Editing Reliabilism (section)

==Objections==
{{Refimprove section|date=April 2011}}
Some find reliabilisms of justification objectionable because it entails [[externalism (epistemology)|externalism]], which is the view that one can have knowledge, or have a justified belief, despite not knowing (having "access" to) the evidence, or other circumstances, that make the belief justified.  Most reliabilists maintain that a belief can be justified, or can constitute knowledge, ''even if'' the believer does not know about or understand the process that makes the belief reliable.  In defending this view, reliabilists (and externalists generally) are apt to point to examples from simple acts of perception: if one sees a bird in the tree outside one's window and thereby gains the belief that there is a bird in that tree, one might not at all understand the cognitive processes that account for one's successful act of perception; nevertheless, it is the fact that the processes worked reliably that accounts for why one's belief is justified.  In short, one finds one holds a belief about the bird, and that belief is justified if any is, but one is not acquainted at all with the processes that led to the belief that justified one's having it. 

Another of the most common objections to reliabilism, made first to Goldman's reliable process theory of knowledge and later to other reliabilist theories, is the so-called generality problem.<ref>{{Cite journal | last1 = Conee | first1 = E. | last2 = Feldman | first2 = R. | title = The Generality Problem for Reliabilism | journal = Philosophical Studies | volume = 89 | issue = 1 | pages = 1–29 | doi =  10.1023/A:1004243308503| year = 1998 | jstor = 4320806| s2cid = 170425156 }}</ref>  For any given justified belief (or instance of knowledge), one can easily identify many different (concurrently operating) "processes" from which the belief results.  My belief that there is a bird in the tree outside my window might be accorded a result of the process of forming beliefs on the basis of sense-perception, of visual sense-perception, of visual sense-perception through non-opaque surfaces in daylight, and so forth, down to a variety of different very specifically described processes.  Some of these processes might be statistically reliable, while others might not.  It would no doubt be better to say, in any case, that we are choosing not which process to say resulted in the belief, but instead how to describe the process, out of the many different levels of generality on which it can be accurately described.

An objection in a similar line was formulated by [[Stephen Stich]] in ''The Fragmentation of Reason''. Reliabilism usually considers that for generating justified beliefs a process needs to be reliable in a set of relevant possible scenarios. However, according to Stich, these scenarios are chosen in a culturally biased manner. Stich does not defend any alternative theory of knowledge or justification, but instead argues that all accounts of normative epistemic terms  are culturally biased and instead only a pragmatic account can be given.

Another objection to reliabilism is called the ''new evil demon problem''.<ref>{{cite journal |title=The Diagonal and the Demon |first=Juan |last=Comesaña |journal=Philosophical Studies |volume=110 |issue=3 |year=2002 |pages=249–266 |doi=10.1023/a:1020656411534 |s2cid=169069884 |url=http://philosophy.wisc.edu/comesana/diagonal.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100614021049/http://philosophy.wisc.edu/comesana/diagonal.pdf |archive-date=2010-06-14 }}</ref> The evil demon problem originally motivated [[skepticism]], but can be repurposed to object to reliabilist accounts as follows:  If our experiences are controlled by an evil demon, it may be the case that we believe ourselves to be doing things that we are not doing.  However, these beliefs are clearly justified. [[Robert Brandom]] has called for a clarification of the role of [[belief]] in reliabilist theories. Brandom is concerned that unless the role of belief is stressed, reliabilism may attribute knowledge to things that would otherwise be considered incapable of possessing it. Brandom gives the example of a parrot that has been trained to consistently respond to red visual stimuli by saying 'that's red'. The proposition is true, the mechanism that produced it is reliable, but Brandom is reluctant to say that the parrot ''knows'' it is seeing red because he thinks it cannot ''believe'' that it is. For Brandom, beliefs pertain to concepts: without the latter there can be no former. Concepts are products of the 'game of giving and asking for reasons'. Hence, only those entities capable of reasoning, through language in a social context, can for Brandom believe and thus have knowledge. Brandom may be regarded as hybridising [[externalism]] and [[internalism]], allowing knowledge to be accounted for by reliable external process so long as  a knower possess some internal understanding of why the belief is reliable.