Editing Polaris Sales Agreement (section)

==Negotiations==
[[File:ST-C378-8-62. Director of the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), Dr. Wernher von Braun, at McDonnell Aircraft Corporation in St. Louis, Missouri.jpg|thumb|upright|The Director of the [[George C. Marshall Space Flight Center]], [[Wernher von Braun]], rides in the back of a motorized cart with the [[Chief Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Defence]] of Great Britain, Sir [[Solly Zuckerman]], in the front passenger seat.]]
With the Nassau Agreement in hand, it remained to work out the details. [[Vice Admiral (Royal Navy)|Vice Admiral]] [[Michael Le Fanu]] had a meeting with the [[United States Secretary of Defense]], [[Robert S. McNamara]], on 21 December 1962, the final day of the Nassau conference. He found McNamara eager to help, and enthusiastic about the idea of Polaris costing as little as possible. The first issue identified was how many Polaris boats should be built. While the Vulcans to carry Skybolt were already in service, the submarines to carry Polaris were not, and there was no provision in the defence budget for them.{{sfn|Jones|2017|pp=406–407}} Some naval officers feared that their construction would adversely impact the [[hunter-killer submarine]] programme.{{sfn|Moore|2001|p=170}} The First Sea Lord, [[Admiral of the Fleet (Royal Navy)|Admiral of the Fleet]] Sir [[Caspar John]], denounced the "millstone of Polaris hung around our necks" as "potential wreckers of the real navy".{{sfn|Moore|2010|p=188}}

The number of missiles required was based on substituting for Skybolt. To achieve the same capability, the BNDSG calculated that this would require eight Polaris submarines, each of which would have 16 missiles, for a total of 128 missiles, with 128 one-megaton warheads.{{sfn|Jones|2017|pp=291–292}} It was subsequently decided to halve this, based on the decision that the ability to destroy twenty Soviet cities would have nearly as great a deterrent effect as the ability to destroy forty.{{sfn|Jones|2017|pp=295–297}} The [[British Admiralty|Admiralty]] considered the possibility of hybrid submarines that could operate as hunter-killers while carrying eight Polaris missiles,{{sfn|Jones|2017|p=347}} but McNamara noted that this would be inefficient, as twice as many submarines would need to be on station to maintain the deterrent, and cautioned that the effect of tinkering with the US Navy's 16-missile layout was unpredictable.{{sfn|Jones|2017|pp=406–407}} [[HM Treasury|The Treasury]] costed a four-boat Polaris fleet at £314 million by 1972/73.{{sfn|Jones|2017|p=409}} A Cabinet Defence Committee meeting on 23 January 1963 approved the plan for four boats, with Thorneycroft noting that four boats would be cheaper and faster to build.{{sfn|Jones|2017|p=410}}

A mission led by Sir [[Solly Zuckerman]], the [[Chief Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Defence]], left for the United States to discuss Polaris on 8 January 1963. It included the [[Vice Chief of the Naval Staff (United Kingdom)|Vice Chief of the Naval Staff]], Vice Admiral Sir [[Varyl Begg]]; the Deputy Secretary of the Admiralty, James Mackay; Rear Admiral [[Hugh Mackenzie (Royal Navy officer)|Hugh Mackenzie]]; and physicist Sir [[Robert Cockburn (physicist)|Robert Cockburn]] and F. J. Doggett from the Ministry of Aviation. That the involvement of the Ministry of Aviation might be a complicating factor was foreseen, but it had experience with nuclear weapons development. Mackenzie had been the [[Commodore Submarine Service|Flag Officer Submarines]] until 31 December 1962, when Le Fanu had appointed him the Chief Polaris Executive (CPE). As such, he was directly answerable to Le Fanu as Controller of the Navy. His CPE staff was divided between London and Foxhill, near [[Bath, Somerset]], where Royal Navy had its ship design, logistics and weapons groups. It was intended as a counterpart to the [[United States Navy Special Projects Office]] (SPO), with whom it would have to deal.{{sfn|Jones|2017|pp=410–411}}

The principal finding of the Zuckerman mission was that the Americans had developed a new version of the Polaris missile, the A3. With a range extended of {{convert|2500|nmi|km}}, it had a new weapons bay housing three re-entry vehicles (REBs or Re-Entry Bodies in US Navy parlance) and a new {{convert|200|ktTNT|adj=on}} [[W58]] warhead to penetrate improved Soviet anti-missile defences expected to become available around 1970. A decision was therefore required on whether to purchase the old A2 missile or the new A3. The Zuckerman mission came out in favour of the new A3 missile, although it was still under development and not expected to enter service until August 1964, as the deterrent would remain credible for much longer.{{sfn|Jones|2017|pp=413–415}} The decision was endorsed by the [[First Lord of the Admiralty]], [[Lord Carrington]], in May 1963, and was officially made by Thorneycroft on 10 June 1963.{{sfn|Moore|2010|p=231}}

The choice of the A3 created a problem for the [[Atomic Weapons Research Establishment]] (AWRE) at [[Aldermaston]], for the Skybolt warhead that had recently been tested in the [[British nuclear testing in the United States|Tendrac nuclear test]] at the [[Nevada Test Site]] in the United States would require a redesigned Re-Entry System (RES) in order to be fitted to a Polaris missile, at an estimated cost of between £30 million and £40 million. The alternative was to make a British copy of the W58. While the AWRE was familiar with the [[W47]] warhead used in the A2, it knew nothing of the W58. A presidential determination was required to release information on the W58 under the MDA, but with this in hand, a mission led by [[John Challens]], the Chief of Warhead Development at the AWRE, visited the [[Lawrence Livermore Laboratory]] from 22 to 24 January 1963, and was shown details of the W58.{{sfn|Jones|2017|pp=413–415}}

[[File:JFKWHP-KN-C19267 KN-C19267. President John F. Kennedy Meets with the Ambassador of Great Britain, Sir David Ormsby-Gore.jpg|thumb|left|President [[John F. Kennedy]] meets with the [[British Ambassador to the United States]], [[David Ormsby-Gore, 5th Baron Harlech|Sir David Ormsby-Gore]], in the [[Oval Office]].]]
The Zuckerman mission found the SPO helpful and forthcoming, but there was one major shock. The British were expected to contribute to the research and development costs of the A3, backdated to 1 January 1963. These were expected to top $700 million by 1968.{{sfn|Jones|2017|pp=416–417}} Skybolt had been offered to the UK at [[unit cost]], with the US absorbing the research and development costs,{{sfn|Harrison|1982|p=27}} but no such agreement had been reached at Nassau for Polaris. Thorneycroft baulked at the prospect of paying research and development costs, but McNamara pointed out that the [[United States Congress]] would not stand for an agreement that placed all the burden on the United States.{{sfn|Jones|2017|pp=417–418}} Macmillan instructed the [[British Ambassador to the United States]], [[David Ormsby-Gore, 5th Baron Harlech|Sir David Ormsby-Gore]], to inform Kennedy that Britain was not willing to commit to an open-ended sharing of research and development costs, but, as a compromise, would pay an additional five per cent for each missile. He asked that Kennedy be informed that a breakdown of the Nassau Agreement would likely cause the fall of his government.{{sfn|Jones|2017|pp=420–421}} Ormsby-Gore met with Kennedy that very day, and while Kennedy noted that the five per cent offer "was not the most generous offer he had ever heard of",{{sfn|Jones|2017|p=422}} he accepted it. McNamara, certain that the United States was being ripped off, calculated the five per cent on top of not just the missiles, but their fire control and navigation systems as well, adding around £2 million to the bill. On Ormsby-Gore's advice, this formulation was accepted.{{sfn|Jones|2017|p=422}}

An American mission now visited the United Kingdom. This was led by [[Paul H. Nitze]], the [[Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs]], and included [[Walt W. Rostow]], the [[Director of Policy Planning]] at the [[State Department]], and Admiral [[Ignatius J. Galantin]], the head of the SPO. The Americans had ideas about how the programme should be organised. They foresaw the [[UK Polaris programme]] having project officers from both countries, with a Joint Steering Task Group that met regularly to provide advice. This was accepted, and would become part of the final agreement.{{sfn|Jones|2017|pp=418–419}} However, a follow-up British mission under Leslie Williams, the Director General Atomic Weapons at the Ministry of Aviation, whose members included Challens and Rear Admiral Frederick Dossor, was given a letter by the SPO with a list of subjects that were off limits. These included [[penetration aid]]s, which were held to be outside the scope of the Nassau Agreement.{{sfn|Jones|2017|pp=434–441}}

One remaining obstacle in the path of the programme was how it would be integrated with the MLF. The British response to the MLF concept "ranged from unenthusiastic to hostile throughout the military establishment and in the two principal political parties".{{sfn|Moore|2010|p=184}} Apart from anything else, it was estimated to cost as much as £100 million over ten years. Nonetheless, the Foreign Office argued that Britain must support the MLF.{{sfn|Moore|2010|p=184}} The Nassau Agreement had invigorated the MLF effort in the United States. Kennedy appointed [[Livingston T. Merchant]] to negotiate the MLF with the European governments, which he did in February and March 1963.{{sfn|Kaplan|Landa|Drea|2006|pp=405–407}} While reaffirming support for those parts of the Nassau Agreement concerning the MLF, the British were successful in getting them omitted from the Polaris Sales Agreement.{{sfn|Jones|2017|pp=428–434}}

[[File:Polaris missile launch from HMS Revenge (S27) 1983.JPEG|thumb|right|A Polaris missile is fired from the submerged British nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine {{HMS|Revenge|S27|6}} on 9 June 1983.]]
The British team completed drafting the agreement in March 1963, and copies were circulated for discussion.{{sfn|Jones|2017|p=443}} The contracts for their construction were announced that month. The Polaris boats would be the largest submarines built in Britain up to that time, and would be built by [[Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering|Vickers Armstrong Shipbuilders]] in [[Barrow-in-Furness]] and [[Cammell Laird]] in [[Birkenhead]]. For similar reasons to the US Navy, the Royal Navy decided to base the boats at [[Faslane]], on the [[Gareloch]], not far from the US Navy's base on the Holy Loch.{{sfn|Moore|2010|p=232}} The drawback of the site was that it isolated the Polaris boats from the rest of the navy.{{sfn|Moore|2001|p=169}} The Polaris Sales Agreement was signed in Washington, D.C., on 6 April 1963 by Ormsby-Gore and [[Dean Rusk]], the [[United States Secretary of State]].{{sfn|Jones|2017|p=444}}