Editing Simplicius of Cilicia (section)

==Philosophy==
{{Neoplatonism}}
One of Simplicius' main concerns was the harmonization of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy. Simplicius, as a Neoplatonist, endeavoured to show that [[Aristotle]] agrees with [[Plato]] even on those points which he controverts, so that he may lead the way to their deeper, hidden meaning. This systematic exposition was part of the widespread effort in late antique Neoplatonism to present the most well-known authorities of the classical pagan tradition as representatives of one and the same venerable doctrine,  which was intended to present it as a superior alternative to Christianity, and to refute the Christian argument that because  the pagan thinkers differ among themselves, they therefore do not possess the truth. Simplicius argued that Aristotle's objections to Plato's teachings did not concern the factual core, but only differed in certain formulations. Simplicius explained his approach on the occasion of his examination of the [[philosophy of time]], arguing that it is not important to know Aristotle's view of this problem; rather, one must first recognize what time actually is.<ref>Simplicius, On Aristotle's Physics p. 773</ref> Then, starting from there, one could get closer to Aristotle's insights. In other respects, too, he postulated a fundamental agreement between the core ideas of the important philosophical teachers and directions, insofar as they seemed to be compatible with the Neoplatonic world view. When in doubt, he opted for a harmonizing interpretation. Where this was not possible, he took a clear position, such as with his rejection of the [[materialism]] of the Stoics.<ref>Han Baltussen: ''Simplicius of Cilicia.'' In: Lloyd P. Gerson (Hrsg.): ''The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity.'' Band 2, Cambridge 2010, p 715–717, 720, 725; Constance Blackwell: ''Neo-Platonic modes of concordism versus definitions of difference''. In: Stephen Clucas: ''Laus Platonici Philosophi.'' Leiden 2011, p. 322–324; Heinrich Dörrie, Matthias Baltes: ''Der Platonismus in der Antike.'' Band 3, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1993, S.&nbsp;248–250; [[Rachel Barney]]: ''Simplicius: Commentary, Harmony, and Authority''. In: ''Antiquorum Philosophia'' 3, 2009, p. 101–119.</ref>

In his view not only [[Plotinus]], but also [[Syrianus]], [[Proclus]], and [[Ammonius Hermiae|Ammonius]], are great philosophers, who have penetrated into the depths of the wisdom of Plato. Many of the more ancient Greek philosophers he also brings into a connection with Platonism. He is, however, distinguished from his predecessors, whom he so admires, in making less frequent application of [[Orphism (religion)|Orphic]], [[Hermeticism|Hermetic]], [[Chaldean Oracles|Chaldean]], and other ''Theologumena'' of the East; partly in proceeding carefully and modestly in the explanation and criticism of particular points, and in striving with diligence to draw from the original sources a thorough knowledge of the older Greek philosophy. Although averse to [[Christianity]] he abstains from assailing Christian doctrines, even when he combats expressly the work of his contemporary, [[John Philoponus]], directed against the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the universe.<ref>Simplicius, ''in Arist. de Caelo'', 6, b, etc., 72; ''in Phys. Ausc.'' 257, 262, etc., 312, etc., 320.</ref> In [[Ethics]] he seems to have abandoned the [[mystical]] [[pantheistic]] purification-theory of the Neoplatonists, and to have found full satisfaction in the ethical system of the later Stoics, however little he was disposed towards their logical and physical doctrines.

=== Astronomy ===
Aristotle had already taken the view that mathematics, as a superordinate science, was allowed to provide axioms to a subordinate science such as astronomy and was responsible for the justification and explanation of astronomical phenomena; the superordinate science knows the causes, the subordinate only the facts. Following this principle, Aristotle used geometric definitions and insights for his cosmological explanations. Philoponus turned against his method of argumentation, believing that a mathematical argument related to physics could be invalidated by pointing to the nature of physical reality, which so limited the mathematical possibility that the argument lost its basis. Thus, mathematical principles are not fully applicable in the physical world. This view met with vehement criticism from Simplicius, who called for an unimpeded transition from physics to its mathematical principles and, conversely, an unrestricted application of mathematical principles to physics, and especially to astronomy. He considered [[deductive reasoning]] to be more important than gaining insights through [[induction (philosophy)|induction]]. Accordingly, he presented Aristotelian cosmology as a strictly deductive system.<ref>Frans A. J. de Haas: ''Mathematik und Phänomene. Eine Polemik über naturwissenschaftliche Methode bei Simplikios''. In: ''Antike Naturwissenschaft und ihre Rezeption'' 10, 2000, S.&nbsp;107–129.</ref>

In astronomy, Simplicius, like Aristotle, presupposed the [[geocentrism]] that was prevalent in antiquity that the Earth was at rest in the center of the universe. With regard to the movements of the stars, however, he deviated from the Aristotelian model, which envisages transparent, uniformly rotating hollow balls (spheres) arranged concentrically around the center of the world, to which the stars are attached, keeping the celestial bodies in their constant orbits. Simplicius thought that this concept was partly superseded by the later astronomical findings presented by [[Claudius Ptolemy|Ptolemy]]. But he did not consider Ptolemy's model to be the final solution either. He was of the opinion that none of the previous theories offered a satisfactory account and explanation of the planetary motions, none was necessarily and demonstrably correct. His own theory also failed to meet his criteria for scientific proof. In contrast to Aristotle, he assumed an axial rotation of all celestial bodies and did not consider their circular movements to be [[concentric spheres|homocentric]]. According to his idea, only the sphere of the fixed stars revolves around the center of the universe; the planets, which in ancient times also included the Sun and the Moon, perform a more complex motion that involves at least one circular motion that is not centered on the Earth.{{sfn|Bowen|2012|pp=14, 27–38}}

Following on from Aristotle, Simplicius distinguished between the approaches of two types of natural scientists: the "physicist" ''(physicós),'' by which he meant a [[natural philosophy|natural philosopher]], and the "mathematician", i.e. a non-philosopher, who tries to grasp physical conditions with mathematical means. A special case of such a “mathematician” is the astronomer. Both types of researchers study the same subject, but in different ways. The "physicist" inquires into the nature of the [[celestial spheres]] and heavenly bodies, he considers them from a qualitative point of view, while the astronomer deals with quantitative points of view, relying on arithmetic and geometrical reasoning. The "physicist" asks about causal connections, the astronomer limits himself to a description that is intended to do justice to the observed phenomena without explaining them causally. Simplicius considered the natural-philosophical, "physical" approach to be the only scientifically profitable one. He believed that astronomers should not be satisfied with devising "hypotheses" – mere rules of calculation – but should use a physical theory well founded by causal argumentation as the starting point for their considerations. Only such a well-founded astronomy can provide real insights. It must be able to explain all observed phenomena, including apparent variations in the size of celestial bodies.{{sfn|Bowen|2012|pp=38-52}}

=== Ontology ===
Aristotle said the universe is not located in one particular place. It cannot be localized, because outside of the spherical sky, which is surrounded and delimited by nothing, there is no reality. Simplicius disagreed with this view. He argued that, according to Aristotelian teaching, the circular motion of the celestial sphere was a local motion, that is, a change of place, and that this implied that the heavens were in one place.<ref>Simplicius, ''Physics'' 601,26–603,22.</ref> Simplicius saw the reason for Aristotle's error in the inadequacy of the Aristotelian definition of the term "place". Aristotle had defined place as the boundary between an enclosure and an enclosed. In doing so, he defined it as a two-dimensional surface. Accordingly, the uninhabited heaven could have no place. Simplicius asked whether “enclosure” meant enveloping from the outside or penetrating what was contained. Both lead to a contradiction: if the enclosure penetrates the enclosed, the place is not the limit; if the place only encloses what is contained, it is only the surface of what is contained and not the latter itself in a place, which is absurd.<ref>Simplicius, ''Physics'' 604,12–605,5.</ref> 

Simplicius opposed Aristotle's concept with his own understanding of place, that place is a space (χώρα, ''chṓra'') and a "vessel" (ὑποδοχή, ''hypodochḗ''),<ref>Simplicius, ''Physics'' 608,4–5.</ref> or an expanded reality affecting all parts of a thing in place. It is not a hollow space and also not – as [[Proclus]] thought – an immaterial body, but material and extended. The matter of the place is not the same as that of the body that is in place; rather, they are two different kinds of matter. There is no inconsistency in this, because from Simplicius' point of view nothing stands in the way of a mutual penetration of two matters.<ref>Simplicius, ''Physics'' 623,1–19.</ref> Place is not an [[accident (philosophy)|accident]], a property of something (such as spatial extension, which a thing has as one of its properties and which is described in the [[category (philosophy)|category]] under [[quantity]]). Rather, it is itself an extended [[ousia]] ("beingness", often translated as "substance"). It plays an important role in the world order, for it is the measure that assigns each body its place and within the bodies its parts. Thus, place is not a neutral space in which objects happen to be located, but is the principle of the ordered structure of the entire cosmos and each individual thing. Place does not passively absorb things, but powerfully shapes the relationships between them.<ref>On this doctrine see Gerard Verbeke: ''Place and space according to Aristotle and Simplicios. A philosophical topology''. In: Johannes Irmscher, Reimar Müller (ed.): ''Aristotle as a philosopher of science.'' Berlin 1983, pp. 113–122, here: 118–122; Richard Sorabji: ''Introduction''. In: James O. Urmson (translator): ''Simplicius: Corollaries on Place and Time.'' London 1992, pp. 1–10, here 1–5.</ref>

=== Eternity of the world ===
Like Aristotle, Simplicius believed that the spatial extent of the universe was finite. He defended the Aristotelian doctrine of the [[eternity of the world|eternity and indestructibility of the cosmos]] against the position of [[John Philoponus]], who, as a Christian, accepted creation as the temporal beginning and a future end of the world and justified his view philosophically. One of Philoponus' arguments was that if the world has no beginning in time, an infinite number of days must already have passed. But if the number of days that make up the past is infinite, the present day could never have been reached, for that would have ended a succession of infinitely many days. On the other hand, Simplicius argued that the past years, since they belonged to the past, no longer existed; it is therefore not a matter of traversing a set of infinitely many real – not just potential – existing units, which Aristotle ruled out.{{sfn|Sorabji|1987|pp=164-178}}{{sfn|Bowen|2012|pp=11–14}}{{sfn|Hoffman|1987}}

=== Cosmology ===
In his ''Commentary on the Enchiridion'', Simplicius defended Neoplatonic [[monism]], according to which there is only one basic principle called "[[The One (Neoplatonism)|The One]]" that is the sole origin of all beings and [[The Form of the Good]], against [[Manichaeism]], a religious doctrine that had been widespread since the 3rd century that offered a dualistic explanation of [[Good and evil]].<ref>Simplicius, ''In enchiridion'' 35:90–91.</ref> According to Manichaean dualism, the cosmos is divided between a kingdom of good and a kingdom of [[Evil]], irreconcilable adversaries that are in constant struggle. 

Simplicius attacked this cosmogony, accusing the Manichean myths of not being true myths but monstrosities. He also faulted the Manicheans themselves for not understanding that mythical representations are not true in the literal sense, but are to be interpreted symbolically.<ref>Ilsetraut Hadot (ed.): ''Simplicius: Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Épictète.'' Leiden 1996, p .&nbsp;140.</ref> As a Neoplatonist, Simplicius opposed this Manichean dualism and saw evil ''(kakón)'' as merely an absence of good rather than a separate principle in itself. According to Simplicius, following Plato and Aristotle, all striving is aimed at the Good and no one willingly chooses evil; someone who pursues evil either failed to recognize it and went astray, or accepted for the sake of a greater good. Wrong decisions and wickedness in a person are therefore only the result of a lack of insight, not of an evil nature in him. According to Simplicius, even if there were something inherently bad, it would act for its own benefit, that is, for something good. Therefore the world view of the Manicheans is contradictory, as according to their mythology, the kingdom of evil strives in the fight against good to gain some benefit from it; so, it actually wants something good, even though it is said to be absolutely bad. Thus, absolute evil seeks that which is contrary to its own nature, which is absurd for Simplicius.<ref>Christian Vogel: ''Stoic Ethics and Platonic Education.'' Heidelberg 2013, pp. 269–272.</ref> 

However, for Simplicius, the error of the Manichaeans also goes back to a legitimate concern: they raised the bad to an independent principle so that they didn't have to trace it back to God, who was supposed to be absolutely good. However, in doing so, the “fell into the fire while fleeing the smoke” by taking up a nonsensical position. The Manichaean idea of a struggle between two original principles presupposes that one principle attacks the other, according to them, good has voluntarily exposed itself to the influence of the opposing power in battle and has suffered losses in the process. This is absurd according to Simplicius' argument: if the good were to behave in this way, it would be unreasonable and incapable and therefore bad. A truly absolute good cannot enter into a fight at all; it is beyond the reach of anything bad.<ref>Heidelberg 2013, p. 267 f.; Ilsetraut Hadot (ed.): "Simplicius: Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Épictète." Leiden 1996, pp. 118–128, 140–144</ref>

Simplicius also accused the Manichaeans of taking away from man the realm of what fell within his competence because it relieved him of the responsibility for his ethical decisions and oaths. If an eternal, powerful principle of evil is the cause of evil, then it is also the cause of human error. A person's bad actions can then no longer be traced back to himself, because in this case he is exposed to an overpowering influence and his self-determination is revoked.<ref>Ilsetraut Hadot: ''The Refutation of Manichaeism in Simplicius' Commentary on the Epictetus''. In: ''Archive for the History of Philosophy'' 51, 1969, pp. 31–57, here: 35–45, 54–56.</ref>

=== Ethics ===
According to Simplicius, the ''Enchiridion'' is aimed at readers who will implement the advice about the distinction in their lives between "what is up to us" ''(ta eph' hēmín),'' and everything else .<ref>Christian Vogel: ''Stoische Ethik und platonische Bildung.'' Heidelberg 2013, p 81–89, 360–365.</ref> Simplicius saw his task as a commentator as helping the reader to better understand what "is up to us," the matters about which the soul can make free decisions, which he considered the primary determinant of whether a good life is good and a bad life is bad.<ref>Christian Vogel: ''Stoische Ethik und platonische Bildung.'' Heidelberg 2013, p. 96–124.</ref> Simplicius also addressed potential [[determinism|deterministic]] and [[fatalism|fatalistic]] objections that may be raised against this concept, that “what is up to us” does not exist at all because human action is determined by coincidences or necessities and not by [[free will]].<ref>Christian Vogel: ''Stoische Ethik und platonische Bildung.'' Heidelberg 2013, p. 111–120.</ref>

In response to Epictetus's view that a student of philosophy should radically turn away from his previous habits, however, Simplicius distanced himself from what he considered unrealistic the demands of radical [[Stoicism]]. Here Simplicius applied Plato's metaphor of the irrational "[[inner child]]"<ref>Plato, ''Phaedo'' 77e.</ref> who strives for sensual pleasure and develops unnecessary fear due to false ideas. According to Platonic understanding, this child should not be killed, but taught and trained, education ''([[Paideia]])'' is "the improvement of the child in us by the educator in us."<ref>Simplicius, ''In enchiridion Epictetus'' 249,70&nbsp;f. Christian Vogel: ''Stoische Ethik und platonische Bildung.'' Heidelberg 2013, pp. 124–129, 137–141, 161–164, 200–202.</ref>

=== Psychology ===
In Simplicius' or doctrine of the soul (psyche), he distinguished three types of souls:<ref>See Christian Vogel for this classification: ''Stoic Ethics and Platonic Education.'' Heidelberg 2013, pp. 107–111, 273 f.; Ilsetraut Hadot (ed.): ''Simplicius: Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Épictète.'' Leiden 1996, pp. 84–86, 91&nbsp;f.</ref>
* the "first" souls whose abodes are above the lunar sphere in the realm of imperishable bodies. They never descend to earth and know no evil. Since they follow their own nature unhindered, they are exclusively focused on the imperishable good. Therefore, they cannot make wrong decisions. There are no impulses in them that relate to material and transitory things.
* the souls that come from the world of the immortal, but descend to earth and inhabit human bodies there. They occupy an intermediate position between the divine world of pure being and the animal and vegetable world of pure becoming, and have access to both realms. Through their descent, they come into contact with the bad. Losing their exclusive focus on good, they must figure out what is good for them and make decisions prone to error. This can result in them receiving a disposition contrary to their good nature. However, they are able to turn to the good through spiritual effort and thus to realize what is natural for them. Ascending to their homeland beyond the lunar sphere, they are freed from all evils.
* the souls of animals and plants that only know their earthly habitat. In their activities they are always directed towards the physical to which they are related. Since animals lack reason, they are at the mercy of their unreasonable desires. But that's not bad for them, it's natural for them. They follow the urge to preserve life; so they too have something good as their goal. Their way of experiencing evil is graded: in lower animals it is a purely bodily experience, similar to plants; in some higher animals the experience of evils approaches that of man.

The interest that Simplicius brought to the theory of the soul and the question of what was bad was – as with all Neoplatonists – practical. He was concerned with the utilization of the knowledge gained from understanding the soul for application to an ethical lifestyle. According to Simplicius' understanding, man is never helplessly at the mercy of evil; he can always choose the good that corresponds to his natural disposition. Moreover, the area in which bad actually occurs is narrowly limited. Impairments affecting the body do not count as bad in the strict sense, and the presence or absence of material goods is immaterial. Processes of material decay are just as necessary as processes of emergence and make sense within the framework of the world order. The interplay of composition and dissolution of bodies is not in itself a bad thing; if you look at it from a higher perspective and see the whole, it becomes necessary. The only really bad things are bad mental attitudes, because what matters is the immortal soul, not the mortal body. Thus genuine evil does not exist in the nature surrounding man, nor in his circumstances, but only in his soul, and there it can be eliminated through knowledge and a philosophical way of life. In addition, physical imperfections are also limited to a relatively small part of the cosmos. They only occur in the earthly realm, for it is only there that the processes of arising, changing, and passing away take place that allow physical deficiencies to occur. According to the world view of the pagan philosophers of the time, Simplicius believed that becoming and passing away only take place in the "sublunar" space – below the moon. He regarded the entire sky above the lunar sphere as a perfect region, to which everything bad was alien.<ref>Christian Vogel: ''Stoic Ethics and Platonic Education.'' Heidelberg 2013, p. 177 f., 185–190 , 216 f., 272 f.; {{harvnb|Mueller|2011|pp= 2,7}}; Ilsetraut Hadot (ed.): ''Simplicius: Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Épictète.'' Leiden 1996, p. 91.</ref>