Editing Samnite Wars (section)

==First Samnite War (343 to 341 BC)==

[[Livy]] is the only preserved source to give a continuous account of the war which has become known in modern historiography as the First Samnite War. In addition, the Fasti Triumphales records two Roman triumphs dating to this war and some of the events described by Livy are also mentioned by other ancient writers.

===Outbreak===

====Livy's account====
According to Livy, the First Samnite War started not because of any enmity between Rome and the Samnites, but due to outside events.<ref>Livy, vii.29.3</ref>  The spark came when the Samnites without provocation attacked the [[Sidicini]],<ref name="auto4">Livy, vii.29.4</ref> a tribe living north of [[Campania]] with their chief settlement at [[Teano|Teanum Sidicinum]].{{Sfn | Oakley | 1998 | p = 289}}  Unable to stand against the Samnites, the Sidicini sought help from the [[Campanians]].<ref name="auto4"/>  However, Livy continues, the Samnites defeated the Campanians in a battle in Sidicine territory and then turned their attention toward Campania.  First they seized the [[Tifata]] hills overlooking Capua (the main Campanian city) and, having left a strong force to hold them, marched into the plain between the hills and Capua.<ref>Livy, vii.29.5–6</ref> There they defeated the Campanians in a second battle and drove them within their walls. This compelled the Campanians to ask Rome for help.<ref>Livy, vii.29.5–7</ref>

In Rome, the Campanian ambassadors were admitted to an audience with the Senate. In a speech, they proposed an alliance between Rome and the Campanians, noting how the Campanians with their famous wealth could be of aid to the Romans, and that they could help to subdue the [[Volsci]], who were enemies of Rome. They pointed out that nothing in Rome's treaty with the Samnites prevented them from also making a treaty with the Campanians, and warning that if they did not, the Samnites would conquer Campania and its strength would be added to the Samnites' instead of the Romans'.<ref>Livy, vii.30.1–23</ref>  After discussing this proposal, the Senate concluded that while there was much to be gained from a treaty with the Campanians, and that this fertile area could become Rome's granary, Rome could not ally with them and still be considered loyal to their existing treaty with the Samnites: for this reason they had to refuse the proposal.<ref>Livy, vii.31.1–2</ref> After being informed of Rome's refusal, the Campanian embassy, in accordance with their instructions, surrendered the people of Campania and the city of Capua unconditionally into the power of Rome.<ref>Livy, vii.31.3–5</ref> Moved by this surrender, the Senators resolved that Rome's honour now required that the Campanians and Capua, who by their surrender had become the possession of Rome, be protected from Samnite attacks.<ref>Livy, vii.31.6–7</ref>

Envoys were sent to the Samnites with the instructions to request that they, in view of their mutual friendship with Rome, spare territory which had become the possession of Rome and to warn them to keep their hands off the city of Capua and the territory of Campania.<ref>Livy, vii.31.8–10</ref>  The envoys delivered their message as instructed to the Samnites' national assembly. However, they were met with a defiant response, "not only did the Samnites declare their intention of waging war against Capua, but their magistrates left the council chamber, and in tones loud enough for the envoys to hear, ordered [their armies] to march out at once into Campanian territory and ravage it."<ref>Livy, vii.31.11–12</ref> When this news reached Rome, the [[fetial]]s were sent to demand redress, and when this was refused Rome declared war against the Samnites.<ref>Livy, vii.32.1–2</ref>

====Modern views====
The historical accuracy of Livy's account is disputed among modern historians.  They are willing to accept that while Livy might have simplified the way in which the Sidicini, Campani and Samnites came to be at war, his narrative here, at least in outline, is historical.{{Sfn | Salmon | 1967 | p = 201}}{{Sfn | Cornell | 1995 | p = 347}}{{Sfn | Oakley | 1998 | p = 285}}{{Sfn | Forsythe | 2005 | p = 288}}  The Sidicini's stronghold at Teanum controlled an important regional crossroads, which would have provided the Samnites with a motive for conquest.{{Sfn | Salmon | 1967 | p = 195}}{{Sfn | Oakley | 1998 | p = 289}}{{Sfn | Forsythe | 2005 | p = 288}}  The First Samnite War might have started quite by accident, as Livy claimed.  The Sidicini were located on the Samnite side of the [[Liri|river Liris]], and while the Roman-Samnite treaty might only have dealt with the middle Liris, not the lower, Rome does not appear to have been overly concerned for the fate of the Sidicini. The Samnites could therefore go to war with Sidicini without fear of Roman involvement. It was only the unforeseen involvement of the Campani that brought in the Romans.{{Sfn | Salmon | 1967 | p = 201}}

Many historians have however had difficulty accepting the historicity of the Campanian embassy to Rome, in particular whether Livy was correct in describing the Campani as surrendering themselves unconditionally into Roman possession.{{Sfn | Salmon | 1967 | p = 197}}{{Sfn | Cornell | 1995 | p = 347}}{{Sfn | Oakley | 1998 | p = 285}}  That Capua and Rome were allied in 343 is less controversial, as such a relationship underpins the whole First Samnite War.{{Sfn | Oakley | 1998 | p = 286}}

Historians have noted the similarities between the events leading to the First Samnite War and events, which according to [[Thucydides]], caused the [[Peloponnesian War]],{{Sfn | Forsythe | 2005 | pp = 284–285}} but there are differences as well.{{Sfn | Oakley | 1998 | p = 294}}  It is clear that Livy, or his sources, has consciously modelled the Campanian embassy after the "Corcyrean debate" in Thucydides' [[History of the Peloponnesian War]].{{Sfn | Oakley | 1998 | p = 285}}{{Sfn | Forsythe | 2005 | p = 285}} There are many parallels between the speech given by the Campanian ambassador to the Roman senate in Livy and the speech of the Corcyrean ambassador to the Athenian assembly in Thucydides. But while Thucydides' Athenians debate the Corcyreans' proposal in pragmatic terms, Livy's senators decide to reject the Campanian alliance based on moral arguments.{{Sfn | Oakley | 1998 | p = 285}}{{Sfn | Forsythe | 2005 | p = 285}}  Livy might have intended his literary educated readers to pick up this contrast.{{Sfn | Oakley | 1998 | p = 285}}  The exaggerated misery of the surrendering Campani contrast with the Campanian arrogance, a stock motif in ancient Roman literature.{{Sfn | Oakley | 1998 | p = 305}}  It is also unlikely that Livy's description of the Samnite national assembly is based on any authentic sources.{{Sfn | Oakley | 1998 | p = 306}}  However, it does not necessarily follow that because the speeches are invented, a standard feature for ancient historians, the Campanian surrender must be invented as well.{{Sfn | Oakley | 1998 | p = 286}}

The chief difficulty lies in how, in 343, rich Capua could have been reduced to such dire straits by the Samnites that the Campani were willing to surrender everything to Rome.{{Sfn | Oakley | 1998 | p = 286}}  During the [[Second Punic War]] (218 to 201 BC), Capua famously sided with [[Carthage]], but after a lengthy siege by Rome, she had to surrender unconditionally in 211 BC, after which the Capuans were harshly punished by the Romans.  {{Harvtxt | Salmon | 1967 | p = 197}} therefore held that the Campanian surrender in 343 is a retrojection by later Roman historians. This invention would serve the double purpose of exonerating Rome from treaty-breaking in 343 BC and justifying the punishment handed out in 211 BC. What Rome agreed to in 343 was an alliance on terms similar to the treaties she had with the Latins and the [[Hernici]].  {{Harvtxt | Cornell | 1995 | p = 347}} accepts the surrender as historical. Studies have shown that voluntary submission was a common feature in the diplomacy of this period.  Likewise {{Harvtxt | Oakley | 1998 | pp = 286–289}} does not believe the surrender of 343 BC to be a retrojection, not finding many similarities between the events of 343 and 211.  The ancient historians record many later instances, whose historicity are not doubted, where a state appealed to Rome for assistance in war against a stronger enemy.  The historical evidence shows the Romans considering such supplicants to have technically the same status as surrendered enemies, but in practice, Rome would not want to abuse would-be allies.  {{Harvtxt | Forsythe | 2005 | p = 287}}, like Salmon, argues that the surrender in 343 is a retrojection of that of 211, invented to better justify Roman actions and for good measure shift the guilt for the First Samnite War onto the manipulative Campani.

Livy portrays the Romans selflessly assuming the burden of defending the Campani, but this is a common theme in Roman republican histories, whose authors wished to show that Rome's wars had been just. Military success was the chief road to prestige and glory among the highly competitive Roman aristocracy. Evidence from later, better documented, time periods shows the Roman Senate quite capable of manipulating diplomatic circumstances so as to provide just causes for expansionary wars. There is no reason to believe this was not also the case in the second half of the 4th century BC.{{Sfn | Forsythe | 2005 | pp = 285–287}}  There are also recorded examples of Rome rejecting appeals for help, implying that the Romans in 343 BC had the choice of rejecting the Campani.{{Sfn | Oakley | 1998 | p = 289}}

===Three Roman victories===
[[File:Samnite soldiers from a tomb frieze in Nola 4th century BCE.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Samnite soldiers from a tomb frieze in Nola, 4th century BC]]
According to Livy, the two Roman consuls for 343 BC, [[Marcus Valerius Corvus]] and [[Aulus Cornelius Cossus Arvina]], both marched against the Samnites. Valerius led his army into Campania, while Cornelius, into Samnium where he camped at [[Saticula]].<ref>Livy, vii.32.2</ref> Livy then goes on to narrate how Rome won three different battles against the Samnites. After a day of hard fighting, Valerius won the [[Battle of Mount Gaurus|first battle]], fought at [[Mount Barbaro|Mount Gaurus]] near [[Cumae]], only after a last desperate charge in fading daylight.<ref>Livy, vii.32.2–.33.18</ref> The [[Battle of Saticula|second battle]] almost ended in disaster for the Romans when the Samnites attempted to trap the other consul, Cornelius Cossus, and his army in a mountain pass. Fortunately for them, one of Cornelius' [[military tribune]]s, [[Publius Decius Mus (consul 340 BC)|Publius Decius Mus]] with a small detachment, seized a hilltop, distracting the Samnites and allowing the Roman army to escape the trap. Decius and his men slipped away to safety during the night; the morning after the unprepared Samnites were attacked and defeated.<ref>Livy, vii.33.1–.37.3; [[Frontinus|Frontin.]] ''[[Stratagems (book)|strat.]]'', i.5.14, iv.5.9; [[Cicero|Cic.]] ''[[De Divinatione|diu.]]'', i.51</ref> Still determined to seize victory, the Samnites collected their forces and laid siege to [[Suessula]] at the eastern edge of Campania. Leaving his baggage behind, Marcus Valerius took his army on forced marches to Suessula. Low on supplies, and underestimating the size of the Roman force, the Samnites scattered their army to forage for food. This gave Valerius the opportunity to win a [[Battle of Suessula|third Roman victory]] when he first captured the Samnites' lightly defended camp and then scattered their foragers.<ref>Livy, vii.37.4–.18</ref> These Roman successes against the Samnites convinced [[Falerii]] to convert her forty year's truce with Rome into a permanent peace treaty, and the Latins to abandon their planned war against Rome and instead campaign against the [[Paeligni]]. The friendly city-state of [[Carthage]] sent a congratulatory embassy to Rome with a twenty-five pound crown for the [[Temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus]]. Both consuls then celebrated [[Roman triumph|triumphs]] over the Samnites.<ref>Livy, vii.38.1–3</ref> The ''[[Fasti Triumphales]]'' records that Valerius and Cornelius celebrated their triumphs over the Samnites on 21 September and 22 September respectively.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://attalus.org/translate/fasti.html|title=Fasti Triumphales : Roman Triumphs|website=attalus.org}}</ref>

Modern historians have doubted the historical accuracy of Livy's description of these three battles. Livy's battle-scenes for this time period are mostly free reconstructions by him and his sources, and there are no reasons why these should be different.<ref>Oakley (1998), p. 310</ref> The number of Samnites killed and the amounts of spoils taken by the Romans have clearly been exaggerated.<ref>Salmon (1967), p. 198; Oakley (1998), p. 358</ref> Historians have noted the many similarities between the story of Publius Decius Mus, and an event said to have taken place in [[Sicily]] in 258 when the Romans were fighting the [[First Punic War]] against Carthage. According to the ancient sources, a Roman army was in danger of being trapped in a defile when a military tribune led a detachment of 300 men to seize a hilltop in the middle of the enemy. The Roman army escaped, but of the 300 only the tribune survived. It is unlikely that this latter, in ancient times more famous, episode has not influenced the descriptions of the former.<ref>Salmon (1967) p. 198; Oakley (1998), pp. 332–333; Forsythe (2005), p. 288</ref>

Salmon (1967) also found several other similarities between the campaigns of 343 and later events which he considered to be doublets. Both the First and the Second Samnite Wars start with an invasion of Samnium by a Cornelius, the way in which a Roman army was led into a trap resembles the famous disaster at [[battle of the Caudine Forks|the Caudine Forks]] in 321 BC, and there are similarities to the campaigns of [[Cornelia (gens)#Cornelii Cossi|Publius Cornelius Arvina]] in 306 BC and [[Publius Decius Mus (consul 312 BC)|Publius Decius Mus]] (the son of the hero of Saticula) in 297 BC. He also thought Valerius Corvus' two Campanian victories could be doublets of Roman operations against [[Hannibal]] in the same area in 215<ref>Salmon (1967), pp. 199–198</ref> On the other hand, the entries in the ''Fasti Triumphales'' supports some measure of Roman success. In Salmon's reconstruction, therefore, there was only one battle in 343 BC, perhaps fought on the outskirts of Capua near the shrine of [[Juno (mythology)|Juno Gaura]], and ending with a narrow Roman victory.<ref>Salmon (1967), p. 201</ref>

Oakley (1998) dismisses these claims of doublets and inclines towards believing there were three battles. The Samnites would have gained significant ground in Campania by the time the Romans arrived and Valerius' two victories could be the outcome of twin Samnite attacks on Capua and Cumae. And while Samnite ambushes are somewhat of a stock motif in Livy's narrative of the Samnite wars, this might simply reflect the mountainous terrain in which these wars were fought.<ref>Oakley (1998), pp. 310–311</ref> The story of Decius, as preserved, has been patterned after that of the military tribune of 258, but Decius could still have performed some heroic act in 343, the memory of which became the origin of the later embellished tale.<ref>Oakley (1998), p. 333</ref>

Forsythe (2005) considers the episode with Cornelius Cossus and Decius Mus to have been invented, in part to foreshadow Decius' sacrifice in 340 BC. P. Decius might have performed some heroic act which then enabled him to become the first of his family to reach the consulship in 340, but if so, no detail of the historical event survives. Instead, later annalists have combined the disaster at the Caudine Forks with the tale of the military tribune of 258 BC to produce the entirely fictitious story recorded by Livy; the difference being that while in the originals the Romans suffered defeat and death, here none of Decius' men are killed and the Romans win a great victory.<ref>Forsythe (2005), p. 288</ref>

===End of the war===

No fighting is reported for 342. Instead the sources focus on [[Roman army mutiny in 342 BC|a mutiny]] by part of the soldiery. According to the most common variant, following the Roman victories of 343 the Campani asked Rome for winter garrisons to protect them against the Samnites. Subverted by the luxurious lifestyle of the Campani, the garrison soldiers started plotting to seize control and set themselves up as masters of Campania. However the conspiracy was discovered by the consuls of 342 before the coup could be carried out. Afraid of being punished, the plotters mutinied, formed a rebel army and marched against Rome. Marcus Valerius Corvus was nominated dictator to deal with the crisis; he managed to convince the mutineers to lay down their arms without bloodshed and a series of economic, military and political reforms were passed to deal with their grievances.<ref>Livy, vii.38.4–42.7; D.H. xv.3.2–15; App. ''Samn.'' 1–2</ref> The history of this mutiny is however disputed among modern historians and it is possible that the whole narrative has been invented to provide a background for the important reforms passed that year.<ref>Oakley  (1998), pp. 363–364; Forsythe (2005), p. 273</ref> These reforms included the ''[[Leges Genuciae]]'' which stated that no one could be reelected to the same office within less than ten years, and it is clear from the list of consuls that, except in years of great crises, this law was enforced. It also became a firm rule that one of the consuls had to be a plebeian.<ref>Forsythe   (2006), pp. 270, 273</ref>

Livy writes that in 341 BC one of the Roman consuls, [[Aemilia (gens)#Aemilii Mamerci|Lucius Aemilius Mamercus]], entered Samnite territory but found no army to oppose him. He was ravaging their territory when Samnite envoys came to ask for peace. When presenting their case to the Roman Senate, the Samnite envoys stressed their former treaty with the Romans, which unlike the Campani, they had formed in times of peace, and that the Samnites now intended to go to war against the Sidicini who were no friends of Rome. The Roman praetor, [[Aemilia (gens)#Aemilii Mamerci|Ti. Aemilius]], delivered the reply of the Senate: Rome was willing to renew her former treaty with the Samnites; moreover, Rome would not involve herself in the Samnites' decision to make war or peace with the Sidicini. Once peace had been concluded the Roman army withdrew from Samnium.<ref>Livy, viii.1.7–2.4</ref>

The impact of Aemilius' invasion of Samnium may have been exaggerated;<ref name="auto">Oakley (1998), p. 394</ref> it could even have been entirely invented by a later writer to bring the war to an end with Rome in a suitably triumphant fashion.<ref>Oakley (1998), p. 311</ref> The sparse mentions of praetors in the sources for the 4th century BC are generally thought to be historical; it is possible therefore that as praetor Ti. Aemilius really was involved in the peace negotiations with the Samnites.<ref name="auto"/> The First Samnite War ended in a negotiated peace rather than one state dominating the other. The Romans had to accept that the Sidicini belonged to the Samnite sphere, but their alliance with the Campani was a far greater prize. Campania's wealth and manpower were a major addition to Rome's strength.<ref>Salmon (1967), p. 202; Forsythe (2005), p. 288</ref>

===Historicity of the war===
The many problems with Livy's account and Diodorus' failure to mention it has even caused some historians to reject the entire war as unhistorical. More recent historians have however accepted the basic historicity of the war.{{Sfn | Salmon | 1967 | p = 199}}{{Sfn | Cornell | 1995 | p = 347}}  No Roman historian would have invented a series of events so unflattering to Rome. Livy was clearly embarrassed at the way Rome had turned from being an ally to an enemy of the Samnites.{{Sfn | Salmon | 1967 | p = 199}}{{Sfn | Cornell | 1995 | p = 347}}  It is also unlikely that the Romans could have established such a dominating position in Campania as they had after 341 without Samnite resistance.{{Sfn | Salmon | 1967 | p = 200}}  Finally Diodorus ignores many other events in early Roman history such as all the early years of the Second Samnite War; his omission of the First Samnite War can therefore not be taken as proof of its unhistoricity.{{Sfn | Salmon | 1967 | p = 200}}

{{anchor|Second Samnite War}}