Editing Rhodesia (section)

==History==
{{main|History of Rhodesia}}
{{History of Zimbabwe}}

===Background===

Until after the [[Second World War]], the landlocked British possession of [[Southern Rhodesia]] was not developed as an indigenous African territory, but rather as a unique state that reflected its [[Multiracialism|multiracial]] character.<ref name="duignan1986">{{citation | last = Duignan | first = Peter | title = Politics and Government in African States 1960–1985 | publisher = Croom Helm Ltd | year = 1986 | isbn = 0-7099-1475-X}}</ref> This situation certainly made it very different from other lands that existed under colonial rule, as many Europeans had arrived to make permanent homes, populating the towns as traders or settling to farm the most productive soils.<ref name="areahandbook">{{citation | last = Nelson | first = Harold | title = Zimbabwe: a country study | publisher = The American University (Washington, D.C.) | year = 1983 | isbn = 0160015987}}</ref><ref name="taylor2006">{{citation | last = Taylor | first = Scott | title = Culture and Customs of Zambia | publisher = Greenwood | year = 2006 | isbn = 0313332460 | url-access = registration | url = https://archive.org/details/culturecustomsof00tayl }}</ref> In 1922, faced with the decision to join the [[Union of South Africa]] as a fifth province or accept nearly full internal autonomy, the electorate cast its vote against South African integration.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.rhodesia.nl/mztosm.html |title=Rhodesia – Mzilikaze to Smith |publisher=Rhodesia.nl |access-date=9 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120826192258/http://www.rhodesia.nl/mztosm.html |archive-date=26 August 2012 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/themes/rhodesia-central-african-federation.htm |title=The Cabinet Papers &#124; Rhodesia and the Central African Federation |publisher=Nationalarchives.gov.uk |access-date=9 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121009031609/https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/themes/rhodesia-central-african-federation.htm |archive-date=9 October 2012 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/plaintexthistories.asp?historyid=ad28 |title=History of Zimbabwe |publisher=Historyworld.net |access-date=9 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120624112253/http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?historyid=ad28 |archive-date=24 June 2012 |url-status=live }}</ref>

In view of the outcome of the referendum, the territory was annexed by the United Kingdom on 12 September 1923.<ref>Southern Rhodesia (Annexation) [[Order in Council]], 30 July 1923 that provided by section 3 thereof: "From and after the coming into operation of this Order the said territories shall be annexed to and form part of His Majesty's Dominions, and shall be known as the Colony of Southern Rhodesia."</ref><ref>Stella Madzibamuto v Desmond William Larder – Burke, Fredrick Phillip George (1969) A.C 645 – Authority for date of annexation having been 12 September 1923</ref><ref name="ReferenceA">''Collective Responses to Illegal Acts in International Law: United Nations Action in the Question of Southern Rhodesia'' by Vera Gowlland-Debbas</ref><ref>Stella Madzibamuto v Desmond William Larder – Burke, Fredrick Phillip George (1969) A.C 645</ref> Shortly after annexation, on 1 October 1923, the first constitution for the new Colony of Southern Rhodesia came into force.<ref name="ReferenceA"/><ref>Southern Rhodesia Constitution Letters Patent 1923</ref> Under this constitution, Southern Rhodesia was given the right to elect its own thirty-member [[Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly|legislature]], [[Prime Minister of Rhodesia|premier]], and cabinet—although the British government retained a formal veto over measures affecting natives and dominated foreign policy.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.rhodesia.me.uk/Parliament.htm |title=Parliament |publisher=Rhodesia.me.uk |access-date=9 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120115081548/http://www.rhodesia.me.uk/Parliament.htm |archive-date=15 January 2012 |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://archive.org/stream/SouthernRhodesia1890-1950ARecordOfSixtyYearsProgress/SR9050_djvu.txt |title=Full text of "Southern Rhodesia 1890–1950; A Record of Sixty Years Progress" |access-date=9 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120706125942/https://archive.org/stream/SouthernRhodesia1890-1950ARecordOfSixtyYearsProgress/SR9050_djvu.txt |archive-date=6 July 2012 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.sapst.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=33&Itemid=110 |title=Zimbambwe |publisher=Sapst.org |date=22 December 1987 |access-date=9 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130510104741/http://www.sapst.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=33&Itemid=110 |archive-date=10 May 2013 |url-status=live }}</ref>

Over the course of the next three decades, Southern Rhodesia experienced a degree of economic expansion and industrialisation almost unrivaled in sub-Saharan Africa.<ref name=Barber>{{cite book|last=Barber|first=William|title=The Economy of British Central Africa|date=1961|pages=ix–xi, 18–29, 108|publisher=University of Pennsylvania Press|location=Philadelphia|isbn=978-0812216202}}</ref> Its natural abundance of mineral wealth—including large deposits of [[chromium]] and [[manganese]]—contributed to the high rate of conventional economic growth.<ref name=Barber/> However, most colonies in Africa, even those rich in natural resources, experienced difficulty in achieving similar rates of development due to a shortage of technical and managerial skills.<ref name=Barber/> Small, rotating cadres of colonial civil servants who possessed little incentive to invest their skills in the local economy were insufficient to compensate for this disadvantage.<ref name=Barber/> Southern Rhodesia had negated the issue by importing a skilled workforce directly from abroad in the form of its disproportionately large European immigrant and expatriate population.<ref name=Barber/> For example, in 1951 over 90% of white Southern Rhodesians were engaged in what the British government classified as "skilled occupations", or professional and technical trades.<ref name=Barber/> This made it possible to establish a diversified economy with a strong manufacturing sector and iron and steel industries, and circumvent the normal British protectionist policy of supporting domestic industry in the metropole while discouraging industry in the colonies abroad.<ref name="duignan1986"/><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.countriesquest.com/africa/zimbabwe/history/settler_colony.htm |title=Settler Colony – History – Zimbabwe – Africa |publisher=Countriesquest.com |access-date=9 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130512205433/http://www.countriesquest.com/africa/zimbabwe/history/settler_colony.htm |archive-date=12 May 2013 |url-status=live }}</ref> As the white population increased, so did capital imports, especially in the wake of the Second World War.<ref name=Barber/> This trend, too, stood in sharp contrast to most other colonial territories, which suffered a major capital deficit due to revenues simply being repatriated to the metropole, leaving little capital to be invested locally.<ref name="World">{{cite book | title = A World of Difference: Encountering and Contesting Development | last1 = Sheppard | first1 = Eric | last2 = Porter | first2 = Philip | last3 = Faust | first3 = David | last4 = Nagar | first4 = Richa | date = 8 August 2009 | location = New York | publisher = The Guilford Press | isbn = 978-1-60623-262-0 | pages = 356, 365–369}}</ref> The considerable investment made by white Rhodesians in the economy financed the development of Southern Rhodesia's export industries as well as the infrastructure necessary to integrate it further with international markets.<ref name=Barber/>

In August 1953, Southern Rhodesia merged with [[Northern Rhodesia]] and [[Nyasaland]], the two other British Central African territories, to form the [[Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland]] – a loose association that placed defence and economic direction under a central government but left many domestic affairs under the control of its constituent territories.<ref name="weitzer1990">{{cite book|last=Weitzer|first=Ronald|title=Transforming Settler States: Communal Conflict and Internal Security in Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe|pages=1–206}}</ref> As it began to appear that decolonisation was inevitable and indigenous black populations were pressing heavily for change,<ref name="duignan1986"/> the federation was dissolved at the end of December 1963.<ref>{{cite web |author=afrikantraveler |url=http://theafricanfile.com/politicshistory/rhodesia-a-failed-attempt-to-maintain-racism-into-the-21st-century/ |title=Rhodesia: A Failed Attempt to Maintain Racism into the 21st Century |publisher=The African File |date=16 May 2012 |access-date=9 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120716010434/http://theafricanfile.com/politicshistory/rhodesia-a-failed-attempt-to-maintain-racism-into-the-21st-century/ |archive-date=16 July 2012 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last=Novak |first=Andrew |url=https://independent.academia.edu/AndrewNovak/Papers/1265638/Sport_and_Racial_Discrimination_in_Colonial_Zimbabwe_A_Reanalysis |title=Academia.edu &#124; Sport and Racial Discrimination in Colonial Zimbabwe: A Reanalysis &#124; Andrew Novak |journal=The International Journal of the History of Sport |volume=29 |issue=6 |pages=850–867 |publisher=Independent.academia.edu |doi=10.1080/09523367.2011.642550 |s2cid=143672916 |access-date=9 October 2012}}</ref>

===Unilateral Declaration of Independence (1965)===<!-- This section is linked from [[Victoria Falls]] -->
{{Main|Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence}}
Although prepared to grant formal independence to Southern Rhodesia (now Rhodesia), the [[British government]] had adopted a policy of ''[[no independence before majority rule]]'' (NIBMR), dictating that colonies with a significant, politically active population of European settlers would not receive independence except under conditions of [[majority rule]].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=173&regionSelect=2-Southern_Africa |title=Database – Uppsala Conflict Data Program |publisher=UCDP |access-date=9 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130603091825/http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=173&regionSelect=2-Southern_Africa |archive-date=3 June 2013 |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.rhodesia.nl/tiger.htm |title=On Board the Tiger |publisher=Rhodesia.nl |date=9 October 1968 |access-date=9 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121012003742/http://www.rhodesia.nl/tiger.htm |archive-date=12 October 2012 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.psywarrior.com/RhodesiaPSYOP.html |title=RHODESIA PSYOP 1965 |publisher=Psywarrior.com |access-date=9 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121002024639/http://www.psywarrior.com/RhodesiaPSYOP.html |archive-date=2 October 2012 |url-status=live }}</ref> White Rhodesians balked at the premise of NIBMR; many felt they had a right to absolute political control, at least for the time being, despite their relatively small numbers.<ref name="weitzer1990"/><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.zimembassy.se/history.html |title=A brief history of Zimbabwe |publisher=Zimembassy.se |date=18 April 1980 |access-date=9 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120823010147/http://www.zimembassy.se/history.html |archive-date=23 August 2012 |url-status=dead }}</ref> They were also disturbed by the chaos of the post-colonial political transitions occurring in other African nations at the time, such as the [[Democratic Republic of the Congo]].<ref name="SmithGB">{{cite book|author= Smith, Ian|title=The Great Betrayal|pages=74–256|publisher= Blake Publishing Ltd.|location=London|year=1997|isbn= 1-85782-176-9}}</ref><ref name="Spikes">{{cite book|title=Angola and the Politics of Intervention: From Local Bush War to Chronic Crisis in Southern Africa|last=Spikes|first=Daniel|year=1993|location=Jefferson|publisher=McFarland & Company|isbn=978-0899508887|pages=52–53}}</ref> A vocal segment of the white populace was open to the concept of gradually incorporating black Rhodesians into civil society and a more integrated political structure in theory, although not without qualification and equivocation.<ref name=West>{{cite book|last=West|first=Michael|title=The Rise of an African Middle Class: Colonial Zimbabwe, 1898-1965|date=August 2002|pages=192–193|publisher=Indiana University Press|location=Bloomington|isbn=0-253-34085-3}}</ref> A greater degree of social and political equality, they argued, was acceptable once more black citizens had obtained higher educational and vocational standards.<ref name=West/> The second faction in the white community was wholly unwilling to concede the principle, much less the practice, of equality to the black population.<ref name=West/> Both groups remained opposed to majority rule in the near future.<ref name=West/> However, once Rhodesia had been introduced as a topic for discussion in international bodies, extension of the status quo became a matter of concern to the British government, which perceived the scrutiny as a serious embarrassment to the United Kingdom.<ref name="areahandbook"/>

After the federation was dissolved in December 1963, British Prime Minister Sir [[Alec Douglas-Home]] insisted that preconditions on independence talks hinge on what he termed the "five principles" – unimpeded progress to majority rule, assurance against any future legislation decidedly detrimental to black interests, "improvement in the political status" of local Africans, an end to official [[racial discrimination]], and a political settlement that could be "acceptable to the whole population".<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/programmes/africaProgramme/pdfs/rhodesiaUDIChronology.pdf |title=Chronology: Rhodesia UDI: Road to Settlement |publisher=Lse.ac.uk |access-date=9 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120912011633/http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/programmes/africaProgramme/pdfs/rhodesiaUDIChronology.pdf |archive-date=12 September 2012 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{hansard |url=1970/dec/16/rhodesia-definition-of-the-five |house=written |access-date=9 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121226115618/http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written_answers/1970/dec/16/rhodesia-definition-of-the-five |archive-date=26 December 2012 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |author=United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |url=http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,CHRON,ZWE,,469f38f8c,0.html |archive-url=https://archive.today/20130416055626/http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,CHRON,ZWE,,469f38f8c,0.html |url-status=dead |archive-date=16 April 2013 |title=Refworld &#124; Chronology for Europeans in Zimbabwe |publisher=UNHCR |access-date=9 October 2012 }}</ref> [[Harold Wilson]] and his incoming [[Labour Party (UK)|Labour]] government took an even harder line on demanding that these points be legitimately addressed before a timetable for independence could be set.<ref name="areahandbook"/>

In 1964, growing white dissatisfaction with the ongoing negotiations played a major role in the ousting of [[Winston Field]] as [[Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia]]. Field was succeeded by [[Ian Smith]], chairman of the conservative [[Rhodesian Front Party]] and an outspoken critic of any immediate transition to majority rule.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://africanhistory.about.com/od/zimbabwe/p/ZimbabweHist1.htm |title=A Brief History of Zimbabwe – Part 1: Early Kingdoms to UDI |publisher=Africanhistory.about.com |access-date=9 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121123074246/http://africanhistory.about.com/od/zimbabwe/p/ZimbabweHist1.htm |archive-date=23 November 2012 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/21/world/africa/21smith.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0|title=Ian Smith, Defiant Symbol of White Rule in Africa, Is Dead at 88|newspaper=[[The New York Times]]|access-date=9 October 2012|first=Alan|last=Cowell|date=21 November 2007|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130510174029/http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/21/world/africa/21smith.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0|archive-date=10 May 2013|url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.talktalk.co.uk/reference/encyclopaedia/hutchinson/m0019893.html |title=Zimbabwe (country) |publisher=Talktalk.co.uk |access-date=9 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130613054037/http://www.talktalk.co.uk/reference/encyclopaedia/hutchinson/m0019893.html |archive-date=13 June 2013 |url-status=live }}</ref> Smith, the colony's first Rhodesian-born leader, soon came to personify resistance to liberals in British government and those agitating for change at home.<ref name="areahandbook"/> In September 1964, Smith visited [[Lisbon]], where Portuguese prime minister [[António de Oliveira Salazar]] promised him "maximum support" if he should declare independence.<ref name="Onslow" /> Aside from a common interest in maintaining security ties in southern Africa, Salazar expressed a great deal of anger at Britain's refusal to support Portugal during the [[Annexation of Goa|Indian annexation of Goa]] in 1961, admonishing Smith not to trust the British government.<ref name="Onslow">[https://books.google.com/books?id=qYohAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA220 Resistance to the "Winds of Change": The Emergence of an "unholy alliance" between Southern Rhodesia, Portugal, and South Africa, 1964–65], Sue Onslow, ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=qYohAQAAQBAJ The Wind of Change: Harold Macmillan and British Decolonization]'', edited by L. Butler and Sarah Stockwell, London: Macmillan, 2013 pages 220–221</ref> A [[Rhodesian mission in Lisbon|Rhodesian Trade Office]] was opened in Lisbon in order to co-ordinate breaking the anticipated sanctions in the event of a unilateral declaration of independence later that year, which encouraged Smith not to compromise.<ref name="Onslow" /> In its turn, the Rhodesian Trade Office in Lisbon functioned as a ''de facto'' embassy and caused tension with London, which objected to Rhodesia conducting its own foreign policy.<ref name="Onslow" /> As land-locked Rhodesia bordered the [[Portuguese Mozambique|Portuguese colony of Mozambique]], Salazar's promise of "maximum support" from [[Estado Novo (Portugal)|Portugal]] in breaking the anticipated sanctions gave Smith more grounds for self-confidence in his talks with London.<ref name="Onslow" /> Smith ruled out acceptance for all five of the British principles as they stood,<ref>{{cite web |url=http://archive.tribunemagazine.co.uk/article/23rd-september-1966/12/policy-for-rhodesia |title=Policy For Rhodesia from theTribune Magazine Archive |publisher=Archive.tribunemagazine.co.uk |date=23 September 1966 |access-date=9 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180809121358/http://archive.tribunemagazine.co.uk/article/23rd-september-1966/12/policy-for-rhodesia |archive-date=9 August 2018 |url-status=dead }}</ref> implying instead that Rhodesia was already legally entitled to independence—a claim that was overwhelmingly endorsed by the predominantly white electorate in a [[Southern Rhodesian independence referendum, 1964|referendum]].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/white-referendum-southern-rhodesia-overwhelmingly-support-ian-smiths-proposal-independen |title=White referendum in Southern Rhodesia is overwhelmingly in support of Ian Smith's proposal for independence. &#124; South African History Online |publisher=Sahistory.org.za |date=6 November 1964 |access-date=9 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140813074554/http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/white-referendum-southern-rhodesia-overwhelmingly-support-ian-smiths-proposal-independen |archive-date=13 August 2014 |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/british-south-rhodesia-1964-1980/ |title=British South Rhodesia (1964–1980) |publisher=Uca.edu |access-date=9 October 2012 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130518172058/http://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/british-south-rhodesia-1964-1980/ |archive-date=18 May 2013 }}</ref>

Emboldened by the results of this referendum and the subsequent general election, the Rhodesian government threatened to declare independence without British consent. [[Harold Wilson]] countered by warning that such an irregular procedure would be considered [[treason]]ous, although he specifically rejected using armed force to quell a rebellion by English "kith and kin", or white Rhodesians of predominantly British descent and origin, many of whom still possessed sympathies and family ties to the United Kingdom.<ref>{{cite magazine |url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,901904,00.html |title=Rhodesia: The Last Thread |magazine=TIME |date=30 December 1966 |access-date=9 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121017185948/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,901904,00.html |archive-date=17 October 2012 |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref name="guardian.co.uk">{{cite news |author=Chris McGreal |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/13/zimbabwe |title=There are many villains to blame for Zimbabwe's decade of horror &#124; World news &#124; The Observer |newspaper=Guardian |access-date=9 October 2012 |location=London |date=13 April 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160309212420/http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/13/zimbabwe |archive-date=9 March 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref> Wilson's refusal to consider a military option further encouraged Smith to proceed with his plans. Talks quickly broke down, and final efforts in October to achieve a settlement floundered; the Smith government remained unwilling to accept the five principles of independence, and the British government argued it would settle for nothing less.<ref name="areahandbook"/>

[[File:Udi2-rho.jpg|thumb|[[Ian Smith]] signing the Unilateral Declaration of Independence]]

On 11 November 1965 the [[Cabinet of Rhodesia]] issued a [[Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence|unilateral declaration of independence]] (UDI).<ref name="duignan1986"/><ref name="raft">{{cite book|last=Raftopolous|first=Brian|title=Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the pre-colonial period to 2008|pages=1–298}}</ref><ref name="blackfire">{{cite book|last=Raeburn|first=Michael|title=We are everywhere: Narratives from Rhodesian guerillas|pages=1–209}}</ref> The UDI was immediately denounced as an "act of rebellion against the Crown" in the United Kingdom, and Wilson promised that the illegal action would be short-lived.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.genocidepreventionnow.org/Home/GPNISSUES/Issue6Spring2011/tabid/109/ctl/DisplayArticle/mid/696/aid/223/Default.aspx?skinsrc=G/Skins/GPN/printskin |title=Issue 6, Spring 2011 |publisher=Genocidepreventionnow.org |access-date=9 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130520070306/http://www.genocidepreventionnow.org/Home/GPNISSUES/Issue6Spring2011/tabid/109/ctl/DisplayArticle/mid/696/aid/223/Default.aspx?skinsrc=G%2FSkins%2FGPN%2Fprintskin |archive-date=20 May 2013 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{hansard |url=1969/jan/21/rhodesia |access-date=9 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121225135820/http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1969/jan/21/rhodesia |archive-date=25 December 2012 |url-status=live }}</ref> However, given its self-governing status Rhodesia had no longer been within the United Kingdom's direct sphere of influence for some time, and the façade of continued British rule was rendered a constitutional fiction by UDI.<ref name="weitzer1990"/> In light of these circumstances, Wilson quickly realised his ability to assert direct leverage over the incumbent Rhodesian government was limited.<ref name="weitzer1990"/>

On 12 October 1965, the [[United Nations General Assembly]] had noted the repeated threats of the Rhodesian authorities "to declare unilaterally the independence of Southern Rhodesia, in order to perpetuate minority rule", and called upon Wilson to use all means at his disposal (including military force) to prevent the Rhodesian Front from asserting independence.<ref>{{cite web|title=Question of Southern Rhodesia|url=https://undocs.org/A/RES/2012(XX)|id=A/RES/2012(XX)|date=12 October 1965|website=undocs.org|publisher=United Nations|access-date=17 March 2017|language=en|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170318090144/http://undocs.org/A/RES/2012(XX)|archive-date=18 March 2017|url-status=live }}</ref> After UDI was proclaimed, UN officials branded the Rhodesian government as an "illegal racist minority regime"<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.southerntimesafrica.com/news_article.php?id=7348&title=Learning%20From%20Rhodesia&type=83 |title=Southern Times-Learning From Rhodesia |publisher=Southerntimesafrica.com |date=12 November 1965 |access-date=9 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130509030234/http://www.southerntimesafrica.com/news_article.php?id=7348&title=Learning%20From%20Rhodesia&type=83 |archive-date=9 May 2013 |url-status=live }}</ref> and called on member states to voluntarily sever economic ties with Rhodesia, recommending [[International sanctions|sanctions]] on petroleum products and military hardware.<ref name="areahandbook"/> In December 1966, the UN further iterated that these sanctions were mandatory, and member states were explicitly barred from purchasing Rhodesian export goods, namely tobacco, chromium, copper, asbestos, sugar, and beef.<ref name="areahandbook"/>

The British government, having already adopted extensive sanctions of its own, [[Beira Patrol|dispatched]] a [[Royal Navy]] squadron to monitor oil deliveries in the port of [[Beira, Mozambique|Beira]] in Mozambique, from which a strategic pipeline ran to [[Mutare|Umtali]] in Rhodesia. The warships were to deter "by force, if necessary, vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for (Southern) Rhodesia".<ref>{{cite web |author=United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |url=http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,RESOLUTION,ZWE,,3b00f205c,0.html |archive-url=https://archive.today/20130416010217/http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,RESOLUTION,ZWE,,3b00f205c,0.html |url-status=dead |archive-date=16 April 2013 |title=Refworld &#124; Resolution 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966 |publisher=UNHCR |access-date=9 October 2012 }}</ref><ref name="gowlland-debbas1990">{{citation | last = Gowlland-Debbas | first = Vera | title = Collective Responses to Illegal Acts in International Law: United Nations Action in the Question of Southern Rhodesia | publisher = Martinus Nijhoff Publishers | year = 1990 | isbn = 0-7923-0811-5}}</ref>

Some Western nations, such as Switzerland, and [[West Germany]], which were not UN member states, continued to conduct business openly with Rhodesia – the latter remained the Smith government's largest trading partner in Western Europe until 1973, when it was admitted to the UN.<ref name="areahandbook"/> Japan remained the chief recipient of Rhodesian exports outside the African continent, and [[Pahlavi Iran|Iran]] also supplied oil to Rhodesia in violation of the embargo.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB391/docs/1977.02.14%20Vance%20Memo%20for%20Carter.pdf |title=The Secretary of State, Washington |publisher=Gwu.edu |access-date=9 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121110195205/http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB391/docs/1977.02.14%20Vance%20Memo%20for%20Carter.pdf |archive-date=10 November 2012 |url-status=live }}</ref> Portugal served as a conduit for Rhodesian goods, which it exported through Mozambique with false [[Certificate of origin|certificates of origin]].<ref name="okoth2006">{{citation | last = Okoth | first = Assa | title = A History of Africa: Volume 2: 1915–1995 | publisher = East African Educational Publishers Ltd | year = 2006 | isbn = 9966-25-358-0}}</ref> South Africa, too, refused to observe the UN sanctions.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.africafocus.org/editor/aa1988.php |title=When Sanctions Worked: The Case of Rhodesia Reexamined |publisher=Africafocus.org |access-date=9 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130318020152/http://www.africafocus.org/editor/aa1988.php |archive-date=18 March 2013 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://commonwealth.sas.ac.uk/libraries/rhodesia/Sanctions.htm |title=Rhodesia Unilateral Declaration of Independence 1965 – Online exhibition |publisher=Commonwealth.sas.ac.uk |access-date=9 October 2012 }}{{dead link|date=November 2024|bot=medic}}{{cbignore|bot=medic}}</ref> In 1971, the [[Byrd Amendment (1971)|Byrd Amendment]] was passed in the United States, permitting American firms to go on importing Rhodesian chromium and nickel products as normal.<ref name="meredith">{{cite book|last=Meredith|first=Martin|title=The Past is Another Country|page=218}}</ref>

Despite the poor showing of sanctions, Rhodesia found it nearly impossible to obtain diplomatic recognition abroad. In 1970, the United States declared it would not recognise UDI "under [any] circumstances".<ref name="a">{{cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/2/newsid_2514000/2514683.stm|title=1970:Ian Smith declares Rhodesia a republic|work=BBC News|access-date=10 November 2007|date=2 March 1970|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080307133422/http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/2/newsid_2514000/2514683.stm|archive-date=7 March 2008|url-status=live }}</ref> South Africa and Portugal, Rhodesia's largest trading partners, also refused to extend diplomatic recognition, and did not open embassies in the Rhodesian capital, [[Harare|Salisbury]], preferring to conduct diplomatic activities through "accredited representatives".<ref name="google13">[https://books.google.com/books?id=3ptWAAAAYAAJ ''Foreign Affairs for New States: Some Questions of Credentials''], Peter John Boyce,
University of Queensland Press, January 1977, page 13</ref> This allowed the South African and Portuguese governments to maintain they were continuing to respect British sovereignty while also accepting the practical authority of the Smith administration.<ref name="google257">{{cite book|author1=Kenneth W. Grundy|author2=Kenneth William Grundy|title=Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa: The Limits of Independence|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=mb7dE6K6gJoC&pg=PA257|year=1973|publisher=University of California Press|isbn=978-0-520-02271-3|page=257}}</ref>

Initially, the Rhodesian state retained its pledged loyalty to Queen [[Elizabeth II]], recognising her as Queen of Rhodesia.<ref name="areahandbook"/> When Smith and Deputy Prime Minister [[Clifford Dupont]] visited Sir [[Humphrey Gibbs]], the [[Governor of Southern Rhodesia]], to formally notify him of the UDI, Gibbs condemned it as an act of treason. After Smith formally announced the UDI on the radio, Governor Gibbs used his [[reserve power]] to dismiss Smith and his entire cabinet from office, on orders from the [[Colonial Office]] in [[Whitehall]]. However, Gibbs was unable to take any concrete actions to bring about a return to lawful colonial government. Rhodesian ministers simply ignored his notices, contending that UDI had made his office obsolete. Even so, Gibbs continued to occupy his [[official residence]], [[State House, Harare|Government House]], in Salisbury until 1970, when he finally left Rhodesia, following the declaration of a republic.<ref name="Age">[https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=IhdVAAAAIBAJ&sjid=cpMDAAAAIBAJ&pg=1090%2C4932581 Queen's man resigns], ''[[The Age]]'', 26 June 1969</ref> He had effectively been superseded before then; the Smith government stated that if the Queen did not appoint a Governor-General, it would name Dupont as "[[Officer Administering the Government]]".<ref name="strips">[https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=vzNIAAAAIBAJ&sjid=qgANAAAAIBAJ&pg=782%2C2383897 Ian Smith Strips Gibbs Of All Official Privilege], Associated Press, ''[[The Morning Record]]'', 18 November 1965</ref> Smith had intended to have Dupont named Governor-General, but Queen Elizabeth II would not even consider this advice.<ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=juURVf5bhHoC&q=%22Her+Majesty+is+not+able+to+entertain+purported+advice+of+this+kind%22 ''Commonwealth Survey''], Central Office of Information, 1965, page 1281</ref> With few exceptions, the international community backed Whitehall's assertion that Gibbs was the Queen's only legitimate representative, and hence the only lawful authority in Rhodesia.

In September 1968, the [[Appellate court|Appellate Division]] of the [[High Court of Rhodesia]] ruled that Ian Smith's administration had become the ''de jure'' government of the country, not merely the ''de facto'' one.<ref name="Beadle">''Rhodesia Herald'', Salisbury, 13 to 20 September 1968</ref> To support his decision, Chief Justice Sir [[Hugh Beadle]] used several statements made by [[Hugo Grotius]], who maintained that there was no way that a nation could rightly claim to be governing a particular territory – if it was waging a war against that territory. Beadle argued that due to Britain's economic war against Rhodesia, she could not (at the same point) be described as ''governing'' Rhodesia.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://jurisafrica.org/docs/constitutions/Constitutional%20Legality.Southern%20Rhodesia%20UDI.pdf |title=Stella Madzimbamuto (Appellant) v Desmond William Lardner Burke and Frederick Phillip George (Respondents) |publisher=Jurisafrica.org |access-date=9 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150420060321/http://www.jurisafrica.org/docs/constitutions/Constitutional%20Legality.Southern%20Rhodesia%20UDI.pdf |archive-date=20 April 2015 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://uniset.ca/microstates/james.html |title=In re James (an insolvent) |publisher=Uniset.ca |access-date=9 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121017090007/http://uniset.ca/microstates/james.html |archive-date=17 October 2012 |url-status=live }}</ref> The ruling set the precedent that despite the UDI, the incumbent Smith government "could lawfully do anything its predecessors could lawfully have done".<ref name="legalitylaw">{{cite book|last=Lauterpacht|first=Elihu|title=International Law Reports (Volume 39)|pages=1–78}}</ref>

A Salisbury commission chaired by prominent lawyer W.R. Waley was appointed to study constitutional options open to the Rhodesian authorities as of April 1968, including on the topic of majority rule, but reopening negotiations with the British on a settlement was ruled out early on.<ref name="weitzer1990"/><ref>{{Cite web |url=http://archive.lib.msu.edu/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/Journal%20of%20the%20University%20of%20Zimbabwe/vol3n1/juz003001001.pdf |title=Archived copy |access-date=30 September 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130605054858/http://archive.lib.msu.edu/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/Journal%20of%20the%20University%20of%20Zimbabwe/vol3n1/juz003001001.pdf |archive-date=5 June 2013 |url-status=live }}</ref> The Waley Commission found that in practical as well as legal terms, "Europeans must surrender any belief in permanent European domination", pointing out that minority rule was not permanently sustainable.<ref name="areahandbook"/> However, Waley also testified that majority rule was not desirable immediately.<ref name="areahandbook"/>

Talks aimed at easing the differences between Rhodesia and the United Kingdom were carried out aboard Royal Navy vessels once in December 1966 and again in October 1968.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.barrylockyer.com/hms_tiger.htm |title=HMS Tiger |publisher=Barrylockyer.com |access-date=9 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130527204410/http://www.barrylockyer.com/hms_tiger.htm |archive-date=27 May 2013 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite magazine |last=Smock |first=David R. |url=http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/24074/david-r-smock/the-forgotten-rhodesians |title=The Forgotten Rhodesians |magazine=Foreign Affairs |access-date=9 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120405100904/http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/24074/david-r-smock/the-forgotten-rhodesians |archive-date=5 April 2012 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last=Cockram |first=B. |url=http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/30730/1/Rhodesia%20Rides%20A%20Tiger.pdf?1 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120417115410/http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/30730/1/Rhodesia%20Rides%20A%20Tiger.pdf?1 |url-status=dead |archive-date=17 April 2012 |title=Rhodesia Rides A Tiger |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |access-date=9 October 2012 }}</ref> Both efforts failed to achieve agreement, although Harold Wilson added a sixth principle to the five he had previously enunciated: "it would be necessary to ensure that, regardless of race, there was no oppression of the majority by the minority or of [any] minority by the majority." Rhodesian resolve stiffened following a failure to reach a new settlement, with more radical elements of the Rhodesian Front calling for a republican constitution.<ref name="areahandbook"/>

During a [[Rhodesian constitutional referendum, 1969|two-proposition referendum]] held in 1969, the proposal for severing all remaining ties to the British Crown passed by a majority of 61,130 votes to 14,327.<ref name="areahandbook"/> Rhodesia declared itself a republic on 2 March 1970. Under the new constitution, a president served as ceremonial head of state, with the prime minister nominally reporting to him.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://africanhistory.about.com/b/2012/03/02/2-march-1970-rhodesia-declared-a-republic.htm |title=2 March 1970 – Rhodesia Declared a Republic |publisher=Africanhistory.about.com |access-date=9 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121118175653/http://africanhistory.about.com/b/2012/03/02/2-march-1970-rhodesia-declared-a-republic.htm |archive-date=18 November 2012 |url-status=live }}</ref> Some in the Rhodesian government had hoped in vain that the declaration of a republic would finally prompt other nations to grant recognition.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/2/newsid_2514000/2514683.stm|title=BBC ON THIS DAY – 2 – 1970: Ian Smith declares Rhodesia a republic|work=bbc.co.uk|access-date=16 February 2006|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080307133422/http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/2/newsid_2514000/2514683.stm|archive-date=7 March 2008|url-status=live }}</ref>

====Impact of UDI====

The years following Rhodesia's UDI saw an unfolding series of economic, military, and political pressures placed on the country that eventually brought about majority rule, a totality of these factors rather than any one the reason for introducing change.<ref name="frontiersmen">{{cite book|last=Clayton|first=Anthony|title=Frontiersmen: Warfare in Africa since 1950|pages=42, 59–69}}</ref> In 2005, a conference at the [[London School of Economics]] that discussed Rhodesia's independence concluded that UDI was sparked by an existing racial conflict complicated by [[Cold War]] intrigues.<ref name="b">{{cite web|author=Dr. Sue Onslow|url=http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CWSC/events/rhodesian_UDI_40_jan_06.htm|title=UDI: 40 Years On|publisher=LSE|access-date=10 November 2007|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071013165015/http://lse.ac.uk/collections/CWSC/events/rhodesian_UDI_40_jan_06.htm|archive-date=13 October 2007|url-status=live }}</ref>

Critics of UDI maintained that Ian Smith intended to safeguard the privileges of an entrenched colonial ruling class at the expense of the impoverished black population.<ref name="c">{{cite web|author=Michael Hartnack|year=2005|url=http://www.theherald.co.za/herald/2005/10/25/cols/hcols.htm|title=40 years in wilderness after UDI declaration|publisher=The Herald|access-date=10 November 2007|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060320101625/http://www.theherald.co.za/herald/2005/10/25/cols/hcols.htm|archive-date=20 March 2006|url-status=dead }}</ref> Smith defended his actions by claiming that the black Rhodesian majority was too inexperienced at the time to participate in the complex administrative process of what was, by contemporary African standards, a reasonably industrialised state.<ref name="SmithGB"/>

At large, UDI further hardened the white population's attitudes towards majority rule and relations with the UK.<ref name="raft"/> A significant majority of white Rhodesian residents were either British immigrants or of British ancestry, and many held a special affection for the British Empire.<ref name="raft"/> However, the UK's refusal to grant them independence on their terms further confirmed their opposition to a political settlement on British terms, and fed their negative attitudes towards British interference in Rhodesian politics at large.<ref name="raft"/> In the years prior to UDI, white Rhodesians increasingly saw themselves as beleaguered and threatened, perpetually insecure and undermined by the metropole, unable to rely on anybody but themselves.<ref name="SmithGB"/> The policy of "No independence before majority rule" transformed the white community's relationship with the UK and increased its suspicions of the British government's untrustworthiness and duplicity in colonial affairs, especially since the latter had adopted NIBMR as a formal policy - the very circumstance UDI was carried out to avoid, and which white Rhodesians had struggled to resist since the onset of decolonisation.<ref name="SmithGB"/>

Black nationalist parties reacted with outrage at UDI, with one ZANU official stating, "...for all those who cherish freedom and a meaningful life, UDI has set a collision course that cannot be altered. 11 November 1965 [has] marked the turning point of the struggle for freedom in that land from a constitutional and political one to primarily a military struggle."<ref name="blackfire"/> It would, however, be several years before the nationalists adopted armed struggle as their primary strategy for obtaining political power.<ref name="blackfire"/> Violent tactics at this time were intended to create opportunities for [[Interventionism (politics)|external intervention]], either by the international community or the British government, rather than seriously undermine the Rhodesian security forces.<ref name="blackfire"/>

Because Rhodesian exports were generally competitive and had previously been entitled to preferential treatment on the British market, the former colony did not recognise the need for escalating the pace of [[Diversification (marketing strategy)|diversification]] before independence. Following the UDI, however, Rhodesia began to demonstrate that it had the potential to develop a greater degree of economic [[self-sufficiency]].<ref name="SmithGB"/><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa064.html |title=What's Wrong With Trade Sanctions |publisher=Cato Institute |date=23 December 1985 |access-date=13 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120716043831/http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa064.html |archive-date=16 July 2012 |url-status=live }}</ref> After the Rhodesian Front began introducing incentives accorded to domestic production, industrial output expanded dramatically. A rigid system of countermeasures enacted to combat sanctions succeeded in blunting their impact for at least a decade.<ref name="areahandbook"/> Over the next nine years Rhodesian companies, spiting the [[International asset recovery|freezing of their assets and blocking of overseas accounts]], also perfected cunning techniques of sanctions evasion through both local and foreign subsidiaries, which operated on a clandestine trade network.<ref name="areahandbook"/>

From 1968 until 1970, there was virtually no further dialogue between Rhodesia and the UK. In a [[Rhodesian constitutional referendum, 1969|referendum]] in 1969, white voters approved a new constitution and the establishment of a republic, thereby severing Rhodesia's last links with the British Crown, duly declared in March 1970. This changed immediately after the election of [[Edward Heath]], who reopened negotiations.<ref name="racewar">{{cite book|last=Brownell|first=Josiah|title=Collapse of Rhodesia: Population Demographics and the Politics of Race|pages=1–255}}</ref> Smith remained optimistic that Heath would do his utmost to remedy Anglo-Rhodesian relations, although disappointed that he continued to adhere publicly to the original "five principles" proposed by Alec Douglas-Home, now [[Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs|foreign secretary]]. In November 1971, Douglas-Home renewed contacts with Salisbury and announced a proposed agreement that would be satisfactory to both sides – it recognised Rhodesia's 1969 constitution as the legal frame of government, while agreeing that gradual legislative representation was an acceptable formula for unhindered advance to majority rule.<ref name="areahandbook"/> Nevertheless, the new settlement, if approved, would also implement an immediate improvement in black political status, offer a means to terminate racial discrimination, and provide a solid guarantee against retrogressive constitutional amendments.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://kora.matrix.msu.edu/files/50/304/32-130-BDE-84-al.sff.document.acoa000370.pdf |title=Zimbabwe Rejects Sellout! |publisher=American Committee on Africa |date=1 February 1972 |access-date=13 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130605054701/http://kora.matrix.msu.edu/files/50/304/32-130-BDE-84-al.sff.document.acoa000370.pdf |archive-date=5 June 2013 |url-status=live }}</ref>

Implementation of the proposed settlement hinged on popular acceptance, but the Rhodesian government consistently refused to submit it to a universal referendum.<ref name="areahandbook"/> A twenty four-member commission headed by an eminent jurist, [[Edward Pearce, Baron Pearce|Lord Pearce]], was therefore tasked with ascertaining [[public opinion]] on the subject.<ref name="historyps">{{cite book|last=Zvobgo|first=Chengetai|title=A History of Zimbabwe, 1890–2000 and Postscript, Zimbabwe, 2001–2008|pages=1–410}}</ref> In 1972, the commission began interviewing interest groups and sampling opinions – although concern was expressed over the widespread [[Political apathy|apathy]] encountered.<ref name="SmithGB"/> According to the commission, whites were in favour of the settlement, and Rhodesians of [[Coloured]] or Asian ancestry generally pleased, while the black response to the settlement's terms was resoundingly negative.<ref name="racewar"/><ref>{{cite news |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/january/18/newsid_2530000/2530291.stm |title=1972: Rhodesia's former leader arrested |publisher=BBC |date=18 January 1972 |access-date=13 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121215143739/http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/january/18/newsid_2530000/2530291.stm |archive-date=15 December 2012 |url-status=live }}</ref> As many as thirty black Rhodesian chiefs and politicians voiced their opposition, prompting Britain to withdraw from the proposals on the grounds of the commission's report.<ref name="historyps"/>

===The Bush War===
{{main|Rhodesian Bush War}}

====Early militant activity====

As early as 1960, [[minority rule]] in Southern Rhodesia was already being challenged by a rising tide of [[political violence]] led by black African nationalists such as [[Joshua Nkomo]] and [[Ndabaningi Sithole]]. A sustained period of civil unrest between 1960 and 1965 further polarised relations between the government and the increasingly militant black nationalists.<ref name="blackfire"/> After their public campaigns were initially suppressed, many black nationalists believed that negotiation was completely incapable of meeting their aspirations. Petrol bombings by politicised radicals became increasingly common, with the ''Zimbabwe Review'' observing in 1961, "for the first time home-made petrol bombs were used by freedom fighters in Salisbury against settler establishments."<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.rhodesia.nl/wilkinson.html |title=Insurgency in Rhodesia, 1957–1973: An Account and Assessment |publisher=International Institute for Strategic Studies |year=1973 |access-date=13 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120525121502/http://www.rhodesia.nl/wilkinson.html |archive-date=25 May 2012 |url-status=live }}</ref> Between January and September 1962, nationalists detonated 33 bombs and were implicated in 28 acts of arson, and 27 acts of sabotage against communications infrastructure.<ref name="blackfire"/> The nationalists also murdered a number of black Rhodesians who were accused of collaboration with the security forces.<ref name="blackfire"/> Nkomo's party, the [[Zimbabwe African People's Union]] (ZAPU) announced that year that it had formed a military wing, the [[Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army]] (ZIPRA) and "the decision to start bringing in arms and ammunition and to send young men away for sabotage training" had already been implemented.<ref name="blackfire"/> As early as 1960, ZAPU's predecessor, the National Democratic Party (NDP), had established informal contacts with the [[Soviet Union]] and [[Czechoslovak Socialist Republic|Czechoslovakia]], and discussed the possibility of obtaining military training in Eastern Europe for its members.<ref name=Hot>{{cite book|last=Shubin|first=Vladimir Gennadyevich|title=The Hot "Cold War": The USSR in Southern Africa|date=2008|pages=92–93, 151–159, 249|publisher=Pluto Press|location=London|isbn=978-0-7453-2472-2}}</ref> In July 1962, Nkomo visited Moscow and discussed plans for a ZAPU-led armed uprising in Rhodesia.<ref name=Hot/> He made formal requests for Soviet funding and arms for ZIPRA, explaining that "for these purposes ZAPU needs arms, explosives, revolvers...the party also needs money to bribe persons who guard important installations, to carry out sabotage".<ref name=Hot/> The Soviets agreed to supply ZAPU with limited funds beginning in 1963, and increased its level of financial support after UDI.<ref name=Hot/> In 1963, ZIPRA also made its first formal request to the Soviet Union for military training.<ref name=Hot/> The Soviets began training ZIPRA militants in guerrilla warfare in early 1964.<ref name=Hot/>

Nkomo's public endorsement of a violent strategy confirmed white politicians' opposition to ZAPU and fed their negative attitudes towards black nationalists at large.<ref name="blackfire"/> In response to the formation of ZIPRA, the Rhodesian government [[Ban (law)|banned]] ZAPU, driving that party's supporters underground.<ref name="crisis">{{cite book|last=Shamuyarira|first=Nathan|title=Crisis in Rhodesia|pages=202–203}}</ref> It also passed draconian security legislation restricting the right to assembly and granting the security forces broad powers to crack down on suspected political subversives.<ref name="blackfire"/> For the first time, the [[capital punishment|death sentence]] was also introduced for any act of politically inspired terrorism which involved arson or the use of explosives.<ref name="areahandbook"/>

The emergence of guerrilla warfare and acts of urban insurrection by the black nationalist parties in Rhodesia allowed racial politics to be elevated into an issue of law and order in white Rhodesian public discourse. To Smith and his government, black nationalists were stateless dissidents whose primary motives were not political, but crime and perpetuating lawlessness; for example, Smith preferred to describe the insurgents as "gangsters" in his commentary.<ref name="SmithGB"/> The use of weapons and explosives sourced from communist states by the black nationalists also disguised the racial dynamics of the conflict, allowing white Rhodesians to claim that they were targets of Soviet-directed communist agitators rather than a domestic political movement.<ref name="frontiersmen"/> Smith and his supporters perceived themselves as collective defenders of the traditional values of the [[British Empire]] against the twin threats of international communism, manifested through the Soviet Union's support for black nationalist militants, and the social and political decadence of the West.<ref name="raft"/> Often repeated appeals to the Christian heritage of their pioneer ancestors in "defending the [[free world]]" and sustaining "Western civilisation" reflected these beliefs.<ref name="raft"/> This was hardly an unusual opinion among white minorities in Southern Africa at the time; a dossier compiled by United States intelligence officials on the topic found that:
{{blockquote|many [southern African] whites....believe that the current social and political ferment throughout the continent is communist inspired and managed; that it would be no problem without communist instigation. They point to materiel and training provided by communist countries to insurgency groups operating against white minority governments in southern Africa. They see foreign-based black liberation groups operating against the Portuguese, Rhodesians, and South Africans as the spearhead of a communist thrust into southern Africa.<ref name=Volk>{{cite book|last=Miller|first=Jamie|title=An African Volk: The Apartheid Regime and Its Search for Survival|year=2016|pages=100–117|publisher=Oxford University Press|location=Oxford|isbn=978-0190274832}}</ref>}}

ZAPU's attempts to implement its armed struggle were hamstrung by a factional split within the party between 1962 and 1963. A number of ZAPU dissidents rejected Nkomo's authority and formed their own organisation, the [[Zimbabwe African National Union]] (ZANU), with Ndabaningi Sithole as its president and [[Robert Mugabe]] as its general secretary.<ref name=Hot/> By August 1964, ZANU was banned by the Rhodesian government as well, which cited widespread acts of violent intimidation attributed to its members.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.rhodesia.nl/wilkinson.html |title=The Rhodesian Agreement: Aspects and Prospects |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |year=1978 |access-date=13 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120525121502/http://www.rhodesia.nl/wilkinson.html |archive-date=25 May 2012 |url-status=live }}</ref> ZANU's agenda was left-wing and [[Pan-Africanism|pan-Africanist]]; it demanded a one-party state with majority rule and the abolition of private property.<ref name="areahandbook"/> Ethnic tensions also exacerbated the split: ZANU recruited almost solely from the [[Shona people|Shona-speaking peoples]] of Rhodesia.<ref name=Hot/> Its chief support base was the rural peasantry in the [[Mashonaland]] countryside.<ref name="areahandbook"/> ZAPU did retain Shona members, even among its senior leadership following the split.<ref name=Hot/> However, thereafter it recruited predominantly from the [[Northern Ndebele people|Ndebele]] ethnic group.<ref name="frontiersmen"/> Due to ZAPU's close relationship with the Soviet Union, ZANU found itself ostracised by the Soviet bloc but soon found a new ally in the [[People's Republic of China]].<ref name=Hot/> Its political ideology was somewhat more influenced by the principles of [[Maoism]] than ZAPU, and a sympathetic Chinese government soon agreed to furnish weapons and training for ZANU's own war effort.<ref name=MWM>{{cite book|last1=Moorcraft|first1=Paul|last2=Chitiyo|first2=Knox|title=Mugabe's War Machine: Saving or Savaging Zimbabwe?|date=2011|pages=46–59|publisher=Pen & Sword Books Ltd|location=South Yorkshire|isbn=978-1848844100}}</ref>

After UDI, ZANU formed its own military wing, the [[Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army]] (ZANLA).<ref name="frontiersmen"/> While ZANLA and ZIPRA both planned for an armed struggle against the Rhodesian government, their respective leadership disagreed on the means of conducting the insurgency. ZIPRA favoured Soviet thinking, placing an emphasis on acquiring sophisticated weaponry in the hopes of winning a conventional battle like the [[Viet Minh]] at [[Battle of Dien Bien Phu|Dien Bien Phu]].<ref name="frontiersmen"/> ZANLA placed greater emphasis on the politicisation of the local populace in the areas it operated, and favoured a more irregular style of warfare.<ref name="frontiersmen"/>

[[File:Scoutwithgun.jpg|thumb|Rhodesian soldier interrogating villagers in late 1977 at gunpoint. This photograph would become one of the most enduring images of the [[Rhodesian Bush War|Bush War]].]]

In early April 1966, two groups of ZANLA insurgents recently trained at a Chinese military facility in [[Nanjing]] crossed into Rhodesia from Zambia, having been issued vague instructions to sabotage important installations and kill white farmers.<ref name="blackfire"/> Five were arrested by the Rhodesian security forces almost immediately.<ref name="blackfire"/> Another seven initially evaded capture and planned to destroy an [[Electricity pylon|electric pylon]] near [[Chinhoyi|Sinoia]].<ref name="blackfire"/> Their explosive charges failed to detonate and were discovered by the [[Rhodesian Security Forces]], who tracked the insurgents to a nearby ranch on April 28.<ref name="blackfire"/> All seven were cornered and killed after a brief firefight; this event is considered to be the first engagement of the [[Rhodesian Bush War]].<ref name="military">{{cite book|last=Moorcraft and McLaughlin, Peter|first=Paul|year=2008|title=The Rhodesian War: A Military History|pages=1–200}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.rhodesianforces.org/AntiTerroristOps.htm |title=Rhodesian Air Force Anti Terrorist Operations (COINOPS) |publisher=rhodesianforces.org |year=2012 |access-date=13 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120304022746/http://www.rhodesianforces.org/AntiTerroristOps.htm |archive-date=4 March 2012 |url-status=live }}</ref> The action at Sinoia has been commemorated by supporters of the guerrillas since as "''Chimurenga Day''", and occupies a place of pride in ZANU hagiography.<ref name=MWM/>

In August 1967, a large and better-equipped column of almost seventy ZIPRA insurgents infiltrated Rhodesia from Zambia, bolstered by recruits from an allied South African militant organisation, [[uMkhonto we Sizwe]] (MK).<ref name=MWM/> The insurgents failed to cultivate prior contacts with the local populace, which immediately informed on their presence to Rhodesian officials. Within the month, the [[British South Africa Police|Rhodesian police]] and army had launched a counteroffensive codenamed [[Operation Nickel]], killing forty-seven insurgents, capturing another twenty, and driving the survivors across the border into Botswana. An even larger ZIPRA column of over a hundred insurgents was intercepted in early 1968 and annihilated by the security forces.<ref name="frontiersmen"/> A third ZIPRA incursion attempt in July 1969 met with similarly catastrophic results.<ref name="frontiersmen"/> Thereafter, ZIPRA abandoned the notion of attempting to infiltrate the country with large groups of insurgents equipped only with small arms; it limited itself to more irregular forms of warfare until it could stockpile enough heavy weaponry to mount a major conventional invasion.<ref name=MWM/> For its part, the ZANLA leadership criticised ZIPRA's continued fixation with winning a major conventional engagement, arguing that the failed incursions demonstrated the futility of engaging the Rhodesian military in the type of pitched battles in which it held an indisputable advantage.<ref name=MWM/> ZIPRA's failure to obtain support from the locals was also noted, and ZANLA began implementing a long-term covert politicisation programme to cultivate civilian support throughout its future area of operations.<ref name=MWM/>

===Military and political escalation (1972–1976)===

By December 1972, ZANLA had cached arms and established a vast underground network of informants and supporters in northeastern Rhodesia.<ref name=MWM/>  As a result of the erosion of Portuguese authority in Mozambique's border provinces due to the [[Mozambican War of Independence]], ZANLA was also able to establish external sanctuaries there.<ref name=MWM/> It was also in the process of cultivating a military alliance with the leading black nationalist movement in Mozambique, the [[Front for the Liberation of Mozambique]] (FRELIMO).<ref name=MWM/> On December 21, a group of ZANLA insurgents under [[Rex Nhongo]] crossed into Rhodesia from Mozambique and [[Attack on Altena Farm|raided an isolated commercial farm]].<ref name="frontiersmen"/> In the successive months, this attack was followed by a succession of raids on white farmers throughout the northeastern districts of the country and resulted in several casualties among the security forces.<ref name="frontiersmen"/> The propaganda value of these raids, coupled with the success of ZANLA's politicisation campaign, denied intelligence to the security forces and furnished more recruits for the insurgents.<ref name="frontiersmen"/> In response, the Rhodesian security forces began coordinating operations in Mozambique with the [[Portuguese Army]] to intercept ZANLA insurgents before they could cross the border.<ref name=Minter>{{cite book|last=Minter|first=William|title=Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique|year=1994|pages=32–40|publisher=Witwatersrand University Press|location=Johannesburg|isbn=978-1439216187}}</ref>

The practical alliances between ZIPRA and MK, and later ZANLA and FRELIMO, prompted Rhodesia to look increasingly towards South Africa and Portugal for active assistance.<ref name=Volk/> Rhodesian politicians frequently reminded officials in the other two nations of common security interests based on the similarity of their restive internal situations.<ref name=Volk/> They saw strong parallels between their nation's position of being threatened by black nationalist insurgencies and the Portuguese predicament with FRELIMO in Mozambique, as well as to a lesser extent the insurgencies in South Africa and [[South West Africa]].<ref name=Volk/> Under the auspices of the [[Alcora Exercise]], the three countries' bureaucracies began routinely sharing information and seeking common diplomatic positions.<ref name=Volk/> Lieutenant General [[Charles 'Pop' Fraser|Alan Fraser]], a senior strategist in the [[South African Defence Force]] wrote in 1970, "there can be no doubt in any of our minds that we have a common enemy: we, i.e. Portugal, the RSA and Rhodesia. Unless we are to lay ourselves open to the possibility of defeat in detail, we must fight this enemy jointly—if not simultaneously."<ref name=Volk/> Nevertheless, aside from intelligence-sharing and some limited coordination on the operational level in Mozambique, the Portuguese could offer Rhodesia little decisive assistance. Portuguese military resources in Mozambique were preoccupied with FRELIMO and somewhat depleted by a decade of war, and little could be spared to assist a foreign ally.<ref name=Volk/> Rhodesia expected far more from South Africa, which possessed far greater military resources and infinitely more diplomatic influence abroad.<ref name=Volk/>

After the [[Carnation Revolution]] and the end of Portuguese rule in Mozambique in 1975, it was no longer viable for the Smith regime to sustain white [[minority rule]] indefinitely. By this time, even South Africa's [[John Vorster]] had come to this view. While Vorster was unwilling to make concessions to his own country's black people, he concluded that white minority rule was not sustainable in a country where black people outnumbered white people 22:1.<ref name="impression">{{cite web |url=http://www.aliciapatterson.org/APF001975/Wright/Wright12/Wright12.html |title=APF newsletter, "Appraisal of Rhodesia in 1975" |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090531063909/http://www.aliciapatterson.org/APF001975/Wright/Wright12/Wright12.html |archive-date=31 May 2009 }}</ref> In 1976, there were 270,000 Rhodesians of European descent and six million Africans.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Weinraub |first1=Bernard |title=White Moderates Cling To Hopes for Rhodesia |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1976/07/13/archives/white-moderates-cling-to-hopes-for-rhodesia.html |newspaper=The New York Times |access-date=27 January 2021 |date=13 July 1976}}</ref>

International business groups involved in the country (e.g. [[Lonrho]]) transferred their support from the Rhodesian government to black nationalist parties. Business leaders and politicians feted Nkomo on his visits to Europe. ZANU also attracted business supporters who saw the course that future events were likely to take.<ref>[[The Guardian]], 21 April 2000 [https://www.theguardian.com/international/story/0,3604,212767,00.html British Multimillionaire bankrolls Mugabe party]</ref> Funding and arms support provided by supporters, particularly from the Soviet Union and its allies in the latter 1970s, allowed both ZIPRA and the ZANLA to acquire more sophisticated weaponry, thereby increasing the military pressure that the guerrillas were able to place on Rhodesia.

Until 1972, containing the guerrillas was little more than a police action. Even as late as August 1975 when Rhodesian government and black nationalist leaders met [[Victoria Falls Conference (1975)|at Victoria Falls]] for negotiations brokered by South Africa and Zambia, the talks never got beyond the procedural phase.<ref>Brookings Institution: [http://brookings.nap.edu/books/0815775938/html/156.html p156, study on conflict resolution] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060921232031/http://brookings.nap.edu/books/0815775938/html/156.html |date=21 September 2006 }}</ref> Rhodesian representatives made it clear they were prepared to fight an all out war to prevent majority rule.<ref>{{cite news|title=Peace talks fail|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/26/newsid_2535000/2535825.stm|work=BBC News|access-date=27 November 2007|date=26 August 1975|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080307132412/http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/26/newsid_2535000/2535825.stm|archive-date=7 March 2008|url-status=live }}</ref> However, the situation changed dramatically after the end of Portuguese colonial rule in Mozambique in 1975. Rhodesia now found itself almost entirely surrounded by hostile states and even South Africa, its only real ally, pressed for a settlement.

{{blockquote|Having let slip one chance after another of reaching an accommodation with more moderate black leaders, Rhodesia's whites seem to have made the tragic choice of facing black nationalism over the barrel of a gun rather than the conference table. The downhill road toward a race war in Rhodesia is becoming increasingly slippery with blood.|''[[Rand Daily Mail]]'' editorial, May 1976<ref>{{cite web|year=1976|url=http://jcgi.pathfinder.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,914118-1,00.html|title=Rhodesia: A Strike At the Lifeline|publisher=Rand Daily Mail via TIME magazine|page=2|access-date=23 November 2007}}{{Dead link|date=April 2019 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref>}}

At this point, ZANU's alliance with FRELIMO and the porous border between Mozambique and eastern Rhodesia enabled large-scale training and infiltration of ZANU/ZANLA fighters. The governments of Zambia and Botswana were also emboldened sufficiently to allow resistance movement bases to be set up in their territories. Guerrillas began to launch operations deep inside Rhodesia, attacking roads, railways, economic targets and isolated security force positions, in 1976.<ref>{{cite magazine|year=1976|url=http://jcgi.pathfinder.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,914118-1,00.html|title=A Strike at the Lifeline|magazine=TIME magazine|access-date=23 November 2007}}{{Dead link|date=April 2019 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref>

[[File:Rhodesian Army recruitment Bush War 1976.png|thumb|A Rhodesian servicewoman taking aim with her [[Browning Hi-Power]] [[9×19mm]] [[semi-automatic pistol]]; from a 1976 army recruitment poster]]

The government adopted a [[strategic hamlet]]s policy of the kind used in [[Malayan Emergency#Comparisons with Vietnam|Malaya]] and [[Vietnam War|Vietnam]] to restrict the influence of insurgents over the population of rural areas. Local people were forced to relocate to protected villages (PVs) which were strictly controlled and guarded by the government against rebel atrocities. The protected villages were compared by the guerrillas to [[concentration camps]]. Some contemporary accounts claim that this interference in the lives of local residents induced many of them who had previously been neutral to support the guerrillas.<ref>APF Newsletter, 1976 :[http://www.aliciapatterson.org/APF001975/Wright/Wright17/Wright17.html Rhodesia's "Protected" Black people.] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071217225248/http://www.aliciapatterson.org/APF001975/Wright/Wright17/Wright17.html|date=17 December 2007}}</ref>

The war degenerated into rounds of increasing brutality from all three parties involved (ZANU and ZAPU, and the Rhodesian Army). Mike Subritzky, a former [[New Zealand Army]] ceasefire monitor in Rhodesia, in 1980 described the war as "both bloody and brutal and brought out the very worst in the opposing combatants on all three sides."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://riv.co.nz/rnza/tales/subritzky5.htm#ps|title=Operation Agila, "The British Empire's Last Sunset"|publisher=NZ History|access-date=23 November 2007|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071118152034/http://riv.co.nz/rnza/tales/subritzky5.htm#ps|archive-date=18 November 2007 }}</ref>

A major problem for the Rhodesian state in fighting the Bush War was always a shortage of manpower.<ref name="Brownell"/>{{rp|601}} Of the 3,000 white men liable for conscription in 1973, only about 1,000 reported when called-up.<ref name="Brownell"/>{{rp|601}} In February 1978, the Rhodesian Army stated it needed a minimum of 1,041 men to continue combat operations, and of those called up, only 570 reported for duty while the rest chose to move to South Africa.<ref name="Brownell"/>{{rp|601}} White emigration increased as the state called up more and more men to fight in the war, creating a vicious circle, which gradually limited the capacity of the Rhodesian state to continue the war.<ref name="Brownell"/>{{rp|602}} In order to stop white emigration, the Smith government brought in a law in 1975 forbidding Rhodesian citizens from holding foreign currency, but the law was widely flouted.<ref name="Brownell"/>{{rp|604}} In order to encourage white emigration, the guerrillas of ZANU and ZAPU followed a strategy of attacking anything and everything that was of economic value across the country in order to force the state to call up more men, and of killing white civilians.<ref name="Brownell">{{cite journal |doi=10.1080/03057070802259837 |pages=591–610 |title=The Hole in Rhodesia's Bucket: White Emigration and the End of Settler Rule|year=2008|last1=Brownell|first1=Josiah|journal=Journal of Southern African Studies|volume=34|issue=3|s2cid=145336659}}</ref>{{rp|606}} Killing Rhodesian white citizens tended to have an "echo effect" as the ZANU and ZAPU had each estimated that for one white citizen killed, it caused about 20 to leave Rhodesia.<ref name="Brownell"/>{{rp|606}}

===End of the Bush War===

{{multiple image
| align = left
| image1 = RhodesiaAllies1965.png
| width1 = 180
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| caption1 = 
| image2 = RhodesiaAllies1975-en.svg
| width2 = 180
| alt2 = 
| caption2 = 
| footer = The geographical situation in 1965 (left, on UDI) and 1975 (right, after the independence of Mozambique and Angola from Portugal). Green: Rhodesia; purple: friendly nations; orange: hostile states; grey: neutral countries
}}

Rhodesia began to lose vital economic and military support from South Africa, which, while sympathetic to the white minority government, never accorded it diplomatic recognition. The South African government placed limits on the fuel and munitions they supplied to the Rhodesian military. They also withdrew the personnel and equipment that they had previously provided to aid the war effort, though covert military support continued.<ref name="news.bbc.co.uk">{{cite news |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/24/newsid_2537000/2537969.stm |title=BBC ON THIS DAY &#124; 24 &#124; 1976: White rule in Rhodesia to end |work=BBC News |access-date=9 October 2012 |date=24 September 1976 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121023233416/http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/24/newsid_2537000/2537969.stm |archive-date=23 October 2012 |url-status=live }}</ref>

In 1976, the South African government and [[United States government]]s worked together to place pressure on Smith to agree to a form of majority rule. In response to the initiative of [[United States Secretary of State]] [[Henry Kissinger]], in 1976 Ian Smith accepted the principle of black majority rule within two years.<ref name="news.bbc.co.uk"/> The Rhodesians now offered more concessions, but those concessions, focused on reaching an "internal settlement" with moderate black leaders, were insufficient to end the war.

At the time, some Rhodesians said the still embittered history between the British-dominated Rhodesia and the [[Afrikaner]]-dominated South Africa partly led the South African government to withdraw its aid to Rhodesia. Ian Smith said in his memoirs that even though many white South Africans supported Rhodesia, South African Prime Minister [[John Vorster]]'s policy of [[détente]] with the black African states ended up with Rhodesia being offered as the "sacrificial lamb" to buy more time for South Africa. Other observers perceived South Africa's distancing itself from Rhodesia as being an early move in the process that led to majority rule in South Africa itself.<ref>APF newsletter, 1976: [http://www.aliciapatterson.org/APF001975/Wright/Wright19/Wright19.html appraisal of Rhodesia in 1976] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100911213214/http://www.aliciapatterson.org/APF001975/Wright/Wright19/Wright19.html |date=11 September 2010 }}</ref>

{{blockquote|In 1976 South Africa saw settlement of the Rhodesian question as vital on several fronts: to cauterise the wound of the psychological blow … caused by her defeat in the Angolan conflict; to pre-empt possible Cuban intervention in Rhodesia and the possibility of South Africa being sucked into another [[Cold War]] regional conflict without the support and endorsement of the western powers|Dr Sue Onslow|South Africa and UDI<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CWSC/pdf/40_years_on_abstracts.doc|title=Cold War Studies Project|work=lse.ac.uk|access-date=8 June 2007|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070615023738/http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CWSC/pdf/40_years_on_abstracts.doc|archive-date=15 June 2007|url-status=live }}</ref>}}

In the latter 1970s, the militants had successfully put the economy of Rhodesia under significant pressure while the numbers of guerrillas in the country were steadily increasing.<ref>Time magazine, 7 August 1978: [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,948221-1,00.html Rhodesia faces collapse] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070930090622/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,948221-1,00.html |date=30 September 2007 }}</ref><ref>Time magazine, 1 August 1978: [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,915164-1,00.html taking the chicken run] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070930122153/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,915164-1,00.html |date=30 September 2007 }}</ref> The government abandoned its early strategy of trying to defend the borders in favour of trying to defend key economic areas and lines of communication with South Africa, while the rest of the countryside became a patchwork of "[[no-go area]]s".

====Late 1970s====

By the late 1970s, Rhodesia's front-line forces contained about 25,000 regular troops and police – backed up by relatively strong army and police reserves.<ref>{{cite web|author=Major Charles Lohman and Major Robert MacPherson|title="Rhodesia: Tactical Victory, Strategic Defeat" WAR SINCE 1945 SEMINAR AND SYMPOSIUM, US Marine Corps Command and Staff College, June 1983 – See Chapter 3|url=https://www.scribd.com/doc/2546386/Rhodesia-Tactical-Victory-Srategic-Defeat|publisher=Scribd.com|access-date=9 October 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121102105856/http://www.scribd.com/doc/2546386/Rhodesia-Tactical-Victory-Srategic-Defeat|archive-date=2 November 2012|url-status=live }}</ref> Its mechanised contingent consisted of light armoured cars and improvised [[MRAP|mine-protected]] armoured personnel carriers, complemented by eight tanks (Polish built [[T-54/T-55 Operators and variants#Poland|T-55LD]] tanks), delivered in the last year of the war. The [[Rhodesian Air Force]] operated an assortment of both [[English Electric Canberra|Canberra]] light bombers, [[Hawker Hunter]] fighter bombers, older [[de Havilland Vampire]] jets as well as a somewhat antiquated, but still potent, helicopter arm. These forces, including highly trained special operations units, were capable of launching devastating raids on resistance movement camps outside the country, as in [[Operation Dingo]] in 1977 and other similar operations.

Nevertheless, guerrilla pressure inside the country itself was steadily increasing in the latter 1970s. By 1978–1979, the war had become a contest between the guerrilla warfare placing ever increasing pressure on the Rhodesian regime and civil population, and the Rhodesian government's strategy of trying to hold off the militants until external recognition for a compromise political settlement with moderate black leaders could be secured.

By this time, the need to cut a deal was apparent to most Rhodesians, but not to all. Ian Smith had dismissed his intransigent Defence Minister, [[P. K. van der Byl]], as early as 1976.<ref>Rhodesia Worldwide: [http://www.rhodesiana.com/rsr/rsr3-004.html "PK"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060313201045/http://www.rhodesiana.com/rsr/rsr3-004.html |date=13 March 2006 }}</ref> Van der Byl was a hard-line opponent of any form of compromise with domestic opposition or the international community since before UDI.

{{blockquote|...it is better to fight to the last man and the last cartridge and die with some honour. Because, what is being presented to us here is a degree of humiliation...|P. K. van der Byl in 1977, commenting on a British peace plan.<ref>The Past is Another Country, Martin Meredith, p 291</ref>}}

Van der Byl eventually retired to his country estate outside [[Cape Town]], but there were elements in Rhodesia, mainly embittered former security force personnel, who forcibly opposed majority rule up to and well beyond the establishment of majority rule.<ref>Newsnet report : [http://www.newsnet.co.zw/index.php?nID=6941 saboteurs hit Zimbabwean military, partisan comment] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070418031150/http://www.newsnet.co.zw/index.php?nID=6941|date=18 April 2007}}</ref> New white immigrants continued to arrive in Rhodesia right up to the eve of majority rule.<ref>''Time'' magazine, October 1977 : [https://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,915681,00.html The Land of Opportunity]</ref>

====Intensification of the Bush War====

The work of journalists such as [[Lord Richard Cecil]], son of [[Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, 6th Marquess of Salisbury]], stiffened the morale of Rhodesians and their overseas supporters.<ref>''The Guardian'', 15 July 2003: [https://www.theguardian.com/obituaries/story/0,,998195,00.html obituary of sixth Marquess of Salisbury]</ref> Lord Richard produced news reports for [[ITN]] which typically contrasted the "incompetent" insurgents with the "superbly professional" government troops.<ref>Nick Downie report: [http://www.rhodesianforces.org/Pages/Army/Rhodesia%20-%20a%20study%20in%20military%20incompetence.htm] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060510234222/http://www.rhodesianforces.org/Pages/Army/Rhodesia%20-%20a%20study%20in%20military%20incompetence.htm|date=10 May 2006}}</ref> A group of ZANLA fighters killed Lord Richard on 20 April 1978 when he was accompanying a Rhodesian airborne unit employed in [[Fire Force (Rhodesia)|Fire Force]] Operations.<ref>2nd Lt CJE Vincent BCR who was present when Lord Cecil was killed</ref>

The shooting down on 3 September 1978 of the civilian [[Air Rhodesia]] airliner, a [[Vickers Viscount]] named the ''[[Air Rhodesia Flight 825|Hunyani]]'', in the [[Kariba, Zimbabwe|Kariba]] area by ZIPRA fighters using a [[surface-to-air missile]], with the subsequent massacre of 10 of its 18 survivors, is widely considered to be the event that finally destroyed the Rhodesians' will to continue the war. Although militarily insignificant, the loss of this aircraft (and a second Viscount, named the ''[[Air Rhodesia Flight 827|Umniati]]'', in 1979) demonstrated the reach of resistance movements extended to Rhodesian civil society.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://home.iprimus.com.au/rob_rickards/viscounts/hunyani.htm |title=The Viscount Disasters – The Story |access-date=13 January 2006 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060304002303/http://home.iprimus.com.au/rob_rickards/viscounts/hunyani.htm |archive-date=4 March 2006 |url-status=live }}</ref>

The Rhodesians' means to continue the war were also eroding fast. In December 1978, a ZANLA unit penetrated the outskirts of Salisbury and fired a volley of rockets and [[incendiary device]] rounds into the main oil storage depot – the most heavily defended economic asset in the country. The storage tanks burned for five days, giving off a column of smoke that could be seen {{convert|80|mi|km|order=flip}} away. {{convert|0.5e6|oilbbl|m3|spell=In}} of petroleum product (comprising Rhodesia's strategic oil reserve) were lost.<ref>The Atlantic Monthly : [http://www.rmi.org/cms/Download.aspx?id=1296&file=S83-08_FragileDomEnergy.pdf&title=The+Fragility+of+Domestic+Energy The Fragility of Domestic Energy, see page 5]{{dead link|date=December 2017|bot=InternetArchiveBot|fix-attempted=yes}}</ref>

The government's defence spending increased from R$30 million, 8.5% of the national budget in 1971 to 1972, to R$400 m in 1978 to 1979, 47% of the national budget. In 1980, the post-independence government of Zimbabwe inherited a US$500 million national debt.<ref>Selby thesis: [http://www.zwnews.com/3-Main%20Body.pdf ZWNEWS.com] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120813050154/http://www.zwnews.com/3-Main%20Body.pdf |date=13 August 2012 }}, p 88</ref>

===End of UDI (1979)===

[[File:Internal Settlement.jpg|thumb|Signing of the Rhodesian Internal Settlement (from left: Bishop Abel Muzorewa, [[Ian Smith]], [[Jeremiah Chirau]] and [[Ndabaningi Sithole]])]]

The Rhodesian army continued its "mobile counter-offensive" strategy of holding key positions ("vital asset ground") while carrying out raids into the no-go areas and into neighbouring countries. While often extraordinarily successful in inflicting heavy guerrilla casualties, such raids also on occasion failed to achieve their objectives. In April 1979 special forces carried out a raid on [[Joshua Nkomo]]'s residence in [[Lusaka]] ([[Zambia]]) with the stated intention of assassinating him.<ref>{{Cite news|title=Did UK warn Mugabe and Nkomo about assassination attempts?|work=BBC News|date=August 2011|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14311834|access-date=2021-11-02}}</ref> Nkomo and his family left hastily a few hours before the raid – having clearly been warned that the raid was coming.

In 1979, some special forces units were accused of using counterinsurgent operations as cover for ivory poaching and smuggling. Colonel [[Reid-Daly]] (commander of the [[Selous Scouts]]) discovered that his phone was bugged and after challenging a superior officer on this issue was court martialled for insubordination. He received the lightest sentence possible, a caution, but he continued to fight his conviction and eventually resigned his commission and left the Army.

By 1978–1979, up to 70% of the regular army was composed of black soldiers (though both the army and police reserves remained overwhelmingly white). By 1979 there were also 30 black commissioned officers in the regular army. While there was never any suggestion of disloyalty among the soldiers from predominantly black units (in particular within the Selous Scouts or the [[Rhodesian African Rifles]] – RAR), some argue that, by the time of the 1980 election, many of the RAR soldiers voted for Robert Mugabe.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Montgomery|first=Margaret B.|title=Perspective {{!}} The military provides a model for how institutions can address racism|language=en-US|newspaper=[[The Washington Post]]|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/06/23/military-provides-model-how-institutions-can-address-racism/|access-date=2021-01-24|issn=0190-8286}}</ref>

As the result of an [[Internal Settlement]] signed on 3 March 1978 between the Rhodesian government and the moderate African nationalist parties, which were not in exile and not involved in the war, elections were held in April 1979. The [[United African National Council]] (UANC) party won a majority in this election, and its leader, [[Abel Muzorewa]] (a [[United Methodist Church]] bishop), became the country's first black prime minister on 1 June 1979. The country's name was changed to [[Zimbabwe Rhodesia]]. The internal settlement left control of the country's police, security forces, civil service and judiciary in white hands, for the moment. It assured whites of about one-third of the seats in parliament. It was essentially a power-sharing arrangement between white people and black people which, in the eyes of many, particularly the insurgents, did not amount to majority rule.<ref>BBC "On this day" report :[http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/1/newsid_2492000/2492915.stm 1 June 1979] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061115003348/http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/1/newsid_2492000/2492915.stm|date=15 November 2006}}.</ref> However, the [[United States Senate]] voted to end economic sanctions against Zimbabwe Rhodesia on 12 June.<ref name="endsanctions">[https://www.nytimes.com/1979/06/13/archives/senate-votes-down-a-move-to-preserve-rhodesia-sanctions-armsbill.html Senate Votes Down A Move To Preserve Rhodesia Sanctions; Arms-Bill Veto Threatened White House Says 52-to-41 Margin Shows President Has Support to Prevent an Override] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180722214110/https://www.nytimes.com/1979/06/13/archives/senate-votes-down-a-move-to-preserve-rhodesia-sanctions-armsbill.html |date=22 July 2018 }}, 13 June 1979. The New York Times.</ref>

While the 1979 election was described by the Rhodesian government as non-racial and democratic, it did not include the main nationalist parties ZANU and ZAPU. In spite of offers from Ian Smith, the latter parties declined to participate in an election in which their political position would be insecure and under a proposed constitution which they had played no part in drafting and which was perceived as retaining strong white minority privilege.

Bishop Muzorewa's government did not receive international recognition. The Bush War continued unabated and sanctions were not lifted. The international community refused to accept the validity of any agreement which did not incorporate the main nationalist parties. The British government (then led by the recently elected [[Margaret Thatcher]]) issued invitations to all parties to attend a peace conference at [[Lancaster House]]. These negotiations took place in London in late 1979. The three-month-long conference almost failed to reach conclusion, due to disagreements on [[Land reform in Zimbabwe|land reform]], but resulted in the [[Lancaster House Agreement]]. UDI ended, and Rhodesia temporarily reverted to the status of a British colony (the 'Colony of Southern Rhodesia').<ref>Southern Rhodesia (Annexation) Order in Council, 30 July 1923 which provided by section 3 thereof: "From and after the coming into operation of this Order the said territories shall be annexed to and form part of His Majesty's Dominions, and shall be known as the ''Colony of Southern Rhodesia''."</ref> As per the agreement, [[Christopher Soames|Lord Soames]] became governor with full legislative and executive powers.

The Lancaster House Agreement further provided for a ceasefire which was followed by an internationally supervised general election, held in [[Southern Rhodesian general election, 1980|February 1980]]. ZANU led by [[Robert Mugabe]] won this election, some alleged,{{who|date=March 2017}} by terrorising its political opposition, including supporters of ZAPU, through former insurgents that had not confined themselves to the designated guerrilla assembly points, as stipulated by the Lancaster House Agreement. The observers and Soames were accused of looking the other way, and Mugabe's victory was certified. Nevertheless, few could doubt that Mugabe's support within his majority Shona tribal group was extremely strong. The Rhodesian military seriously considered mounting a coup against a perceived stolen election ("[[Operation Quartz]]") to prevent ZANU from taking over the country.<ref>{{cite web|first=R.|last=Allport|title=Operation Quartz – Rhodesia 1980|url=http://www.memoriesofrhodesia.com/media/documents/Op-Quartz.pdf|website=memoriesofrhodesia.com|access-date=5 February 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110101171326/http://www.memoriesofrhodesia.com/media/documents/Op-Quartz.pdf|archive-date=1 January 2011|url-status=live }}</ref> The alleged coup was to include the assassination of Mugabe and coordinated assaults on guerrilla assembly points throughout the country. The plan was eventually scuttled, as it was obvious that Mugabe enjoyed widespread support from the black majority despite voter intimidation, as well as the fact that the coup would gain no external support, and a conflagration which would engulf the country was seen as inevitable.

===Republic of Zimbabwe (1980)===

On 18 April 1980 the country became independent within the [[Commonwealth of Nations]] as the Republic of Zimbabwe, and its capital, Salisbury, was renamed [[Harare]] two years later.