Editing Tariff (section)

== History ==
=== Ancient Greece ===
[[File:AtheneOudheid.JPG|thumb|In Ancient Greek, the port of Piraeus was connected to Athens with [[Long Walls]] that provided security for transportation of goods.]]
In the city state of [[Classical Athens|Athens]], the port of [[Piraeus]] enforced a system of levies to raise taxes for the Athenian government. Grain was a key commodity that was imported through the port, and Piraeus was one of the main ports in the [[east Mediterranean]]. A levy of two percent was placed on goods arriving in the market through the docks of Piraeus.<ref>{{cite book |last=Wilson |first=Nigel |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_TzjAQAAQBAJ&q=piraeus+ancient+greece&pg=PA573 |title=Encyclopedia of Ancient Greece |date=2013 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-136-78799-7 |language=en}}</ref> The Athenian government also placed restrictions on the lending of money and transport of grain to only be allowed through the port of Piraeus.<ref>{{cite book |last=Michell |first=H. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=njIDBAAAQBAJ&q=piraeus |title=The Economics of Ancient Greece |date=2014 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-107-41911-7 |page=253 |language=en}}</ref>

===Britain===
{{See also|Protectionism#In the United Kingdom}}
In the 14th century, [[Edward III of England|Edward III]] took interventionist measures, such as banning the import of woollen cloth in an attempt to develop local manufacturing. Beginning in 1489, [[Henry VII of England|Henry VII]] took actions such as increasing export duties on raw wool. The Tudor monarchs, especially [[Henry VIII]] and [[Elizabeth I]], used protectionism, subsidies, distribution of monopoly rights, government-sponsored industrial espionage and other means of government intervention to develop the wool industry, leading to England becoming the largest wool-producing nation in the world.<ref name=Chang />

A protectionist turning point in British economic policy came in 1721, when policies to promote manufacturing industries were introduced by [[Robert Walpole]]. These included, for example, increased tariffs on imported foreign manufactured goods, export subsidies, reduced tariffs on imported raw materials used for manufactured goods and the abolition of export duties on most manufactured goods. Thus, the UK was the first country to pursue a strategy of large-scale infant-industry development. These policies were similar to those used by countries such as [[Japan]], [[South Korea|Korea]] and [[Taiwan]] after the Second World War.<ref name="Chang" /> Outlining his policy, Walpole declared:<blockquote>Nothing contributes as much to the promotion of public welfare as the export of manufactured goods and the import of foreign raw materials.</blockquote>

Walpole's protectionist policies continued over the next century, helping British manufacturing catch up with and then leapfrog its continental counterparts. Britain remained a highly protectionist country until the mid-19th century. By 1820, the UK's average tariff rate on manufactured imports was 45-55%.<ref name=Chang /> Moreover, in its colonies, the UK imposed a total ban on advanced manufacturing activities that the country did not want to see developed. Walpole forced Americans to specialize in low-value-added products. The UK also banned exports from its colonies that competed with its own products at home and abroad. The country banned imports of cotton textiles from India, which at the time were superior to British products. It banned the export of woollen fabrics from its colonies to other countries (Wool Act). Finally, Britain wanted to ensure that the colonists stuck to the production of raw materials and never became a competitor to British manufacturers. Policies were established to encourage the production of raw materials in the colonies. Walpole granted export subsidies (on the American side) and abolished import taxes (on the British side) on raw materials produced in the American colonies. The colonies were thus forced to leave the most profitable industries in the hands of the United Kingdom.<ref name=Chang />

In 1800, Britain, with about 10% of Europe's population, supplied 29% of all [[pig iron]] produced in Europe, a proportion that had risen to 45% by 1830. Per capita industrial production was even higher: in 1830 it was 250% higher than in the rest of Europe, up from 110% in 1800.<ref name="Bairoch">{{cite book |last1=Bairoch |title=Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes |year=1993 |publisher=University of Chicago Press |isbn=9780226034621 |url=https://archive.org/details/economicsworldhi00bair |url-access=registration}}</ref>

Protectionist policies of industrial promotion continued until the mid-19th century. At the beginning of that century, the average tariff on British manufactured goods was about 50%, the highest of all major European countries. Despite its growing technological lead over other nations, the UK continued its policy of industrial promotion until the mid-19th century, maintaining very high tariffs on manufactured goods until the 1820s, two generations after the start of the [[Industrial Revolution]].

Free trade in Britain began in earnest with the [[repeal of the Corn Laws]] in 1846, which was equivalent to free trade in grain. The Corn Acts had been passed in 1815 to restrict wheat imports and to guarantee the incomes of British farmers; their repeal devastated Britain's old rural economy, but began to mitigate the effects of the [[Great Famine (Ireland)|Great Famine]] in Ireland. Tariffs on many manufactured goods were also abolished. But while free-trade was progressing in Britain, protectionism continued on the European mainland and in the United States.<ref name="Chang" />

Customs duties on many manufactured goods were also abolished. The Navigation Acts were abolished in 1849 when free traders won the public debate in the UK. But while free trade progressed in the UK, protectionism continued on the Continent. The UK practiced free trade unilaterally in the vain hope that other countries would follow, but the USA emerged from the Civil War even more explicitly protectionist than before, Germany under [[Otto von Bismarck|Bismarck]] rejected free trade, and the rest of Europe followed suit.<ref name="Chang" />

After the 1870s, the British economy continued to grow, but inexorably lagged behind the protectionist United States and Germany: from 1870 to 1913, industrial production grew at an average annual rate of 4.7% in the USA, 4.1% in Germany and only 2.1% in Great Britain. Thus, Britain was finally overtaken economically by the United States around 1880. British leadership in fields such as steel and textiles was eroded, and the country fell behind as new, more technologically advanced industries emerged after 1870 in other countries still practicing protectionism.<ref name=Bairoch />

On June 15, 1903, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, [[Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice, 5th Marquess of Lansdowne]], made a speech in the House of Lords in which he defended fiscal retaliation against countries that applied high tariffs and whose governments subsidised products sold in Britain (known as "premium products", later called "[[Dumping (pricing policy)|dumping]]"). The retaliation was to take the form of threats to impose duties in response to goods from that country. [[Liberal Unionists|Liberal unionists]] had split from the [[Liberal Party (UK)|liberals]], who advocated free trade, and this speech marked a turning point in the group's slide toward [[protectionism]]. Lansdowne argued that the threat of retaliatory tariffs was similar to gaining respect in a room of gunmen by pointing a big gun (his exact words were "a gun a little bigger than everyone else's"). The "Big Revolver" became a slogan of the time, often used in speeches and cartoons.<ref>{{cite book |author1=Hugh Montgomery |author2=Philip George Cambray |title=A Dictionary of Political Phrases and Allusions : With a short bibliography |publisher=S. Sonnenschein |url=https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.24174 |year=1906 |page=[https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.24174/page/n41 33]}}</ref>

In response to the [[Great Depression]], Britain abandoned free trade in 1932, recognizing that it had lost production capacity to the United States and Germany, which remained protectionist. The country reintroduced large-scale tariffs, but it was too late to re-establish the nation's position as a dominant economic power. In 1932, the level of industrialization in the United States was 50% higher than in the United Kingdom.<ref name="Chang" />

===United States===
{{See also|History of tariffs in the United States|Protectionism in the United States}}
[[File:Average tariff rates (France, UK, US).png|thumb|Average tariff rates (France, UK, US){{Update needed|date=November 2024}}]]
[[File:Average Tariff Rates in USA (1821-2016).png|thumb|Average tariff rates in US (1821–2016){{Update needed|date=November 2024}}]]
[[File:U.S. Trade Balance (1895–2015) and Trade Policies.png|thumb|US Trade Balance and Trade Policy (1895–2015){{Update needed|date=November 2024}}]]

Before the [[Constitution of the United States|new Constitution]] took effect in 1789, the Congress could not levy taxes{{snd}}it sold land or begged money from the states. The new national government needed revenue and decided to depend upon a tax on imports with the [[Tariff of 1789]].<ref>John C. Miller, ''The Federalist Era: 1789–1801'' (1960), pp. 14–15,</ref> The policy of the U.S. before 1860 was low tariffs "for revenue only" (since duties continued to fund the national government).<ref>Percy Ashley, ''Modern Tariff History: Germany, United States, France'' (3rd ed. 1920) pp. 133–265.</ref>

The [[Embargo Act of 1807]] was passed by the U.S. Congress in that year in response to European interference with American merchant shipping. While not a tariff per se, the Act prohibited the import of all kinds of manufactured imports, resulting in a huge drop in US trade and protests from all regions of the country. However, the embargo also had the effect of launching new, emerging US domestic industries across the board, particularly the textile industry, and marked the beginning of the manufacturing system in the United States.<ref>Smith, Ryan P., "A History of America's Ever-Shifting Stance on Tariffs: Unpacking a debate as old as the United States itself", ''Smithsonian Magazine'', 18 April 2018, retrieved 5 April 2023</ref>

An attempt at imposing a high tariff occurred in 1828, but the South denounced it as a "[[Tariff of Abominations]]" and it almost caused a rebellion in South Carolina until it was lowered.<ref>Robert V. Remini, "Martin Van Buren and the Tariff of Abominations." ''American Historical Review'' 63.4 (1958): 903–917.</ref>

Between 1816 and the end of the Second World War, the United States had one of the highest average tariff rates on manufactured imports in the world. According to Paul Bairoch, the United States was "the homeland and bastion of modern protectionism" during this period.<ref name=Chang1>{{cite web |url=http://www.ips-dc.org/kicking_away_the_ladder_the_real_history_of_free_trade/ |title=Kicking Away the Ladder: The 'Real' History of Free Trade |last1=Chang |first1=Ha-Joon |last2=Gershman |first2=John |publisher=Institute for Policy Studies |access-date=1 September 2017 |date=2003-12-30 |archive-date=2017-09-02 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170902002011/http://www.ips-dc.org/kicking_away_the_ladder_the_real_history_of_free_trade/ |url-status=live}}</ref>

Many American intellectuals and politicians during the country's catching-up period felt that the free trade theory advocated by British classical economists was not suited to their country. They argued that the country should develop manufacturing industries and use government protection and subsidies for this purpose, as Britain had done before them. Many of the American economists of the time, until the last quarter of the 19th century, were strong advocates of industrial protection: [[Daniel Raymond]] who influenced [[Friedrich List]], [[Mathew Carey]] and his son Henry, who was one of Lincoln's economic advisers. The intellectual leader of this movement was [[Alexander Hamilton]], the first Secretary of the Treasury of the United States (1789–1795). The United States rejected [[David Ricardo]]'s [[theory of comparative advantage]] and protected its industry. The country pursued a protectionist policy from the beginning of the 19th century until the middle of the 20th century, after the Second World War.<ref name=Chang1/><ref name="Chang"/>

In [[Report on Manufactures]], considered the first text to express modern protectionist theory, Alexander Hamilton argued that if a country wished to develop a new activity on its soil, it would have to temporarily protect it. According to him, this protection against foreign producers could take the form of import duties or, in rare cases, prohibition of imports. He called for customs barriers to allow American industrial development and to help protect infant industries, including bounties (subsidies) derived in part from those tariffs. He also believed that duties on raw materials should be generally low.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Dorfman & Tugwell |title=Early American Policy |date=1960}}</ref> Hamilton argued that despite an initial "increase of price" caused by regulations that control foreign competition, once a "domestic manufacture has attained to perfection... it invariably becomes cheaper.<ref name=Chang2/> In this report, Hamilton also proposed export bans on major raw materials, tariff reductions on industrial inputs, pricing and patenting of inventions, regulation of product standards and development of financial and transportation infrastructure. The U.S. Congress adopted the tariffs but refused to grant subsidies to manufactures.<ref name=Chang2/>

[[Alexander Hamilton]] and [[Daniel Raymond]] were among the first theorists to present the [[infant industry argument]]. Hamilton was the first to use the term "infant industries" and to introduce it to the forefront of economic thinking. Hamilton believed that political independence was predicated upon economic independence. Increasing the domestic supply of manufactured goods, particularly war materials, was seen as an issue of national security. And he feared that Britain's policy towards the colonies would condemn the United States to be only producers of agricultural products and raw materials.<ref name=Chang1/><ref name=Chang2/>

Britain initially did not want to industrialise the American colonies, and implemented policies to that effect (for example, banning high value-added manufacturing activities). Under British rule, America was denied the use of tariffs to protect its new industries. This explains why, after independence, the Tariff Act of 1789 was the second bill of the Republic signed by President Washington allowing Congress to impose a fixed tariff of 5% on all imports, with a few exceptions.<ref name="Chang2">{{cite book |author1=Ha-Joon Chang |title=Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective}}</ref>

The Congress passed a tariff act (1789), imposing a 5% flat rate tariff on all imports.<ref name="Bairoch"/> Between 1792 and the war with Britain in 1812, the average tariff level remained around 12.5%, which was too low to encourage consumers to buy domestic products and thus support emerging American industries. When the [[War of 1812]] broke out, all rates doubled to an average of 25% to account for increased government spending. The war paved the way for new industries by disrupting manufacturing imports from the UK and the rest of Europe. A major policy shift occurred in 1816, when American manufacturers who had benefited from the tariffs lobbied to retain them. New legislation was introduced to keep tariffs at the same levels —especially protected were cotton, woolen, and iron goods.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Thomas C. Cochran, William Miller |title=The Age of Enterprise: A Social History of Industrial America |date=1942}}</ref> The American industrial interests that had blossomed because of the tariff lobbied to keep it, and had it raised to 35 percent in 1816. The public approved, and by 1820, America's average tariff was up to 40 percent.

===19th century onwards===
In the 19th century, statesmen such as Senator [[Henry Clay]] continued Hamilton's themes within the [[Whig Party (United States)|Whig Party]] under the name "[[American System (economic plan)|American System]]" which consisted of protecting industries and developing infrastructure in explicit opposition to the "British system" of free trade.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Luthin |first1=Reinhard H. |title=Abraham Lincoln and the Tariff |journal=The American Historical Review |date=1944 |volume=49 |issue=4 |pages=609–629 |doi=10.2307/1850218 |jstor=1850218}}</ref> Before 1860 they were always defeated by the low-tariff Democrats.<ref>William K. Bolt, ''Tariff Wars and the Politics of Jacksonian America'' (2017) covers 1816 to 1861.</ref>

From 1846 to 1861, American tariffs were lowered but this was followed by a series of recessions and the 1857 panic, which eventually led to higher demands for tariffs than President James Buchanan signed in 1861 (Morrill Tariff).<ref name=Chang1/><ref name=Chang2/>

During the American Civil War (1861–1865), agrarian interests in the South were opposed to any protection, while manufacturing interests in the North wanted to maintain it. The war marked the triumph of the protectionists of the industrial states of the North over the free traders of the South. Abraham Lincoln was a protectionist like Henry Clay of the Whig Party, who advocated the "American system" based on infrastructure development and protectionism. Once elected, Lincoln implemented a 44-percent tariff during the [[American Civil War|Civil War]]—in part to pay for railroad subsidies and for the war effort, and to protect favored industries. After the war, tariffs remained at or above wartime levels. High tariffs were a policy designed to encourage rapid industrialisation and protect the high American wage rates.<ref name="Chang2" />

The policy from 1860 to 1933 was usually high protective tariffs (apart from 1913 to 1921). After 1890, the tariff on wool did affect an important industry, but otherwise the tariffs were designed to keep American wages high. The conservative Republican tradition, typified by [[William McKinley]] was a high tariff, while the Democrats typically called for a lower tariff to help consumers but they always failed until 1913.<ref name=Taussig1931>F.W. Taussig,. ''The Tariff History of the United States''. 8th ed. (1931); [https://books.google.com/books?id=MyqgiptJzfwC 5th ed. 1910 is online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230107190506/https://books.google.com/books?id=MyqgiptJzfwC |date=2023-01-07 }}</ref><ref>Robert W. Merry, ''President McKinley: Architect of the American Century'' (2017) pp. 70–83.</ref>

In the early 1860s, Europe and the United States pursued completely different trade policies. The 1860s were a period of growing protectionism in the United States, while the European free trade phase lasted from 1860 to 1892. The tariff average rate on imports of manufactured goods in 1875 was from 40% to 50% in the United States, against 9% to 12% in continental Europe at the height of free trade.<ref name=Bairoch />

After the United States caught up with European industries in the 1890s, the [[Mckinley Tariff]]'s argument was no longer to protect "infant industries", but to maintain workers' wages, support agricultural protection and the principle of reciprocity.<ref name=Bairoch />

In 1913, following the electoral victory of the Democrats in 1912, there was a significant reduction in the average tariff on manufactured goods from 44% to 25%. However, the First World War rendered this bill ineffective, and new "emergency" tariff legislation was introduced in 1922 after the Republicans returned to power in 1921.<ref name="Chang2" />

According to economic historian Douglas Irwin, a common myth about United States trade policy is that low tariffs harmed American manufacturers in the early 19th century and then that high tariffs made the United States into a great industrial power in the late 19th century.<ref name="The Economist 20171126">{{cite news |url=https://www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts/21731616-douglas-irwin-agrees-trade-policy-important-all-manner-powers-are-wrongly |title=A historian on the myths of American trade |newspaper=The Economist |access-date=2017-11-26 |language=en |archive-date=2017-11-26 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171126044721/https://www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts/21731616-douglas-irwin-agrees-trade-policy-important-all-manner-powers-are-wrongly |url-status=live}}</ref> A review by the ''Economist'' of Irwin's 2017 book ''Clashing over Commerce: A History of US Trade Policy'' notes:<ref name="The Economist 20171126" /><blockquote>Political dynamics would lead people to see a link between tariffs and the economic cycle that was not there. A boom would generate enough revenue for tariffs to fall, and when the bust came pressure would build to raise them again. By the time that happened, the economy would be recovering, giving the impression that tariff cuts caused the crash and the reverse generated the recovery. Mr Irwin also methodically debunks the idea that protectionism made America a great industrial power, a notion believed by some to offer lessons for developing countries today. As its share of global manufacturing powered from 23% in 1870 to 36% in 1913, the admittedly high tariffs of the time came with a cost, estimated at around 0.5% of GDP in the mid-1870s. In some industries, they might have sped up development by a few years. But American growth during its protectionist period had more to do with its abundant resources and openness to people and ideas.</blockquote>

===Tariffs and the Great Depression===
{{more|Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act}}
Economist [[Douglas A. Irwin]] assesses the impact of the Hwaley-Smoot Act: in the two years following the imposition of the Smoot-Hawley tariff in June 1930, the volume of U.S. imports fell by over 40%. He shows that part of this collapse in trade is attributed to the tariff itself, and not to other factors such as falling incomes or foreign retaliation. Partial and general equilibrium evaluations indicate that the Smoot-Hawley tariff reduced imports by between 4% and 8% (ceteris paribus). In addition, a counterfactual simulation suggests that almost a quarter of the observed 40% drop in imports can be attributed to the increase in the effective tariff (i.e. Smoot-Hawley plus deflation).<ref name="Peddling Protectionism"></ref>

Irwin argues that while the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act was not the primary cause of the Great Depression, it contributed to its severity by provoking international retaliation and reducing global trade. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act raised the average level of tariffs on dutiable imports by 15 to 18 percent. What mitigated the impact of Smoot-Hawley was the small size of the trade sector at the time. Only a third of total imports to the United States in 1930 were subject to duties, and those dutiable imports represented only 1.4 percent of GDP. According to Irwin, there is no evidence that the legislation achieved its goals of net job creation or economic recovery. Even from a Keynesian perspective, the policy was counterproductive, as the decline in exports exceeded the reduction in imports. While falling foreign incomes were a key factor in the collapse of U.S. exports, the tariff also limited foreign access to U.S. dollars, appreciating the currency and making American goods less competitive abroad. Irwin emphasizes that one of the most damaging consequences of the Act was the deterioration of the United States' trade relations with key partners. Enacted at a time when the League of Nations was seeking to implement a global "tariff truce", the Smoot-Hawley Tariff was widely perceived as a unilateral and hostile move, undermining international cooperation. In his assessment, the most significant long-term impact was that the resentment it generated encouraged other countries to form discriminatory trading blocs. These preferential arrangements, diverted trade away from the United States and hindered the global economic recovery.<ref name="Peddling Protectionism">{{cite journal |author=Daniel Griswold |title=Peddling Protectionism: Smoot-Hawley and the Great Depression |journal=Cato Journal |volume=31 |issue=3 |pages=661–665 |date=2011 |url=https://www.proquest.com/docview/905851675 |access-date=3 April 2025 |id={{ProQuest|905851675}}}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Irwin |first=Douglas A. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=oz_BDgAAQBAJ&pg=PA116 |title=Peddling Protectionism: Smoot-Hawley and the Great Depression |publisher=Princeton University Press |year=2011 |isbn=9781400888429 |page=116}}</ref>

In a November 2024 article,''[[The Economist]]'' observed that the Act, "which raised average tariffs on imports by around 20% and incited a tit-for-tat trade war, was devastatingly effective: global trade fell by two-thirds. It was so catastrophic global trade fell by two-thirds. It was so catastrophic for growth in America and around the world that legislators have not touched the issue since. 'Smoot-Hawley' became synonymous with disastrous policy making".<ref>{{cite magazine |magazine=The Economist |first=Alice |last=Fulwood |title=What Donald Trump's election means for the global economy |url=https://www.economist.com/the-world-ahead/2024/11/20/what-donald-trumps-election-means-for-the-global-economy |date=20 November 2024}} Alice Fulwood is Wall Street editor of the Economist</ref>

Economist [[Milton Friedman]] argued that while the tariffs of 1930 caused harm, they were not the main cause for the Great Depression. He placed greater blame on the lack of sufficient action on the part of the Federal Reserve.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Noble |first=Holcombe B. |date=2006-11-16 |title=Milton Friedman, Free Markets Theorist, Dies at 94 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/16/business/17friedmancnd.html |access-date=2025-02-13 |work=[[The New York Times]]}}</ref>

[[Paul Krugman]] writes that protectionism does not lead to recessions. According to him, the decrease in imports (which can be obtained by introducing tariffs) has an expansive effect, that is, it is favourable to growth. Thus, in a trade war, since exports and imports will decrease equally, for everyone, the negative effect of a decrease in exports will be offset by the expansionary effect of a decrease in imports. Therefore, a trade war does not cause a recession. Furthermore, in his view,  the [[Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act]] did not cause the Great Depression and that the decline in trade between 1929 and 1933 "was almost entirely a consequence of the Depression, not a cause. Trade barriers were a response to the Depression".<ref>{{Cite web |last=Krugman |first=Paul |date=2016-03-04 |title=The Mitt-Hawley Fallacy |url=https://archive.nytimes.com/krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/03/04/the-mitt-hawley-fallacy/ |access-date=2024-11-01 |website=Paul Krugman Blog |language=en}}</ref> 

[[Peter Temin]], an economist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has agreed that the contractionary effect of the tariff was small.<ref>{{cite book |last=Temin |first=P. |year=1989 |title=Lessons from the Great Depression |publisher=[[MIT Press]] |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=squLnSDrJ4EC&q=peter+temin+smoot+hawley+Lessons+from+the+Great+Depression&pg=PA46 |isbn=9780262261197}}</ref>{{Page needed|date=November 2024}} Other economists have contended that the record tariffs of the 1920s and early 1930s exacerbated the [[Great Depression in the United States|Great Depression in the U.S.]], in part because of retaliatory tariffs imposed by other countries on the United States.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Guzik |first=Erik |date=2024-10-31 |title=Tariffs are back in the spotlight, but skepticism of free trade has deep roots in American history |url=https://theconversation.com/tariffs-are-back-in-the-spotlight-but-skepticism-of-free-trade-has-deep-roots-in-american-history-241311 |access-date=2024-11-01 |website=The Conversation |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite magazine |last=Schulman |first=Bruce J. |date=2024-10-24 |title=Tariffs Don't Have to Make Economic Sense to Appeal to Trump Voters |url=https://time.com/7095746/trump-tariffs-politics-rhetoric/ |access-date=2024-11-01 |magazine=TIME |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Helm |first=Sally |date=April 5, 2018 |title=Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act: A Classic Economics Horror Story |url=https://www.npr.org/2018/04/05/599707003/smoot-hawley-tariff-act-a-classic-economics-horror-story |work=NPR}}</ref>
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