Editing Sextus Empiricus (section)

== Philosophy ==
{{main|Pyrrhonism}}
As a skeptic, Sextus Empiricus raised concerns which applied to all types of knowledge. He doubted the validity of [[problem of induction|induction]]<ref>Sextus Empiricus. ''[[Outlines of Pyrrhonism]]'' trans. [[Robert Gregg Bury|R.G. Bury]] (Loeb edn) (London: W. Heinemann, 1933), p. 283.</ref> long before its best known critic [[David Hume]], and raised the [[regress argument]] against all forms of reasoning:
{{blockquote|Those who claim for themselves to judge the truth are bound to possess a criterion of truth. This criterion, then, either is without a judge's approval or has been approved. But if it is without approval, whence comes it that it is trustworthy? For no matter of dispute is to be trusted without judging. And, if it has been approved, that which approves it, in turn, either has been approved or has not been approved, and so on ''[[ad infinitum]]''.<ref>Sextus Empiricus. ''Against the Logicians'' trans. R.G. Bury (Loeb edn) (London: W. Heinemann, 1935) p. 179</ref>}}
This view is known as [[Pyrrhonian skepticism]], which Sextus differentiated from [[Academic skepticism]] as practiced by [[Carneades]] which, according to Sextus, denies the possibility of knowledge altogether, something that Sextus criticized as being an affirmative belief. Instead, Sextus advocates simply giving up belief; in other words, suspending judgment ([[epoché]]) about whether or not anything is knowable.<ref>See ''PH'' I.3, I.8, I.198; cf. J. Barnes, "Introduction", xix ff., in Sextus Empiricus, ''Outlines of Scepticism''. Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes (transl.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).</ref> Only by suspending judgment can we attain a state of [[ataraxia]] (roughly, 'peace of mind').

There is some debate as to the extent to which Sextus advocated the suspension of judgement. According to [[Myles Burnyeat]],<ref>Burnyeat, M., "Can The Sceptic Live His Scepticism" in Myles Burnyeat and Michael Frede (ed.), ''The Original Sceptics: A Controversy'' (Hackett, 1997): 25–57. Cf. Burnyeat, M., "The Sceptic in His Place and Time", ''ibid.'', 92–126.</ref>  [[Jonathan Barnes]],<ref>Barnes, J., "The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist" in Myles Burnyeat and Michael Frede (ed.), ''The Original Sceptics: A Controversy'' (Hackett, 1997): 58–91.</ref> and [[Benson Mates]],<ref>Mates, B. ''The Skeptic Way'' (Oxford UP, 1996).</ref> Sextus advises that we should suspend judgment about virtually all beliefs; that is to say, we should neither affirm any belief as true nor deny any belief as false, since we may live without any beliefs, acting by habit. [[Michael Frede]], however, defends a different interpretation,<ref>Frede, M., "The Sceptic's Beliefs" in Myles Burnyeat and Michael Frede (ed.), ''The Original Sceptics: A Controversy'' (Hackett, 1997): 1–24. Cf. Frede, M., "The Skeptic's Two Kinds of Assent and the Question of the Possibility of Knowledge", ''ibid.'', 127–152.</ref> according to which Sextus does allow beliefs, so long as they are not derived by reason, philosophy or speculation; a skeptic may, for example, accept common opinions in the skeptic's society. The important difference between the skeptic and the dogmatist is that the skeptic does not hold his beliefs ''as a result of rigorous philosophical investigation.''