Editing Republic of Guinea Armed Forces (section)

===The militia===
[[Image:David Haba Guinean army 2005-199.jpg|thumb|left|A Guinean soldier translates for other soldiers during a joint U.S.-Guinean exercise, 2005.]]
Increasing mistrust of the regular armed forces after the [[Labé]] plot led to the militia assuming greater importance.<ref>Nelson et al 1975, pp. 328–9, 338–9</ref> The militia had grown out of a 1961 [[Democratic Party of Guinea]] (PDG) decision to create workplace 'committees for the defence of the revolution.' These committees were encouraged by party officials to report dishonest practices such as theft and embezzlement of funds which might 'endanger the achievements of the revolution.'

The PDG youth arm, the Youth of the African Democratic Revolution (JRDA) was especially exhorted to report irregularities and crime to party or police authorities. Units of volunteers, formed in response to this call, assumed limited policing functions. Following government praise for these units' efforts, the militia's role expanded, especially as black-market activity and smuggling grew worse. The force was formalized as the Popular Militia (Milices Populaires) in the early 1960s, given distinctive uniforms, and linked to the developing civic service, which was engaged in national development tasks. After 1966 it was consciously modeled after the [[China|Chinese]] [[Red Guards]].

In 1969, the militia was officially granted a role equivalent to the army, as a counterbalance in any military coup d'état. The elements in the Conakry area were issued small arms and given military training. Touré had heralded this policy in 1967 when he wrote: 'thanks to their special political, physical, and social training, the people's militia will become the indisputable mainspring of our security system, of which the conventional armed forces constitute [but] a fundamental section.'<ref>Ahmed Sékou Touré, ''The Doctrine and Methods of the Democratic Party of Guinea'', Imprimerie Nationale Patrice Lumumba, Conakry, 1967, quoted in Mohamed Saliou Camara, 'From Military Politization to Militarization of Power in Guinea-Conakry', ''Journal of Political and Military Sociology'', Vol.28, No. 2, 2000. ({{ISSN|0047-2697}}) 2000.</ref>

The militia was re-titled the National and Popular Militia in 1974 and its regular section scaled down, as the President announced that the country could not afford the large standing force that he believed was necessary to deter what he saw as the constant threat of invasion.<ref>Nelson et al 1975, pp. 339–340, seemingly drawing on U.S. Department of Commerce translations of articles in the PDG newspaper Horoya, 1974, made available through the Joint Publications Research Service.</ref> The militia was re-organised in multiple tiers, with a staff in Conakry, some combat units, and the remainder of the permanent element serving as a cadre for reserve militia units in villages, industrial sites, and schools.

The permanent cadre was to circulate among the villages, spending three months in each one, to train the local militia. President Touré announced that the ultimate goal was to have a 100-strong paramilitary unit in each of the country's 4,000 villages. Infantry weapons of Soviet manufacture imported from the USSR, Czechoslovakia and the PRC were to be issued as they became available.

With much focus on the militia, Touré kept much of the armed forces in poverty. The [[International Crisis Group]] said that '..conditions of service were deplorable, even for officers. The senior officer corps lived on meagre rations and saw its privileges and family allowances curtailed over time. Soldiers of all ranks had to find ways to supplement their rations and were often reduced to working either on state farms or in small agricultural projects.'<ref>On this period, Crisis Group interviews, colonel and former member of the Comités d'Unité Militaire (CUM), Kindia, May 2010; retired military officer, Conakry, February 2010. See also Barry Mamadou Aliou, ''L'armée guinéenne: Comment et pour quoi faire?'' (Paris, 2009), via ICG 2010</ref> '...All regular military activity, for example exercises, was considered potentially subversive.'<ref>Crisis Group interview, retired general, Conakry, May 2010.</ref>