Editing John Diefenbaker (section)

===== Bilateral antipathy: the Kennedy administration =====
[[File:John Diefenbaker at the US Naval base at Argentia, Newfoundland (17 May 1962).jpg|thumb|alt=Diefenbaker, wearing a coat over his suit, shakes hands with a smiling man. Two other men are in the background.|Diefenbaker (front right) at the US Naval base in Argentia, Newfoundland, during the 1962 campaign.]]

Kennedy and Diefenbaker started off well, but matters soon worsened. When the two met in Washington on February 20, Kennedy impressed Diefenbaker, and the Prime Minister invited Kennedy to visit Ottawa.<ref>Asa McKercher, "Diefenbaker's World: One Canada and the History of Canadian–American Relations, 1961–63." ''The Historian'' 75.1 (2013): 94-120, at pp. 99–100.</ref>  Kennedy, however, told his aides that he never wanted "to see the boring son of a bitch again".{{sfn|Smith|1995|p=382}} The Ottawa visit began awkwardly. Kennedy accidentally left behind a briefing note suggesting he "push" Diefenbaker on several issues, including the decision to accept nuclear weapons on Canadian soil, which bitterly divided the Canadian Cabinet. Diefenbaker was also annoyed by Kennedy's speech to Parliament, in which he urged Canada to join the OAS (which Diefenbaker had already rejected),{{sfn|Smith|1995|pp=385–388}} and by the President spending most of his time talking to Leader of the Opposition Pearson at the formal dinner.{{sfn|Nash|1990|pp=126–128}}{{sfn|''Montreal Gazette'' 1979-08-17, Obituary}} Both Kennedy and [[Jacqueline Kennedy|his wife Jackie]] were bored by Diefenbaker's Churchill anecdotes at lunch, stories that Jackie Kennedy later described as "painful".{{sfn|Druzin|2011}}

Diefenbaker was initially inclined to go along with Kennedy's request that nuclear weapons be stationed on Canadian soil as part of NORAD. However, when an August 3, 1961 letter from Kennedy which urged this was leaked to the media, Diefenbaker was angered and withdrew his support. The Prime Minister was also influenced by a massive [[Anti-nuclear movement in Canada|demonstration against nuclear weapons]], which took place on [[Parliament Hill]]. Diefenbaker was handed a petition containing 142,000 names.{{sfn|Nash|1990|pp=139–141}}

By 1962, the American government was becoming increasingly concerned at the lack of a commitment from Canada to take nuclear weapons. The interceptors and Bomarc missiles with which Canada was being supplied as a NORAD member were either of no use or of greatly diminished utility without nuclear devices.{{sfn|Nash|1990|p=144}} Canadian and American military officers launched a quiet campaign to make this known to the press, and to advocate Canadian agreement to acquire the warheads.{{sfn|Nash|1990|pp=144–146}} Diefenbaker was also upset when Pearson was invited to the White House for a dinner for Nobel Prize winners in April, and met with the President privately for 40 minutes.{{sfn|Nash|1990|pp=156–158}} When the Prime Minister met with retiring American Ambassador [[Livingston Merchant]], he angrily disclosed the paper Kennedy had left behind, and hinted that he might make use of it in the upcoming election campaign.{{sfn|Smith|1995|pp=433–435}} Merchant's report caused consternation in Washington, and the ambassador was sent back to see Diefenbaker again. This time, he found Diefenbaker calm, and the Prime Minister pledged not to use the memo, and to give Merchant advance word if he changed his mind.{{sfn|Smith|1995|pp=435–436}} Canada appointed a new [[Embassy of Canada in Washington, D.C.|ambassador to Washington]], [[Charles Ritchie (diplomat)|Charles Ritchie]], who on arrival received a cool reception from Kennedy, and found that the squabble was affecting progress on a number of issues.{{sfn|Nash|1990|pp=162–164}}

Kennedy was careful to avoid overt favouritism during the [[1962 Canadian election]] campaign. Several times during the campaign, Diefenbaker stated that the Kennedy administration desired his defeat because he refused to "bow down to Washington."{{sfn|Nash|1990|pp=167–168}} After Diefenbaker was returned with a minority, Washington continued to press for acceptance of nuclear arms, but Diefenbaker, faced with a split between Defence Minister [[Douglas Harkness]] and External Affairs Minister [[Howard Charles Green|Howard Green]] on the question, continued to stall, hoping that time and events would invite consensus.{{sfn|Nash|1990|pp=176–177}}

When the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] erupted in October 1962, Kennedy chose not to consult with Diefenbaker before deciding on what actions to take. The President sent former Ambassador Merchant to Ottawa to inform the Prime Minister as to the content of the speech that Kennedy was to make on television. Diefenbaker was upset at both the lack of consultation and the fact that he was given less than two hours advance word.{{sfn|Nash|1990|pp=180–184}} He was angered again when the U.S. government released a statement stating that it had Canada's full support.{{sfn|Nash|1990|pp=189–190}} In a statement to the Commons, Diefenbaker proposed sending representatives of neutral nations to Cuba to verify the American allegations, which Washington took to mean that he was questioning Kennedy's word.{{sfn|Nash|1990|pp=188–189}} When American forces went to a heightened alert, [[DEFCON]] 3, Diefenbaker was slow to order Canadian forces to match it. Harkness and the Chiefs of Staff had Canadian forces clandestinely go to that alert status anyway,{{sfn|Nash|1990|p=194}} and Diefenbaker eventually authorized it.{{sfn|Nash|1990|p=200}} The crisis ended without war, and polls found that Canadians widely supported Kennedy's actions. Diefenbaker was severely criticized in the media.{{sfn|Nash|1990|pp=203–204}}