Editing Paradigm (section)

==Scientific paradigm==
{{Main|Paradigm shift|Sociology of knowledge|Systemics|Commensurability (philosophy of science)|Confirmation holism}}
{{See also|Paradigm (experimental)||Scientific consensus}}
The ''[[Oxford English Dictionary]]'' defines a ''paradigm'' as "a pattern or model, an exemplar; a typical instance of something, an example".<ref>{{cite OED|paradigm}}</ref> The historian of science [[Thomas Kuhn]] gave the word its contemporary meaning when he adopted the word to refer to the set of concepts and practices that define a scientific discipline at any particular period of [[time]]. In his book, ''[[The Structure of Scientific Revolutions]]'' (first published in 1962), Kuhn defines a scientific paradigm as: "universally recognized scientific achievements that, for a time, provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners,<ref name=":0">"The Structure of Scientific Revolution, Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. page 10</ref> i.e.,
* ''what'' is to be observed and scrutinized
* the kind of ''questions'' that are supposed to be asked and probed for answers in relation to this subject
* ''how'' these questions are to be structured
* ''what'' predictions made by the primary theory within the discipline
* ''how'' the results of scientific investigations should be interpreted
* ''how'' an experiment is to be conducted, and ''what'' equipment is available to conduct the experiment.

In ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'', Kuhn saw the sciences as going through alternating periods of ''normal science'', when an existing model of reality dominates a protracted period of puzzle-solving, and ''revolution'', when the model of reality itself undergoes sudden drastic change. Paradigms have two aspects. Firstly, within normal science, the term refers to the set of exemplary experiments that are likely to be copied or emulated. Secondly, underpinning this set of exemplars are shared preconceptions, made prior to – and conditioning – the collection of evidence.<ref>Kuhn, T S (1970) ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' (2nd Edition) University of Chicago Press. Section V, pages 43–51. {{ISBN|0-226-45804-0}}.</ref><!-- APA Reference format; 'Author Last Name, Initials. (Year of publication). Title of the work. Publication city: Publishing Company.//--> These preconceptions embody both hidden assumptions and elements that Kuhn describes as quasi-metaphysical.<ref>Kuhn, T S (1970) ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.'' (2nd Edition) University of Chicago Press. Pages 88 and 41, respectively.</ref> The interpretations of the paradigm may vary among individual scientists.<ref>Kuhn, T S (1970) ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.'' (2nd Edition) University of Chicago Press. Page 44.</ref>

Kuhn was at pains to point out that the rationale for the choice of exemplars is a specific way of viewing reality: that view and the status of "exemplar" are mutually reinforcing. For well-integrated members of a particular discipline, its paradigm is so convincing that it normally renders even the possibility of alternatives unconvincing and counter-intuitive. Such a paradigm is ''opaque'', appearing to be a direct view of the bedrock of reality itself, and obscuring the possibility that there might be other, alternative imageries hidden behind it. The conviction that the current paradigm ''is'' reality tends to disqualify evidence that might undermine the paradigm itself; this in turn leads to a build-up of unreconciled anomalies. It is the latter that is responsible for the eventual revolutionary overthrow of the incumbent paradigm, and its replacement by a new one. Kuhn used the expression ''paradigm shift'' (see below) for this process, and likened it to the perceptual change that occurs when our interpretation of an ambiguous image "flips over" from one state to another.<ref name="Kuhn, T S 1970 Page 85">Kuhn, T S (1970) ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.'' (2nd Edition) University of Chicago Press. Page 85.</ref> (The [[Rabbit–duck illusion|rabbit-duck illusion]] is an example: it is not possible to see both the rabbit and the duck simultaneously.) This is significant in relation to the issue of ''incommensurability'' (see below).

An example of a currently accepted paradigm would be the [[standard model]] of physics. The [[scientific method]] allows for orthodox scientific investigations into phenomena that might contradict or disprove the standard model; however grant funding would be proportionately more difficult to obtain for such experiments, depending on the degree of deviation from the accepted standard model theory the experiment would test for. To illustrate the point, an experiment to test for the mass of neutrinos or the decay of protons (small departures from the model) is more likely to receive money than experiments that look for the violation of the conservation of momentum, or ways to engineer reverse time travel.

Mechanisms similar to the original Kuhnian paradigm have been invoked in various disciplines other than the philosophy of science. These include: the idea of major cultural themes,<ref>{{cite book|last=Benedict|first = Ruth|date= 2005|title = Patterns of Culture|publisher = Houghton Mifflin Harcourt|isbn = 9780618619559|url = https://books.google.com/books?id=Da78mq9fUWcC}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last =Spradley|first= James P.|date =1979|title = The Ethnographic Interview|publisher = Holt, Rinehart and Winston|isbn = 9780030444968}}</ref> [[World view|worldviews]] (and see below), [[Ideology|ideologies]], and [[mindset]]s. They have somewhat similar meanings that apply to smaller and larger scale examples of disciplined thought.  In addition, [[Michel Foucault]] used the terms [[episteme]] and [[discourse]], mathesis, and taxinomia, for aspects of a "paradigm" in Kuhn's original sense.