Editing Xi'an Incident (section)

===Gradual changes in policy===
The [[Japanese invasion of Manchuria]] in November 1931 posed a clear threat to both sides of the Chinese Civil War (as well as to the Soviet Union), but it did not lead to an immediate cessation of hostilities.{{sfn|Yang|2020|pp=55-56}} The failure of the [[First United Front]] four years previously had created deep, lasting distrust.{{efn|{{Unbulleted list citebundle|For the attitude of the CCP, see {{harvnb|Sheng|1992|pp=153–155}} and {{harvnb|Yang|2020|p=56}}|For Chiang's attitude, see {{harvnb|Coble|1991|pp=56–57}} and {{harvnb|van de Ven|2003|p=172}}}}}} Chiang Kai-shek articulated his policy as "first internal pacification, then external resistance."{{efn|{{lang-zh|t=先安內，後讓外。|p=Xiān ānnèi, hòu ràngwài.}}}}{{sfn|Coble|1991|pp=56-57}} The CCP called for simultaneously "Resisting Japan and Opposing Chiang".{{sfn|Yang|2020|p=59}}

The first subtle changes in this mutual policy of non-cooperation was initiated by the Communists in Manchuria. There, guerilla groups found it impossible to fight against the Japanese while also fighting the Nationalists.{{sfn|Yang|2020|p=57}} Starting in late 1932 the Comintern authorized the Communist guerillas in Manchuria to cooperate with all anti-Japanese forces.{{sfn|Yang|2020|p=57}}{{sfn|Gao|2018|pp=80,123}} That same year, the USSR restored diplomatic relations with the Nationalist Government.{{sfn|Yang|2020|pp=58-59}} The events in Europe—including [[Hitler's rise to power]]—were a major influence on the move towards a united front. The [[7th World Congress of the Comintern]] encouraged Communist parties everywhere to form a united front with moderate forces to resist the Fascists.{{sfn|Pantsov|2012|p=291}} [[Wang Ming]], head of the CCP delegation, published the "1 August Declaration" in October, which publicly called on all parties in China to form a united front against Japanese Imperialism.{{sfn|Gao|2018|p=124}}{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=220}} They proposed creating an anti-Japanese defense government to coordinate resistance.{{sfn|Yang|2020|pp=60-61}} Importantly, though, the offer did not extend to Chiang himself; the CCP's delegation still considered him and his central government the "running dog" of the Japanese.{{sfn|Sheng|1992|p=153}}

The CCP itself (cut off from radio communication with Moscow) learned of the 1 August Declaration in November 1935.{{sfn|Yang|2020|pp=60-61}} Party leaders held a conference at Wayaobu in December to discuss the implications of this new policy. Their [[Wayaobu Manifesto]] marked an important retreat from the hardline positions they had held during the early civil war. It called for "the most broad national united front" to resist Japan, and announced that the CCP would suspend class conflict in the interests of cross-class collaboration.{{sfn|Yang|1990|pp=182-184}} However, it also made clear that they did not want to give up their military strength. As a basis from which to resist the Japanese, the Manifesto called for the Red Army to be expanded to 1 million men and for the Chinese Soviet to dramatically increase its land area.{{sfn|Yang|1990|p=184}}