Editing Protoscience (section)

==Thought collective==
{{main|Thought collective}}
:''This material is from [[Ludwik Fleck#Thought collective|Ludwik Fleck § Thought collective]]''
[[Thomas Kuhn]] later discovered that Fleck 1935 had voiced concepts that predated Kuhn's own work. That is, 
Fleck wrote that the development of [[truth]] in scientific research was an unattainable ideal as different researchers were locked into thought collectives (or thought-styles). This means "that a pure and direct observation cannot exist: in the act of perceiving objects the observer, i.e. the epistemological subject, is always influenced by the epoch and the environment to which he belongs, that is by what Fleck calls the thought style".{{sfn|Siwecka|2011}} Thought style throughout Fleck's work is closely associated with representational style. A "fact" was a relative value, expressed in the language or symbolism of the thought collective in which it belonged, and subject to the social and temporal structure of this collective. He argued, however, that within the active cultural style of a thought collective, knowledge claims or facts were constrained by passive elements arising from the observations and experience of the natural world. This passive resistance of natural experience represented within the stylized means of the thought collective could be verified by anyone adhering to the culture of the thought collective, and thus facts could be agreed upon within any particular thought style.{{sfn|Fleck|1979|pp=101-102}} Thus while a fact may be verifiable within its own collective, it may be unverifiable in others. He felt that the development of scientific facts and concepts was not unidirectional and does not consist of just accumulating new pieces of information, but at times required changing older concepts, methods of observations, and forms of representation. This changing of prior knowledge is difficult because a collective attains over time a specific way of investigating, bringing with it a blindness to alternative ways of observing and conceptualization. Change was especially possible when members of two thought collectives met and cooperated in observing, formulating hypothesis and ideas. He strongly advocated comparative epistemology. He also notes some features of the culture of modern natural sciences that recognize provisionality and evolution of knowledge along the value of pursuit of passive resistances.{{sfn|Fleck|1979|pp=118-120, 142-145}} This approach anticipated later developments in [[social constructionism]], and especially the development of critical [[science and technology studies]].