Editing Physicalism (section)

=== Type physicalism ===
{{See also|Type physicalism}}

[[Type physicalism]], also known as mind-body identity theory, holds that [[Mental event|mental events]] can be grouped into types that correlate with types of physical events.<ref name="DStoljar" /> For instance, one type of mental events, such as pain, correlates with a particular type of physical events, such as C-fiber firings. On this account, all instances of pain correspond to situations where C-fibers are firing. Type physicalism can be understood as the position that there is an identity between types: any mental type is identical with some physical type.

A common argument against type physicalism is the problem of [[multiple realizability]]. Multiple realizability posits that the same mental state can be realized by different physical states. Another way to put it is that there is a many-to-one mapping from physical states to mental states.<ref name="BechtelMundale19992">{{Cite journal |last1=Bechtel |first1=William |author-link1=William Bechtel |last2=Mundale |first2=Jennifer |date=1999 |title=Multiple Realizability Revisited: Linking Cognitive and Neural States |journal=Philosophy of Science |volume=66 |issue=2 |pages=175–207 |doi=10.1086/392683 |issn=0031-8248 |jstor=188642 |s2cid=122093404}}</ref><ref name="Kim1993" /><ref name="Fodor1974" />