Editing Battle of Britain (section)

====Higher-level dispositions====
[[File:British and German aircraft a dog fight.jpg|thumb|left|Pattern of [[vapour trails]] left by British and German aircraft after a [[dogfight]]]]

''Luftwaffe'' tactics were influenced by their fighters. The Bf 110 proved too vulnerable against the nimble single-engined RAF fighters and the bulk of fighter escort duties devolved to the Bf 109. Fighter tactics were then complicated by bomber crews who demanded closer protection. After the hard-fought battles of 15 and 18 August, Göring met his unit leaders. The need for the fighters to meet up on time with the bombers was stressed. It was also decided that one bomber ''Gruppe'' could only be properly protected by several ''Gruppen'' of 109s. Göring stipulated that as many fighters as possible were to be left free for ''Freie Jagd'' ("Free Hunts": a free-roving fighter sweep preceded a raid to try to sweep defenders out of the raid's path). The Ju 87 units, which had suffered heavy casualties, were only to be used under favourable circumstances.<ref>{{harvnb|Bungay|2000|pp=232–233}}</ref> In early September, due to increasing complaints from the bomber crews about RAF fighters seemingly able to get through the escort screen, Göring ordered an increase in close escort duties. This decision shackled many of the Bf 109s to the bombers and, although they were more successful at protecting the bombers, casualties amongst the fighters mounted, primarily because they were forced to fly and manoeuvre at reduced speeds.<ref>{{harvnb|Bungay|2000|p=305}}</ref>

The ''Luftwaffe'' varied its tactics to break Fighter Command. It launched many ''Freie Jagd'' to draw up RAF fighters. RAF fighter controllers were often able to detect these and position squadrons to avoid them, keeping to Dowding's plan to preserve fighter strength for the bomber formations. The ''Luftwaffe'' also tried using small formations of bombers as bait, covering them with large numbers of escorts. This was more successful, but escort duty kept the fighters tied to the slower bombers making them more vulnerable.

By September, standard tactics for raids had become an amalgam of techniques. A ''Freie Jagd'' would precede the main attack formations. The bombers would fly in at altitudes between {{cvt|16000|and|20000|ft|m|order=flip|-3}}, closely escorted by fighters. Escorts were divided into two parts (usually ''Gruppen''), some operating close to the bombers and others a few hundred yards away and a little above. If the formation was attacked from the starboard, the starboard section engaged the attackers, the top section moving to starboard and the port section to the top position. If the attack came from the port side the system was reversed. British fighters coming from the rear were engaged by the rear section and the two outside sections similarly moving to the rear. If the threat came from above, the top section went into action while the side sections gained height to be able to follow RAF fighters down as they broke away. If attacked, all sections flew in defensive circles. These tactics were skilfully evolved and carried out and were difficult to counter.<ref>{{harvnb|Wood|Dempster|2003|p=216}}</ref>

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-2006-0123, Adolf Galland.jpg|thumb|upright|right|[[Adolf Galland]], the successful leader of III./JG 26, became ''[[Geschwaderkommodore]]'' of [[JG 26]] on 22 August.]]
[[Adolf Galland]] noted:

{{blockquote|We had the impression that, whatever we did, we were bound to be wrong. Fighter protection for bombers created many problems which had to be solved in action. Bomber pilots preferred close screening in which their formation was surrounded by pairs of fighters pursuing a zigzag course. Obviously, the visible presence of the protective fighters gave the bomber pilots a greater sense of security. However, this was a faulty conclusion, because a fighter can only carry out this purely defensive task by taking the initiative in the offensive. He must never wait until attacked because he then loses the chance of acting. We fighter pilots certainly preferred the free chase during the approach and over the target area. This gives the greatest relief and the best protection for the bomber force.<ref>{{harvnb|Holmes|2007|p=69}}</ref>}}

The biggest disadvantage faced by Bf 109 pilots was that without the benefit of long-range [[drop tank]]s (which were introduced in limited numbers in the late stages of the battle), usually of {{cvt|300|L|impgal usgal|adj=on}} capacity, the 109s had an [[Combat endurance|endurance]] of just over an hour and, for the 109E, a {{cvt|600|km|mi}} range. Once over Britain, a 109 pilot had to keep an eye on a red "low fuel" light on the instrument panel: once this was illuminated, he was forced to turn back and head for France. With the prospect of two long flights over water and knowing their range was substantially reduced when escorting bombers or during combat, the ''Jagdflieger'' coined the term ''[[Kanalkrankheit]]'' or "Channel sickness".<ref>{{harvnb|Price|1980|pp=13–15}}</ref>