Editing Six-Day War (section)

=== Military preparation ===
Before the war, Israeli pilots and ground crews had trained extensively in rapid refitting of aircraft returning from [[sortie]]s, enabling a single aircraft to sortie up to four times a day, as opposed to the norm in Arab air forces of one or two sorties per day. This enabled the [[Israeli Air Force]] (IAF) to send several attack waves against Egyptian airfields on the first day of the war, overwhelming the Egyptian Air Force and allowed it to knock out other Arab air forces on the same day. This has contributed to the Arab belief that the IAF was helped by foreign air forces (see [[Controversies relating to the Six-Day War#Combat support|Controversies relating to the Six-Day War]]). Pilots were extensively schooled about their targets, were forced to memorize every single detail, and rehearsed the operation multiple times on dummy runways in total secrecy.

The Egyptians had constructed fortified defenses in the Sinai. These designs were based on the assumption that an attack would come along the few roads leading through the desert, rather than through the difficult desert terrain. The Israelis chose not to risk attacking the Egyptian defenses head-on, and instead surprised them from an unexpected direction.

James Reston, writing in ''[[The New York Times]]'' on 23 May 1967, noted, "In; discipline, training, morale, equipment and general competence his [Nasser's] army and the other Arab forces, without the direct assistance of the Soviet Union, are no match for the Israelis. ... Even with 50,000 troops and the best of his generals and air force in Yemen, he has not been able to work his way in that small and primitive country, and even his effort to help the Congo rebels was a flop."<ref>{{Cite news |author=Reston, James |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1967/05/24/archives/washington-nassers-reckless-maneuvers-cairo-and-moscow-the-us.html |title=Washington: Nasser's Reckless Maneuvers; Cairo and Moscow The U.S. Commitment The Staggering Economy Moscow's Role |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=24 May 1967 |page=46 |access-date=22 July 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180706021950/https://www.nytimes.com/1967/05/24/archives/washington-nassers-reckless-maneuvers-cairo-and-moscow-the-us.html |archive-date=6 July 2018 |url-status=live }}</ref>

On the eve of the war, Israel believed it could win a war in 3–4 days. The United States estimated Israel would need 7–10 days to win, with British estimates supporting the U.S. view.{{Sfnp|Quigley|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=0zEi3qGWLFIC&pg=PA60 60]}}<ref>{{Cite web |title=Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967 – Office of the Historian |url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d130 |website=history.state.gov |access-date=8 June 2019 |archive-date=17 March 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200317083302/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d130 |url-status=live }}</ref>