Editing Hu Jintao (section)

==Legacy==
Hu presided over a decade of consistent economic growth, led China through the [[2008 financial crisis]] relatively unscathed, and increased China's international stature immensely.<ref name=chengli>{{cite journal|last=Li|first=Cheng|author2=Eve Cary|title=The Last Year of Hu's Leadership: Hu's to Blame?|journal=Jamestown Foundation: China Brief|date=20 December 2011|volume=11|issue=23|url=http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38811&cHash=c0006cd99bfe551991fcf1924d37c0cf|access-date=2 January 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130530050317/http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38811&cHash=c0006cd99bfe551991fcf1924d37c0cf|archive-date=30 May 2013|url-status=live}}</ref> China's achievements under Hu included modernizing China's infrastructure, launching China's first crewed space probe, and sponsoring two successful international events: the [[2008 Beijing Olympics]] and the [[Expo 2010|2010 Shanghai Expo]].<ref name=chengli/> In addition, Hu's "soft approach" to Taiwan, coinciding with the election of a [[Kuomintang]] government in Taipei, improved the [[Cross-strait relations|relationship between mainland China and Taiwan]]. Trade and contact between the two sides increased significantly during Hu's tenure. In addition, Hu and Premier [[Wen Jiabao]]'s populist policies have resulted in the elimination of agricultural taxes for farmers, more flexible policies towards migrant workers living in cities, more balanced development between the coastal regions and the hinterlands, enforcing minimum wage in cities and the promotion of sustainable and affordable housing developments. The response to the [[SARS]] public health crisis and the massive expansion of [[Healthcare reform in China|health insurance coverage]] for middle- to low-income citizens earned Hu accolades domestically. Generally speaking, these policies have been well received by the Chinese public.<ref name=wanglei>{{cite news|last1=Wang|first1=Lei|script-title=zh:胡锦涛时代遗患 为官不为遭炮轰|url=http://opinion.dwnews.com/news/2015-03-16/59641567.html|work=Duowei News|language=zh-hans|date=16 March 2015|access-date=17 March 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150319195513/http://opinion.dwnews.com/news/2015-03-16/59641567.html|archive-date=19 March 2015|url-status=live}}</ref>

In foreign policy, Hu's critics say that his government was overly aggressive in asserting its new power, overestimated its reach, and raised the ire and apprehension of various neighbours, including Southeast Asian countries, India, and Japan. Such policies are also said to be provocative towards the United States.<ref name=econo>{{cite news|title=America in the Asia-Pacific: We're back|url=http://www.economist.com/node/21538803|access-date=2 January 2012|newspaper=The Economist|date=19 November 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120101111329/http://www.economist.com/node/21538803|archive-date=1 January 2012|url-status=live}}</ref> Domestic critics, including the country's elites, intellectuals, and particularly dissidents, point to various shortcomings of the Hu administration and his failure in implementing his signature "Socialist Harmonious Society" policy. They cite, for example, that China's internal security budget exceeded its military budget during Hu's tenure as protests and other 'mass incidents' continued to increase across the country.<ref name=talkchange>{{cite news|last=Wines|first=Michael|title=As China Talks of Change, Fear Rises on the Risks|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/18/world/asia/as-china-talks-of-change-fear-rises-on-risks.html |access-date=18 July 2012|newspaper=The New York Times|date=17 July 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120727020910/http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/18/world/asia/as-china-talks-of-change-fear-rises-on-risks.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all|archive-date=27 July 2012|url-status=live}}</ref> China's [[Gini coefficient]] climbed to 0.47 by 2010, indicating a potentially unsustainable gap between the rich and the poor.<ref name=chengli/> The Hu administration's inability to rein in the [[wealth gap]] and its renewed emphasis on the role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the economy led some economists to believe that Hu missed a critical opportunity for reform and structural adjustment.<ref>{{cite news|last=Johnson|first=Ian|title=On Way Out, China's Leader Offers Praise for the Status Quo|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/09/world/asia/hu-jintao-exiting-communist-leader-cautions-china.html |access-date=16 November 2012|newspaper=The New York Times|date=8 November 2012|author2=Keith Bradshear|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121115190405/http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/09/world/asia/hu-jintao-exiting-communist-leader-cautions-china.html?pagewanted=all|archive-date=15 November 2012|url-status=live}}</ref> Hu's increased support for SOEs, including to merger and consolidate, is a trend that has continued during the administration of Xi Jinping.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=217}}

Hu's tough-on-corruption policies saw mixed results. While there were some attempts to increase transparency in the expenditures of official organs and bureaucrats, deeply entrenched systemic issues that were contributing to the growth of corruption remained unresolved. In addition, the massive corruption scandal that ensnared the military shortly after Hu's departure from office showed that Hu was unable to tackle entrenched interests in the military. In his own departing speech at the 18th Party Congress, Hu emphasized the potentially devastating effects that unchecked corruption would have on the party and the country. Moreover, the Hu administration's insistence on censorship and the curtailing of freedom of speech drew extensive criticism from human rights organizations and Western governments,<ref name=chengli/> while artists and writers inside the country chided increased restrictions on cultural expressions during Hu's term. Although in the early years of his tenure Hu attempted to pioneer a form of "intraparty democracy" that called for greater participation from lower-ranked members to determine policy and select the leadership, there was little evidence of meaningful changes to the party's governing structure and decision-making process.<ref name=talkchange/> His focus on intraparty democracy did result in the Politburo work report system and the invitation of approximately 200 members of the Central Committee to cast nonbinding votes for Politburo candidates.<ref name=":Tsang&Cheung">{{Cite book |last1=Tsang |first1=Steve |author-link=Steve Chang |title=The Political Thought of Xi Jinping |last2=Cheung |first2=Olivia |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |year=2024 |isbn=9780197689363}}</ref>{{Rp|page=67}}

Consensus-based decision-making became a hallmark of the Hu era.<ref>{{cite magazine |last=Elegant |first=Simon |date=4 October 2007 |title=In China, Hu is the Man to See |url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1668457,00.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100619115625/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1668457,00.html |archive-date=19 June 2010 |access-date=13 March 2010 |magazine=Time}}</ref> Hu was never a strongman, did not rule with an iron fist, and was often seen as first-among-equals with his [[Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|Politburo Standing Committee]] colleagues. Some called China's political landscape during Hu's era one of "nine dragons taming the water" ({{zh|s=九龙治水|labels=no}}), that is, nine PSC members each ruling over their own fief. In addition, Hu not only faced a profusion of special interest groups and political factions within the party, his ability to implement a cohesive program was also constrained by the influence of former leader [[Jiang Zemin]].<ref name=hujintao>{{cite news|last1=Zhang|first1=Guangzhao|script-title=zh:公正评价胡锦涛的十年|url=http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001047627?full=y|work=Financial Times Chinese|language=zh-hans|date=21 December 2012|access-date=17 March 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150402162147/http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001047627?full=y|archive-date=2 April 2015|url-status=live}}</ref> Consequently, there is debate on how much power Hu held personally to effect change. Nevertheless, within the context of the system he was placed in, Hu was credited for being an effective mediator and consensus-builder.<ref name=chengli/> Hu also won praise for stepping down as military chief in favour of his successor Xi Jinping, and at the same time relinquishing his position as general secretary. This was seen as a message to the establishment and Jiang Zemin that elders should retire according to protocol and avoid meddling in the affairs of their successors.<ref name=luotui>{{cite news |last1=Jia |first1=Qi |script-title=zh:如何正确评价胡锦涛裸退的历史意义 |trans-title=How to correctly evaluate the historical significance of Hu Jintao's complete resignation |url=http://history.dwnews.com/news/2014-12-26/59626298.html |work=Duowei News |language=zh-hans |access-date=17 March 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150402182932/http://history.dwnews.com/news/2014-12-26/59626298.html |archive-date=2 April 2015|url-status=dead}}</ref> His administration was known for its focus more on [[Technocracy|technocratic]] competence.<ref name="brown">{{cite journal |last=Brown |first=Kerry |date=10 July 2011 |title=Chinese leadership: The challenge in 2012 |url=http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/07/10/chinese-leadership-the-challenge-in-2012 |url-status=live |journal=East Asia Forum Quarterly |volume=3 |issue=2 |pages=4–5 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110822073822/http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/07/10/chinese-leadership-the-challenge-in-2012/ |archive-date=22 August 2011 |access-date=19 August 2011}}</ref>