Editing Blitzkrieg (section)

===Air superiority===
[[File:Hawker Typhoon ExCC.jpg|thumb|alt=A British designed single engine ground attack aircraft equipped with cannon and rockets|The [[Hawker Typhoon]], especially when armed with eight [[RP-3]] rockets, posed a threat to German armour and motor vehicles during [[Operation Overlord]] in 1944.]]
The influence of air forces over forces on the ground changed significantly over the course of the Second World War. Early German successes were conducted when Allied aircraft could not make a significant impact on the battlefield. In May 1940, there was near parity in numbers of aircraft between the ''Luftwaffe'' and the Allies, but the ''Luftwaffe'' had been developed to support Germany's ground forces, had liaison officers with the mobile formations and operated a higher number of sorties per aircraft.{{sfn|Boyne|2002|p=233}} In addition, the Germans' air parity or superiority allowed the unencumbered movement of ground forces, their unhindered assembly into concentrated attack formations, aerial reconnaissance, aerial resupply of fast moving formations and close air support at the point of attack.{{Citation needed|date=August 2015}} The Allied air forces had no close air support aircraft, training or doctrine.{{sfn|Boyne|2002|p=233}} The Allies flew 434 French and 160 British sorties a day but methods of attacking ground targets had yet to be developed and so Allied aircraft caused negligible damage. Against the Allies' 600 sorties, the ''Luftwaffe'' on average flew 1,500 sorties a day.{{sfn|Dildy|2014|p=36}}

On 13 May, ''Fliegerkorps'' VIII flew 1,000 sorties in support of the crossing of the Meuse. The following day the Allies made repeated attempts to destroy the German pontoon bridges, but German fighter aircraft, ground fire and ''Luftwaffe'' flak batteries with the panzer forces destroyed 56 percent of the attacking Allied aircraft, and the bridges remained intact.{{sfn|Terraine|1998|pp=133–135}}

Allied air superiority became a significant hindrance to German operations during the later years of the war. By June 1944, the Western Allies had the complete control of the air over the battlefield, and their fighter-bomber aircraft were very effective at attacking ground forces. On D-Day, the Allies flew 14,500 sorties over the battlefield area alone, not including sorties flown over Northwestern Europe. Against them the ''Luftwaffe'' flew some 300 sorties on 6 June. Though German fighter presence over Normandy increased over the next days and weeks, it never approached the numbers that the Allies commanded. Fighter-bomber attacks on German formations made movement during daylight almost impossible.

Subsequently, shortages soon developed in food, fuel and ammunition and severely hampered the German defenders. German vehicle crews and even flak units experienced great difficulty moving during daylight.{{Efn|The historian H.P. Willmott wrote, "Many examples of the experiences and losses suffered by German formations moving up to the front are well known. Panzer Lehr, for instance, on 7 June alone lost 84 half-tracks, prime movers and self propelled guns, 40 fuel bowsers, 90 soft-skinned vehicles and five tanks as it made its way from Le Mans to Caen.{{sfn|Willmott|1984|pp=89, 94}}}} Indeed, the final German offensive operation in the west, [[Operation Wacht am Rhein]], was planned to take place during poor weather to minimise interference by Allied aircraft. Under those conditions, it was difficult for German commanders to employ the "armored idea", if at all.{{Citation needed|date=August 2015}}