Editing Thought (section)

==Theories of thinking==
Various theories of thinking have been proposed.<ref name="BorchertThinking"/> They aim to capture the characteristic features of thinking. The theories listed here are not exclusive: it may be possible to combine some without leading to a contradiction.

===Platonism===
According to [[Platonism]], thinking is a spiritual activity in which [[Platonic form]]s and their interrelations are discerned and inspected.<ref name="BorchertThinking"/><ref name="Woolf"/> This activity is understood as a form of silent inner speech in which the soul talks to itself.<ref name="Langland-Hassan"/> Platonic forms are seen as universals that exist in a changeless realm different from the sensible world. Examples include the forms of goodness, beauty, unity, and sameness.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Kraut |first1=Richard |title=Plato |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=24 April 2021 |date=2017}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Brickhouse |first1=Thomas |last2=Smith |first2=Nicholas D. |title=Plato: 6b. The Theory of Forms |url=https://iep.utm.edu/plato/#SH6b |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=24 April 2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Nehamas |first1=Alexander |title=Plato on the Imperfection of the Sensible World |journal=American Philosophical Quarterly |date=1975 |volume=12 |issue=2 |pages=105–117 |jstor=20009565 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/20009565 |issn=0003-0481}}</ref> On this view, the difficulty of thinking consists in being unable to grasp the Platonic forms and to distinguish them as the original from the mere imitations found in the sensory world. This means, for example, distinguishing beauty itself from derivative images of beauty.<ref name="Woolf"/> One problem for this view is to explain how humans can learn and think about Platonic forms belonging to a different realm.<ref name="BorchertThinking"/> Plato himself tries to solve this problem through his theory of recollection, according to which the soul already was in contact with the Platonic forms before and is therefore able to remember what they are like.<ref name="Woolf">{{cite journal |last1=Woolf |first1=Raphael |title=Plato and the Norms of Thought |journal=Mind |date=1 January 2013 |volume=122 |issue=485 |pages=171–216 |doi=10.1093/mind/fzt012 |url=https://academic.oup.com/mind/article/122/485/171/961176 |issn=0026-4423|doi-access=free }}</ref> But this explanation depends on various assumptions usually not accepted in contemporary thought.<ref name="Woolf"/>

===Aristotelianism and conceptualism===
[[Aristotelianism|Aristotelians]] hold that the mind is able to think about something by instantiating the essence of the object of thought.<ref name="BorchertThinking"/> So while thinking about trees, the mind instantiates tree-ness. This instantiation does not happen in matter, as is the case for actual trees, but in mind, though the universal essence instantiated in both cases is the same.<ref name="BorchertThinking"/> In contrast to Platonism, these universals are not understood as Platonic forms existing in a changeless intelligible world.<ref name="Sellars"/> Instead, they only exist to the extent that they are instantiated. The mind learns to discriminate universals through abstraction from experience.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Klima |first1=Gyula |title=The Medieval Problem of Universals: 1. Introduction |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/universals-medieval/#Intr |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=21 October 2021 |date=2017}}</ref> This explanation avoids various of the objections raised against Platonism.<ref name="Sellars">{{cite book |last1=Sellars |first1=Wilfrid |title=Philosophy for The Future, The Quest of Modern Materialism |date=1949 |url=http://www.ditext.com/sellars/apm.html |chapter=Aristotelian Philosophies of Mind}}</ref>

Conceptualism is closely related to Aristotelianism. It states that thinking consists in mentally evoking concepts. Some of these concepts may be innate, but most have to be learned through abstraction from sense experience before they can be used in thought.<ref name="BorchertThinking"/>

It has been argued against these views that they have problems in accounting for the logical form of thought. For example, to think that it will either rain or snow, it is not sufficient to instantiate the essences of rain and snow or to evoke the corresponding concepts. The reason for this is that the [[Exclusive or|disjunctive relation]] between the rain and the snow is not captured this way.<ref name="BorchertThinking"/> Another problem shared by these positions is the difficulty of giving a satisfying account of how essences or concepts are learned by the mind through abstraction.<ref name="BorchertThinking"/>

===Inner speech theory===
Inner speech theories claim that thinking is a form of [[inner speech]].<ref name="Crowell"/><ref name="Harman4"/><ref name="Langland-Hassan">{{cite book |last1=Langland-Hassan |first1=Peter |last2=Vicente |first2=Agustin |title=Inner Speech: New Voices |date=2018 |location=Oxford |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/LANISN |chapter=Introduction}}</ref><ref name="BritannicaThought"/> This view is sometimes termed ''psychological nominalism''.<ref name="BorchertThinking"/> It states that thinking involves silently evoking words and connecting them to form mental sentences. The knowledge a person has of their thoughts can be explained as a form of overhearing one's own silent monologue.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Roessler |first1=Johannes |title=Thinking, Inner Speech, and Self-Awareness |journal=Review of Philosophy and Psychology |date=2016 |volume=7 |issue=3 |pages=541–557 |doi=10.1007/s13164-015-0267-y |s2cid=15028459 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/ROETIS-2}}</ref> Three central aspects are often ascribed to inner speech: it is in an important sense similar to hearing sounds, it involves the use of language and it constitutes a motor plan that could be used for actual speech.<ref name="Langland-Hassan"/> This connection to language is supported by the fact that thinking is often accompanied by muscle activity in the speech organs. This activity may facilitate thinking in certain cases but is not necessary for it in general.<ref name="BritannicaThought"/> According to some accounts, thinking happens not in a regular language, like English or French, but has its own type of language with the corresponding symbols and syntax. This theory is known as the [[language of thought hypothesis]].<ref name="Harman4">{{cite book |last1=Harman |first1=Gilbert |title=Thought |date=1973 |publisher=Princeton University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HART |chapter=4. Thought and meaning}}</ref><ref name="RescorlaLOTH">{{cite web |last1=Rescorla |first1=Michael |title=The Language of Thought Hypothesis |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/language-thought/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=18 October 2021 |date=2019}}</ref>

Inner speech theory has a strong initial plausibility since introspection suggests that indeed many thoughts are accompanied by inner speech. But its opponents usually contend that this is not true for all types of thinking.<ref name="BorchertThinking"/><ref name="Nida-rümelin">{{cite journal |last1=Nida-rümelin |first1=Martine |title=Thinking Without Language. A Phenomenological Argument for Its Possibility and Existence |journal=Grazer Philosophische Studien |date=2010 |volume=81 |issue=1 |pages=55–75 |doi=10.1163/9789042030190_005 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/NIDTWL}}</ref><ref name="Bermudez">{{cite book |last1=Bermudez |first1=Jose Luis |title=Thinking Without Words |date=2003 |publisher=Oxford University Press USA |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/LUITWW}}</ref> It has been argued, for example, that forms of daydreaming constitute non-linguistic thought.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Lohmar |first1=Dieter |editor1-first=Dan |editor1-last=Zahavi |title=Language and non-linguistic thinking |journal=The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology |date= 2012 |doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199594900.001.0001 |isbn=978-0-19-959490-0 |url=https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199594900.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199594900-e-19 |language=en}}</ref> This issue is relevant to the question of whether animals have the capacity to think. If thinking is necessarily tied to language then this would suggest that there is an important gap between humans and animals since only humans have a sufficiently complex language. But the existence of non-linguistic thoughts suggests that this gap may not be that big and that some animals do indeed think.<ref name="Bermudez"/><ref>{{cite web |last1=Andrews |first1=Kristin |last2=Monsó |first2=Susana |title=Animal Cognition: 3.4 Thought |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cognition-animal/#Thou |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=25 October 2021 |date=2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Premack |first1=David |title=Human and animal cognition: Continuity and discontinuity |journal=Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences |date=28 August 2007 |volume=104 |issue=35 |pages=13861–13867 |doi=10.1073/pnas.0706147104 |pmid=17717081 |pmc=1955772 |bibcode=2007PNAS..10413861P |language=en |issn=0027-8424|doi-access=free }}</ref>

====Language of thought hypothesis====
There are various theories about the relation between language and thought. One prominent version in contemporary philosophy is called the [[language of thought hypothesis]].<ref name="Harman4"/><ref name="RescorlaLOTH"/><ref name="Katz">{{cite web |last1=Katz |first1=Matthew |title=Language of Thought Hypothesis |url=https://iep.utm.edu/lot-hypo/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=27 October 2021}}</ref><ref name="Aydede">{{cite web |last1=Aydede |first1=Murat |title=Oxford Bibliographies: Language of Thought |url=https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0151.xml |access-date=27 October 2021 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Fodor |first1=Jerry A. |title=Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited |date=2008 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/FODLT}}</ref> It states that thinking happens in the medium of a mental language. This language, often referred to as ''Mentalese'', is similar to regular languages in various respects: it is composed of words that are connected to each other in syntactic ways to form sentences.<ref name="Harman4"/><ref name="RescorlaLOTH"/><ref name="Katz"/><ref name="Aydede"/> This claim does not merely rest on an intuitive analogy between language and thought. Instead, it provides a clear definition of the features a representational system has to embody in order to have a linguistic structure.<ref name="Katz"/><ref name="RescorlaLOTH"/><ref name="Aydede"/> On the level of syntax, the representational system has to possess two types of representations: atomic and compound representations. Atomic representations are basic whereas compound representations are constituted either by other compound representations or by atomic representations.<ref name="Katz"/><ref name="RescorlaLOTH"/><ref name="Aydede"/> On the level of semantics, the semantic content or the meaning of the compound representations should depend on the semantic contents of its constituents. A representational system is linguistically structured if it fulfills these two requirements.<ref name="Katz"/><ref name="RescorlaLOTH"/><ref name="Aydede"/>

The language of thought hypothesis states that the same is true for thinking in general. This would mean that thought is composed of certain atomic representational constituents that can be combined as described above.<ref name="Katz"/><ref name="RescorlaLOTH"/><ref name="BorchertLanguageOfThought">{{cite book |last1=Borchert |first1=Donald |title=Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition |date=2006 |publisher=Macmillan |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/language-thought |chapter=Language of thought}}</ref> Apart from this abstract characterization, no further concrete claims are made about how human thought is implemented by the brain or which other similarities to natural language it has.<ref name="Katz"/> The language of thought hypothesis was first introduced by [[Jerry Fodor]].<ref name="RescorlaLOTH"/><ref name="Katz"/> He argues in favor of this claim by holding that it constitutes the best explanation of the characteristic features of thinking. One of these features is ''productivity'': a system of representations is ''productive'' if it can generate an infinite number of unique representations based on a low number of atomic representations.<ref name="Katz"/><ref name="RescorlaLOTH"/><ref name="BorchertLanguageOfThought"/> This applies to thought since human beings are capable of entertaining an infinite number of distinct thoughts even though their mental capacities are quite limited. Other characteristic features of thinking include ''systematicity'' and ''inferential coherence''.<ref name="RescorlaLOTH"/><ref name="Katz"/><ref name="BorchertLanguageOfThought"/> Fodor argues that the language of thought hypothesis is true as it explains how thought can have these features and because there is no good alternative explanation.<ref name="Katz"/> Some arguments against the language of thought hypothesis are based on neural networks, which are able to produce intelligent behavior without depending on representational systems. Other objections focus on the idea that some mental representations happen non-linguistically, for example, in the form of maps or images.<ref name="Katz"/><ref name="RescorlaLOTH"/>

Computationalists have been especially interested in the language of thought hypothesis since it provides ways to close the gap between thought in the human brain and computational processes implemented by computers.<ref name="Katz"/><ref name="RescorlaLOTH"/><ref name="Milkowski"/> The reason for this is that processes over representations that respect syntax and semantics, like [[inference]]s according to the [[modus ponens]], can be implemented by physical systems using causal relations. The same linguistic systems may be implemented through different material systems, like brains or computers. In this way, computers can ''think''.<ref name="Katz"/><ref name="RescorlaLOTH"/>

===Associationism===
An important view in the empiricist tradition has been [[associationism]], the view that thinking consists in the succession of ideas or images.<ref name="BritannicaThought"/><ref name="Doorey">{{cite book |last1=Doorey |first1=Marie |title=The Gale Encyclopedia of Science |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/medicine/psychology/psychology-and-psychiatry/conditioning |chapter=Conditioning}}</ref><ref name="Veldt">{{cite book |last1=Van der Veldt |first1=J. H. |title=New Catholic Encyclopedia |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/medicine/psychology/psychology-and-psychiatry/associationism |chapter=Associationism}}</ref> This succession is seen as being governed by laws of association, which determine how the train of thought unfolds.<ref name="BritannicaThought"/><ref name="Mandelbaum"/> These laws are different from logical relations between the contents of thoughts, which are found in the case of drawing inferences by moving from the thought of the premises to the thought of the conclusion.<ref name="Mandelbaum"/> Various laws of association have been suggested. According to the laws of similarity and contrast, ideas tend to evoke other ideas that are either very similar to them or their opposite. The law of contiguity, on the other hand, states that if two ideas were frequently experienced together, then the experience of one tends to cause the experience of the other.<ref name="BritannicaThought"/><ref name="Doorey"/> In this sense, the history of an organism's experience determines which thoughts the organism has and how these thoughts unfold.<ref name="Mandelbaum">{{cite web |last1=Mandelbaum |first1=Eric |title=Associationist Theories of Thought |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/associationist-thought/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=23 October 2021 |date=2020}}</ref> But such an association does not guarantee that the connection is meaningful or rational. For example, because of the association between the terms "cold" and "Idaho", the thought "this coffee shop is cold" might lead to the thought "Russia should annex Idaho".<ref name="Mandelbaum"/>

One form of associationism is imagism. It states that thinking involves entertaining a sequence of images where earlier images conjure up later images based on the laws of association.<ref name="BorchertThinking"/> One problem with this view is that we can think about things that we cannot imagine. This is especially relevant when the thought involves very complex objects or infinities, which is common, for example, in mathematical thought.<ref name="BorchertThinking"/> One criticism directed at associationism in general is that its claim is too far-reaching. There is wide agreement that associative processes as studied by associationists play some role in how thought unfolds. But the claim that this mechanism is sufficient to understand all thought or all mental processes is usually not accepted.<ref name="Veldt"/><ref name="Mandelbaum"/>

===Behaviorism===
According to [[behaviorism]], thinking consists in behavioral dispositions to engage in certain publicly observable behavior as a reaction to particular external stimuli.<ref name="RescorlaComputationalism"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Lazzeri |first1=Filipe |title=O que é Behaviorismo sobre a mente? |journal=Principia|date=2019-08-16 |volume=23 |issue=2 |pages=249–277 |doi=10.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n2p249 |s2cid=212888121 |language=pt |issn=1808-1711|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name="Graham">{{cite web |last1=Graham |first1=George |title=Behaviorism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/behaviorism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=31 May 2021 |date=2019}}</ref> On this view, having a particular thought is the same as having a disposition to behave in a certain way. This view is often motivated by empirical considerations: it is very difficult to study thinking as a private mental process but it is much easier to study how organisms react to a certain situation with a given behavior.<ref name="Graham"/> In this sense, the capacity to solve problems not through existing habits but through creative new approaches is particularly relevant.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Audet |first1=Jean-Nicolas |last2=Lefebvre |first2=Louis |title=What's flexible in behavioral flexibility? |journal=Behavioral Ecology |date=18 February 2017 |volume=28 |issue=4 |pages=943–947 |doi=10.1093/beheco/arx007 |url=https://academic.oup.com/beheco/article/28/4/943/3003315 |issn=1045-2249|doi-access=free }}</ref> The term "behaviorism" is also sometimes used in a slightly different sense when applied to thinking to refer to a specific form of inner speech theory.<ref name="Reese">{{cite journal |last1=Reese |first1=Hayne W. |title=Thinking as the Behaviorist Views It |journal=Behavioral Development Bulletin |date=2000 |volume=9 |issue=1 |pages=10–12 |doi=10.1037/h0100531 |url=https://psycnet.apa.org/fulltext/2014-55592-003.html |language=en}}</ref> This view focuses on the idea that the relevant inner speech is a derivative form of regular outward speech.<ref name="BritannicaThought"/> This sense overlaps with how behaviorism is understood more commonly in philosophy of mind since these inner speech acts are not observed by the researcher but merely inferred from the subject's intelligent behavior.<ref name="Reese"/> This remains true to the general behaviorist principle that behavioral evidence is required for any psychological hypothesis.<ref name="Graham"/>

One problem for behaviorism is that the same entity often behaves differently despite being in the same situation as before.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Mele |first1=Alfred R. |title=Motivation and Agency |date=2003 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MELMAA-2 |chapter=Introduction}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Mele |first1=Alfred R. |title=Motivation: Essentially Motivation-Constituting Attitudes |journal=Philosophical Review |date=1995 |volume=104 |issue=3 |pages=387–423 |doi=10.2307/2185634 |jstor=2185634 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MELMEM}}</ref> This problem consists in the fact that individual thoughts or mental states usually do not correspond to one particular behavior. So thinking that the pie is tasty does not automatically lead to eating the pie, since various other mental states may still inhibit this behavior, for example, the belief that it would be impolite to do so or that the pie is poisoned.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Schwitzgebel |first1=Eric |title=Belief |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2019 |access-date=22 June 2020 |archive-date=15 November 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191115080001/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Borchert |first1=Donald |title=Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition |date=2006 |publisher=Macmillan |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BORMEO |chapter=Belief |access-date=2 April 2021 |archive-date=12 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210112065913/https://philpapers.org/rec/BORMEO |url-status=live }}</ref>

===Computationalism===
[[Computationalism|Computationalist]] theories of thinking, often found in the cognitive sciences, understand thinking as a form of information processing.<ref name="Milkowski">{{cite web |last1=Milkowski |first1=Marcin |title=Computational Theory of Mind |url=https://iep.utm.edu/compmind/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=21 October 2021}}</ref><ref name="BritannicaComputationalism">{{cite web |title=Philosophy of mind – The computational-representational theory of thought (CRTT) |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy-of-mind/The-computational-representational-theory-of-thought-CRTT |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=21 October 2021 |language=en}}</ref><ref name="RescorlaComputationalism"/> These views developed with the rise of computers in the second part of the 20th century, when various theorists saw thinking in analogy to computer operations.<ref name="BritannicaComputationalism"/> On such views, the information may be encoded differently in the brain, but in principle, the same operations take place there as well, corresponding to the storage, transmission, and processing of information.<ref name="BritannicaThought"/><ref name="Baum">{{cite book |last1=Baum |first1=Eric B. |title=What Is Thought? |date=2004 |publisher=Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BAUWIT |chapter=1. Introduction}}</ref> But while this analogy has some intuitive attraction, theorists have struggled to give a more explicit explanation of what computation is. A further problem consists in explaining the sense in which thinking is a form of computing.<ref name="RescorlaComputationalism">{{cite web |last1=Rescorla |first1=Michael |title=The Computational Theory of Mind |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-mind/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=22 October 2021 |date=2020}}</ref> The traditionally dominant view defines computation in terms of [[Turing machine]]s, though contemporary accounts often focus on [[neural network]]s for their analogies.<ref name="Milkowski"/> A Turing machine is capable of executing any algorithm based on a few very basic principles, such as reading a symbol from a cell, writing a symbol to a cell, and executing instructions based on the symbols read.<ref name="Milkowski"/> This way it is possible to perform deductive reasoning following the [[inference rule]]s of [[formal logic]] as well as simulating many other functions of the mind, such as language processing, decision making, and motor control.<ref name="BritannicaComputationalism"/><ref name="RescorlaComputationalism"/> But computationalism does not only claim that thinking is in some sense similar to computation. Instead, it is claimed that thinking just is a form of computation or that the mind is a Turing machine.<ref name="RescorlaComputationalism"/>

Computationalist theories of thought are sometimes divided into functionalist and representationalist approaches.<ref name="RescorlaComputationalism"/> Functionalist approaches define mental states through their causal roles but allow both external and internal events in their causal network.<ref name="Polger">{{cite web |last1=Polger |first1=Thomas W. |title=Functionalism |url=https://iep.utm.edu/functism/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=31 May 2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Gulick |first1=Robert Van |editor1-first=Ansgar |editor1-last=Beckermann |editor2-first=Brian P |editor2-last=McLaughlin |editor3-first=Sven |editor3-last=Walter |title=Functionalism |url=https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199262618-e-8 |website=The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind |language=en |doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001 |date=2009|isbn=978-0-19-926261-8 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Honderich |first1=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HONTOC-2 |chapter=Mind}}</ref> Thought may be seen as a form of program that can be executed in the same way by many different systems, including humans, animals, and even robots. According to one such view, whether something is a thought only depends on its role "in producing further internal states and verbal outputs".<ref>{{cite web |last1=Levin |first1=Janet |title=Functionalism: 2.2 Thinking Machines and the "Turing Test" |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/#ThiMacTurTes |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=22 October 2021 |date=2021}}</ref><ref name="Polger"/> Representationalism, on the other hand, focuses on the representational features of mental states and defines thoughts as sequences of intentional mental states.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Pitt |first1=David |title=Mental Representation: 1. The Representational Theory of Mind |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mental-representation/#Representational |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=22 October 2021 |date=2020}}</ref><ref name="RescorlaComputationalism"/> In this sense, computationalism is often combined with the language of thought hypothesis by interpreting these sequences as symbols whose order is governed by syntactic rules.<ref name="RescorlaComputationalism"/><ref name="RescorlaLOTH"/>

Various arguments have been raised against computationalism. In one sense, it seems trivial since almost any physical system can be described as executing computations and therefore as thinking. For example, it has been argued that the molecular movements in a regular wall can be understood as computing an algorithm since they are "isomorphic to the formal structure of the program" in question under the right interpretation.<ref name="RescorlaComputationalism"/> This would lead to the implausible conclusion that the wall is thinking. Another objection focuses on the idea that computationalism captures only some aspects of thought but is unable to account for other crucial aspects of human cognition.<ref name="RescorlaComputationalism"/><ref name="BritannicaComputationalism"/>