Editing Political question (section)

==Doctrine==
Unlike the rules of [[Standing (law)|standing]], [[ripeness]], and [[mootness]], when the political question doctrine applies, a particular question is beyond judicial competence no matter who raises it, how immediate the interests it affects, or how burning the controversy.<ref name=":0" /> The doctrine is grounded in the [[Separation of powers under the United States Constitution|separation of powers]], as well as the federal judiciary's desire to avoid inserting itself into conflicts between branches of the [[US federal government|federal government]].<ref name=":0" /> It is justified as leaving political questions to the political process, in which voters can indirectly approve or reject the challenged action through voting.<ref name=":0" />

The leading Supreme Court case on the political question doctrine is ''[[Baker v. Carr]]'' (1962).<ref name="Baker v. Carr 1962">''Baker v. Carr'', 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).</ref><ref name=":0" /> In that case, the Supreme Court held that an unequal apportionment of a state legislature may have denied equal protection and presented a justiciable issue.<ref name=":0" /> In ''Baker'', the Court outlined six characteristics "[p]rominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question":<ref name="Baker v. Carr 1962" />

*"a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or 
*a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or 
*the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or 
*the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or 
*an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or 
*the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question."

The first factor—a textually demonstrable commitment to another branch—is the classical view that the Court must decide all cases and issues before it unless, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, the Constitution itself commits the issue to another branch of government.<ref>Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 7–9 (1959); Weston, Political Questions, 38 Harv.L.Rev. 296 (1925).</ref> The second and third factors—lack of judicially discoverable standards and involvement of the judiciary in nonjudicial policy determinations—suggest a functional approach, based on practical considerations of how government ought to work.<ref>Nowak & Rotunda, Constitutional Law, 8th ed. 2010, pp. 137–138; Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 Yale L.J. 517 (1966).</ref> The final three factors—lack of respect for other branches, need for adherence to a political decision already made, and possibility of embarrassment—are based on the Court's prudential consideration against overexertion or aggrandizement.<ref>Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch, 1962, pp. 23–28, 69–71; Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term: Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 Harv.L.Rev. 40, 46, 75 (1961); Finkelstein, Judicial Self–Limitation, 37 Harv.L.Rev. 338, 361 (1924); Finkelstein, Some Further Notes on Judicial Self–Limitation, 39 Harv.L.Rev. 221 (1926).</ref>