Editing Analytic philosophy (section)

=== Metaphysics ===

One difference with respect to early analytic philosophy was the revival of metaphysical theorizing during the second half of the 20th century, and metaphysics remains a fertile topic of research. Although many discussions are continuations of old ones from previous decades and centuries, the debates remains active.<ref name="inwagenetall1998">Van Inwagen, Peter, and Dean Zimmerman (eds.) (1998), ''Metaphysics: The Big Questions.''</ref>

==== Decline of logical positivism ====
The rise of metaphysics mirrored the decline of logical positivism, first challenged by the later Wittgenstein.

===== Sellars =====
[[Wilfrid Sellars|Wilfred Sellars]]'s criticism of the "Myth of the Given", in ''Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind'' (1956), challenged logical positivism by arguing against sense-data theories. In his "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man" (1962), Sellars distinguishes between the "manifest image" and the "scientific image" of the world. Sellars's goal of a [[synoptic philosophy]] that unites the everyday and scientific views of reality is the foundation and archetype of what is sometimes called the Pittsburgh School, whose members include [[Robert Brandom]], [[John McDowell]], and [[John Haugeland]].

===== Quine =====
[[File:Willard Van Orman Quine on Bluenose II in Halifax NS harbor 1980.jpg|thumb|120px|W. V. O. Quine helped to undermine logical positivism.]]

Also among the developments that resulted in the decline of logical positivism and the revival of metaphysical theorizing was [[Harvard University|Harvard]] philosopher [[Willard Van Orman Quine|W. V. O. Quine]]'s attack on the [[analytic proposition|analytic–synthetic distinction]] in "[[Two Dogmas of Empiricism]]", published in 1951 in ''[[The Philosophical Review]]'' and republished in Quine's book ''From A Logical Point of View'' (1953), a paper "sometimes regarded as the most important in all of [[20th century philosophy|twentieth-century philosophy]]".<ref name=qui>{{cite journal |last=Quine |first=W. V. O. |year=1951 |title=Two Dogmas of Empiricism |url=https://courses.cs.sfu.ca/2015fa-phil-880-g1/pages/quine1/view |journal=[[The Philosophical Review]] |volume=60 |issue=1 |pages=20–43 |doi=10.2307/2181906 |jstor=2181906}} Reprinted in his 1953 ''From a Logical Point of View''. Harvard University Press.</ref><ref>S. Yablo and A. Gallois, ''Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?'', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 72, (1998), pp.&nbsp;229–261, 263–283 [https://www.mit.edu/%7Eyablo/om.pdf first part] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110912125408/http://www.mit.edu/%7Eyablo/om.pdf|date=12 September 2011}}</ref><ref>[[Peter Godfrey-Smith]], ''Theory and Reality'', 2003, [[University of Chicago]], {{ISBN|0-226-30062-5}}, pages 30–33 (section 2.4 "Problems and Changes")</ref>

''From a Logical Point of View'' also contains Quine's essay "[[wikisource:On What There Is|On What There Is]]" (1948), which elucidates Russell's theory of descriptions and contains Quine's famous dictum of [[ontological commitment]], "To be is to be the value of a [[Free variables and bound variables|variable]]". He also dubbed the problem of nonexistence [[Plato's beard]].

Quine sought to naturalize philosophy and saw philosophy as continuous with science, but instead of logical positivism advocated a kind of [[semantic holism]] and [[ontological relativity]], which explained that every term in any statement has its meaning contingent on a vast network of knowledge and belief, the speaker's conception of the entire world. In his magnum opus ''[[Word and Object]]'' (1960), Quine introduces the idea of [[radical translation]], an introduction to his theory of the [[indeterminacy of translation]], and specifically to prove the [[inscrutability of reference]].

===== Kripke =====
[[File:Kripke.JPG|thumb|160px|Saul Kripke helped to revive interest in metaphysics among analytic philosophers.]]

Important also for the revival of metaphysics was the further development of [[modal logic]], first introduced by pragmatist [[C. I. Lewis]], especially the work of [[Saul Kripke]] and his ''[[Naming and Necessity]]'' (1980).{{efn|Named in reference to Carnap's  ''[[Meaning and Necessity]]''.}}

According to one author, ''Naming and Necessity'' "played a large role in the implicit, but widespread, rejection of the view—so popular among ordinary language philosophers—that philosophy is nothing more than the analysis of language."<ref name=ageofm>Soames, Scott. 2005. ''Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century: Volume 2: The Age of Meaning''. [[Princeton University Press]]. Cited in Byrne, Alex and Hall, Ned. 2004. 'Necessary Truths'. ''Boston Review'' October/November 2004.</ref>

Kripke was influential in arguing that flaws in common theories of descriptions and proper names are indicative of larger misunderstandings of the [[Modal metaphysics|metaphysics]] of necessity and [[Contingency (philosophy)|possibility]]. Kripke also argued that [[Metaphysical necessity|necessity]] is a metaphysical notion distinct from the [[Epistemology|epistemic]] notion of ''[[A priori and a posteriori|a priori]]'', and that there are [[Logical truth|necessary truths]] that are known ''[[A posteriori necessity|a posteriori]]'', such as that water is H<sub>2</sub>O.<ref name=":1">[[Dean Zimmerman (philosopher)|Zimmerman, Dean W.]], "Prologue" in ''Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 1'' (Oxford University Press, 2004), p. xix.</ref>

Kripke is widely regarded as having revived theories of [[essence]] and [[Identity (philosophy)|identity]] as respectable topics of philosophical discussion.<ref name=":1" /> Kripke and [[Hilary Putnam]] argued for realism about [[natural kind]]s. Kripke holds that it is [[Essentialism|essential]] that water is H<sub>2</sub>O, or for [[gold]] to be [[atomic number]] 79.  Putnam's [[Twin Earth thought experiment]] can be used to illustrate the same point with water.<ref>{{Citation |last1=Bird |first1=Alexander |title=Natural Kinds |date=2024 |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2024/entries/natural-kinds/ |access-date=2024-04-22 |edition=Spring 2024 |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |last2=Tobin |first2=Emma |editor2-last=Nodelman |editor2-first=Uri}}</ref>

===== David Lewis =====
American philosopher [[David Lewis (philosopher)|David Lewis]] defended a number of elaborate metaphysical theories. In works such as ''[[On the Plurality of Worlds]]'' (1986) and ''Counterfactuals'' (1973) he argued for [[modal realism]] and [[counterpart theory]]{{snd}}the belief in real, concrete [[possible world]]s. According to Lewis, "actual" is merely an indexical label we give a world when we are in it. Lewis also defended what he called Humean [[supervenience]], a [[Counterfactual conditional|counterfactual theory]] of [[Causality|causation]],<ref>{{Citation |last=Hitchcock |first=Christopher |title=Lewis on Causation |date=6 March 2015 |work=A Companion to David Lewis |pages=295–311 |place=Oxford, UK |publisher=John Wiley & Sons, Ltd |doi=10.1002/9781118398593.ch19 |isbn=978-1-118-39859-3}}</ref> and contributed to [[Abstract and concrete|abstract object]] theory.<ref name=":2">{{Cite journal |last=Lewis |first=David |date=March 1986 |title=Against structural universals |journal=Australasian Journal of Philosophy |volume=64 |issue=1 |pages=25–46 |doi=10.1080/00048408612342211 |issn=0004-8402}}</ref> He became closely associated with Australia, whose philosophical community he visited almost annually for more than 30 years.

==== Universals ====
In response to the [[Problem of universals|problem]] of [[Universal (metaphysics)|universals]], Australian [[David Malet Armstrong]] defended a kind of [[moderate realism]].<ref>{{Citation |last=Jackson |first=Frank |title=Armstrong, David Malet (1926–2014) |date=2016 |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/biographical/armstrong-david-malet-1926-2014/v-1 |access-date=21 July 2020 |edition=1 |place=London |publisher=Routledge |doi=10.4324/9780415249126-v035-1 |isbn=978-0-415-25069-6 |encyclopedia=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Armstrong |first=David Malet |title=Universals and scientific realism |date=1995 |publisher=Cambridge Univ. Press |isbn=0-521-28033-8 |oclc=174240749}}</ref> Quine and Lewis defended [[nominalism]].<ref name=":2" />

==== Mereology ====
Polish philosopher [[Stanisław Leśniewski]] coined the term [[mereology]], which is the formal study of parts and wholes, a subject that arguably goes back to the time of the [[Pre-Socratic philosophy|pre-Socratics]].<ref>Cotnoir, A. J., and Varzi, Achille C.. Mereology. United Kingdom, OUP Oxford, 2021. p. 2</ref> David Lewis believed in [[perdurantism]] and introduced the term '[[Gunk (mereology)|gunk]]'. [[Peter Van Inwagen]] believes in [[mereological nihilism]], except for living beings, a view called [[organicism]].

==== Free will and determinism ====
Peter van Inwagen's 1983 [[monograph]] ''An Essay on Free Will''{{sfn|van Inwagen|1983}} played an important role in rehabilitating [[Libertarianism (metaphysics)|libertarianism]] with respect to [[free will]], in mainstream analytical philosophy.{{sfn|Kane|2005|p=23}} In the book, he introduces the [[consequence argument]] and the term [[incompatibilism]] about free will and [[determinism]], to stand in contrast to [[compatibilism]]—the view that free will is compatible with determinism. [[C. D. Broad|Charlie Broad]] had previously made similar arguments.

==== Personal identity ====
Since [[John Locke]], philosophers have been concerned with the problem of [[personal identity]]. [[Derek Parfit]] in ''[[Reasons and Persons]]'' (1984) defends a kind of [[bundle theory]], while David Lewis again defends perdurantism. [[Bernard Williams]] in ''The Self and the Future'' (1970) argues that personal identity is bodily identity rather than mental continuity.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=54nvGHWVfqY |title=Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self |pages=103}}</ref>

==== Principle of sufficient reason ====
Since [[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz|Leibniz]] philosophers have discussed the [[principle of sufficient reason]] or PSR. Van Inwagen criticizes the PSR.{{sfn|van Inwagen|1983}} [[Alexander Pruss]] defends it.<ref>Pruss, "Leibnizian Cosmological Arguments"</ref>

==== Philosophy of time ====
Analytic [[Philosophy of space and time|philosophy of time]] traces its roots to the British idealist [[J. M. E. McTaggart]]'s article "[[The Unreality of Time]]"  (1908). In it, McTaggart distinguishes between the dynamic, [[A series and B series|A-, or tensed, theory]] of time (past, present, future), in which [[flow of time|time flows]]; and the static or tenseless [[B-theory of time]] (earlier than, simultaneous with, later than). [[Eternalism (philosophy of time)|Eternalism]] holds that past, present, and future are equally real. In contrast, [[Presentism (philosophy of time)|Presentism]] holds that only entities in the present exist.<ref>{{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=206, 214–215}}</ref>

The theory of special relativity seems to advocate a B-theory of time. David Lewis's perdurantism, or [[four-dimensionalism]], requires a B-theory of time.<ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=-9MYDQAAQBAJ Personal Identity and Resurrection]</ref> [[A. N. Prior]], who invented [[tense logic]], advocated the A-theory of time.

==== Logical pluralism ====
[[Many-valued logic|Many-valued]] and [[Non-classical logic|non-classical]] logics have been popular since the Polish logician [[Jan Łukasiewicz|Jan Lukasiewicz]]. [[Graham Priest]] is a [[Dialetheism|dialetheist]], seeing it as the most natural solution to problems such as the [[liar paradox]]. [[JC Beall]], together with [[Greg Restall]], is a pioneer of a widely-discussed version of [[logical pluralism]].<ref>{{Cite web |title=Logical Pluralism |url=https://global.oup.com/academic/product/logical-pluralism-9780199288410?cc=us&lang=en& |accessdate=February 5, 2017 |publisher=global.oup.com}}</ref>