Editing Public choice (section)

=== History of social choice and public choice theory ===
{{See also|Social choice theory}}

A 19th-century precursor of modern public choice theory was the work of Swedish economist [[Knut Wicksell]],<ref>Knut Wicksell (1896 [1958]). "A New Principle of Just Taxation," J.M. Buchanan, trans., in [[Richard A. Musgrave]] and [[Alan T. Peacock]], ed. (1958). ''Classics in the Theory of Public Finance'', Palgrave Macmillan, an essay from Wicksell (1896), ''Finanzthcoretische Untersuchungen'', Jena: Gustav Fischer.</ref> which treated government as political exchange, a ''[[quid pro quo]]'', in formulating a [[benefit principle]] linking taxes and expenditures.<ref>• [[Dennis C. Mueller]] (1976). "Public Choice: A Survey," ''Journal of Economic Literature'', 14(2), p. 396. [pp. [http://pages.uoregon.edu/cjellis/441/Mueller.pdf 395–433.] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131019084807/http://pages.uoregon.edu/cjellis/441/Mueller.pdf |date=October 19, 2013 }}<br />&nbsp;&nbsp; •  James M. Buchanan(1986). [https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1986/buchanan-lecture.html# "The Constitution of Economic Policy,"] IV. Politics as Exchange & V. The Constitution of Economic Policy, Nobel Prize lecture. Republished in 1987, ''American Economic Review'', 77(3), pp. 243–250 {{JSTOR|1804093}}.</ref> American statesman and political theorist [[John C. Calhoun]] is also seen as a precursor to modern public choice theory.<ref name=":2">{{Cite journal |last1=Tabarrok |first1=Alexander |last2=Cowen |first2=Tyler |date=1992 |title=The Public Choice Theory of John C. Calhoun |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/40751557 |journal=Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics |volume=148 |issue=4 |pages=655–674 |jstor=40751557 |issn=0932-4569}}</ref> His writings on political economy anticipate the "public choice revolution" in modern economics and political science.<ref name=":2" />

Some subsequent economic analysis has been described as treating government as though it attempted "to maximize some kind sort of welfare function for society" and as distinct from characterizations of self-interested [[economic agents]], such as those in business.<ref name="Tullock2008"/> This is a clear dichotomy, as one can be self-interested in one area but altruistic in another. By contrast, public choice theory models government as made up of officials who, besides pursuing the public interest, may act to benefit themselves, for example in the [[budget-maximizing model]] of [[bureaucracy]], possibly at the cost of [[Economic efficiency|efficiency.]]<ref name="Tullock2008"/><ref name="Niskanen">William A. Niskanen ([1971] 1994). ''Bureaucracy and Public Economics'', Elgar. Expanded ed. Description and review  [http://www.thelockeinstitute.org/books/bureaucracy.html links] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130402183714/http://www.thelockeinstitute.org/books/bureaucracy.html |date=2013-04-02 }} and review [https://books.google.com/books?id=QDB-QgAACAAJ excerpts].</ref>