Editing William H. Riker (section)

==Academic career==
Riker took on a professorship at [[Lawrence University]] in [[Appleton, Wisconsin]] (then Lawrence College), where he published ''[[The Theory of Political Coalitions]]'' (1962). In 1962, he became the chair of the Political Science Department at the [[University of Rochester]], where he remained chair until 1977, and remained active until his death.<ref name=":1" />

Riker was elected to the [[National Academy of Sciences]] in 1974.<ref name=":0" />

Riker founded the now-mainstream field of [[positive political theory]], which introduced [[game theory]] and the axiomatic method of [[social choice theory]] to [[political science]].<ref>{{Cite book |author=Eamonn Butler |author-link=Eamonn Butler |title=Public Choice—A Primer |location=London |publisher=[[Institute of Economic Affairs]] |year=2012 |page=36 |url=http://www.iea.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/files/IEA%20Public%20Choice%20web%20complete%2029.1.12.pdf |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221009/http://www.iea.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/files/IEA%20Public%20Choice%20web%20complete%2029.1.12.pdf |archive-date=2022-10-09 |url-status=live |type=PDF}}</ref> [[Bruce Bueno de Mesquita]] and [[Kenneth Shepsle]] in their memoir write that "These have proved crucial to predictive tests for political theory."<ref>{{Cite web |title=William Harrison Riker |last1=Bueno de Mesquita |first1=Bruce |author-link1=Bruce Bueno de Mesquita |last2=Shepsle |first2=Kenneth |series=Biographical Memoirs |publisher=National Academy of Sciences |url=http://www.nap.edu/html/biomems/wriker.html |access-date=2013-09-18}}</ref>
Riker is also often credited with being the founder of [[rational choice theory]]<ref>{{cite web |last1=Roskin |first1=Michael G. |title=Political science |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/political-science/Theory-of-rational-choice |access-date=25 January 2021}}</ref> with his work on applying economic theory to mathematical models of politics.

Among other contributions, Riker is known for work on the theory and history of [[federalism]] and on what he called "[[heresthetic]]"—the art of changing political outcomes without changing peoples' underlying preferences by manipulating the decision-making process, for example by changing the order in which decisions are made. In his book ''Liberalism Against Populism'', he argued that the instability of majority rule, demonstrated in [[Arrow's impossibility theorem]] and the [[McKelvey–Schofield chaos theorem]], meant that "populist" interpretations of democracy as implementing a collective will of the people were untenable. Instead, democratic leaders aimed to build disparate coalitions; a piece of successful coalition-building could cause realigning elections, in which blocs of voters swiftly changed their allegiance.

Concerning political coalition for the benefit of minorities, Riker argued that the larger the coalition, the shorter-lived it is.<ref>[[Eamonn Butler]], ''Public Choice: A Primer'', London: [[Institute of Economic Affairs]], 2012, p. 63</ref> In his book The Theory of Political Coalitions (1962), Riker argued that in situations where there is conflict over finite resources, actors will seek to create coalitions that are large enough to ensure that they get access to the resources, but that the coalitions will not be larger than that (because the actors will not want to dilute the resources more than they have to).

The William H. Riker Prize for excellence in undergraduate teaching is awarded by the University of Rochester bi-annually in his honor. The Political Economy section of the American Political Science Association awards an annual book prize in his name as well.