Editing Potsdam Conference (section)

==Relationships among leaders==
A number of changes had taken place in the five months since the [[Yalta Conference]] and greatly affected the relationships among the leaders. The Soviets occupied Central and Eastern Europe. The [[Baltic states]] were forcibly reincorporated into the USSR, while the Red Army also occupied Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania. Refugees fled from those countries. Stalin had set up a puppet communist government in Poland, insisted that his control of Eastern Europe was a defensive measure against possible future attacks, and claimed that it was a legitimate sphere of Soviet influence.<ref>Leffler, Melvyn P., "For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War, First Edition, (New York, 2007) p. 31</ref>

[[Winston Churchill]], who had served for most of the war as British prime minister in a [[Churchill war ministry|coalition government]], was replaced during the conference by [[Clement Attlee]]. Churchill's government had a Soviet policy since the early 1940s that differed considerably from [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]]'s and believed Stalin to be a "devil"-like tyrant, who led a vile system.<ref name="miscamble51">{{Harvnb|Miscamble|2007|p=51}}</ref> A [[1945 United Kingdom general election|general election]] was held in the United Kingdom on 5 July 1945, but its results were delayed to allow the votes of armed forces personnel to be counted in their home constituencies. The outcome became known during the conference, when Attlee became the new prime minister.

Roosevelt had died on 12 April 1945, and US Vice-{{Not a typo|President}} [[Harry Truman]] assumed the presidency, which saw [[VE Day]] (Victory in Europe) within a month and [[VJ Day]] (Victory in Japan) on the horizon.

William Bullitt had been ambassador to the Soviet Union until 1936, and ambassador to France until 1940, until having a falling out with Roosevelt and a demotion in the State Department.  He later claimed Roosevelt told him in January 1943 with regards to potential Soviet domination over eastern Europe - "I just have a hunch that Stalin is not that kind of a man.... I think that if I give him everything I possibly can and ask for nothing from him in return, 'noblesse oblige', he won't try to annex anything and will work with me for a world of democracy and peace.".<ref name="miscamble52">{{Harvnb|Miscamble|2007|p=52}}</ref>  Bullitt wrote a memo criticizing FDR and his focus on Europe over Asia, which was published in the press in May 1943.

While a [[United States Senate|United States Senator]] and later as [[Vice President of the United States|Vice President]], Truman had closely followed the Allied progress of the war. [[George Lenczowski]] noted that "despite the contrast between his relatively modest background and the international glamour of his aristocratic predecessor, [Truman] had the courage and resolution to reverse the policy that appeared to him naive and dangerous," which was "in contrast to the immediate, often ''[[ad hoc]]'' moves and solutions dictated by the demands of the war."<ref name="LenczAmPres">[[George Lenczowski]], ''American Presidents and the Middle East,'' (1990), pp. 7–13</ref> With the end of the war, the priority of Allied unity was replaced by the challenge of the relationship between the two emerging superpowers.<ref name="LenczAmPres" /> Both leading powers continued to portray a cordial relationship to the public, but suspicion and distrust lingered between them.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hunt |first=Michael |title=The World Transformed |publisher=Oxford University Press |date=2013 |isbn=978-0-1993-7102-0 |pages=35}}</ref> Despite this, on 17 July, the first day of the conference, Truman noted "I can deal with Stalin. He is honest — but smart as hell."<ref>Quoted in Arnold A. Offner, Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953. (Stanford University Press, 2002). p 14</ref>

Truman was much more suspicious of the Soviets than Roosevelt had been and became increasingly suspicious of Stalin's intentions.<ref name="LenczAmPres" /> Truman and his advisers saw Soviet actions in Eastern Europe as aggressive expansionism, which was incompatible with the agreements committed to by Stalin at Yalta in February. In addition, Truman became aware of possible complications elsewhere after Stalin had objected to Churchill's proposal for an Allied withdrawal from Iran ahead of the schedule that had been agreed at the [[Tehran Conference]]. The Potsdam Conference was the only time that Truman met Stalin in person.<ref>Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. 1: ''Year of Decisions'' (1955), p.380, cited in Lenczowski, ''American Presidents,'' p.10</ref><ref>Nash, Gary B. "The Troublesome Polish Question." The American People: Creating a Nation and a Society. New York: Pearson Longman, 2008. Print.</ref>

At the Yalta Conference, France was granted an occupation zone within Germany. France was a participant in the [[Berlin Declaration (1945)|Berlin Declaration]] and was to be an equal member of the [[Allied Control Council]]. Nevertheless, at the insistence of the Americans, [[Charles de Gaulle]] was not invited to Potsdam — just as he had been denied representation at Yalta — for fear that he would reopen the Yalta decisions. De Gaulle thus felt a diplomatic slight, which became a cause of deep and lasting resentment for him.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Reinisch |first=Jessica |title=The Perils of Peace |publisher=Oxford University Press |date=2013 |pages=53}}</ref> Other reasons for the omission included the longstanding personal mutual antagonism between Roosevelt and de Gaulle, ongoing disputes over the French and American occupation zones, and the anticipated conflicts of interest over [[French Indochina]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Thomas |first=Martin |title=The French Empire at War 1940-45 |publisher=Manchester University Press |date=1998 |pages=215}}</ref> It also reflected the judgement of the British and the Americans that French aims, with respect to many items on the conference's agenda, were likely to contradict agreed-upon Anglo-American objectives.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Feis |first=Hebert |url=https://archive.org/details/betweenwarpeacep0000feis |title=Between War and Peace; the Potsdam Conference |publisher=Princeton University Press |date=1960 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/betweenwarpeacep0000feis/page/138 138] |url-access=registration}}</ref>