Editing Reductionism (section)

=== Ontological reductionism ===
Richard Jones divides ontological reductionism into two: the reductionism of substances (e.g., the reduction of mind to matter) and the reduction of the number of structures operating in nature (e.g., the reduction of one physical force to another). This permits scientists and philosophers to affirm the former while being anti-reductionists regarding the latter.<ref>Richard H. Jones (2000), ''Reductionism: Analysis and the Fullness of Reality'', pp. 24—26, 29–31. Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press.</ref>

[[Nancey Murphy]] has claimed that there are two species of ontological reductionism: one that claims that wholes are nothing more than their parts; and atomist reductionism, claiming that wholes are not "really real". She admits that the phrase "really real" is apparently senseless but she has tried to explicate the supposed difference between the two.<ref>Nancey Murphy, "Reductionism and Emergence. A Critical Perspective." In ''Human Identity at the Intersection of Science, Technology and Religion''. Edited by Nancey Murphy, and Christopher C. Knight. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010. P. 82.</ref>

Ontological reductionism denies the idea of ontological [[emergence]], and claims that emergence is an [[Epistemology|epistemological]] phenomenon that only exists through analysis or description of a system, and does not exist fundamentally.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Silberstein|first1=Michael|last2=McGeever|first2=John|date=April 1999|title=The Search for Ontological Emergence|url=https://academic.oup.com/pq/article-lookup/doi/10.1111/1467-9213.00136|journal=The Philosophical Quarterly|language=en|volume=49|issue=195|pages=201–214|doi=10.1111/1467-9213.00136|issn=0031-8094}}</ref>

In some scientific disciplines, ontological reductionism takes two forms: '''token-identity theory''' and '''type-identity theory'''.<ref>{{cite book | chapter-url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-reduction/#TypIdeThe | title=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | chapter=Scientific Reduction | year=2019 | publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University }}</ref> In this case, "token" refers to a biological process.<ref>{{cite book | chapter-url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reduction-biology/ | title=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | chapter=Reductionism in Biology | year=2022 | publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University }}</ref> 

Token ontological reductionism is the idea that every item that exists is a sum item. For perceivable items, it affirms that every perceivable item is a sum of items with a lesser degree of complexity. Token ontological reduction of biological things to chemical things is generally accepted.

Type ontological reductionism is the idea that every type of item is a sum type of item, and that every perceivable type of item is a sum of types of items with a lesser degree of complexity. Type ontological reduction of biological things to chemical things is often rejected.

[[Michael Ruse]] has criticized ontological reductionism as an improper argument against [[vitalism]].<ref>{{cite journal|url=http://icb.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/29/3/1061.pdf |first=Michael |last=Ruse |title=Do Organisms Exist? |journal=Am. Zool. |volume=29 |pages=1061–1066 |year=1989 |issue=3 |doi=10.1093/icb/29.3.1061|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081002163413/http://icb.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/29/3/1061.pdf |archive-date=2008-10-02 }}</ref>