Editing Speech act (section)

==Overview==
{{main|locutionary act|illocutionary act|perlocutionary act|metalocutionary act}}
Speech acts can be analysed on multiple levels:

# A '''locutionary act''': the performance of an [[utterance]]: the actual utterance and its apparent meaning, comprising any and all of its verbal, social, and rhetorical meanings, all of which correspond to the verbal, syntactic and semantic aspects of any meaningful utterance;
# an '''illocutionary act''': the active result of the implied request or meaning presented by the locutionary act. For example, if the locutionary act in an interaction is the question "Is there any salt?" the implied illocutionary request is "Please pass the salt to me." or at least "I wish to add salt to my meal.";
# and under certain conditions a further '''perlocutionary act''': the actual effect of the locutionary and illocutionary acts, such as persuading, convincing, scaring, enlightening, inspiring, or otherwise getting someone to do or realize something, whether intended or not.<ref name=":0" />
# Additionally, a '''metalocutionary act''' categorizes speech acts that refer to the forms and functions of the discourse itself rather than continuing the substantive development of the discourse, or to the configurational functions of [[Prosody (linguistics)|prosody]] and [[punctuation]].<ref>Gibbon, D., "A New Look at Intonation Syntax and Semantics", in A. R. James & P. Westney, eds., ''New Linguistic Impulses in Foreign Language Teaching'' ([[Tübingen]]: Gunter Narr Verlag, 1981), esp. [https://books.google.com/books?id=QTw3Jzyd6_4C&pg=PA88 pp. 88–93].</ref>{{rp|88–93}}

===Illocutionary acts===
The concept of an [[illocutionary act]] is central to the concept of a speech act. Although there are several scholarly opinions regarding how to define 'illocutionary acts', there are some kinds of acts that are widely accepted as illocutionary. Examples of these widely accepted acts are commands or promises.

The first of these opinions is the one held by [[John L. Austin]] who coined the term "speech act" in his book ''[[How to Do Things with Words]]'' published posthumously in 1962.<ref name=":0" />  According to Austin's preliminary informal description, the idea of an "illocutionary act" can be captured by emphasizing that "by saying something, we ''do'' something", as when someone issues an order to someone to go by saying "Go!", or when a minister joins two people in marriage saying, "I now pronounce you husband and wife." (Austin would eventually define the "illocutionary act" in a more exact manner.)

[[John R. Searle]] gave an alternative to Austin's explanation of the illocutionary act saying, a "speech act" is often meant to refer to exactly the same thing as the term illocutionary act. Searle's work on speech acts is understood to further refine Austin's conception. However, some philosophers have pointed out a significant difference between the two conceptions: whereas Austin emphasized the conventional interpretation of speech acts, Searle emphasized a psychological interpretation (based on beliefs, intentions, etc.).<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/consciousness-and-language/C57EB3F8CA2E04CB15256B3E8DCE8D79|title=Consciousness and Language by John R. Searle|last=Searle|first=John R.|date=July 2002|publisher=Cambridge Core|doi=10.1017/cbo9780511606366|access-date=2019-03-04|isbn=9780511606366}}</ref>

=== Perlocutionary acts ===
While illocutionary acts relate more to the speaker, [[perlocutionary act]]s are centered around the listener. Perlocutionary acts always have a 'perlocutionary effect', which is the effect a speech act has on a listener. This could affect the listener's thoughts, emotions or even their physical actions.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Blackwell Textbook In Linguistics|last=Birner|first=Betty J.|publisher=Wiley-Blackwell|year=2013|pages=187}}</ref> An example of this could be if someone uttered the sentence "I'm hungry." The perlocutionary effect on the listener could be the effect of being persuaded by the utterance. For example, after hearing the utterance, the listener could be persuaded to make a sandwich for the speaker.

===Performative speech acts===
An interesting type of illocutionary speech act is that performed in the utterance of what Austin calls [[performative utterance]]s, typical instances of which are "I nominate John to be President", "I sentence you to ten years' imprisonment", or "I promise to pay you back." In these typical, rather explicit cases of performative sentences, the action that the sentence describes (nominating, sentencing, promising) is performed by the utterance of the sentence itself. J.L. Austin claimed that performative sentences could be "happy or unhappy". They were only happy if the speaker does the actions he or she talks about. They were unhappy if this did not happen. Performative speech acts also use explicit verbs instead of implicit ones. For example, stating "I intend to go." does convey information, but it does not really mean that you are [e.g.] ''promising'' to go; so it does not count as "performing" an action ("such as" the action of promising to go). Therefore, it [the word "intend"] is an implicit verb; i.e., a verb that would not be suitable for use in performative speech acts.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Essays in speech act theory|date=2001|publisher=J. Benjamins Pub. Co|editor1=Vanderveken, Daniel |editor2=Kubo, Susumu |isbn=9789027298157|location=Amsterdam|oclc=70766237}}</ref>

===Indirect speech acts===
{{Unsourced|section|date=June 2024}}
In the course of performing speech acts people communicate with each other. The content of communication may be identical, or almost identical, with the content intended to be communicated, as when a stranger asks, "What is your name?" However, the meaning of the linguistic means used may also be different from the content intended to be communicated. One may, in appropriate circumstances, request Peter to do the dishes by just saying, "Peter ...!", or one can promise to do the dishes by saying, "Me!"{{citation needed|date=January 2022}}

One common way of performing speech acts is to use an expression, which indicates one speech act, and indeed performs this act, but also performs a further speech act, which is indirect. One may, for instance, say, "Peter, can you close the window?", thereby asking Peter whether he will be able to close the window, but also requesting that he does so. Since the request is performed indirectly, by means of (directly) performing a question, it counts as an [[indirect speech act]].{{cn|date=June 2024}}

An even more indirect way of making such a request would be to say, in Peter's presence in the room with the open window, "I'm cold." The speaker of this request must rely upon Peter's understanding of several items of information that is not explicit: that the window is open and is the cause of them being cold, that being cold is an uncomfortable sensation and they wish it to be taken care of, and that Peter cares to rectify this situation by closing the window. This, of course, depends much on the relationship between the requester and Peter—he might understand the request differently if they were his boss at work than if they were his girlfriend or boyfriend at home. The more presumed information pertaining to the request, the more indirect the speech act may be considered to be.{{citation needed|date=January 2022}}

Indirect speech acts are commonly used to reject proposals and to make requests. For example, if a speaker asks, "Would you like to meet me for coffee?" and the other replies, "I have class", the second speaker has used an indirect speech act to reject the proposal. This is indirect because the literal meaning of "I have class" does not entail any sort of rejection.{{citation needed|date=January 2022}}

This poses a problem for [[linguists]], as it is confusing to see how the person who made the proposal can understand that his proposal was rejected. In 1975 John Searle suggested that the illocutionary force of indirect speech acts can be derived by means of a [[H. P. Grice|Gricean]] reasoning process;<ref>{{Cite encyclopedia |last=Searle |first= John R. |title=Indirect Speech Acts |encyclopedia=Speech Acts |series=Syntax and Semantics |volume=3 |year=1975 |publisher=Academic Press |location=New York |pages=59–82 |isbn=0-12-785423-1 }}</ref> however, the process he proposes does not seem to accurately solve the problem {{citation needed |date=February 2020 |reason=Who makes this claim?}}.

In other words, this means that one does not need to say the words apologize, pledge, or praise in order to show they are doing the action. All the examples above show how the actions and indirect words make something happen rather than coming out straightforward with specific words and saying it.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Linguistics 001 -- Lecture 13 -- Pragmatics |url=https://www.ling.upenn.edu/courses/Fall_2019/ling001/pragmatics.html |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20240416051206/https://www.ling.upenn.edu/courses/Fall_2019/ling001/pragmatics.html |archive-date=2024-04-16 |access-date=2025-01-01 |website=www.ling.upenn.edu}}</ref>