Editing Charles Sanders Peirce (section)

==Pragmatism==
{{Main|Pragmaticism|Pragmatic maxim|Pragmatic theory of truth#Peirce}}
<div style="padding:5px;font-size:94%;max-width:22em; border: 1px solid #a2a9b1; float:right;">Some noted articles and lectures
* [[s:Author:Charles Sanders Peirce#Articles in The Popular Science Monthly Project|Illustrations of the Logic of Science]] (1877–1878): <br>inquiry, pragmatism, statistics, inference
# The Fixation of Belief (1877)
# How to Make Our Ideas Clear (1878)
# The Doctrine of Chances (1878)
# The Probability of Induction (1878)
# The Order of Nature (1878)
# Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis (1878)
* The Harvard lectures on pragmatism (1903)
* What Pragmatism Is (1905)
* Issues of Pragmaticism (1905)
* Pragmatism (1907 MS in ''The Essential Peirce'', 2)</div> Peirce's recipe for pragmatic thinking, which he called ''[[pragmatism]]'' and, later, ''[[pragmaticism]]'', is recapitulated in several versions of the so-called ''[[pragmatic maxim]]''. Here is one of his more [[Pragmatic maxim#2|emphatic reiterations]] of it:

{{quote|Consider what effects that might ''conceivably'' have practical bearings you ''conceive'' the objects of your ''conception'' to have. Then, your ''conception'' of those effects is the whole of your ''conception'' of the object.}}

As a movement, pragmatism began in the early 1870s in discussions among Peirce, [[William James]], and others in [[the Metaphysical Club]]. James among others regarded some articles by Peirce such as "[[s:The Fixation of Belief|The Fixation of Belief]]" (1877) and especially "[[s:How to Make Our Ideas Clear|How to Make Our Ideas Clear]]" (1878) as foundational to [[pragmatism]].<ref>James, William (1897), ''The Will to Believe'', see p. 124.</ref> Peirce (CP 5.11–12), like James (''[[s:Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking|Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking]]'', 1907), saw pragmatism as embodying familiar attitudes, in philosophy and elsewhere, elaborated into a new deliberate method for fruitful thinking about problems. Peirce differed from James and the early [[John Dewey]], in some of their tangential enthusiasms, in being decidedly more rationalistic and realistic, in several senses of those terms, throughout the preponderance of his own philosophical moods.

In 1905 Peirce coined the new name [[pragmaticism]] "for the precise purpose of expressing the original definition", saying that "all went happily" with James's and [[F.C.S. Schiller]]'s variant uses of the old name "pragmatism" and that he coined the new name because of the old name's growing use in "literary journals, where it gets abused". Yet he cited as causes, in a 1906 manuscript, his differences with James and Schiller and, in a 1908 publication, his differences with James as well as literary author [[Giovanni Papini]]'s declaration of pragmatism's indefinability. Peirce in any case regarded his views that truth is immutable and infinity is real, as being opposed by the other pragmatists, but he remained allied with them on other issues.<ref>See [[Pragmaticism#Pragmaticism's name]] for discussion and references.</ref>{{circular reference|date=March 2024}}

Pragmatism begins with the idea that belief is that on which one is prepared to act. Peirce's pragmatism is a method of clarification of conceptions of objects. It equates any conception of an object to a conception of that object's effects to a general extent of the effects' conceivable implications for informed practice. It is a method of sorting out conceptual confusions occasioned, for example, by distinctions that make (sometimes needed) formal yet not practical differences. He formulated both pragmatism and statistical principles as aspects of scientific logic, in his "Illustrations of the Logic of Science" series of articles. In the second one, "[[s:How to Make Our Ideas Clear|How to Make Our Ideas Clear]]", Peirce discussed three grades of clearness of conception:

# Clearness of a conception familiar and readily used, even if unanalyzed and undeveloped.
# Clearness of a conception in virtue of clearness of its parts, in virtue of which logicians called an idea "distinct", that is, clarified by analysis of just what makes it applicable. Elsewhere, echoing Kant, Peirce called a likewise distinct definition "nominal" (CP 5.553).
# Clearness in virtue of clearness of conceivable practical implications of the object's conceived effects, such that fosters fruitful reasoning, especially on difficult problems. Here he introduced that which he later called the [[pragmatic maxim]].

By way of example of how to clarify conceptions, he addressed conceptions about truth and the real as questions of the [[#Presuppositions of logic|presuppositions of reasoning]] in general. In clearness's second grade (the "nominal" grade), he defined truth as a sign's correspondence to its object, and the real as the object of such correspondence, such that truth and the real are independent of that which you or I or any actual, definite [[Community of inquiry|community of inquirers]] think. After that needful but confined step, next in clearness's third grade (the pragmatic, practice-oriented grade) he defined truth as that opinion which ''would'' be reached, sooner or later but still inevitably, by research taken far enough, such that the real does depend on that ideal final opinion—a dependence to which he appeals in theoretical arguments elsewhere, for instance for the long-run validity of the rule of induction.<ref name="Induction">"That the rule of induction will hold good in the long run may be deduced from the principle that reality is only the object of the final opinion to which sufficient investigation would lead", in Peirce (1878 April), "The Probability of Induction", p. [https://archive.org/stream/popscimonthly12yoummiss#page/728/mode/1up 718] (via ''Internet Archive'' ) in ''Popular Science Monthly'', v. 12, pp. 705–718. Reprinted in ''Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce'', 2.669–693, ''Writings of Charles S. Peirce'', 3:290–305, ''The Essential Peirce'', 1:155–169, elsewhere.</ref> Peirce argued that even to argue against the independence and discoverability of truth and the real is to presuppose that there is, about that very question under argument, a truth with just such independence and discoverability.

Peirce said that a conception's meaning consists in "[[Pragmatic maxim#2|all general modes of rational conduct]]" implied by "acceptance" of the conception—that is, if one were to accept, first of all, the conception as true, then what could one conceive to be consequent general modes of rational conduct by all who accept the conception as true?—the whole of such consequent general modes is the whole meaning. His pragmatism does not equate a conception's meaning, its intellectual purport, with the conceived benefit or cost of the conception itself, like a meme (or, say, propaganda), outside the perspective of its being true, nor, since a conception is general, is its meaning equated with any definite set of actual consequences or upshots corroborating or undermining the conception or its worth. His pragmatism also bears no resemblance to "vulgar" pragmatism, which misleadingly connotes a ruthless and [[Machiavelli]]an search for mercenary or political advantage. Instead the pragmatic maxim is the heart of his pragmatism as a method of experimentational mental [[Pragmatic maxim#6|reflection]]<ref>Peirce (1902), ''Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce'', 5.13 note 1.</ref> arriving at conceptions in terms of conceivable confirmatory and disconfirmatory circumstances—a method hospitable to the formation of explanatory hypotheses, and conducive to the use and improvement of verification.<ref>See ''Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce'', 1.34 [http://www.textlog.de/4220.html Eprint] (in "The Spirit of Scholasticism"), where Peirce ascribed the success of modern science less to a novel interest in verification than to the improvement of verification.</ref>

Peirce's pragmatism, as method and theory of definitions and conceptual clearness, is part of his theory of inquiry,<ref>See [[Joseph Morton Ransdell|Joseph Ransdell]]'s comments and his tabular list of titles of Peirce's proposed list of memoirs in 1902 for his Carnegie application, [http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/intro/l75intro.htm Eprint]</ref> which he variously called speculative, general, formal or [[universal rhetoric]] or simply methodeutic.<ref name="rhetoric">See [http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/rhetoricspec.html rhetoric definitions] at ''Commens Digital Companion to C.S. Peirce''.</ref> He applied his pragmatism as a method throughout his work.

===Theory of inquiry===
{{See also|Inquiry}}

In "[[wikisource:The_Fixation_of_Belief|The Fixation of Belief]]" (1877), Peirce gives his take on the psychological origin and aim of inquiry. On his view, individuals are motivated to inquiry by desire to escape the feelings of anxiety and unease which Peirce takes to be characteristic of the state of doubt. Doubt is described by Peirce as an "uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle to free ourselves and pass into the state of belief."  Peirce uses words like "irritation" to describe the experience of being in doubt and to explain why he thinks we find such experiences to be motivating.  The irritating feeling of doubt is appeased, Peirce says, through our efforts to achieve a settled state of satisfaction with what we land on as our answer to the question which led to that doubt in the first place.  This settled state, namely, belief, is described by Peirce as "a calm and satisfactory state which we do not wish to avoid."  Our efforts to achieve the satisfaction of belief, by whichever methods we may pursue, are what Peirce calls "inquiry".  Four methods which Peirce describes as having been actually pursued throughout the history of thought are summarized below in the section after next. 

====Critical common-sensism====
Critical common-sensism,<ref>Peirce (1905), "Issues of Pragmaticism", ''The Monist'', v. XV, n. 4, pp. [[iarchive:monist18instgoog/page/n532|481–499]]. Reprinted ''Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce'', 5.438–463. Also important: ''Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce'', 5.497–525.</ref> treated by Peirce as a consequence of his pragmatism, is his combination of [[Scottish School of Common Sense|Thomas Reid's common-sense philosophy]] with a [[fallibilism]] that recognizes that propositions of our more or less vague common sense now indubitable may later come into question, for example because of transformations of our world through science. It includes efforts to raise genuine doubts in tests for a core group of common indubitables that change slowly, if at all.

====Rival methods of inquiry====
In "[[s:The Fixation of Belief|The Fixation of Belief]]" (1877), Peirce described inquiry in general not as the pursuit of truth ''per se'' but as the struggle to move from irritating, inhibitory doubt born of surprise, disagreement, and the like, and to reach a secure belief, belief being that on which one is prepared to act. That let Peirce frame scientific inquiry as part of a broader spectrum and as spurred, like inquiry generally, by actual doubt, not mere verbal, quarrelsome, or [[hyperbolic doubt]], which he held to be fruitless. Peirce sketched four methods of settling opinion, ordered from least to most successful:

# The method of {{em|tenacity}} (policy of sticking to initial belief) – which brings comforts and decisiveness but leads to trying to ignore contrary information and others' views as if truth were intrinsically private, not public. The method goes against the social impulse and easily falters since one may well notice when another's opinion seems as good as one's own initial opinion. Its successes can be brilliant but tend to be transitory.
# The method of {{em|authority}} – which overcomes disagreements but sometimes brutally. Its successes can be majestic and long-lasting, but it cannot regulate people thoroughly enough to withstand doubts indefinitely, especially when people learn about other societies present and past.
# The method of the {{em|a priori}} – which promotes conformity less brutally but fosters opinions as something like tastes, arising in conversation and comparisons of perspectives in terms of "what is agreeable to reason". Thereby it depends on fashion in [[paradigm]]s and goes in circles over time. It is more intellectual and respectable but, like the first two methods, sustains accidental and capricious beliefs, destining some minds to doubt it.
# The method of {{em|science}} – wherein inquiry supposes that the real is discoverable but independent of particular opinion, such that, unlike in the other methods, inquiry can, by its own account, go wrong ([[fallibilism]]), not only right, and thus purposely tests itself and criticizes, corrects, and improves itself.

Peirce held that, in practical affairs, slow and stumbling ratiocination is often dangerously inferior to instinct and traditional sentiment, and that the scientific method is best suited to theoretical research,<ref>Peirce, "Philosophy and the Conduct of Life", Lecture 1 of the 1898 Cambridge (MA) Conferences Lectures, ''Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce'', 1.616–648 in part and ''[[#RLT|Reasoning and the Logic of Things]]'', 105–122, reprinted in ''The Essential Peirce'', 2:27–41.</ref> which in turn should not be trammeled by the other methods and practical ends; reason's "first rule"<ref name="FRL" /> is that, in order to learn, one must desire to learn and, as a corollary, must not block the way of inquiry. [[Scientific method]] excels over the others finally by being deliberately designed to arrive—eventually—at the most secure beliefs, upon which the most successful practices can be based. Starting from the idea that people seek not truth ''per se'' but instead to subdue irritating, inhibitory doubt, Peirce showed how, through the struggle, some can come to submit to truth for the sake of belief's integrity, seek as truth the guidance of potential conduct correctly to its given goal, and wed themselves to the scientific method.

====Scientific method====
Insofar as clarification by pragmatic reflection suits explanatory hypotheses and fosters predictions and testing, pragmatism points beyond the usual duo of foundational alternatives: [[deductive reasoning|deduction]] from self-evident truths, or ''[[rationalism]]''; and [[inductive reasoning|induction]] from experiential phenomena, or ''[[empiricism]]''.

Based on his critique of three [[#Modes of inference|modes of argument]] and different from either [[foundationalism]] or [[coherentism]], Peirce's approach seeks to justify claims by a three-phase dynamic of inquiry:

# Active, [[abductive reasoning|abductive]] genesis of theory, with no prior assurance of truth;
# Deductive application of the contingent theory so as to clarify its practical implications;
# Inductive testing and evaluation of the utility of the provisional theory in anticipation of future experience, in both senses: ''[[prediction]]'' and ''control''.

Thereby, Peirce devised an approach to inquiry far more solid than the flatter image of inductive generalization ''simpliciter'', which is a mere re-labeling of phenomenological patterns. Peirce's pragmatism was the first time the [[scientific method]] was proposed as an [[epistemology]] for philosophical questions.

A theory that succeeds better than its rivals in predicting and controlling our world is said to be nearer the truth. This is an operational notion of truth used by scientists.

Peirce extracted the pragmatic [[mental model|model]] or [[theory]] of inquiry from its raw materials in classical logic and refined it in parallel with the early development of symbolic logic to address problems about the nature of scientific reasoning.

Abduction, deduction, and induction make incomplete sense in isolation from one another but comprise a cycle understandable as a whole insofar as they collaborate toward the common end of inquiry. In the pragmatic way of thinking about conceivable practical implications, every thing has a purpose, and, as possible, its purpose should first be denoted. Abduction hypothesizes an explanation for deduction to clarify into implications to be tested so that induction can evaluate the hypothesis, in the struggle to move from troublesome uncertainty to more secure belief. No matter how traditional and needful it is to study the modes of inference in abstraction from one another, the integrity of inquiry strongly limits the effective [[modularity (programming)|modularity]] of its principal components.

Peirce's outline of the scientific method in §III–IV of "A Neglected Argument"<ref name="NA">Peirce (1908), "[[wikisource:A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God|A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God]]", published in large part, ''Hibbert Journal'' v. 7, 90–112. Reprinted with an unpublished part, ''Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce'', 6.452–485, ''Selected Writings'' pp. 358–379, ''The Essential Peirce'', 2:434–450, ''Peirce on Signs'' 260–278.</ref> is summarized below (except as otherwise noted). There he also reviewed plausibility and inductive precision (issues of [[#Modes of inference|critique of arguments]]).

# ''Abductive'' (or retroductive) phase. Guessing, inference to explanatory hypotheses for selection of those best worth trying. From abduction, Peirce distinguishes induction as inferring, on the basis of tests, the proportion of truth in the hypothesis. Every inquiry, whether into ideas, brute facts, or norms and laws, arises from surprising observations in one or more of those realms (and for example at any stage of an inquiry already underway). All explanatory content of theories comes from abduction, which guesses a new or outside idea so as to account in a simple, economical way for a surprising or complicated phenomenon. The modicum of success in our guesses far exceeds that of random luck, and seems born of attunement to nature by developed or inherent instincts, especially insofar as best guesses are optimally plausible and simple in the sense of the "facile and natural", as by [[Galileo]]'s natural light of reason and as distinct from "logical simplicity".<ref>See also Nubiola, Jaime (2004), "[http://www.unav.es/users/LumeNaturale.html Il Lume Naturale: Abduction and God]", ''Semiotiche'' I/2, 91–102.</ref> Abduction is the most fertile but least secure mode of inference. Its general rationale is inductive: it succeeds often enough and it has no substitute in expediting us toward new truths.<ref>Peirce (c. 1906), "PAP (Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmatism)" (MS 293), ''[[#NEM|The New Elements of Mathematics]]'' v. 4, pp. 319–320, first quote under "[http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/abduction.html Abduction]" at ''Commens Digital Companion to C. S. Peirce''.</ref> In 1903, Peirce called pragmatism "the logic of abduction".<ref>Peirce (1903), "Pragmatism – The Logic of Abduction", ''Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce'', 5.195–205, especially 196. [http://www.textlog.de/7663.html Eprint].</ref> Coordinative method leads from abducting a plausible hypothesis to judging it for its testability<ref>Peirce, Carnegie application, MS L75.279–280: [http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/l75v1-08.htm#m27 Memoir 27] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110524021101/http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/l75v1-08.htm#m27 |date=2011-05-24  }}, Draft B.</ref> and for how its trial would economize inquiry itself.<ref name="econ">See MS L75.329–330, from Draft D of [http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/l75v1-08.htm#m27 Memoir 27] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110524021101/http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/l75v1-08.htm#m27 |date=2011-05-24  }} of Peirce's application to the Carnegie Institution: {{quote|Consequently, to discover is simply to expedite an event that would occur sooner or later, if we had not troubled ourselves to make the discovery. Consequently, the art of discovery is purely a question of economics. The economics of research is, so far as logic is concerned, the leading doctrine with reference to the art of discovery. Consequently, the conduct of abduction, which is chiefly a question of heuretic and is the first question of heuretic, is to be governed by economical considerations.}}</ref> The hypothesis, being insecure, needs to have practical implications leading at least to mental tests and, in science, lending themselves to scientific tests. A simple but unlikely guess, if not costly to test for falsity, may belong first in line for testing. A guess is intrinsically worth testing if it has plausibility or reasoned objective probability, while [[Subjective probability|subjective likelihood]], though reasoned, can be misleadingly seductive. Guesses can be selected for trial strategically, for their caution (for which Peirce gave as example the game of [[Twenty Questions]]), breadth, or incomplexity.<ref>Peirce, C. S., "On the Logic of Drawing Ancient History from Documents", ''The Essential Peirce'', 2, see pp. 107–109. On Twenty Questions, see 109: {{quote|Thus, twenty skillful hypotheses will ascertain what 200,000 stupid ones might fail to do.}}</ref> One can discover only that which would be revealed through their sufficient experience anyway, and so the point is to expedite it; economy of research demands the leap, so to speak, of abduction and governs its art.<ref name="econ" />

# ''Deductive'' phase. Two stages:
:i. Explication. Not clearly premised, but a deductive analysis of the hypothesis so as to render its parts as clear as possible.
:ii. Demonstration: Deductive Argumentation, [[Euclid]]ean in procedure. Explicit deduction of consequences of the hypothesis as predictions about evidence to be found. [[Corollary|Corollarial]] or, if needed, Theorematic.

# ''Inductive'' phase. Evaluation of the hypothesis, inferring from observational or experimental tests of its deduced consequences. The long-run validity of the rule of induction is deducible from the principle (presuppositional to reasoning in general) that the real "is only the object of the final opinion to which sufficient investigation would lead";<ref name="Induction" /> in other words, anything excluding such a process would never be real. Induction involving the ongoing accumulation of evidence follows "a method which, sufficiently persisted in", will "diminish the error below any predesignate degree". Three stages:
:i. Classification. Not clearly premised, but an inductive classing of objects of experience under general ideas.
:ii. Probation: direct Inductive Argumentation. Crude or Gradual in procedure. Crude Induction, founded on experience in one mass (CP 2.759), presumes that future experience on a question will not differ utterly from all past experience (CP 2.756). Gradual Induction makes a new estimate of the proportion of truth in the hypothesis after each test, and is Qualitative or Quantitative. Qualitative Gradual Induction depends on estimating the relative evident weights of the various qualities of the subject class under investigation (CP 2.759; see also ''Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce'', 7.114–120). Quantitative Gradual Induction depends on how often, in a fair sample of instances of ''S'', ''S'' is found actually accompanied by ''P'' that was predicted for ''S'' (CP 2.758). It depends on measurements, or statistics, or counting.
:iii. Sentential Induction. "...which, by Inductive reasonings, appraises the different Probations singly, then their combinations, then makes self-appraisal of these very appraisals themselves, and passes final judgment on the whole result".

====Against Cartesianism====
Peirce drew on the methodological implications of the [[#Four incapacities|four incapacities]]—no genuine introspection, no intuition in the sense of non-inferential cognition, no thought but in signs, and no conception of the absolutely incognizable—to attack philosophical [[René Descartes|Cartesianism]], of which he said that:<ref name="SCFI" />

# "It teaches that philosophy must begin in universal doubt" – when, instead, we start with preconceptions, "prejudices [...] which it does not occur to us ''can'' be questioned", though we may find reason to question them later. "Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts."
# "It teaches that the ultimate test of certainty is...in the individual consciousness" – when, instead, in science a theory stays on probation till agreement is reached, then it has no actual doubters left. No lone individual can reasonably hope to fulfill philosophy's multi-generational dream. When "candid and disciplined minds" continue to disagree on a theoretical issue, even the theory's author should feel doubts about it.
# It trusts to "a single thread of inference depending often upon inconspicuous premisses" – when, instead, philosophy should, "like the successful sciences", proceed only from tangible, scrutinizable premisses and trust not to any one argument but instead to "the multitude and variety of its arguments" as forming, not a chain at least as weak as its weakest link, but "a cable whose fibers", soever "slender, are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected".
# It renders many facts "absolutely inexplicable, unless to say that 'God makes them so' is to be regarded as an explanation"{{efn|Peirce believed in God. See section [[#Philosophy: metaphysics]].}} – when, instead, philosophy should avoid being "unidealistic",{{efn|However, Peirce disagreed with Hegelian [[absolute idealism]]. See for example ''Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce'', 8.131.}} misbelieving that something real can defy or evade all possible ideas, and supposing, inevitably, "some absolutely inexplicable, unanalyzable ultimate", which explanatory surmise explains nothing and so is inadmissible.