Editing Bernard Montgomery (section)

==== Normandy ====
{{See also|Operation Overlord}}

[[File:Simonds.jpg|left|thumb|Montgomery with officers of the [[First Canadian Army]]. From left, [[Major general|Major-General]] [[Christopher Vokes|Vokes]], General [[Harry Crerar|Crerar]], [[Field marshal (United Kingdom)|Field Marshal]] Montgomery, [[Lieutenant-general (United Kingdom)|Lieutenant-General]] [[Brian Horrocks|Horrocks]], [[Lieutenant-general (Canada)|Lieutenant-General]] [[Guy Simonds|Simonds]], Major-General Spry, and Major-General [[Bruce Matthews (Canadian Army officer)|Matthews]]]]

As a result of his dissatisfaction with Italy, he was delighted to receive the news that he was to return to Britain in January 1944.<ref>{{harvnb|Hart|2007|p=8}}</ref> He was assigned to command the [[21st Army Group]] consisting of all Allied ground forces participating in [[Operation Overlord]], codename for the Allied invasion of [[Normandy]]. Overall direction was assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces, American General Dwight D. Eisenhower.<ref name=heath217 /> Both Churchill and Eisenhower had found Montgomery difficult to work with in the past and wanted the position to go to the more affable General Sir Harold Alexander.<ref name="Keegan, 1994 p. 56">{{harvnb|Keegan|1994|p=56}}</ref> However Montgomery's patron, General Sir Alan Brooke, firmly argued that Montgomery was a much superior general to Alexander and ensured his appointment.<ref name="Keegan, 1994 p. 56" /> Without Brooke's support, Montgomery would have remained in Italy.<ref name="Keegan, 1994 p. 56" /> At St Paul's School on 7 April and 15 May Montgomery presented his strategy for the invasion. He envisaged a ninety-day battle, with all forces reaching the [[Seine]]. The campaign would pivot on an Allied-held [[Caen]] in the east of the Normandy bridgehead, with relatively static British and Canadian armies forming a shoulder to attract and defeat German counter-attacks, relieving the US armies who would move and seize the [[Cotentin Peninsula]] and [[Brittany]], wheeling south and then east on the right forming a pincer.<ref name=odnb />

[[File:The British Army in the United Kingdom 1939-45 H35960.jpg|thumb|right|General Montgomery inspects men of the 5th/7th Battalion, [[Gordon Highlanders]] of the [[51st (Highland) Division]], at Beaconsfield, February 1944.]]

During the ten weeks of the [[Invasion of Normandy|Battle of Normandy]], unfavourable autumnal weather conditions disrupted the Normandy landing areas.<ref name=odnb /> Montgomery's initial plan was for the Anglo-Canadian troops under his command to break out immediately from their beachheads on the Calvados coast towards Caen with the aim of taking the city on either D Day or two days later.<ref>{{harvnb|Powers|1992|pp=455–471}}</ref> Montgomery attempted to take Caen with the 3rd Infantry Division, the [[50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division]] and the 3rd Canadian Division, but was stopped from 6–8 June by the [[21st Panzer Division]] and [[12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend|12th SS Panzer Division ''Hitlerjugend'']], who hit the advancing Anglo-Canadian troops very hard.<ref name=badsey43>{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=43}}</ref> The 12th Waffen SS Division ''Hitlerjugend'', as its name implies, was drawn entirely from the more fanatical elements of the [[Hitler Youth]], and commanded by the ruthless SS-''[[Brigadeführer]]'' [[Kurt Meyer]], aka "Panzer Meyer".<ref>{{harvnb|English|2014|p=51}}</ref> Rommel followed up this success by ordering the [[2nd Panzer Division]] to Caen while Field Marshal [[Gerd von Rundstedt]] received permission from Hitler to have the elite [[1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler|1st SS Panzer Division ''Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler'']] and [[2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich|2nd SS Panzer Division ''Das Reich'']] sent to Caen as well.<ref name=badsey43 /> Montgomery thus had to face what Stephen Badsey called the "most formidable" of all the German divisions in France.<ref name=badsey43 />

[[File:The British Army in Normandy 1944 B5179.jpg|thumb|upright=1.1|right|General Montgomery passes German POWs while being driven along a road in a jeep, shortly after arriving in Normandy, 8 June 1944. Two seem to have recognised him.]]

The failure to take Caen immediately has been the source of an immense historiographical dispute with bitter nationalist overtones.<ref name="Powers pages 455-471">{{harvnb|Powers|1992|p=471}}</ref> Broadly, there has been a "British school" which accepts Montgomery's post-war claim that he never intended to take Caen at once, and instead the Anglo-Canadian operations around Caen were a "holding operation" intended to attract the bulk of the German forces towards the Caen sector to allow the Americans to stage the "break out operation" on the left flank of the German positions, which was all part of Montgomery's "Master Plan" that he had conceived long before the Normandy campaign.<ref name="Powers pages 455-471" /> By contrast, the "American school" argued that Montgomery's initial "master plan" was for the 21st Army Group to take Caen at once and move his tank divisions into the plains south of Caen, to then stage a breakout that would lead the 21st Army Group into the plains of northern France and hence into [[Antwerp]] and finally the [[Ruhr]].<ref>Powers, pp. 458, 471.</ref> Letters written by Eisenhower at the time of the battle make it clear that Eisenhower was expecting from Montgomery "the early capture of the important focal point of Caen". Later, when this plan had clearly failed, Eisenhower wrote that Montgomery had "evolved" the plan to have the US forces achieve the break-out instead.<ref>{{harvnb|Carafano|2008|p=22}}</ref>

[[File:The British Army in Normandy 1944 B5787.jpg|thumb|left|General Montgomery in conversation with Major-General [[Douglas Graham (British Army officer)|Douglas Graham]], GOC [[50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division]], pictured here in Normandy, 20 June 1944]]

As the campaign progressed, Montgomery altered his initial plan for the invasion and continued the strategy of attracting and holding German counter-attacks in the area north of Caen rather than to the south, to allow the U.S. First Army in the west to take [[Cherbourg]]. A memo summarising Montgomery's operations written by Eisenhower's chief of staff, General [[Walter Bedell Smith]] who met with Montgomery in late June 1944 says nothing about Montgomery conducting a "holding operation" in the Caen sector, and instead speaks of him seeking a "breakout" into the plains south of the Seine.<ref>{{harvnb|Powers|1992|p=461}}</ref> On 12 June, Montgomery ordered the 7th Armoured Division into an attack against the [[Panzer Lehr Division]] that made good progress at first, but ended when the Panzer Lehr was joined by the 2nd Panzer Division.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 44">{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=44}}</ref> At the [[Battle of Villers-Bocage]] on 13 June, the British lost twenty [[Cromwell tank|Cromwell]] tanks to five [[Tiger I|Tiger]] tanks led by [[SS]] ''[[Obersturmführer]]'' [[Michael Wittmann]], in about five minutes.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 44" /><!--no mention of the counter-ambushes in the town or the Battle of the Box or the depletion of the 101st SS heavy tank battalion from 44 to 16 operational Tigers?--> Despite the setback at Villers Bocage, Montgomery was still optimistic as the Allies were landing more troops and supplies than they were losing in battle, and though the German lines were holding, the ''[[Wehrmacht]]'' and ''[[Waffen SS]]'' were suffering considerable attrition.<ref>{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=45}}</ref> [[Air Chief Marshal]] [[Arthur Tedder, 1st Baron Tedder|Sir Arthur Tedder]] complained that it was impossible to move fighter squadrons to France until Montgomery had captured some airfields, something he asserted that Montgomery appeared incapable of doing.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 47">{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=47}}</ref> The first [[V-1 flying bomb]] attacks on London, which started on 13 June, further increased the pressure on Montgomery from Whitehall to speed up his advance.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 47" />

[[File:The British Army in the Normandy Campaign 1944 B5634.jpg|thumb|right|[[George VI|The King]] with Lieutenant-General [[Miles Dempsey]], GOC British Second Army, and General Montgomery, at his HQ in {{ill|Creullet castle|fr|Château de Creullet}}, 16 June 1944]]

On 18 June, Montgomery ordered Bradley to take Cherbourg while the British were to take Caen by 23 June.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 47" /> In Operation Epsom, the British VII Corps commanded by Sir Richard O'Connor attempted to outflank Caen from the west by breaking through the dividing line between the Panzer Lehr and the 12th SS to take the strategic Hill 112.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 48">{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=48}}</ref> Epsom began well with O'Connor's assault force (the British 15th Scottish Division) breaking through and with the 11th Armoured Division stopping the counter-attacks of the 12th SS Division.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 48" /> General [[Friedrich Dollmann]] of Seventh Army had to commit the newly arrived II SS Corps to stop the British offensive.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 48" /> Dollmann, fearing that Epsom would be a success, committed suicide and was replaced by SS ''Oberstegruppenführer'' [[Paul Hausser]]. O'Connor, at the cost of about 4,000 men, had won a salient only {{convert|5|mi|km}} deep and {{convert|2|mi|km}} wide, but placed the Germans in an unviable long-term position.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 48" /> There was a strong sense of crisis in the Allied command, as the Allies had advanced only about {{convert|15|mi|km}} inland, at a time when their plans called for them to have already taken [[Rennes]], [[Alençon]] and [[St. Malo]].<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 48" /> After Epsom, Montgomery had to tell General [[Harry Crerar]] that the activation of the First Canadian Army would have to wait as there was only room at present, in the Caen sector, for the newly arrived XII Corps under Lieutenant-General [[Neil Ritchie]], which caused some tension with Crerar, who was anxious to get into the field.{{sfn|D'Este|1983|p=247}} Epsom had forced further German forces into Caen but all through June and the first half of July Rommel, Rundstedt, and Hitler were engaged in planning for a great offensive to drive the British into the sea; it was never launched and would have required the commitment of a large number of German forces to the Caen sector.{{sfn|D'Este|1983|p=246}}

It was only after several failed attempts to break out in the Caen sector that Montgomery devised what he later called his "master plan" of having the 21st Army Group hold the bulk of the German forces, thus allowing the Americans to break out.{{sfn|Copp|2004|p=84}} The Canadian historians [[Terry Copp]] and Robert Vogel wrote about the dispute between the "American school" and "British school" after having suffered several setbacks in June 1944:

{{Blockquote|Montgomery drew what was the indisputably correct conclusion from these events. If the British and Canadians could continue to hold the bulk of the German armoured divisions on their front through a series of limited attacks, they could wear down the Germans and create the conditions for an American breakout on the right.

This is what Montgomery proposed in his Directive of June 30th and, if he and his admirers had let the record speak for itself, there would be little debate about his conduct of the first stages of the Normandy campaign. Instead, Montgomery insisted that this Directive was a consistent part of a master plan that he had devised long before the invasion. Curiously, this view does a great disservice to 'Monty' for any rigid planning of operations before the German response was known would have been bad generalship indeed!"{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1983|p=86}}}}

Hampered by stormy weather and the [[bocage]] terrain, Montgomery had to ensure that Rommel focused on the British in the east rather than the Americans in the west, who had to take the Cotentin Peninsula and Brittany before the Germans could be trapped by a general swing east.<ref>{{harvnb|Powers|1992|p=458}}</ref> Montgomery told General Sir Miles Dempsey, the commander of Second British Army: "Go on hitting, drawing the German strength, especially some of the armour, onto yourself—so as to ease the way for Brad [Bradley]."<ref name="Urban, p. 283">{{harvnb|Urban|2005|p=283}}</ref> The Germans had deployed twelve divisions, of which six were Panzer divisions, against the British while deploying eight divisions, of which three were Panzer divisions, against the Americans.<ref name="Urban, p. 283" /> By the middle of July Caen had not been taken, as Rommel continued to prioritise prevention of the break-out by British forces rather than the western territories being taken by the Americans.<ref>{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|pp=53–56}}</ref> This was broadly as Montgomery had planned, albeit not with the same speed as he outlined at St Paul's, although as the American historian Carlo D'Este pointed out the actual situation in Normandy was "vastly different" from what was envisioned at the St. Paul's conference, as only one of four goals outlined in May had been achieved by 10 July.{{sfn|D'Este|1983|pp=322–323}}

[[File:The British Army in Normandy 1944 B7767.jpg|left|thumb|Prime Minister Churchill with General Montgomery at the latter's HQ in Normandy, July 1944]]

On 7 July, Montgomery began Operation Charnwood with a [[carpet bombing]] offensive that turned much of the French countryside and the city of Caen into a wasteland.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 53">{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=53}}</ref> The British and Canadians succeeded in advancing into northern Caen before the Germans, who used the ruins to their advantage and stopped the offensive.<ref>{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|pp=53–54}}</ref> On 10 July, Montgomery ordered Bradley to take Avranches, after which U.S. Third Army would be activated to drive towards Le Mans and Alençon.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 56">{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=56}}</ref> On 14 July 1944, Montgomery wrote to his patron Brooke, saying he had chosen on a "real show down on the eastern flanks, and to loose a Corps of three armoured divisions in the open country about the Caen-Falaise road&nbsp;... The possibilities are immense; with seven hundred tanks loosed to the South-east of Caen, and the armoured cars operating far ahead, anything can happen."<ref>{{harvnb|Weinberg|2004|p=689}}</ref> The [[French Resistance#Role in the liberation of France and casualties|French Resistance had launched Plan Violet]] in June 1944 to systematically destroy the telephone system of France, which forced the Germans to use their radios more and more to communicate, and as the code-breakers of Bletchley Park had broken many of the German codes, Montgomery had, thanks to "[[Ultra (cryptography)|Ultra]]" intelligence, a good idea of the German situation.<ref>{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=72}}</ref> Montgomery thus knew German Army Group B had lost 96,400 men while receiving 5,200 replacements and the Panzer Lehr Division now based at St. Lô was down to only 40 tanks.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 56" /> Montgomery later wrote that he knew he had the Normandy campaign won at this point as the Germans had almost no reserves while he had three armoured divisions in reserve.<ref>{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=57}}</ref>

An American break-out was achieved with [[Operation Cobra]] and the encirclement of German forces in the [[Falaise pocket]] at the cost of British losses with the diversionary [[Operation Goodwood]].{{sfn|D'Este|1983|p=202}} On the early morning of 18 July 1944, Operation Goodwood began with British heavy bombers beginning carpet bombing attacks that further devastated what was left of Caen and the surrounding countryside.<ref>{{harvnb|Urban|2005|pp=285–286}}</ref> A British tank crewman from the Guards Armoured Division later recalled: "At 0500 hours a distant thunder in the air brought all the sleepy-eyed tank crews out of their blankets. 1,000 Lancasters were flying from the sea in groups of three or four at {{convert|3000|ft|m}}. Ahead of them the pathfinders were scattering their flares and before long the first bombs were dropping."<ref>{{harvnb|Urban|2005|p=281}}</ref> A German tankman from the 21st Panzer Division at the receiving end of this bombardment remembered: "We saw little dots detach themselves from the planes, so many of them that the crazy thought occurred to us: are those leaflets?&nbsp;... Among the thunder of the explosions, we could hear the wounded scream and the insane howling of men who had [been] driven mad."<ref>{{harvnb|Urban|2005|p=282}}</ref> The British bombing had badly smashed the German front-line units. Initially, the three British armoured divisions assigned to lead the offensive, the 7th, 11th and the Guards, made rapid progress and were soon approaching the Borguebus ridge, which dominated the landscape south of Caen, by noon.<ref>{{harvnb|Urban|2005|pp=282–283}}</ref>

[[File:The British Army in Normandy 1944 B6934.jpg|thumb|right|General Montgomery stops his car to chat with troops during a tour of I Corps area near Caen, 11 July 1944.]]

If the British could take the Borguebus Ridge, the way to the plains of northern France would be wide open, and potentially Paris could be taken, which explains the ferocity with which the Germans defended the ridge. One German officer, Lieutenant Baron von Rosen, recalled that to motivate a Luftwaffe officer commanding a battery of four 88&nbsp;mm guns to fight against the British tanks, he had to hold his handgun to the officer's head "and asked him whether he would like to be killed immediately or get a high decoration. He decided for the latter."<ref>{{harvnb|Urban|2005|pp=283–284}}</ref> The well dug-in 88&nbsp;mm guns around the Borguebus Ridge began taking a toll on the British Sherman tanks, and the countryside was soon dotted with dozens of burning Shermans.<ref name="Urban, p. 284">{{harvnb|Urban|2005|p=284}}</ref> One British officer reported with worry: "I see palls of smoke and tanks brewing up with flames belching forth from their turrets. I see men climbing out, on fire like torches, rolling on the ground to try and douse the flames."<ref name="Urban, p. 284" /> Despite Montgomery's orders to try to press on, fierce German counter-attacks stopped the British offensive.<ref name="Urban, p. 284" />

The objectives of Operation Goodwood were all achieved except the complete capture of the Bourgebus Ridge, which was only partially taken. The operation was a strategic Allied success in drawing in the last German reserves in Normandy towards the Caen sector away from the American sector, greatly assisting the American breakout in Operation Cobra. By the end of Goodwood on 25 July 1944, the Canadians had finally taken Caen while the British tanks had reached the plains south of Caen, giving Montgomery the "hinge" he had been seeking, while forcing the Germans to commit the last of their reserves to stop the Anglo-Canadian offensive.<ref name="Urban, p. 285">{{harvnb|Urban|2005|p=285}}</ref> "Ultra" decrypts indicated that the Germans now facing Bradley were seriously understrength, with Operation Cobra about to commence.<ref>{{harvnb|Baxter|1999|p=75}}</ref> During Operation Goodwood, the British had 400 tanks knocked out, with many recovered returning to service. The casualties were 5,500 with {{convert|7|mi|km}} of ground gained.<ref name="Urban, p. 285" /> Bradley recognised Montgomery's plan to pin down German armour and allow U.S. forces to break out:

{{Blockquote|The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we [the Americans] were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride, this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for while we tramped around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.<ref>{{harvnb|Baxter|1999|p=72}}</ref>}}

The long-running dispute over what Montgomery's "master plan" in Normandy led historians to differ greatly about the purpose of Goodwood. The British journalist [[Mark Urban]] wrote that the purpose of Goodwood was to draw German troops to their left flank to allow the American forces to break out on the right flank, arguing that Montgomery had to lie to his soldiers about the purpose of Goodwood, as the average British soldier would not have understood why they were being asked to create a diversion to allow the Americans to have the glory of staging the breakout with Operation Cobra.<ref name="Urban, p. 285" /> By contrast, the American historian Stephen Power argued that Goodwood was intended to be the "breakout" offensive and not a "holding operation", writing: "It is unrealistic to assert that an operation which called for the use of 4,500 Allied aircraft, 700 artillery pieces and over 8,000 armored vehicles and trucks and that cost the British over 5,500 casualties was conceived and executed for so limited an objective."<ref>{{harvnb|Powers|1992|pp=462–463}}</ref> Power noted that Goodwood and Cobra were supposed to take effect on the same day, 18 July 1944, but Cobra was cancelled owing to heavy rain in the American sector, and argued that both operations were meant to be breakout operations to trap the German armies in Normandy. American military writer Drew Middleton wrote that there is no doubt that Montgomery wanted Goodwood to provide a "shield" for Bradley, but at the same time Montgomery was clearly hoping for more than merely diverting German attention away from the American sector.<ref>{{cite news |last=Middleton |first=Drew |title=Mistake in the Master Plan |newspaper=The New York Times |date=22 January 1984 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1984/01/22/books/mistake-in-the-master-plan.html |access-date=6 June 2016}}</ref>{{sfn|D'Este|1983|p=396}} British historian [[John Keegan]] pointed out that Montgomery made differing statements before Goodwood about the purpose of the operation.<ref>{{harvnb|Keegan|1994|pp=191–192}}</ref> Keegan wrote that Montgomery engaged in what he called a "hedging of his bets" when drafting his plans for Goodwood, with a plan for a "break out if the front collapsed, if not, sound documentary evidence that all he had intended in the first place was a battle of attrition".<ref>{{harvnb|Keegan|1994|p=192}}</ref> Again Bradley confirmed Montgomery's plan and that the capture of Caen was only incidental to his mission, not critical. The American magazine ''LIFE'' quoted Bradley in 1951:
{{Blockquote|While Collins was hoisting his VII Corps flag over Cherbourg, Montgomery was spending his reputation in a bitter siege against the old university city of Caen. For three weeks he had rammed his troops against those panzer divisions he had deliberately drawn towards that city as part of our Allied strategy of diversion in the Normandy Campaign. Although Caen contained an important road junction that Montgomery would eventually need, for the moment the capture of that city was only incidental to his mission. For Monty's primary task was to attract German troops to the British front that we might more easily secure Cherbourg and get into position for the breakout.

While this diversion of Monty's was brilliantly achieved, he nevertheless left himself open to criticism by overemphasising the importance of his thrust toward Caen. Had he limited himself simply to the containment without making Caen a symbol of it, he would have been credited with success instead of being charged, as he was, with failure.<ref>''Life'' magazine, 16 April 1951, p. 99.</ref>}} With Goodwood drawing the Wehrmacht towards the British sector, U.S. First Army enjoyed a two-to-one numerical superiority. Bradley accepted Montgomery's advice to begin the offensive by concentrating at one point instead of a "broad front" as Eisenhower would have preferred.<ref name="Urban, p. 288">{{harvnb|Urban|2005|p=288}}</ref>

Operation Goodwood almost cost Montgomery his job, as Eisenhower seriously considered sacking him and only chose not to do so because to sack the popular "Monty" would have caused such a political backlash in Britain against the Americans at a critical moment in the war that the resulting strains in the Atlantic alliance were not considered worth it.<ref>{{harvnb|Powers|1992|p=469}}</ref> Montgomery expressed his satisfaction at the results of Goodwood when calling the operation off. Eisenhower was under the impression that Goodwood was to be a break-out operation. Either there was a miscommunication between the two men or Eisenhower did not understand the strategy.<ref>{{harvnb|Lehrman|2016|p=146}}</ref> Bradley fully understood Montgomery's intentions. Both men would not give away to the press the true intentions of their strategy.<ref>{{harvnb|Baxter|1999|pp=74–75}}</ref>

[[File:General Montgomery with Generals Patton (left) and Bradley (centre) at 21st Army Group HQ, Normandy, 7 July 1944. B6551.jpg|thumb|left|General Montgomery with Lieutenant Generals [[George S. Patton]] (left) and [[Omar Bradley]] (centre) at 21st Army Group HQ, 7 July 1944]]

Many American officers had found Montgomery a difficult man to work with, and after Goodwood, pressured Eisenhower to fire Montgomery.<ref name="Urban, p. 285" /> Although the Eisenhower–Montgomery dispute is sometimes depicted in nationalist terms as being an Anglo-American struggle, it was the British Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder who was pressing Eisenhower most strongly after Goodwood to fire Montgomery.<ref>{{harvnb|Weinberg|2004|p=690}}</ref> An American officer wrote in his diary that Tedder had come to see Eisenhower to "pursue his current favourite subject, the sacking of Monty".<ref name="Urban, p. 287">{{harvnb|Urban|2005|p=287}}</ref> With Tedder leading the "sack Monty" campaign, it encouraged Montgomery's American enemies to press Eisenhower to fire Montgomery.<ref name="Urban, p. 287" /> Brooke was sufficiently worried about the "sack Monty" campaign to visit Montgomery at his Tactical Headquarters (TAC) in France and as he wrote in his diary; "warned [Montgomery] of a tendency in the PM [Churchill] to listen to suggestions that Monty played for safety and was not prepared to take risks".<ref name="Urban, p. 285" /> Brooke advised Montgomery to invite Churchill to Normandy, arguing that if the "sack Monty" campaign had won the Prime Minister over, then his career would be over, as having Churchill's backing would give Eisenhower the political "cover" to fire Montgomery.<ref name="Urban, p. 287" /> On 20 July, Montgomery met Eisenhower and on 21 July, Churchill, at the TAC in France.<ref name="Urban, p. 287" /> One of Montgomery's staff officers wrote afterwards that it was "common knowledge at Tac that Churchill had come to sack Monty".<ref name="Urban, p. 287" /> No notes were taken at the Eisenhower–Montgomery and Churchill–Montgomery meetings, but Montgomery was able to persuade both men not to sack him.<ref name="Urban, p. 288" />

With the success of Cobra, which was soon followed by unleashing Patton's Third Army, Eisenhower wrote to Montgomery: "Am delighted that your basic plan has begun brilliantly to unfold with Bradley's initial success."<ref name="Urban, p. 289">{{harvnb|Urban|2005|p=289}}</ref> The success of Cobra was aided by Operation Spring, when the II Canadian Corps under General [[Guy Simonds]] (the only Canadian general whose skill Montgomery respected) began an offensive south of Caen that made little headway, but which the Germans regarded as the main offensive.<ref>{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=69}}</ref> Once Third Army arrived, Bradley was promoted to take command of the newly created 12th Army Group, consisting of U.S. First and Third Armies. Following the American breakout, there followed the Battle of Falaise Gap. British, Canadian, and Polish soldiers of 21st Army Group commanded by Montgomery advanced south, while the American and French soldiers of Bradley's 12th Army Group advanced north to encircle the German Army Group B at Falaise, as Montgomery waged what Urban called "a huge battle of annihilation" in August 1944.<ref name="Urban, p. 289" /> Montgomery began his offensive into the ''Suisse Normande'' region with [[Operation Bluecoat]], with Sir Richard O'Connor's VIII Corps and [[Gerard Bucknall]]'s XXX Corps heading south.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 73">{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=73}}</ref> A dissatisfied Montgomery sacked Bucknall for being insufficiently aggressive and replaced him with General [[Brian Horrocks]].<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 73" /> At the same time, Montgomery ordered Patton—whose Third Army was supposed to advance into Brittany—to instead capture [[Nantes]], which was soon taken.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 73" />

Hitler waited too long to order his soldiers to retreat from Normandy, leading Montgomery to write: "He [Hitler] refused to face the only sound military course. As a result the Allies caused the enemy staggering losses in men and materials."<ref name="Urban, p. 289" /> Knowing via "Ultra" that Hitler was not planning to retreat from Normandy, Montgomery, on 6 August 1944, ordered an envelopment operation against Army Group B—with the First Canadian Army under Harry Crerar to advance towards Falaise, British Second Army under Miles Dempsey to advance towards [[Argentan]], and Patton's Third Army to advance to [[Alençon]].<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 77">{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=77}}</ref> On 11 August, Montgomery changed his plan, with the Canadians to take Falaise and to meet the Americans at Argentan.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 77" /> The First Canadian Army launched two operations, Operation Totalize on 7 August, which advanced only {{convert|9|mi|km}} in four days in the face of fierce German resistance, and Operation Tractable on 14 August, which finally took Falaise on 17 August.<ref>{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|pp=79–80}}</ref> In view of the slow Canadian advance, Patton requested permission to take Falaise, but was refused by Bradley on 13 August. This prompted much controversy, many historians arguing that Bradley lacked aggression and that Montgomery should have overruled Bradley.<ref>{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=80}}</ref>

The so-called [[Falaise pocket|Falaise Gap]] was closed on 22 August 1944, but several American generals, most notably Patton, accused Montgomery of being insufficiently aggressive in closing it. About 60,000 German soldiers were trapped in Normandy, but before 22 August, about 20,000 Germans had escaped through the Falaise Gap.<ref name="Urban, p. 289" /> About 10,000 Germans had been killed in the Battle of the Falaise Gap, which led a stunned Eisenhower, who viewed the battlefield on 24 August, to comment with horror that it was impossible to walk without stepping on corpses.<ref>{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=84}}</ref> The successful conclusion of the Normandy campaign saw the beginning of the debate between the "American school" and "British school" as both American and British generals started to advance claims about who was most responsible for this victory.<ref name="Urban, p. 289" /> Brooke wrote in defence of his protégé Montgomery: "Ike knows nothing about strategy and is 'quite' unsuited to the post of Supreme Commander. It is no wonder that Monty's real high ability is not always realised. Especially so when 'national' spectacles pervert the perspective of the strategic landscape."<ref>{{harvnb|Urban|2005|pp=289–290}}</ref> About Montgomery's conduct of the Normandy campaign, Badsey wrote:

{{Blockquote|Too much discussion on Normandy has centered on the controversial decisions of the Allied commanders. It was not good enough, apparently, to win such a complete and spectacular victory over an enemy that had conquered most of Europe unless it was done perfectly. Most of the blame for this lies with Montgomery, who was foolish enough to insist that it ''had'' been done perfectly, that Normandy—and all his other battles—had been fought accordingly to a precise master plan drawn up beforehand, from which he never deviated. It says much for his personality that Montgomery found others to agree with him, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. His handling of the Battle of Normandy was of a very high order, and as the person who would certainly have been blamed for losing the battle, he deserves the credit for winning it.<ref>{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=87}}</ref>}}