Editing Erwin Rommel (section)

=== Atlantic Wall 1944 ===
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-300-1863-29, Riva-Bella, Waffenvorführung Panzerwerfer, Rommel.jpg|thumb|right|Rommel observes the fall of shot at Riva-Bella, just north of Caen in the area that would become [[Sword Beach]] in Normandy.]]
On 4 November 1943, Rommel became General Inspector of the Western Defences. He was given a staff that befitted an army group commander, and the powers to travel, examine and make suggestions on how to improve the defences. Hitler, who was having a disagreement with him over military matters, intended to use Rommel as a psychological trump card.{{sfn|Remy|2002|p=215}}

There was broad disagreement in the German High Command as to how best to meet the expected Allied invasion of Northern France. The Commander-in-Chief West, Gerd von Rundstedt, believed there was no way to stop the invasion near the beaches because of the Allied navies' firepower, as had been experienced at [[Allied invasion of Italy#German counterattacks|Salerno]].{{sfn|Willmott|1984|p=69}} He argued that the German armour should be held in reserve well inland near [[Paris]], where they could be used to counter-attack in force in a more traditional military doctrine. The allies could be allowed to extend themselves deep into France, where a battle for control would be fought, allowing the Germans to envelop the allied forces in a pincer movement, cutting off their avenue of retreat. He feared the piecemeal commitment of their armoured forces would cause them to become caught in a battle of attrition which they could not hope to win.{{sfn|Willmott|1984|p=69}}

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-719-0240-35, Pas de Calais, Atlantikwall, Luftlandehindernisse.jpg|thumb|left| A sketch by Rommel. His words on the picture: "Patterns for anti-airlanding obstacles. Now to be spaced irregularly instead of regularly". {{ill|The House of Local History of Baden-Württemberg|de|Haus der Geschichte Baden-Württemberg}} now keeps several of these, some hand-coloured by Rommel himself.{{sfn|Fleischhauer|Friedmann|2012}}]]

The notion of holding the armour inland to use as a mobile reserve force from which they could mount a powerful counterattack applied the classic use of armoured formations as seen in France in 1940. These tactics were still effective on the Eastern Front, where control of the air was important but did not dominate the action. Rommel's own experiences at the end of the North African campaign revealed to him that the Germans would not be able to preserve their armour from air attack for this type of mass assault.{{sfn|Willmott|1984|p=69}} Rommel believed their only opportunity would be to oppose the landings directly at the beaches, and to counterattack there before the invaders could become well-established. Though there had been some defensive positions established and gun emplacements made, the [[Atlantic Wall]] was a token defensive line. Rundstedt had confided to Rommel that it was for propaganda purposes only.{{sfn|Lewin|1998|p=213}}

Upon arriving in Northern France, Rommel was dismayed by the lack of completed works. According to [[Friedrich Ruge|Ruge]], Rommel was in a staff position and could not issue orders, but he made every effort to explain his plan to commanders down to the platoon level, who took up his words eagerly, but "more or less open" opposition from the above slowed down the process.<ref name="Ruge160415"/> Rundstedt intervened and supported Rommel's request for being made a commander.{{sfn|Brighton|2008|p=247}} It was granted on 15 January 1944.<ref name="Ruge160415">{{cite web|last1=Ruge|last2=Dihm|first1=Friedrich|first2=Friedrich|title=Rommel and the Atlantic Wall December 1943 – July 1944 Oral History – World War II – Invasion of Normandy (1944)|url=https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/r/rommel-atlantic-wall.html#352|website=Naval History and Heritage Command (US)|date=16 April 2015|access-date=16 August 2016|archive-date=30 November 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211130183554/https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/r/rommel-atlantic-wall.html#352|url-status=live}}</ref>

He and his staff set out to improve the fortifications along the [[Atlantic Wall]] with great energy and engineering skill.{{refn|Lieb: Of course, Rommel did not conceive all these devices himself&nbsp;...{{Sfn|Lieb|2014|p=120}}|group=N}}{{refn|Earle Rice, historian and senior design engineer in aerospace and nuclear industries: he would add all manner of ingenious obstacles and impedance devices to the anticipated landing areas. But&nbsp;... shortages of concrete and other materials and insufficient time prevented him from completing the Atlantic Wall to his satisfaction.{{sfn|Rice|2009|pp=89–90}}|group=N}}{{refn|Zaloga, historian and military technology expert: Rommel and his headquarters developed a variety of obstacles to interfere with landing craft. This was Rommel's single most important contribution to the defence of the Normandy coast&nbsp;... Rommel's pet project, the coastal obstacles, had proven to be one of the most successful innovations in the German defences.{{sfn|Zaloga|2013a|pp=53, 57}}|group=N}} This was a compromise: Rommel now commanded the 7th and 15th armies; he also had authority over a 20-kilometre-wide strip of coastal land between [[Zuiderzee]] and the mouth of the Loire. The chain of command was convoluted: the air force and navy had their own chiefs, as did the South and Southwest France and the Panzer group; Rommel also needed Hitler's permission to use the tank divisions.{{sfn|Remy|2002|p=219}} Rommel had millions of mines laid and thousands of tank traps and obstacles set up on the beaches and throughout the countryside, including in fields suitable for glider aircraft landings, the so-called [[Rommel's asparagus]]{{sfn|Lieb|2014|p=121}} (the Allies would later counter these with [[Hobart's Funnies]]{{sfn|Rice|2009|p=90}}). In April 1944, Rommel promised Hitler that the preparations would be complete by 1 May, a promise he failed to deliver. By the time of the Allied invasion, the preparations were far from finished. The quality of some of the troops manning them was poor and many bunkers lacked sufficient stocks of ammunition.{{sfn|Lieb|2014|p=121}}

Rundstedt expected the Allies to invade in the [[Pas-de-Calais]] because it was the shortest crossing point from Britain, its port facilities were essential to supplying a large invasion force, and the distance from Calais to Germany was relatively short.{{sfn|Willmott|1984|p=60}} Rommel and Hitler's views on the matter are a matter of debate between authors, with both seeming to change their positions.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Pinkus|first1=Oscar|title=The War Aims and Strategies of Adolf Hitler|date=2005|publisher=McFarland|isbn=978-0-7864-2054-4|page=432|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gPnjXC1lEJ8C&pg=PA432}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Bradham|first1=Randolph|title=To the last Man|date=2012|publisher=Pen and Sword|isbn=978-1-84832-665-1|page=55|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=PVd-AwAAQBAJ&pg=PA55}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Chant|first1=Christopher|title=Hitler's Generals|date=1998|publisher=Salamander Books, Limited|page=62}}</ref>

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-300-1863-33A, Riva-Bella, Waffenvorführung Panzerwerfer, Rommel.jpg|thumb|right|Inspecting 21st Panzer Division troops and a mule track carrier of the Nebelwerfer]]
Hitler vacillated between the two strategies. In late April, he ordered the [[I SS Panzer Corps]] placed near Paris, far enough inland to be useless to Rommel, but not far enough for Rundstedt. Rommel moved those armoured formations under his command as far forward as possible, ordering General [[Erich Marcks]], commanding the 84th Corps defending the Normandy section, to move his reserves into the frontline. Rundstedt was willing to delegate a majority of the responsibilities to Rommel (the central reserve was Rundstedt's idea but he did not oppose some form of coastal defence), Rommel's strategy of an armour-supported coastal defence line was opposed by some officers, most notably [[Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg]], who was supported by Guderian.{{sfn|Willmott|1984|p=69}}<ref>{{cite book|last1=Harrison|first1=Gordon|title=US Army in WW II: European Theater of Operations, Cross Channel Attack|date=1951|isbn=978-0-7948-3739-6|page=247|publisher=Government Printing Office |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iSAW3D9GIHQC&pg=PA247}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Williams|first1=Andrew|title=D-Day To Berlin|date=2004|publisher=Government Printing Office |isbn=978-0-340-83397-1|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iSAW3D9GIHQC&pg=PA247}}</ref>{{sfn|Brighton|2008|p=247}}<ref>{{cite book|last1=Keegan|first1=John|title=The Book of War: 25 Centuries of Great War Writing – On the Other Side of the Hill|date=1999|publisher=Penguin |isbn=978-0-14-029655-6|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=4c6n8T9rNeMC&pg=PT359}}</ref> Hitler compromised and gave Rommel three divisions (the 2nd, the 21st and the 116th Panzer), let Rundstedt retain four and turned the other three to Army Group G, pleasing no one.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Levine|first1=Joshua|title=Operation Fortitude: The Story of the Spies and the Spy Operation That Saved D-Day|date=2011|publisher=Rowman & Littlefield|isbn=978-0-7627-7735-8|pages=7–9|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=cQWiCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA8}}</ref>

The Allies staged elaborate deceptions for [[D-Day]] (see [[Operation Fortitude]]), giving the impression that the landings would be at Calais. Although Hitler himself expected a Normandy invasion for a while, Rommel and most Army commanders in France believed there would be two invasions, with the main invasion coming at the Pas-de-Calais. Rommel drove defensive preparations all along the coast of Northern France, particularly concentrating on fortification building in the [[River Somme]] estuary. By D-Day on 6 June 1944 nearly all the German staff officers, including Hitler's staff, believed that Pas-de-Calais was going to be the main invasion site, and continued to believe so even after the landings in Normandy had occurred.{{sfn|Willmott|1984|p=89}}
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-718-0149-12A, Paris, Rommel, von Rundstedt, Gause und Zimmermann.jpg|thumb|left|Generalfeldmarschälle [[Gerd von Rundstedt]] and Erwin Rommel meeting in Paris]]

The 5 June storm in the channel seemed to make a landing very unlikely, and a number of the senior officers left their units for training exercises and various other efforts. On 4 June the chief meteorologist of the 3 Air Fleet reported that weather in the channel was so poor there could be no landing attempted for two weeks. Rommel left France on 5 June, and on the next day he was at home celebrating his wife's 50th birthday.{{sfn|Lieb|2014|p=121}} He was recalled and returned to his headquarters at 10{{nbsp}}pm. Meanwhile, earlier in the day, Rundstedt had requested the reserves be transferred to his command. At 10{{nbsp}}am Keitel advised that Hitler declined to release the reserves but that Rundstedt could move the [[12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend]] closer to the coast, with the [[Panzer-Lehr-Division]] placed on standby. Later in the day, Rundstedt received authorisation to move additional units in preparation for a counterattack, which Rundstedt decided to launch on 7 June. Upon arrival, Rommel concurred with the plan. By nightfall, Rundstedt, Rommel and Speidel continued to believe that the Normandy landing might have been a diversionary attack, as the Allied deception measures still pointed towards Calais. The 7 June counterattack did not take place because Allied air bombardments prevented the 12th SS's timely arrival.{{sfn|Messenger|2009|pp=168–170}} All this made the German command structure in France in disarray during the opening hours of the D-Day invasion.{{sfn|Willmott|1984|p=83}}

The Allies secured five beachheads by nightfall of 6 June, landing 155,000 troops.{{sfn|Messenger|2009|p=169}} The Allies pushed ashore and expanded their beachhead despite strong German resistance. Rommel believed that if his armies pulled out of range of Allied naval fire, it would give them a chance to regroup and re-engage them later with a better chance of success. While he managed to convince Rundstedt, they still needed to win over Hitler. At a meeting with Hitler at his [[Wolfsschlucht II]] headquarters in [[Margival]] in northern France on 17 June, Rommel warned Hitler about the inevitable collapse in the German defences but was rebuffed and told to focus on military operations.{{sfn|Lieb|2014|p=125}}{{sfn|Hart|2014|p=146}}

By mid-July the German position was crumbling. On 17 July 1944, as Rommel was returning from visiting the headquarters of the I SS Panzer Corps, a fighter plane piloted by either [[Charley Fox]] of [[412 Transport Squadron|412 Squadron RCAF]],<ref name="Telegraph">{{cite news|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/3381986/Flight-Lieutenant-Charley-Fox.html |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220110/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/3381986/Flight-Lieutenant-Charley-Fox.html |archive-date=10 January 2022 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live|title=Obituary: Flight Lieutenant Charley Fox|newspaper=The Telegraph|date=4 November 2008}}{{cbignore}}</ref> [[:fr:Jacques Remlinger|Jacques Remlinger]] of [[No. 602 Squadron RAF]],<ref name="Oraison">{{usurped|1=[https://web.archive.org/web/20211206201612/http://www.pierre-clostermann.com/Resources/Allocution_JR.pdf "funeral oration"]}}, by Pierre Clostermann.</ref><ref>Véronique Chemla, "[http://www.veroniquechemla.info/2012/07/jacques-remlinger-1923-2002-pilote-de.html Jacques Remlinger (1923–2002), pilote chasse de la RAF et des FAFL] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211206201613/http://www.veroniquechemla.info/2012/07/jacques-remlinger-1923-2002-pilote-de.html |date=6 December 2021 }}", 18 juin 2015.</ref> or [[Johannes Jacobus le Roux]] of [[No. 602 Squadron RAF]]<ref>Marco Mattioli, ''"Chris" Le Roux, l'uomo che attaccò Rommel'', in Aerei nella Storia, nº 76, Parma, West-Ward Edizioni, febbraio-marzo 2011, pp. 12–15, {{ISSN|1591-1071}} (WC · ACNP).</ref> strafed his staff car near [[Sainte-Foy-de-Montgommery]]. The driver sped up and attempted to get off the main roadway, but a 20&nbsp;mm round shattered his left arm, causing the vehicle to veer off the road and crash into trees. Rommel was thrown from the car, suffering injuries to the left side of his face from glass shards and three fractures to his skull.<ref name="Telegraph"/>{{sfn|Hoffman|2004|p=65}} He was hospitalised with major head injuries (assumed to be almost certainly fatal).{{sfn|Marshall|1994|p=137}}