Editing Devil (section)

== Devil in moral philosophy ==
=== Spinoza ===
A non-published manuscript of [[Spinoza]]'s ''[[Ethics (Spinoza book)|Ethics]]'' contained a chapter (Chapter XXI) on the devil, where Spinoza examined whether the devil may exist or not. He defines the devil as an entity which is contrary to God.<ref name="Spinoza-1985">, B. d., Spinoza, B. (1985). ''The Collected Works of Spinoza, Volume I.'' Vereinigtes Königreich: Princeton University Press.</ref>{{rp|p=46}}<ref name="Spinoza-2007">Jarrett, C. (2007). Spinoza: A Guide for the Perplexed. Vereinigtes Königreich: Bloomsbury Publishing.</ref>{{rp|p=150}} However, if the devil is the opposite of God, the devil would consist of Nothingness, which does not exist.<ref name="Spinoza-1985"/>{{rp|p=145}}

In a paper called ''On Devils'', he writes that we can a priori find out that such a thing cannot exist. Because the duration of a thing results in its degree of perfection, and the more essence a thing possess the more lasting it is, and since the devil has no perfection at all, it is impossible for the devil to be an existing thing.<ref>Guthrie, S. L. (2018). Gods of this World: A Philosophical Discussion and Defense of Christian Demonology. US: Pickwick Publications.</ref>{{rp|p=72}} Evil or immoral behaviour in humans, such as anger, hate, envy, and all things for which the devil is blamed for could be explained without the proposal of a devil.<ref name="Spinoza-1985"/>{{rp|p=145}} Thus, the devil does not have any [[explanatory power]] and should be dismissed ([[Occam's razor]]). 

Regarding evil through free choice, Spinoza asks how it can be that Adam would have chosen sin over his own well-being. Theology traditionally responds to this by asserting it is the devil who tempts humans into sin, but who would have tempted the devil? According to Spinoza, a rational being, such as the devil must have been, could not choose his own damnation.<ref>Polka, B. (2007). Between Philosophy and Religion, Vol. II: Spinoza, the Bible, and Modernity. Ukraine: Lexington Books.</ref> The devil must have known his sin would lead to doom, thus the devil was not knowing, or the devil did not know his sin will lead to doom, thus the devil would not have been a rational being. Spinoza concluded a strict [[determinism]] in which [[moral agency]] as a free choice, cannot exist.<ref name="Spinoza-1985"/>{{rp|p=150}}

=== Kant ===
[[File:Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) engraving.jpg|thumb|right|Immanuel Kant;18th century [[Germans|German]] philosopher]]
The Devil found a way into [[Rationalism|rational discourse]] through [[Immanuel Kant]]s personification of the "idea of absolute egoism".<ref>Felber, A., Hutter, M., Achenbach, R., Aune, D. E., Lang, B., Sparn, W., Reeg, G., Dan, J., Radtke, B., & Apostolos-Cappadona, D. (2011). Devil. In Religion Past and Present Online. Brill. https://doi.org/10.1163/1877-5888_rpp_COM_025084</ref> In ''[[Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone]]'', Immanuel Kant uses the devil as the personification of maximum moral reprehensibility. Deviating from the common Christian idea, Kant does not locate the morally reprehensible in sensual urges. Since evil has to be [[Intelligibility (philosophy)|intelligible]], only when the sensual is consciously placed above the moral obligation can something be regarded as morally evil. Thus, to be evil, the devil must be able to comprehend morality but consciously reject it, and, as a ''spiritual being'' ([[Geist|Geistwesen]]), having no relation to any form of sensual pleasure. It is necessarily required for the devil to be a spiritual being because if the devil were also a sensual being, it would be possible that the devil does evil to satisfy lower sensual desires, and does not act from the mind alone. The devil acts against morals, not to satisfy sensual lust, but solely for the sake of evil. As such, the devil is unselfish, for he does not benefit from his evil deeds. 

However, Kant denies that a human being could ever be completely devilish, since a human does not act evil for the sake of evil itself, but for is perceived as good, such as a law or self-love.<ref>Calder, Todd, "The Concept of Evil", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/concept-evil/></ref> Kant argues that despite that there are devilish vices (ingratitude, envy, and malicious joy), i.e., vices that do not bring any personal advantage, however, the person cannot act for the sake of evil itself and thus, not be considered a devil. In his ''Lecture on Moral Philosophy'' (1774/75) Kant gives an example of a tulip seller who was in possession of a rare tulip, but when he learned that another seller had the same tulip, he bought it from him and then destroyed it instead of keeping it for himself. If he had acted according to his sensual urges, the seller would have kept the tulip for himself to make a profit, but not have destroyed it. Nevertheless, the destruction of the tulip cannot be completely absolved from sensual impulses, since a sensual joy or relief still accompanies the destruction of the tulip and therefore cannot be thought of solely as a violation of morality.<ref>Hendrik Klinge: Die moralische Stufenleiter: Kant über Teufel, Menschen, Engel und Gott. Walter de Gruyter, 2018, ISBN 978-3-11-057620-7</ref>{{rp|p=156-173}}

Kant further argues that a (spiritual) devil would be a self-contradiction. If the devil would be defined by doing evil, the devil had no free choice in the first place. But if the devil had no free-choice, the devil could not have been held accountable for his actions, since he had no free will but was only following his nature.<ref>Formosa, Paul. "Kant on the limits of human evil." ''Journal of Philosophical Research'' 34 (2009): 189–214.</ref>