Editing Yom Kippur War (section)

=== Arab–Israeli conflict ===
The war was part of the [[Arab–Israeli conflict]], an ongoing dispute that has included many battles and wars since the [[Israeli Declaration of Independence|founding of the State of Israel]] in 1948. During the [[Six-Day War]] of 1967, Israel had captured Egypt's [[Sinai Peninsula]], roughly half of Syria's [[Golan Heights]], and the territories of the [[West Bank]] which had been [[Jordanian annexation of the West Bank|held by Jordan since 1948]].{{sfnp|Ben-Ami|2005}}{{page needed|date=December 2024}}

On 19 June 1967, shortly after the Six-Day War, the Israeli government voted to return the Sinai to Egypt and the Golan Heights to Syria in exchange for a permanent peace settlement and a demilitarization of the returned territories.{{sfnp|Herzog|1989|p=253}}<ref>{{cite news |author=Seth S. King |title=Israeli aims tied to 6 vital areas |url=http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1967/06/30/83128870.html?pageNumber=1 |newspaper=The New York Times |date=30 June 1967 |access-date=21 September 2015}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |author=Drew Middleton |title=Latin nations bid Israel withdraw |url=http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1967/07/01/83130813.html?pageNumber=1 |newspaper=The New York Times |date=1 June 1967 |access-date=21 September 2015}}</ref> This decision was not made public at the time, nor was it conveyed to any Arab state. Israeli Foreign Minister [[Abba Eban]] has said that it had been conveyed, but there seems to be no solid evidence to corroborate his claim; no formal peace proposal was made either directly or indirectly by Israel.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Raz |first=Avi |date=2013 |title=The Generous Peace Offer that was Never Offered: The Israeli Cabinet Resolution of June 19, 1967 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/44254276 |journal=Diplomatic History |volume=37 |issue=1 |pages=85–108 |doi=10.1093/dh/dhs004 |jstor=44254276 |issn=0145-2096}}</ref> The Americans, who were briefed of the Cabinet's decision by Eban, were not asked to convey it to Cairo and Damascus as official peace proposals, nor were they given indications that Israel expected a reply.<ref>{{cite book |last=Shlaim |first=Avi |date=2014 |title=The Iron Wall – Israel and the Arab World |publisher=Penguin Books |edition=paperback 2014 |page=270 |isbn=978-0-14-103322-8 |quote=The decision of 19 June read, "Israel proposes the conclusion of a peace agreement with Egypt based on the international border and the security needs of Israel." The international border placed the Gaza strip within Israel's territory. ... it makes no mention of a request by Eban to transmit these terms to Egypt and Syria. ... One is left with the impression that Eban was more interested in using the cabinet decision of 19 June to impress the Americans than to engage the governments of Egypt and Syria in substantive negotiations}}</ref><ref>{{harvp|Ben-Ami|2005|p=125}}: "But was there on 19 June 1967 an Israeli peace overture towards Syria and Egypt? Did the Israeli cabinet end its deliberations on that day with a decision to convey concrete peace proposals to its Arab neighbors along the lines as discussed in the Cabinet, or perhaps ask the American administration to do so on its behalf? Notwithstanding Abba Eban's (Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1967) insistence that this was indeed the case, there seems to be no solid evidence to corroborate his claim. No formal peace proposal was made either directly or indirectly by Israel. The Americans, who were briefed of the Cabinet's decision by Eban, were not asked to convey it to Cairo and Damascus as official peace proposals, nor were they given indications that Israel expected a reply. At the meeting of 19 June the Israeli government developed policy guidelines; it did not discuss a peace initiative, nor did it ever formalise it as such."</ref> Eban rejected the prospect of a mediated peace, insisting of the need for direct negotiations with the Arab governments.<ref>{{cite news |last=Smith |first=Terrebce |date=15 August 1967 |title=A Mediated Peace Rejected by Eban |url=http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1967/08/15/90390826.html?pageNumber=1 |newspaper=New York Times |access-date=16 September 2015}}</ref>

The Arab position, as it emerged in September 1967 at the [[Khartoum Resolution|Khartoum Arab Summit]], was to reject any peaceful settlement with the State of Israel. The eight participating states—Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait, and Sudan—passed a resolution that would later become known as the "three nos": there would be no peace, no recognition and no negotiation with Israel. Prior to that, King [[Hussein of Jordan]] had stated that he could not rule out a possibility of a "real, permanent peace" between Israel and the Arab states.<ref>{{cite news |author=<!--Staff writer(s); no by-line.--> |title=Eban rejects aid in settling crisis |url=http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1967/06/26/83125500.html?pageNumber=3 |newspaper=The New York Times |date=27 June 1967 |access-date=21 September 2015|page=3}}</ref>

Armed hostilities continued on a limited scale after the Six-Day War and escalated into the [[War of Attrition]], an attempt to wear down the Israeli position through long-term pressure.<ref>{{cite book|last=Gavriely-Nuri|first=Dalia|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Qc-xfP6b3gsC&q=%2522War%2520of%2520Attrition%2522%25201967&pg=PA107|title=The Normalization of War in Israeli Discourse, 1967–2008|date=2013|publisher=Rowman & Littlefield|isbn=978-0-7391-7260-5|page=107|language=en}}</ref> In December 1970, Egyptian President [[Anwar Sadat]] had signaled in an interview with ''[[The New York Times]]'' that, in return for a total withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, he was ready "to recognize the rights of Israel as an independent state as defined by the [[United Nations Security Council|Security Council of the United Nations]]."<ref name="Podeh" /> On 4 February 1971, Sadat gave a speech to the Egyptian National Assembly outlining a proposal under which Israel would withdraw from the Suez Canal and the Sinai Peninsula along with other occupied Arab territories.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Gazit |first=Mordechai |date=January 1997 |title=Egypt and Israel – Was There a Peace Opportunity Missed in 1971? |url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/002200949703200107 |journal=[[Journal of Contemporary History]] |language=en |volume=32 |issue=1 |pages=97–115 |doi=10.1177/002200949703200107 |s2cid=159846721 |issn=0022-0094 |access-date=13 October 2023}}</ref>

Swedish diplomat [[Gunnar Jarring]] coincidentally proposed a similar initiative four days later, on 8 February 1971. Egypt responded by accepting much of Jarring's proposals, though differing on several issues, regarding the [[Gaza Strip]], for example, and expressed its willingness to reach an accord if it also implemented the provisions of [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 242]]. This was the first time an Arab government had gone public declaring its readiness to sign a peace agreement with Israel.<ref name="Podeh">{{cite book |last1=Podeh |first1=Elie |title=Chances for Peace: Missed Opportunities in the Arab-Israeli Conflict |date=2015 |publisher=[[University of Texas Press]] |location=Austin, TX |isbn=978-1-4773-0561-4 |pages=104–105 |edition=first |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ecyGCgAAQBAJ}}</ref>

Israeli Prime Minister [[Golda Meir]] reacted to the overture by forming a committee to examine the proposal and vet possible concessions. When the committee unanimously concluded that Israel's interests would be served by full withdrawal to the internationally recognized lines dividing Israel from Egypt and Syria, returning the Gaza Strip and, in a majority view, returning most of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, Meir was angered and shelved the document.<ref>Podeh, p. 106.</ref>

The United States was infuriated by the cool Israeli response to Egypt's proposal, and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs [[Joseph J. Sisco|Joseph Sisco]] informed Israeli ambassador [[Yitzhak Rabin]] that "Israel would be regarded responsible for rejecting the best opportunity to reach peace since the establishment of the state." Israel responded to Jarring's plan on 26 February by outlining its readiness to make some form of withdrawal, while declaring it had no intention of returning to the [[Green Line (Israel)|pre-5 June 1967 lines]].<ref name="auto2">Podeh p. 107.</ref> Explicating the response, Eban told the [[Knesset]] that the pre-5 June 1967 lines "cannot assure Israel against aggression".<ref>{{cite news |title=Sinai Pull-Back Rejected |url=https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2002&dat=19710215&id=27EiAAAAIBAJ&pg=981,4282183 |access-date=4 July 2019 |agency=Beaver County Times |date=15 February 1971}}</ref> Jarring was disappointed and blamed Israel for refusing to accept a complete pullout from the Sinai Peninsula.<ref name="auto2" />

The U.S. considered Israel an ally in the [[Cold War]] and had been supplying the Israeli military since the 1960s. U.S. National Security Advisor [[Henry Kissinger]] believed that the regional [[Balance of power (international relations)|balance of power]] hinged on maintaining Israel's military dominance over Arab countries and that an Arab victory in the region would strengthen Soviet influence. Britain's position, on the other hand, was that war between the Arabs and Israelis could only be prevented by the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and a return to the pre-1967 boundaries.<ref>{{cite journal |issn=1531-3298 |volume=10 |issue=2 |pages=3–40 |last=Hughes |first=Geraint |s2cid=57566713 |title=Britain, the Transatlantic Alliance, and the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 |journal=[[Journal of Cold War Studies]] |access-date=2 July 2018 |date=11 June 2008 |url=http://muse.jhu.edu/article/237150 |doi=10.1162/jcws.2008.10.2.3}}</ref>

Sadat also had important domestic concerns in wanting war. "The three years since Sadat had taken office ... were the most demoralized in Egyptian history. ... A desiccated economy added to the nation's despondency. War was a desperate option."{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=13}} Almost a full year before the war, in a meeting on 24 October 1972, with his [[Supreme Council of the Armed Forces]], Sadat declared his intention to go to war with Israel even without proper Soviet support.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=25}}

In February 1973, Sadat made a final peace overture that would have included Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula that he relayed to Kissinger via his adviser [[Mohammed Hafez Ismail|Mohammad Hafez Ismail]], which Kissinger made known to Meir. Meir rejected the peace proposal despite knowing that the only plausible alternative was going to war with Egypt.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Bar-Joseph |first=Uri |date=July 2006 |title=Last Chance to Avoid War: Sadat's Peace Initiative of February 1973 and its Failure |url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022009406064668 |journal=[[Journal of Contemporary History]] |language=en |volume=41 |issue=3 |pages=545–556 |doi=10.1177/0022009406064668 |s2cid=154116645 |issn=0022-0094 |access-date=13 October 2023}}</ref>