Editing Battle of Waterloo (section)

==Analysis==

===Historical importance===
Waterloo proved a decisive battle in more than one sense. Each generation in Europe up to the outbreak of the [[First World War]] looked back at Waterloo as the turning point that dictated the course of subsequent world history, seeing it in retrospect as the event that ushered in the [[Concert of Europe]], an era characterised by relative peace, material prosperity and technological progress.<ref>Barbero (2005), p. 422</ref><ref>Compare:{{cite book |last=Barbero |first=Alessandro |author-link=Alessandro Barbero |title=The Battle: A new history of Waterloo |publisher=Atlantic Books Ltd |year=2003 |isbn=978-1782391388 |location=London |publication-date=2013 |translator-last=Cullen |translator-first=John |chapter=Epilogue |quote=Most [...] would have agreed with the French writer's statement: 'On that day, the perspective of the human race was altered. Waterloo is the hinge of the Nineteenth Century.' [...] Later, the twentieth century swept away the illusions of unlimited progress and perpetual peace that had become widespread after Waterloo. |access-date=31 January 2018 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=NEoMT0B0CfAC}}</ref> The battle definitively ended the series of wars that had convulsed Europe—and involved other regions of the world—since the [[French Revolution]] of the early 1790s. It also ended the [[First French Empire]] and the political and military career of Napoleon Bonaparte, one of the greatest commanders and statesmen in history.<ref>Barbero (2005), pp. 422–423</ref>{{efn|Through the finality of Napoleon's defeat, "met his/her Waterloo" has entered the English lexicon as a phrase to describe someone's circumstances when they have met with absolute and final defeat.}}

There followed almost four decades of international peace in Europe. No further major international conflict occurred until the [[Crimean War]] of 1853–1856. Changes to the configuration of European states, as refashioned in the aftermath of Waterloo, included the formation of the [[Holy Alliance]] of reactionary governments intent on repressing revolutionary and democratic ideas, and the reshaping of the former [[Holy Roman Empire]] into a [[German Confederation]] increasingly marked by the political dominance of [[Prussia]].

The bicentenary of Waterloo prompted renewed attention to the geopolitical and economic legacy of the battle and to the century of relative transatlantic peace which followed.<ref>{{harvnb|Rapport|2015}}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Black|2015}}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Keeling|2015}}</ref>{{efn|Napoleon's last escapade was important politically because it "compelled all the powers at Vienna to bury their remaining differences in order to achieve a peace which would enshrine the principles of the balance of power".{{harv|Kennedy|1987|p= 37}} "No international disturbance comparable in magnitude...has ever been followed by such a protracted period of peace". {{harv|Palmer|1956|p=420}} Recovering, after Waterloo, from six decades of abnormal obstacles to transatlantic commerce (from the Seven Years' War onwards), increasingly industrialized Europe and North America, by 1914, accounted for over 90% of global coal, iron and steel production and 76% of international trade.{{harv|Paxton|1985|p=2}}}}

===Views on the reasons for Napoleon's defeat===
General [[Antoine-Henri Jomini|Antoine-Henri, Baron Jomini]], one of the leading military writers on the Napoleonic art of war, had a number of theories to explain Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo.{{efn|Jomini was Swiss, but was an officer, eventually a general, in the French army and had served on the staff of Marshal Ney. He later served in the Russian army.}}

{{blockquote|In my opinion, four principal causes led to this disaster:

The first, and most influential, was the arrival, skilfully combined, of Blücher, and the false movement that favoured this arrival;{{efn|This "false movement" was the detachment of Grouchy's force in pursuit of the Prussians: Napoleon had overestimated the extent of his victory at Ligny and underestimated the resilience of the Prussians. He also seems to have discounted the presence of Bülow's substantial corps, which had not been in action at Ligny. Had Napoleon retained Grouchy's 30,000 men as a guard for his right flank, it is likely that these troops could have held off the Prussians and allowed the rest of Napoleon's army to attack Wellington's army unmolested.}} the second, was the admirable firmness of the British infantry, joined to the sang-froid and aplomb of its chiefs; the third, was the horrible weather, that had softened the ground, and rendered the offensive movements so toilsome, and retarded till one o'clock the attack that should have been made in the morning; the fourth, was the inconceivable formation of the first corps, in masses very much too deep for the first grand attack.|Antoine-Henri Jomini{{sfn|Jomini|1864|pp=223, 224}}}}

The Prussian soldier, historian, and theorist [[Carl von Clausewitz]], who as a young colonel had served as chief-of-staff to Thielmann's Prussian III Corps during the Waterloo campaign, expressed the following opinion:

{{blockquote|Bonaparte and the authors who support him have always attempted to portray the great catastrophes that befell him as the result of chance. They seek to make their readers believe that through his great wisdom and extraordinary energy the whole project had already moved forward with the greatest confidence, that complete success was but a hair's breadth away, when treachery, accident, or even fate, as they sometimes call it, ruined everything. He and his supporters do not want to admit that huge mistakes, sheer recklessness, and, above all, overreaching ambition that exceeded all realistic possibilities, were the true causes.|Carl von Clausewitz{{sfn|Bassford|Moran|Pedlow|2015|loc=ch. 3}}}}

Wellington wrote in his dispatch to London:

{{blockquote|I should not do justice to my own feelings, or to Marshal Blücher and the Prussian army, if I did not attribute the successful result of this arduous day to the cordial and timely assistance I received from them. The operation of General Bülow upon the enemy's flank was a most decisive one; and, even if I had not found myself in a situation to make the attack which produced the final result, it would have forced the enemy to retire if his attacks should have failed, and would have prevented him from taking advantage of them if they should unfortunately have succeeded<ref name="Gazette, 17028" />}}

In his famous study of the Campaign of 1815, the Prussian Clausewitz does not agree with Wellington on this assessment. Indeed, he claims that if Bonaparte had attacked in the morning, the battle would probably have been decided by the time the Prussians arrived, and an attack by Blücher, while not impossible or useless, would have been much less certain of success.<ref>{{cite web |title=Part 5 of Clautwitz: On Waterloo, Chapters 40–49 |url=https://www.clausewitz.com/readings/1815/five40-49.htm |access-date=2022-02-19 |website=clausewitz.com |archive-date=24 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220324061404/https://www.clausewitz.com/readings/1815/five40-49.htm |url-status=live }}</ref>

Parkinson (2000) adds: "Neither army beat Napoleon alone. But whatever the part played by Prussian troops in the actual moment when the Imperial Guard was repulsed, it is difficult to see how Wellington could have staved off defeat, when his centre had been almost shattered, his reserves were almost all committed, the French right remained unmolested and the Imperial Guard intact. ... Blücher may not have been totally responsible for victory over Napoleon, but he deserved full credit for preventing a British defeat".{{sfn|Parkinson|2000|pp=240–241}} Steele (2014) writes: "Blücher's arrival not only diverted vital reinforcements, but also forced Napoleon to accelerate his effort against Wellington. The tide of battle had been turned by the hard-driving Blücher. As his Prussians pushed in Napoleon's flank, Wellington was able to shift to the offensive".{{sfn|Steele|2014|p=178}}

It has also been noted that Wellington's maps of the battlefield were based on a recent reconnaissance and therefore more up to date than those used by Napoleon, who had to rely on [[Joseph de Ferraris|Ferraris]]-[[Louis Capitaine|Capitaine]] maps of 1794.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Van den Bosch |first=Glenn |date=May 2008 |title=The importance of maps at the Battle of Waterloo |url=https://www.bimcc.org/newsletters/31 |journal=BIMCC Newsletter |issue=31 |pages=15–17 |access-date=6 August 2022 |archive-date=6 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220806115014/https://www.bimcc.org/newsletters/31 |url-status=live }}</ref>