Moritz Schlick|Schlick]], together with many of his views on the subject, from [[David Hume|Hume]], who asserted that "the removal" of what he called "physical necessity" must always result in "the same thing with ''chance''. As objects must either be conjoin'd or not,... 'tis impossible to admit of any medium betwixt chance and an absolute necessity".}}

{{blockquote|I shall later argue against this important doctrine according to which the alternative to determinism is sheer chance. Yet I must admit that the doctrine seems to hold good for the quantum-theoretical models which have been designed to explain, or at least to illustrate, the possibility of human freedom. This seems to be the reason why these models are so very unsatisfactory.<ref>Popper, K. R. "Of Clouds and Clocks," in: ''Objective Knowledge'', corrected edition, p. 227, Oxford, Oxford University Press (1973). Popper's Hume quote is from ''Treatise on Human Understanding'', (see note 8) Book I, Part I, Section XIV, p. 171</ref>}}

{{blockquote|Hume's and Schlick's ontological thesis that there cannot exist anything intermediate between chance and determinism seems to me not only highly dogmatic (not to say doctrinaire) but clearly absurd; and it is understandable only on the assumption that they believed in a complete determinism in which chance has no status except as a symptom of our ignorance.<ref>''Of Clouds and Clocks'', in ''Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach'', Oxford (1972) pp. 227 ff.</ref>}}

Popper called not for something between chance and necessity but for a combination of randomness and control to explain freedom, though not yet explicitly in two stages with random chance before the controlled decision, saying, "freedom is not just chance but, rather, the result of a subtle interplay between something almost random or haphazard, and something like a restrictive or selective control."<ref>''ibid'', p. 232</ref>

Then in his 1977 book with John Eccles, ''The Self and its Brain'', Popper finally formulates the two-stage model in a temporal sequence. And he compares free will to Darwinian evolution and natural selection:

{{blockquote|New ideas have a striking similarity to genetic mutations. Now, let us look for a moment at genetic mutations. Mutations are, it seems, brought about by quantum theoretical indeterminacy (including radiation effects). Accordingly, they are also probabilistic and not in themselves originally selected or adequate, but on them there subsequently operates natural selection which eliminates inappropriate mutations. Now we could conceive of a similar process with respect to new ideas and to free-will decisions, and similar things.}}

{{blockquote|That is to say, a range of possibilities is brought about by a probabilistic and quantum mechanically characterised set of proposals, as it were—of possibilities brought forward by the brain. On these there then operates a kind of selective procedure which eliminates those proposals and those possibilities which are not acceptable to the mind.<ref>Eccles, John C. and Karl Popper. ''The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism,'' Routledge (1984)</ref>}}