Editing Syllogism (section)

===Aristotle===
{{main|Term logic}}
[[Aristotle]] defines the syllogism as "a discourse in which certain (specific) things having been supposed, something different from the things supposed results of necessity because these things are so."<ref>[[Aristotle]], ''[[Prior Analytics]]'', 24b18–20</ref> Despite this very general definition, in ''[[Prior Analytics]]'' Aristotle limits himself to categorical syllogisms that consist of three [[categorical proposition]]s, including categorical [[modal logic|modal]] syllogisms.<ref>[[Susanne Bobzien|Bobzien, Susanne]]. [2006] 2020. "[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-ancient/ Ancient Logic]." ''[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]''. § [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-ancient/#Ari Aristotle].</ref>

The use of syllogisms as a tool for understanding can be dated back to the logical reasoning discussions of [[Aristotle]]. Before the mid-12th century, medieval logicians were only familiar with a portion of Aristotle's works, including such titles as ''[[Categories (Aristotle)|Categories]]'' and ''[[On Interpretation]]'', works that contributed heavily to the prevailing Old Logic, or ''[[logica vetus]]''. The onset of a New Logic, or ''[[logica nova]]'', arose alongside the reappearance of ''Prior Analytics'', the work in which Aristotle developed his theory of the syllogism.

''Prior Analytics'', upon rediscovery, was instantly regarded by logicians as "a closed and complete body of doctrine", leaving very little for thinkers of the day to debate, and reorganize. Aristotle's theory on the syllogism for ''[[assertoric]]'' sentences was considered especially remarkable, with only small systematic changes occurring to the concept over time. This theory of the syllogism would not enter the context of the more comprehensive logic of consequence until logic began to be reworked in general in the mid-14th century by the likes of [[John Buridan]].

Aristotle's ''Prior Analytics'' did not, however, incorporate such a comprehensive theory on the modal syllogism—a syllogism that has at least one [[Modal logic|modalized]] premise, that is, a premise containing the modal words ''necessarily'', ''possibly'', or ''contingently''. Aristotle's terminology in this aspect of his theory was deemed vague, and in many cases unclear, even contradicting some of his statements from ''On Interpretation''. His original assertions on this specific component of the theory were left up to a considerable amount of conversation, resulting in a wide array of solutions put forth by commentators of the day. The system for modal syllogisms laid forth by Aristotle would ultimately be deemed unfit for practical use, and would be replaced by new distinctions and new theories altogether.