Editing Schlieffen Plan (section)

===''Kabinettskrieg''===
{{see also|Total war}}

[[File:Image from page 389 of "Moltke, a biographical and critical study" (1894) (14578535519).jpg|thumb|{{centre|Map showing areas of France occupied during the Franco-Prussian War}}]]
After the end of the [[French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars]] in 1815, European aggression had turned outwards and the fewer wars fought within the continent had been {{lang|de|Kabinettskriege}}, local conflicts decided by professional armies loyal to dynastic rulers. Military strategists had adapted by creating plans to suit the characteristics of the post-Napoleonic scene. In the late nineteenth century, military thinking remained dominated by the [[Unification of Germany|German Wars of Unification]] (1864–1871), which had been short and decided by great battles of annihilation. In ''[[Vom Kriege]]'' (On War, 1832) [[Carl von Clausewitz]] (1780–1831) had defined decisive battle as a victory which had political results

{{quote|... the object is to overthrow the enemy, to render him politically helpless or militarily impotent, thus forcing him to sign whatever peace we please.|Clausewitz{{sfn|Foley|2007|p=41}}}}

{{lang|de|Niederwerfungsstrategie}}, (''prostration'' strategy, later termed {{lang|de|Vernichtungsstrategie}} (destruction strategy) a policy of seeking decisive victory) replaced the slow, cautious approach to war that had been overturned by [[Napoleon]]. German strategists judged the defeat of the Austrians in the [[Austro-Prussian War]] (14 June – 23 August 1866) and the French imperial armies in 1870, as evidence that a strategy of decisive victory could still succeed.{{sfn|Foley|2007|p=41}}