Editing USS Liberty incident (section)

==Attack on the ''Liberty''==
===Events leading to the attack===
During the [[Six-Day War]] between [[Israel]] and several [[Arabs|Arab]] nations, the United States maintained a [[neutral country]] status.<ref name=NSAhistory1>{{harvnb|Gerhard|Millington|1981|p=1}}</ref> Several days before the war began, USS ''Liberty'' was ordered to proceed to the eastern [[Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] area to perform a signals intelligence collection mission in international waters near the north coast of Sinai, Egypt.<ref name=NSAhistory5>{{harvnb|Gerhard|Millington|1981|p=5}}</ref> After the war erupted, due to concerns about its safety as it approached its patrol area, several messages were sent to ''Liberty'' to increase its allowable closest point of approach (CPA) to Egypt's and Israel's coasts from {{convert|12.5|and|6.5|nmi|mi km}}, respectively, to {{convert|20|and|15|nmi|mi km}}, and then later to {{convert|100|nmi|mi km}} for both countries,<ref name=NSAhistory21>{{harvnb|Gerhard|Millington|1981|p=21}}</ref> thereby reducing proximity.  However, due to ineffective message handling and routing, these messages were not received until after the attack.<ref name="NSAhistory21"/>

According to Israeli sources, at the start of the war on 5 June, General [[Yitzhak Rabin]], [[Israeli Air Force]] (IAF) [[Chief of the General Staff (Israel)|chief of staff]] informed [[Commander (United States)|Commander]] [[Ernest Carl Castle]], the American naval attaché in [[Tel Aviv]], that Israel would defend its coast with every means at its disposal, including sinking unidentified ships. He asked the U.S. to keep its ships away from Israel's shore or at least inform Israel of their exact positions.{{sfn|IDF History Report|1982|page=22}}{{efn |The failure of the Israeli navy's attacks on Egyptian and Syrian ports early in the war did little to assuage Israel's fears. The U.S. had previously rejected Israel's request for a formal naval liaison. On 31 May, [[Avraham Harman]], Israel's ambassador to Washington, had warned Under Secretary of State [[Eugene V. Rostow]] that if war breaks out, "we would have no telephone number to call, no code for plane recognition, and no way to get in touch with the [[United States Sixth Fleet|U.S. Sixth Fleet]]".{{sfn|Oren|2000}}}}

American sources said that no inquiry about ships in the area was made until after the attack on ''Liberty''. In a message sent from U.S. Secretary of State [[Dean Rusk]] to U.S. Ambassador [[Walworth Barbour]] in Tel Aviv, Israel, Rusk asked for "urgent confirmation" of Israel's statement. Barbour responded: "No request for info on U.S. ships operating off Sinai was made until after ''Liberty'' incident." Further, Barbour stated: "Had Israelis made such an inquiry it would have been forwarded immediately to the chief of naval operations and other high naval commands and repeated to dept [Department of State]."<ref name="JamesScottBookp197">{{harvnb|Scott|2009|p=197}}</ref>

With the outbreak of war, Captain [[William McGonagle|William L. McGonagle]] of ''Liberty'' immediately asked [[Vice admiral (United States)|Vice Admiral]] William I. Martin at the [[United States Sixth Fleet]] headquarters to send a destroyer to accompany ''Liberty'' and serve as its armed escort and as an auxiliary communications center. The following day, Admiral Martin replied: "''Liberty'' is a clearly marked United States ship in international waters, not a participant in the conflict and not a reasonable subject for attack by any nation. Request denied."<ref>{{harvnb|Ennes|1987|pages=38–39}}</ref> He promised, however, that in the unlikely event of an inadvertent attack, jet fighters from the Sixth Fleet would be overhead in ten minutes.<!-- 5 Jan 2012: no reference to a primary source (e.g., copy of messages or official report) seems to exist that supports statements in this paragraph. Thus, these secondary source claims cannot be verified. -->

Meanwhile, at the United Nations on 6 June, U.S. Ambassador [[Arthur Goldberg]] told the [[United Nations Security Council]] that vessels of the Sixth Fleet were several hundred miles from the conflict, in response to Egyptian complaints that the United States was supporting Israel in the conflict.<ref name=NSAhistory21/> When this statement was made, it was in fact true; ''Liberty'', now assigned to the Sixth Fleet, was in the central Mediterranean Sea, passing between Libya and Crete.<ref name=NSAhistory20>{{harvnb|Gerhard|Millington|1981|p=20}}</ref> It would ultimately steam to about {{convert|13|nmi|mi km|abbr=on}} north of the Sinai Peninsula.<ref name=NSAhistory25>{{harvnb|Gerhard|Millington|1981|p=25}}</ref>

On the night of 7 June Washington time, early morning on 8 June, 01:10 [[Coordinated Universal Time#Time zones|Zulu]] or 03:10 local time, the Pentagon issued an order to Sixth Fleet headquarters to tell ''Liberty'' to come no closer than {{convert|100|nmi|mi km}} to Israel, Syria, or the Sinai coast (Oren, p.&nbsp;263).<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.nsa.gov/liberty/51668/3084841.pdf |title=Chronology of Events |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070628075318/http://www.nsa.gov/liberty/51668/3084841.pdf |archive-date=28 June 2007 |url-status=dead |access-date=17 June 2007}}</ref>{{rp|5, 58 (Exhibit N)}} According to the Naval Court of Inquiry<ref name=USNCOIreport>[http://www.thelibertyincident.com/docs/CourtOfInquiry.pdf U.S. Naval Court of Inquiry] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061219235857/http://www.thelibertyincident.com/docs/CourtOfInquiry.pdf |date=19 December 2006 }} Court of Inquiry for USS ''Liberty'' attack, Record of Proceedings, 18 June 1967</ref>{{rp|23 ff, 111 ff}} and the National Security Agency official history,<ref name=NSAhistory2123>{{harvnb|NSA History Report|pp=21–23}}</ref> the order to withdraw was not sent on the radio frequency that ''Liberty'' monitored for her orders until 15:25 Zulu, several hours after the attack, due to a long series of administrative and message routing problems. The Navy said a large volume of unrelated high-precedence traffic, including intelligence intercepts related to the conflict, were being handled at the time; and that this combined with a shortage of qualified [[Radioman|radiomen]] contributed to the delayed transmission of the withdrawal message.<ref name=USNCOIreport/>{{rp|111 ff}}

===Visual contact===
Official testimony combined with ''Liberty''{{'}}s deck log establish that throughout the morning of the attack, 8 June, the ship was overflown, at various times and locations, by IAF aircraft.<ref name=NSAhistory25/> The primary aircraft type was the [[Nord Noratlas]]; there were also two unidentified delta-wing jets at about 09:00 Sinai time ([[Greenwich Mean Time|GMT]]+2).<ref name=NSAhistory25/> ''Liberty'' crewmembers say that one of the Noratlas aircraft flew so close to ''Liberty'' that noise from its propellers rattled the ship's deck plating, and that the pilots and crewmembers waved to each other.<ref>{{harvnb|Ennes|1987|p=62}}</ref> It was later reported, based on information from IDF sources, that the over-flights were coincidental, and that the aircraft were hunting for Egyptian submarines that had been spotted near the coast.

At about 05:45 Sinai time, a ship-sighting report was received at Israeli Central Coastal Command (CCC) in respect of ''Liberty'', identified by an aerial naval observer as "apparently a [[destroyer]], sailing {{convert|70|miles|disp=sqbr}} west of Gaza".<ref>{{harvnb|IDF History Report|1982|pp=6–7}}</ref> The vessel's location was marked on a CCC control table, using a red marker, indicating an unidentified vessel.<ref name=IDFHR7>{{harvnb|IDF History Report|1982|p=7}}</ref> At about 06:00, the aerial naval observer, Major Uri Meretz, reported that the ship appeared to be a U.S. Navy supply ship; at about 09:00 the red marker was replaced with a green marker to indicate a neutral vessel.<ref name=IDFHR7/> About the same time, an Israeli jet fighter pilot reported that a ship {{convert|20|miles}} north of Arish had fired at his aircraft after he tried to identify the vessel.<ref name=IDFHR7/> Israeli naval command dispatched two destroyers to investigate, but they were returned to their previous positions at 09:40 after doubts emerged during the pilot's debriefing.<ref name=IDFHR7/> After the naval observer's Noratlas landed and he was debriefed, the ship he saw was further identified as USS ''Liberty'', based on its "GTR-5" hull markings.<ref>{{harvnb|IDF History Report|1982|pp=7–8}}</ref> USS ''Liberty''{{'s}} marker was removed from CCC's Control Table at 11:00, due to its positional information being considered out of date.<ref name="IDFHR8">{{harvnb|IDF History Report|1982|p=8}}</ref>

At 11:24, the Israeli chief of naval operations received a report that Arish was being shelled from the sea.<ref name="IDFHR8"/> An inquiry into the source of the report was ordered to determine its validity.<ref name=IDFHR8/> The report came from an air support officer in Arish.<ref name=IDFHR10>{{harvnb|IDF History Report|1982|p=10}}</ref> Additionally, at 11:27 the Israeli Supreme Command head of operations received a report stating that a ship had been shelling Arish, but the shells had fallen short.<ref name=IDFHR10/> (The investigative journalist [[James Bamford]] points out that ''Liberty'' had only four [[M2 Browning|.50 caliber machine guns]] mounted on her decks and thus could not have shelled the coast.{{sfn|Bamford|2001}}) The Head of Operations ordered that the report be verified, and that it be determined whether or not Israeli Navy vessels were off the coast of Arish.<ref name=IDFHR10/> At 11:45, another report arrived at Supreme Command saying two ships were approaching the Arish coast.<ref name=IDFHR10/>

[[File:Tsqd914.jpg|thumb|right|Israeli Motor Torpedo Boats (MTBs) in formation, c. 1967. These were the MTBs that attacked USS ''Liberty''.]]
The shelling and ship reports were passed from Supreme Command to Fleet Operations control center.<ref name=IDFHR10/> The chief of naval operations took them seriously, and at 12:05 torpedo boat Division 914 was ordered to patrol in the direction of Arish.<ref name=IDFHR10/> Division 914, codenamed "Pagoda", was under the command of Commander Moshe Oren.<ref name=IDFHR10/> It consisted of three torpedo boats numbered: T-203, T-204 and T-206.<ref name=IDFHR10/> At 12:15, Division 914 received orders to patrol a position {{convert|20|miles}} north of Arish.<ref name=IDFHR10/> As Commander Oren headed toward Arish, he was informed by Naval Operations of the reported shelling of Arish and told that IAF aircraft would be dispatched to the area after the target had been detected.<ref name=IDFHR10/> Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin was concerned that the supposed Egyptian shelling was the prelude to an amphibious landing that could outflank Israeli forces. Rabin reiterated the standing order to sink any unidentified ships in the area, but advised caution, as Soviet vessels were reportedly operating nearby. At 13:41, the torpedo boats detected an unknown vessel 20 miles northwest of Arish and {{convert|14|miles}} off the coast of [[Lake Bardawil|Bardawil]].<ref name="Wikimapia"/><ref name=IDFHR11>{{harvnb|IDF History Report|1982|p=11}}</ref> The ship's speed was estimated on their radars.<ref name=IDFHR11/> The combat information center officer on T-204, Ensign Aharon Yifrah, reported to Oren that the target had been detected at a range of {{convert|22|miles}}, that her speed had been tracked for a few minutes, after which he had determined that the target was moving westward at a speed of {{convert|30|knots}}. These data were forwarded to the Fleet Operations control center.<ref name=IDFHR11/>

The speed of the target was significant because it indicated that the target was a combat vessel.<ref name=IDFHR11/> Moreover, Israeli forces had standing orders to fire on any unknown vessels sailing in the area at over {{convert|20|knots}}, a speed which, at the time, could be attained only by warships. The chief of naval operations asked the torpedo boats to double-check their calculations. Yifrah twice recalculated and confirmed his assessment.<ref name="IDFHR11"/> A few minutes later, Commander Oren reported that the target, now {{convert|17|miles}} from his position, was moving at a speed of {{convert|28|knots}} on a different heading.<ref>[http://thelibertyincident.com/docs/israeli/yerushalmi-report-en.pdf Yerushalmi Inquiry Report] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080530071820/http://thelibertyincident.com/docs/israeli/yerushalmi-report-en.pdf |date=30 May 2008 }} p 3</ref> Bamford, however, points out that ''Liberty''{{'}}s top speed was far below 28 knots. His sources say that at the time of the attack ''Liberty'' was following her signal-intercept mission course along the northern Sinai coast, at about {{convert|5|knots}} speed.{{sfn|Bamford|2001}}

The data on the ship's speed, together with its direction, gave the impression that it was an Egyptian destroyer fleeing toward port after shelling Arish. The torpedo boats gave chase, but did not expect to overtake their target before it reached Egypt. Commander Oren requested that the Israeli Air Force dispatch aircraft to intercept.<ref name=IDFHR11/> At 13:48, the chief of naval operations requested dispatch of fighter aircraft to the ship's location.<ref name=IDFHR12>{{harvnb|IDF History Report|1982|p=12}}</ref>

[[File:D2 1 b.jpg|thumb|right|[[Hunt-class destroyer]] HMS ''Blean''. The Egyptian Navy had Hunt-class destroyers in 1967.]]
The IAF dispatched a flight of two [[Dassault Mirage III|Mirage III]] fighter jets codenamed Kursa flight which arrived at ''Liberty'' at about 14:00.<ref name="IDFHR13">{{harvnb|IDF History Report|1982|p=13}}</ref> The formation leader, Captain [[Iftach Spector]], attempted to identify the ship.<ref name=IDFHR13/> He radioed to one of the torpedo boats his observation that the ship looked like a military ship with one smokestack and one mast.<ref name=IDFRRIR5>{{harvnb|IDF Ram Ron Report|1967|p=5}}</ref> He also communicated, in effect, that the ship appeared to him like a destroyer or another type of small ship.<ref name=IDFRRIR5/> In a post-attack statement, the pilots said they saw no distinguishable markings or flag on the ship.<ref name=IDFRRIR5/>

At this point, a recorded exchange took place between a command headquarters weapons systems officer, one of the air controllers, and the chief air controller questioning a possible American presence. Immediately after the exchange, at 13:57, the chief air controller, Lieutenant-Colonel Shmuel Kislev, cleared the Mirages to attack.<ref name=JamesScottBookp215>{{harvnb|Scott|2009|p=215}}</ref>

===Air and sea attacks===
After being cleared to attack, the Mirages dove on the ship and attacked with 30-mm cannons and rockets.<ref>{{harvnb|Scott|2009|p=47}}</ref> The attack came a few minutes after the crew completed a chemical attack drill, with Captain McGonagle on the command bridge.<ref>{{harvnb|Scott|2009|pp=44–46}}</ref> The crew was in "stand-down mode", with their helmets and life jackets removed.<ref>[[Michael Oren|Oren, Michael B.]] – ''[[Six Days of War|Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East]]''</ref> Battle readiness "modified condition three" was set, which meant that the ship's four .50 caliber machine guns were manned and ammunition was ready for loading and firing.<ref>{{harvnb|Gerhard|Millington|1981|pp=25–26}}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Scott|2009|p=39}}</ref> Eight crewmen either were killed immediately or received fatal injuries and died later, and 75 were wounded.<ref name="NSAhistory28">{{harvnb|Gerhard|Millington|1981|p=28}}</ref> Among the wounded was McGonagle, who was hit in the right thigh and arm.<ref>{{harvnb|Scott|2009|p=66}}</ref> During the attack, antennas were severed, gas drums caught fire, and the ship's flag was knocked down. McGonagle sent an urgent request for help to the Sixth Fleet, "Under attack by unidentified jet aircraft, require immediate assistance".

The Mirages left after expending their ammunition, and were replaced by a flight of two [[Dassault Super Mystère]]s codenamed Royal flight. The Mysteres were armed with [[napalm]] bombs, and were flown by Captain Yossi Zuk and his wingman, Yaakov Hamermish. The Mysteres released their payloads over the ship and strafed it with their cannons. Much of the ship's superstructure caught fire.<ref name="IDFHR13"/> The Mysteres were readying to attack again when the Israeli Navy, alerted by the absence of return fire, warned Kislev that the target could be Israeli. Kislev told the pilots not to attack if there was any doubt about identification, and the Israeli Navy quickly contacted all of its vessels in the area. The Israeli Navy found that none of its vessels were under fire, and the aircraft were cleared to attack. However, Kislev was still disturbed by a lack of return fire and requested one last attempt to identify the ship. Captain Zuk made an attempt at identification while strafing the ship. He reported seeing no flag, but saw the ship's GTR-5 marking. Kislev immediately ordered the attack stopped. Kislev guessed that the ship was American.

The fact that the ship had Latin alphabet markings led Chief of Staff Rabin to fear that the ship was Soviet. Though Egyptian warships were known to disguise their identities with Western markings, they usually displayed Arabic letters and numbers only. Rabin ordered the torpedo boats to remain at a safe distance from the ship, and sent in two [[Aérospatiale SA 321 Super Frelon]] helicopters to search for survivors. These radio communications were recorded by Israel. The order was also recorded in the torpedo boat's log, although Commander Oren claimed not to have received it. The order to cease fire was given at 14:20, twenty-four minutes before the torpedo boats arrived at the ''Liberty''{{'}}s position.{{efn|While Egyptian naval ships were known to disguise their identities with Western markings, they usually displayed Arabic letters and numbers only. The fact that the ship had Western markings led Rabin to fear that it was Soviet, and he immediately called off the jets. Two IAF Super Frelon helicopters were sent to look for survivors – Spector had reported seeing men overboard – while the torpedo boat squadron was ordered to hold its fire pending further attempts at identification. Though that order was recorded in the torpedo boat's log, [the commander], Oren, claimed he never received it.{{sfn|Oren|2000}}}}

During the interval, crewmen aboard ''Liberty'' hoisted a large American flag. During the early part of the air attack and before the torpedo boats were sighted, ''Liberty'' sent a distress message that was received by Sixth Fleet aircraft carrier {{USS|Saratoga|CV-60|6}}.<ref name="NSAhistory28"/> Aircraft carrier {{USS|America|CV-66|6}} dispatched eight aircraft. The carrier had been in the middle of strategic exercises. Vice-Admiral William I. Martin recalled the aircraft minutes later.

McGonagle testified at the naval court of inquiry that during {{Blockquote|the latter moments of the air attack, it was noted that three high speed boats were approaching the ship from the northeast on a relative bearing of approximately 135 [degrees] at a distance of about 15 [nautical] miles. The ship at the time was still on [westward] course 283 [degrees] true, speed unknown, but believed to be in excess of five knots.<ref name=USNCOIreport/>{{rp|38}}}} McGonagle testified that he "believed that the time of initial sighting of the torpedo boats ... was about 14:20", and that the "boats appeared to be in a wedge type formation with the center boat the lead point of the wedge. Estimated speed of the boats was about {{convert|27|to|30|kn|km/h|disp=sqbr}}", and that it "appeared that they were approaching the ship in a torpedo launch attitude".<ref name=USNCOIreport/>{{rp|38}}

When the [[Shayetet 15#Torpedo fleet|torpedo boats]] arrived, Commander Oren could see that the ship could not be the destroyer that had supposedly shelled Arish or any ship capable of {{convert|30|kn|km/h}} speed. According to Michael Limor, an Israeli naval reservist serving on one of the torpedo boats, they attempted to contact the ship by heliograph and radio, but received no response.<ref>{{cite news|title=Israeli Seaman Describes Attack |work=Owosso [[Argus-Press]] |location=Owosso, Michigan |date=6 July 1967 |page=12 |url=https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1978&dat=19670706&id=wnUiAAAAIBAJ&pg=595,422193&hl=en}}</ref> At {{convert|6,000|meters|sp=us}}, T-204 paused and signalled "AA", which means "identify yourself".{{Citation needed|date=July 2013}} Due to damaged equipment, McGonagle could only reply using a handheld [[Signal lamp|Aldis lamp]].{{Citation needed|date=July 2013}} Oren recalled receiving a similar response from the ''[[Ibrahim el Awal]]'', an Egyptian destroyer captured by Israel during the [[Suez Crisis]], and was convinced that he was facing an enemy ship.{{Citation needed|date=April 2013}} He consulted an Israeli identification guide to Arab fleets and concluded the ship was the Egyptian supply ship ''El Quseir'', based on observing its deckline, midship bridge and smokestack. The captain of boat T-203 reached the same conclusion independently. The boats moved into battle formation, but did not attack.{{sfn|Oren|2000}}<ref>{{harvnb|IDF History Report|1982|p=16}}</ref>

[[File:USS Liberty (AGTR-5) turns while under attack by Israeli motor torpedo boats, 8 June 1967 (USN 1123754).jpg|thumb|''Liberty'' turns to evade Israeli torpedo boats]]
As the torpedo boats rapidly approached, McGonagle ordered a sailor to proceed to machine gun Mount 51 and open fire.<ref name=USNCOIreport/>{{rp|38}} However, he then noticed that the boats appeared to be flying an Israeli flag, and "realized that there was a possibility of the aircraft having been Israeli and the attack had been conducted in error".<ref name=USNCOIreport/>{{rp|39}} McGonagle ordered the man at gun mount 51 to hold fire, but a short burst was fired at the torpedo boats before the man understood the order.<ref name=USNCOIreport/>{{rp|39}}

McGonagle observed that machine gun Mount 53 began firing at the center torpedo boat at about the same time gun mount 51 fired, and that its fire was "extremely effective and blanketed the area and the center torpedo boat".<ref name=USNCOIreport/>{{rp|39}} Machine gun mount 53 was located on the starboard amidships side, behind the pilot house.<ref name=USNCOIreport/>{{rp|16}} McGonagle could not see or "get to mount 53 from the starboard wing of the bridge".<ref name=USNCOIreport/>{{rp|39}} So, he "sent Mr. Lucas around the port side of the bridge, around to the skylights, to see if he could tell [Seaman] Quintero, whom [he] believed to be the gunner on Machine gun 53, to hold fire".<ref name=USNCOIreport/>{{rp|39}} Lucas "reported back in a few minutes in effect that he saw no one at mount 53".<ref name=USNCOIreport/>{{rp|39}} Lucas, who had left the command bridge during the air attack and returned to assist McGonagle,<ref name=USNCOIreport/>{{rp|14}} believed that the sound of gunfire was likely from ammunition [[cooking off]], due to a nearby fire.<ref name=USNCOIreport/>{{rp|16}} Previously, Lucas had granted a request from Quintero to fire at the torpedo boats, before heat from a nearby fire chased him from gun mount 53.<ref name=USNCOIreport/>{{rp|26,27}} McGonagle later testified, at the Court of Inquiry, that this was likely the "extremely effective" firing event he had observed.<ref name=USNCOIreport/>{{rp|49}}

After coming under fire, the torpedo boats returned fire with their cannons, killing ''Liberty''{{'s}} helmsman.<ref name="Gerhard 1981 29"/> The torpedo boats then launched five torpedoes at the ''Liberty''.<ref>{{harvnb|IDF History Report|1982|p=17}}</ref> At 12:35Z (14:35 local time)<ref name="Gerhard 1981 29"/> one torpedo hit ''Liberty'' on the [[starboard]] side forward of the superstructure, creating a {{convert|39|ft|m|abbr=on}} wide hole in what had been a cargo hold converted to the ship's research spaces and killing 25 servicemen, almost all of them from the intelligence section, and wounding dozens.<ref name="Gerhard 1981 29">{{harvnb|Gerhard|Millington|1981|p=29}}</ref> It has been said the torpedo hit a major hull frame that absorbed much of the energy; crew members reported that if the torpedo had missed the frame the ''Liberty'' would have split in two. The other four torpedoes missed the ship.{{citation needed|date=May 2019}}

The torpedo boats then closed in and [[strafe]]d the ship's hull with their cannons and machine guns.{{Citation needed|date=July 2013}} According to some crewmen, the torpedo boats fired at damage control parties and sailors preparing life rafts for launch. (See [[#Details in dispute|disputed details below]].) A life raft which floated from the ship was picked up by T-203 and found to bear U.S. Navy markings. T-204 then circled ''Liberty'', and Oren spotted the designation GTR-5, but saw no flag.{{Citation needed|date=July 2013}} It took until 15:30 to establish the ship's identity. Shortly before the ''Liberty''{{'}}s identity was confirmed, the ''Saratoga'' launched eight aircraft armed with conventional weapons towards ''Liberty''. After the ship's identity was confirmed, the General Staff was notified and an apology was sent to naval attaché Castle. The aircraft approaching ''Liberty'' were recalled to the ''Saratoga''.

===Aftermath of the attack===
[[File:USS Liberty (AGTR-5) with USS Little Rock (CLG-4) 1967.jpg|thumb|The 6th Fleet [[flagship]], {{USS|Little Rock|CLG-4|6}} standing by ''Liberty'']]
[[File:USS LIBERTY Memorial.jpg|thumb|USS ''LIBERTY'' Memorial<br />Arlington National Cemetery]]
According to transcripts of intercepted radio communications, published by the U.S. National Security Agency, at about 14:30, near the beginning of the torpedo boat attack, two IAF helicopters were dispatched to ''Liberty''{{'}}s location. The helicopters arrived at about 15:10, about 35 minutes after the torpedo hit the ship. After arriving, one of the helicopter pilots was asked by his ground-based controller to verify that the ship was flying an American flag. The helicopters conducted a brief search for crew members of the ship who might have fallen overboard during the air attack. No one was found. The helicopters left the ship at about 15:20.

At about 16:00, two hours after the attack began, Israel informed the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv that its military forces had mistakenly attacked a U.S. Navy ship. When the ship was "confirmed to be American" the torpedo boats returned at about 16:40 to offer help;<ref name=IDFRRIR9>{{harvnb|IDF Ram Ron Report|1967|p=9}}</ref> it was refused by the ''Liberty''. Later, Israel provided a helicopter to fly U.S. naval attaché Commander Castle to the ship.<ref name=NSAhistory>{{cite web |title=NSA History Report |url=http://www.nsa.gov/liberty/liber00010.pdf |ref={{harvid|NSA History Report}} |access-date=27 September 2006 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040313000704/http://www.nsa.gov/liberty/liber00010.pdf |archive-date=13 March 2004 |url-status=dead |df=dmy-all }}</ref> (pp.&nbsp;32, 34)

In Washington, President [[Lyndon B. Johnson]] had received word from the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] that ''Liberty'' had been torpedoed by an unknown vessel at 09:50 eastern time. Johnson assumed that the Soviets were involved, and hotlined Moscow with news of the attack and the dispatch of jets from ''Saratoga''. He chose not to make any public statements and delegated this task to [[Phil G. Goulding]], who was an assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs at the time.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/USS_Liberty_Pueblo_Stark/607.pdf|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20130713013349/http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/USS_Liberty_Pueblo_Stark/607.pdf|url-status=dead|title=Public Affairs in the USS ''Liberty'' Incident.|archivedate=13 July 2013}}</ref> Soon afterward, the Israelis said that they had mistakenly attacked the ship. The Johnson administration conveyed "strong dismay" to Israeli ambassador [[Avraham Harman]]. Meanwhile, apologies were soon sent by Israeli prime minister [[Levi Eshkol]], Foreign Minister [[Abba Eban]], and [[chargé d'affaires]] [[Ephraim Evron]]. Within 48 hours, Israel offered to compensate the victims and their families.{{sfn|Oren|2000}}

Though ''Liberty'' was severely damaged, with a 39&nbsp;ft wide by 24&nbsp;ft high (12 m × 7.3 m) hole and a twisted keel, her crew kept her afloat, and she was able to leave the area under her own power. ''Liberty'' was first met by Soviet [[Kildin-class destroyer|Kildin class]] guided missile destroyer (DDG 626/4), which offered help. Subsequently it was met by the destroyers {{USS|Davis|DD-937|6}} and {{USS|Massey|DD-778|6}}, and the cruiser {{USS|Little Rock|CL-92|6}}. Medical personnel were transferred to ''Liberty'', and she was escorted to [[Malta]], where she was given interim repairs. After these were completed in July 1967, ''Liberty'' returned to the U.S. She was decommissioned in June 1968 and struck from the [[Naval Vessel Register]]. ''Liberty'' was transferred to the [[United States Maritime Administration]] (MARAD) in December 1970 and sold for scrap in 1973.

From the start, the response to Israeli statements of mistaken identity ranged between frank disbelief to unquestioning acceptance within the administration in Washington. A communication to the Israeli ambassador on 10 June, by Secretary Rusk stated, among other things:

{{Blockquote|At the time of the attack, the USS ''Liberty'' was flying the American flag and its identification was clearly indicated in large white letters and numerals on its hull. ... Experience demonstrates that both the flag and the identification number of the vessel were readily visible from the air ... Accordingly, there is every reason to believe that the USS ''Liberty'' was identified, or at least her nationality determined, by Israeli aircraft approximately one hour before the attack. ... The subsequent attack by the torpedo boats, substantially after the vessel was or should have been identified by Israeli military forces, manifests the same reckless disregard for human life.<ref>{{cite web|title=Diplomatic Note From Secretary of State Rusk to the Israeli Ambassador|url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d352|website=U.S. Department of State: Office of the Historian|publisher=US Government|access-date=9 November 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160101195630/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d352|archive-date=1 January 2016|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Lenczowski|1990|p=111}} citing {{harvnb|Ennes|1987|p=285|loc=appendix S}}</ref>}}

[[File:Plaquemem.JPG|thumb|left|upright=0.7|Commemorative plaque in the Israeli [[Clandestine Immigration and Naval Museum|Clandestine Naval Museum]]{{efn|Translation: "We express deep sorrow for the thirty-four friends who died by our hands in combat they should not have been involved in. May their memory be blessed. Veterans of [[Motor Torpedo Boat|MTB]] squadron"}}]]
[[George Lenczowski]] notes: "It was significant that, in contrast to his secretary of state, President Johnson fully accepted the Israeli version of the tragic incident." He notes that Johnson himself included only one small paragraph about the ''Liberty'' in his autobiography,<ref>{{cite book|last=Johnson|first=Lyndon Baines|author-link=Lyndon B. Johnson|title=The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=BW7jnQAACAAJ&pg=PP1|year=1971|publisher=Holt, Rinehart and Winston|pages=300–301 |quote=We learned that the ship had been attacked in error by Israeli gunboats and aircraft. Ten men of the ''Liberty'' crew were killed and a hundred were wounded. This heartbreaking episode grieved the Israelis deeply, as it did us.}}</ref> in which he accepted the Israeli explanation, minimized the affair and distorted the number of dead and wounded, by lowering them from 34 to 10 and 171 to 100, respectively. Lenczowski further states: "It seems Johnson was more interested in avoiding a possible confrontation with the Soviet Union, ... than in restraining Israel."{{sfn|Lenczowski|1990|pp=110–112}}

McGonagle received the [[Medal of Honor]], the highest U.S. medal, for his actions.<ref>[http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/moh/moh20.htm#mcgonagle Navy Medal of Honor: Vietnam War (era) 1964–1975, citation for Captain William L. McGonagle, U.S. Navy] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060418060733/http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/moh/moh20.htm#mcgonagle |date=18 April 2006 }}. Retrieved May 15, 2006</ref><ref name="heroic" /> The Medal of Honor is generally presented by the president of the United States in the White House,<ref name="heroic" /><ref>[http://www.cmohs.org/medal.htm Congressional Medal of Honor Society] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070623031055/http://www.cmohs.org/medal.htm |date=23 June 2007 }}. Retrieved June 20, 2007</ref> but this time it was awarded at the Washington Navy Yard by the [[United States Secretary of the Navy|Secretary of the Navy]] in an unpublicized ceremony.<ref name="heroic">[http://www.washington-report.org/backissues/0398/9803026.html Even as USS ''Liberty''<nowiki>'</nowiki>s Heroic Captain Receives New Honor, Coverup of Israeli Attack on His Ship Continues] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060518064155/http://www.washington-report.org/backissues/0398/9803026.html |date=18 May 2006 }}, ''Washington Report on Middle East Affairs'', March 1998, pp. 26, 88</ref> Other ''Liberty'' sailors received decorations for their actions during and after the attack, but most of the award citations omitted mention of Israel as the perpetrator. In 2009, however, a [[Silver Star]] was awarded to crewmember Terry Halbardier, who braved machine-gun and cannon fire to repair a damaged antenna that restored the ship's communication; in his award citation Israel was named as the attacker.<ref>Bernton, Hal, "[http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2009316427_liberty09m.html Deadly attack on USS ''Liberty'' gets new attention] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090612021322/http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2009316427_liberty09m.html |date=12 June 2009 }}", ''[[The Seattle Times]]'', June 9, 2009.</ref>{{Clear}}

===U.S. government investigations===
{{Blockquote|quote=The Court produced evidence that the Israeli armed forces had ample opportunity to identify ''LIBERTY'' correctly. The Court had insufficient information before it to make a judgment on the reasons for the decision by Israeli aircraft and motor torpedo boats to attack&nbsp;... It was not the responsibility of the Court to rule on the culpability of the attackers, and no evidence was heard from the attacking nation.|source=[[:File:DoD USS Liberty Inquiry Press Release 28 Jun 1967.djvu|U.S. Defense Department's June 28, 1967, News Release]] concerning the Naval Court of Inquiry into the attack.}}
[[File:AGTR-5 torpedo damage 8Jun67.jpg|thumb|Torpedo damage to ''Liberty''<nowiki>'</nowiki>s research compartment ([[Starboard]] side)]]

American inquiries, memoranda, records of testimony, and various reports involving or mentioning the ''Liberty'' attack include, but are not limited to, the following:
* U.S. Naval Court of Inquiry<ref>{{cite web |title=Court of Inquiry |url=http://www.thelibertyincident.com/docs/CourtOfInquiry.pdf |access-date=30 June 2022}}</ref> of June 1967
* Joint Chief of Staff's Report<ref>{{cite web |title=Report of the JCS Fact Finding Team, USS Liberty Incident, 8 June 1967 |url=http://www.thelibertyincident.com/docs/JCSreport.pdf |access-date=30 June 2022}}</ref> of June 1967
* CIA Intelligence Memorandums<ref>{{cite web |title=Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967 |url=http://www.thelibertyincident.com/docs/CIAreports.pdf |access-date=30 June 2022}}</ref> of June 1967
* Clark Clifford Report<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.thelibertyincident.com/clifford.html|title=The ''Liberty'' Incident: Clark Clifford Report|website=www.thelibertyincident.com|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200223114246/http://www.thelibertyincident.com/clifford.html|archive-date=23 February 2020}}</ref> of July 1967
* Senate Foreign Relations Committee Testimony during hearings of the 1967 Foreign Aid Authorization bill, July 1967<ref>{{cite web |title=Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninetieth Congress |url=http://www.thelibertyincident.com/docs/SenateInvestigation.pdf |access-date=30 June 2022}}</ref>
* House Armed Services Committee Investigation of 1971<ref>{{cite web |title=Report of the Armed Services Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety-Second Congress, First Session |url=http://thelibertyincident.com/docs/HouseInvestigation1971.pdf |access-date=30 June 2022}}</ref>
* The NSA History Report<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/uss_liberty/|title=U.S.S. ''Liberty'' – NSA/CSS|date=24 September 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090924012118/http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/uss_liberty/|archive-date=24 September 2009}}</ref> of 1981

The U.S. Naval Court of Inquiry record contains testimony by ''Liberty'' crew members, exhibits of attack damage photographs, and various reports.<ref name="JamesScottBookp265">{{harvnb|Scott|2009|p=263}}</ref> The court concluded that the testimony record revealed "a shallow investigation, plagued by myriad disagreements between the captain and his crew".<ref name=JamesScottBookp183>{{harvnb|Scott|2009|p=183}}</ref> According to the Navy Court of Inquiry's record of proceedings, four days were spent hearing testimony: two days for fourteen survivors of the attack and several U.S. Navy expert witnesses, and two partial days for two expert U.S. Navy witnesses.<ref name='A7'/> No testimony was heard from Israeli personnel involved.<ref name='A7'/><ref name='A1'>{{cite news |last1=B. Oren |first1=Michael |title=The USS Liberty Incident: 'The USS ''Liberty'': Case Closed' |url=https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/quot-the-uss-liberty-case-closed-quot |access-date=16 April 2019 |agency=Jewish virtual library |publisher=jewishvirtuallibrary.org |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190416220721/https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/quot-the-uss-liberty-case-closed-quot |archive-date=16 April 2019 |url-status=live |df=dmy-all }}</ref>{{Better source needed|date=August 2023}}

The official U.S. records of the Liberty incident were designated [[top-secret]] and closed to the general public.<ref name='A1'/> The U.S. government and Israel jointly stated: "That the Israeli attack upon the USS ''Liberty'' had been the result of error, and nothing more."<ref name='A1'/> Admiral [[Thomas Hinman Moorer|Thomas H. Moorer]], [[Chief of Naval Operations]] after the ''Liberty'' incident, said that he "cannot accept the claim by the Israelis that this was a case of mistaken identity".<ref name='A1'/>

The CIA Memoranda consists of two documents: one dated June 13, 1967, and the other dated June 21, 1967. The June 13 memorandum is an "account of circumstances of the attack ... compiled from all available sources".<ref name="A3">{{cite book |url=http://www.thelibertyincident.com/docs/CIAreports.pdf |title=Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967 |date=2004 |publisher=Government printing Office |isbn=0-16-051513-0 |editor1-last=Schwar |editor1-first=Harriet Dashiell |location=Washington (D.C.) |page=469 |access-date=26 December 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190129052624/http://thelibertyincident.com/docs/CIAreports.pdf |archive-date=29 January 2019 |url-status=live |df=dmy-all}}</ref> The June 21 memorandum is a point-by-point analysis of the Israeli inquiry findings of fact.<ref name='A3'/> It concludes: "The attack was not made in malice toward the U.S. and was by mistake, but the failure of the IDF Headquarters and the attacking aircraft to identify the ''Liberty'' and the subsequent attack by torpedo boats were both incongruous and indicative of gross negligence."<ref name='A3'/>

The [[Clark Clifford]] report concluded: "The unprovoked attack on the ''Liberty'' constitutes a flagrant act of gross negligence for which the Israeli Government should be held completely responsible, and the Israeli military personnel involved should be punished."<ref name='A1'/>

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony contains, as an aside during hearings concerning a foreign aid authorization bill, questions and statements from several senators and responses from then [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of Defense]], [[Robert McNamara]], about the ''Liberty'' attack. For the most part, the senators were dismayed about the attack, as expressed by Senator [[Bourke B. Hickenlooper]]: "From what I have read I can't tolerate for one minute that this [attack] was an accident." There was concern about obtaining more information on the attack, as expressed by committee chairman [[J. William Fulbright]]: "We asked for [the attack investigation report] about two weeks ago and have not received it yet from Secretary Rusk. ... By the time we get to it we will be on some other subject." Secretary McNamara promised fast delivery of the investigation report, "...&nbsp;you will have it in four hours", and concluded his remarks by saying: "I simply want to emphasize that the investigative report does not show any evidence of a conscious intent to attack a U.S. vessel."<ref>{{cite report |title=S.1872 A Bill to Amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 |publisher=Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate |date=12 June 1967 |url=http://www.thelibertyincident.com/docs/SenateInvestigation.pdf |access-date=2 July 2006 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061219235027/http://www.thelibertyincident.com/docs/SenateInvestigation.pdf |archive-date=19 December 2006 |url-status=live |df=dmy-all |page=268}}</ref>

The [[House Armed Services Committee]] investigation report, "Review of Department of Defense Worldwide Communications"<ref name='A4'>{{cite book |last1=Harriette |first1=A. |last2=Ennes Jr |first2=J.M. |title=Assault on the ''Liberty'' |date=1979 |publisher=Рипол Классик |isbn=978-5872324027 |page=270 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ybgHAwAAQBAJ&q=Review+of+Department+of+Defense+Worldwide+Communications%2Bliberty&pg=PA269 |access-date=16 April 2019}}</ref> was not an investigation focused on the ''Liberty'' attack, although it contains a section describing the flow of communications connected with the ''Liberty'' incident.<ref name='A4'/>

The [[National Security Agency]] (NSA) history report on the event included declassified documents which stated: "Every official interview of numerous ''Liberty'' crewmen gave consistent evidence that indeed the ''Liberty'' was flying an American flag—and, further, the weather conditions were ideal to ensure its easy observance and identification."<ref name='A9'>{{cite news |last1=Crewdson |first1=John |title=New revelations in attack on American spy ship |url=https://www.chicagotribune.com/chi-liberty_tuesoct02-story.html |access-date=16 April 2019 |agency=Chicago Tribune |publisher=chicagotribune.com |date=2 October 2007 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190416220719/https://www.chicagotribune.com/chi-liberty_tuesoct02-story.html |archive-date=16 April 2019 |url-status=live |df=dmy-all }}</ref>

The [[USS Liberty Veterans Association|USS ''Liberty'' Veterans Association]], composed of veterans from the ship, states that U.S. congressional investigations and other U.S. investigations were not actually investigations into the attack, but rather reports using evidence only from the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry, or investigations unrelated to culpability that involved issues such as communications.<ref name='A1'/> In their view, the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry is the only actual investigation on the incident to date.<ref name='A7'>{{cite web |title=U.S. Naval Court of Inquiry; USS ''Liberty'' |date=10 June 1967 |publisher=USS Liberty Memorial |url=http://www.ussliberty.com/nci.pdf |access-date=13 May 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100326100232/http://www.ussliberty.com/nci.pdf |archive-date=26 March 2010 |url-status=live |df=dmy-all }}</ref> They say it was hastily conducted, in only ten days, even though the court's president, [[Isaac C. Kidd Jr.|Rear Admiral Isaac Kidd]], said that it would take six months to conduct properly.<ref name='A7'/> The inquiry's [[terms of reference]] were limited to whether any shortcomings on the part of the ''Liberty''{{'}}s crew had contributed to the injuries and deaths that resulted from the attack.<ref name='A7'/>

[[Michael Oren]] (a former Israeli ambassador to the United States) contends that "the United States [[National Archives and Records Administration|National Archives]] contain no evidence to suggest that information obtained by the ''Liberty'' augmented Washington's already detailed picture of events on the Golan front and of Israel's intentions there."<ref name='A1'/>

===Israeli government investigations===
According to an Israel Foreign Ministry letter to the Israeli Embassy in Washington: {{Blockquote|In the grave situation that has been created, the only way to soften the result is for us to be able to announce to the U.S. government already today that we intend to prosecute people for this disaster. We have to publicize that in Israel already tonight. ... it is crucial that our announcement about prosecuting those who are to blame be publicized before – I repeat, before – the publication of the American report here.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Aderet |first1=Ofer |title='But Sir, It's an American Ship.' 'Never Mind, Hit Her!' When Israel Attacked USS ''Liberty'' |url=https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/but-sir-its-an-american-ship-never-mind-hit-her-1.5492908 |access-date=17 April 2019 |agency=Haaretz |publisher=haaretz.com |date=11 July 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190417105511/https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/but-sir-its-an-american-ship-never-mind-hit-her-1.5492908 |archive-date=17 April 2019 |url-status=live |df=dmy-all }}</ref>}}

Two subsequent Israeli inquiry reports and a historical report concluded the attack was conducted because ''Liberty'' was confused with an Egyptian vessel and because of failures in communications between Israel and the U.S. The three Israeli reports were:<ref name='A1'/>
* Fact Finding Inquiry by Colonel Ram Ron ("Ram Ron Report"—June 1967)<ref name=IDFRRIR>{{harvnb|IDF Ram Ron Report|1967}}</ref>
* Preliminary Inquiry (Hearing) by Examining Judge [[Yeshayahu Yerushalmi]] ("Yerushalmi Report"—July 1967)<ref>{{cite web |url=http://thelibertyincident.com/docs/israeli/yerushalmi-report-en.pdf |title=Yerushalmi Report |access-date=30 September 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121019013052/http://thelibertyincident.com/docs/israeli/yerushalmi-report-en.pdf |archive-date=19 October 2012 |url-status=live |df=dmy-all }}</ref> (Adjudication of IDF negligence [[complaint]]s.)
* Historical Report "The ''Liberty'' Incident"—[[Israel Defense Forces|IDF]] History Department report (1982)<ref name='A8'>{{harvnb|IDF History Report|1982}}</ref>

In the historical report, it was acknowledged that IDF naval headquarters knew at least three hours before the attack that the ship was "an electromagnetic audio-surveillance ship of the U.S. Navy" but concluded that this information had simply "gotten lost, never passed along to the ground controllers who directed the air attack nor to the crews of the three Israeli torpedo boats".<ref name='A8'/>

The Israeli government said that three crucial errors were made: the refreshing of the status board (removing the ship's classification as American, so that the later shift did not see it identified), the erroneous identification of the ship as an Egyptian vessel, and the lack of notification from the returning aircraft informing Israeli headquarters of markings on the front of the hull (markings that would not be found on an Egyptian ship). As a common root of these problems, Israel blamed the combination of alarm and fatigue experienced by the Israeli forces at that point of the war when pilots were severely overworked.<ref name='A9'/><ref name='A8'/>

After conducting his own fact-finding inquiry and reviewing evidence, Judge Yerushalmi's decision was: "I have not discovered any deviation from the standard of reasonable conduct which would justify committal of anyone for trial." In other words, he found no negligence by any IDF member associated with the attack.<ref name=JamesScottBookp265/>