Editing Orthodox Judaism (section)

== History ==
===Modernity crisis===
[[File:JewinKune.jpg|thumb|A Jewish man pilloried in the synagogue, a common punishment in the pre-emancipation Jewish community in Europe.]]
{{See|Jewish emancipation}}
Until the latter half of the 18th century, Jewish communities in Central and Western Europe were autonomous entities, with distinct privileges and obligations. They were led by the affluent wardens' class (''[[parnasim]]''), judicially subject to [[rabbinical court]]s, which governed most civil matters. The rabbinical class monopolized education and morals, much like the Christian clergy. Jewish Law was considered normative and enforced upon transgressors (common sinning was rebuked, but tolerated) invoking all communal sanctions: imprisonment, taxation, flogging, pillorying, and, especially, [[Herem (censure)|excommunication]]. Cultural, economic, and social exchange with non-Jewish society was limited and regulated.

This state of affairs came to an end with the rise of the modern, centralized state, which appropriated all authority. The nobility, clergy, urban guilds, and all other corporate estates were gradually stripped of privileges, inadvertently creating a more equal and secularized society. The Jews were one of the groups affected: excommunication was banned, and rabbinic courts lost almost all their jurisdiction. The state, especially following the [[French Revolution]], was more and more inclined to tolerate Jews as a religious sect, but not as an autonomous entity, and sought to reform and integrate them as "useful subjects". Jewish emancipation and equal rights were discussed. The Christian (and especially [[Protestant]]) separation of "religious" and "secular" was applied to Jewish affairs, to which these concepts were alien. The rabbis were bemused when the state expected them to assume pastoral care, foregoing their principal judicial role. Of secondary importance, much less than the civil and legal transformations, were the ideas of [[Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]] that  chafed at the authority of tradition and faith.

By the end of the 18th century, the weakened rabbinic establishment was facing a new kind of transgressor: they could not be classified as tolerable sinners overcome by their urges (''khote le-te'avon''), or as schismatics like the [[Sabbateans]] or [[Frankists (Sabbateanism)|Frankists]], against whom sanctions were levied. Their attitudes did not fit the criteria set when faith was a normative and self-evident part of worldly life, but rested on the realities of the new, secularized age. The wardens' class, which wielded most power within the communities, was rapidly acculturating and often sought to oblige the state's agenda. 

Rabbi [[Elazar Fleckeles]], who returned to [[Prague]] from the countryside in 1783, recalled that he first faced there "new vices" of principled irreverence towards tradition, rather than "old vices" such as gossip or fornication. In [[Hamburg]], Rabbi [[Raphael Cohen]] attempted to reinforce traditional norms. Cohen ordered the men in his community to grow a beard, forbade holding hands with one's wife in public, and decried women who wore wigs, instead of visible [[headgear]], to cover their hair; Cohen taxed and otherwise persecuted [[Kohen#Effects on marital status|members of the priestly caste]] who left the city to marry divorcees, men who appealed to [[Invalidity of gentile courts|state courts]], those who ate food [[Bishul Yisrael|cooked by Gentiles]], and other transgressors. Hamburg's Jews repeatedly appealed to the civil authorities, which eventually justified Cohen. However, the unprecedented meddling in his jurisdiction profoundly shocked him and dealt a blow to the prestige of the rabbinate.

An ideological challenge to rabbinic authority, in contrast to prosaic secularization, appeared in the form of the ''[[Haskalah]]'' (Jewish Enlightenment) movement which came to the fore in 1782. [[Hartwig Wessely]], [[Moses Mendelssohn]], and other ''maskilim'' called for a [[Words of Peace and Truth|reform of Jewish education]], [[Jerusalem (Mendelssohn)|abolition of coercion in matters of conscience]], and other modernizing measures. They bypassed rabbinic approval and set themselves, at least implicitly, as a rival intellectual elite. A bitter struggle ensued. Reacting to Mendelssohn's assertion that freedom of conscience must replace communal censure, Rabbi Cohen of Hamburg commented: {{Blockquote|The very foundation of the Law and commandments rests on coercion, enabling to force obedience and punish the transgressor. Denying this fact is akin to denying the sun at noon.<ref>See Jacob Katz, ''Out of the Ghetto: The Social Background of Jewish Emancipation, 1770–1870''. Syracuse University Press, 1973. pp. 144–152.</ref>}}

However, ''maskilic''<nowiki/>'-rabbinic rivalry ended in most of Central Europe, as governments imposed modernization upon their Jewish subjects. Schools replaced traditional [[cheders|''cheders'']], and [[standard German]] began to supplant [[Yiddish]]. Differences between the establishment and the Enlightened became irrelevant, and the former often embraced the views of the latter (now antiquated, as more aggressive modes of acculturation replaced the Haskalahs program). In 1810, when philanthropist [[Israel Jacobson]] opened what was later identified as the first [[Reform Judaism|Reform]] synagogue<ref>{{Cite book |last=Meyer |first=Michael A. |title=Response to Modernity: A History of the Reform Movement in Judaism |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=1988 |isbn=9780195051674 |location=New York |pages=42}}</ref> in [[Seesen]], with modernized rituals, he encountered little protest.

===Hamburg Temple dispute===
[[File:Moses S. Schreiber Litho.jpg|thumb|[[Moses Sofer]] of [[Pressburg]], considered the father of Orthodoxy in general and ultra-Orthodoxy in particular.]]
The founding of the [[Hamburg Temple]] in 1818 mobilized the conservative elements. The organizers of the [[synagogue]] wished to appeal to acculturated Jews with a modernized ritual. They openly defied not just the local rabbinic court that ordered them to desist, but published learned tracts that castigated the entire rabbinical elite as hypocritical and [[Obscurantism|obscurant]]. The moral threat they posed to rabbinic authority, as well as ''halakhic'' issues such as having a gentile play an organ on the Sabbath, were combined with theological issues. The Temple's revised prayer book omitted or rephrased petitions for the coming of the Messiah and renewal of sacrifices (''post factum'', it was considered to be the first [[Reform Judaism|Reform]] liturgy). More than anything else, this doctrinal breach alarmed the traditionalists. Dozens of rabbis from across Europe united in support of the Hamburg rabbinic court, banning the major practices enacted there and offering ''halakhic'' grounds for forbidding any changes. Most historians concur that the 1818–1821 [[Hamburg Temple disputes|Hamburg Temple dispute]], with its concerted backlash against Reform and the emergence of a self-aware conservative ideology, marks the beginning of Orthodox Judaism.

The leader and organizer of the Orthodox camp during the dispute, and the most influential figure in early Orthodoxy, was Rabbi [[Moses Sofer]] of [[Pressburg]], [[Hungary]]. Historian [[Jacob Katz]] regarded him as the first to grasp the realities of the modern age. Sofer understood that what remained of his political clout would soon disappear, and that he had largely lost the ability to enforce observance; as Katz wrote, "obedience to ''halakha'' became dependent on recognizing its validity, and this very validity was challenged by those who did not obey". He was deeply troubled by reports from his native [[Frankfurt]] and the arrival from the west of dismissed rabbis, ejected by progressive wardens, or pious families, fearing for the education of their children. These émigrés often became ardent followers.

Sofer's response to the crisis of traditional Jewish society was unremitting conservatism, canonizing every detail of prevalent norms in the observant community lest any compromise legitimize the progressives' claim that the law was fluid or redundant. He was unwilling to trade ''halakhic'' opinions for those he considered to be pretending to honor the rules of rabbinic discourse, while intending to undermine them. Sofer regarded traditional customs as equivalent to vows; he warned in 1793 that even the "custom of ignoramuses" (one known to be rooted solely in a mistake of the common masses) was to be meticulously observed and revered. Sofer was frank and vehement about his stance, stating during the Hamburg dispute that prayers in the vernacular were not problematic ''per se'', but he forbade them because they constituted an innovation. He succinctly expressed his attitude in [[wordplay]] he borrowed from the Talmud: "The new (''[[Chadash]]'', originally meaning new grain) is forbidden by the Torah anywhere." Regarding the new, ideologically-driven sinners, Sofer commented in 1818 that they should have been anathemized and banished from the People of Israel like earlier heretical sects.

Unlike most, if not all, rabbis in Central Europe, who had little choice but to compromise, Sofer enjoyed unique circumstances. He, too, had to tread carefully during the 1810s, tolerating a modernized synagogue in Pressburg and other innovations, and his [[yeshiva|''yeshiva'']] was nearly closed by warden Wolf Breisach. But in 1822, three poor (and therefore traditional) community members, whose deceased apostate brother bequeathed them a large fortune, rose to the wardens' board. Breisach died soon after, and the Pressburg community became dominated by the conservatives. Sofer also possessed a strong base in the form of his ''yeshiva'', the world's largest at the time, with hundreds of students. And crucially, the large and privileged [[Hungarian nobility]] blocked most imperial reforms in the backward country, including those relevant to the Jews. Hungarian Jewry retained its pre-modern character well into the 19th century, allowing Sofer's disciples to establish a score of new ''yeshivas'', at a time when these institutions were rapidly closing in the west, and a strong rabbinate to appoint them. A generation later, a self-aware Orthodoxy was well entrenched in the country. Hungarian Jewry gave rise both to Orthodoxy in general, in the sense of a comprehensive response to modernity, and specifically to the traditionalist, militant [[Ultra orthodox|ultra-Orthodoxy]].<ref>Michael K. Silber. ''The Historical Experience of German Jewry and its Impact on Haskalah and Reform in Hungary''. In: Jacob Katz, ed., ''Toward Modernity: The European Jewish Model'' (New Brunswick and Oxford: Transaction Books, 1987). pp. 108–113, 118–122, 150 (footnote no. 57).</ref>

The 1818–1821 controversy also elicited a different response, which first arose in its very epicenter. Severe protests did not affect Temple congregants, eventually leading the wardens of Hamburg's Jewish community to a comprehensive compromise for the sake of unity. They replaced the elderly, traditional Chief [[Dayan (rabbinic judge)|Dayan]] Baruch Oser with [[Isaac Bernays]]. The latter was a university graduate, clean-shaven, and modern, who could appeal to the acculturated and the young. Bernays signified a new era, and historians marked him as the first modern rabbi, fitting the demands of emancipation: his contract forbade him to tax, punish, or coerce, and he lacked political or judiciary power. He was forbidden from interfering in the Temple's conduct. Conservative in the principal issues of faith, in aesthetic, cultural, and civil matters, Bernays was a reformer and the Temple leaders. He introduced secular studies for children, wore a [[cassock]] like a Protestant clergyman, and delivered vernacular sermons. He forbade the spontaneous, informal character of synagogue conduct typical of [[Ashkenazi]] tradition, and ordered prayers to be somber and dignified. Bernays' style re-unified the Hamburg community by accommodating their aesthetic demands (but not theological ones, raised by only a learned few).<ref>Ismar Schorch, ''Emancipation and the Crisis of Religious Authority: The Emergence of the Modern Rabbinate''; in: Werner Eugen Mosse etc., ''Revolution and Evolution: 1848 in German-Jewish History''. Mohr Siebeck, 1981. pp. 208–209</ref>
 
[[File:Isaac Bernays.JPG|thumb|[[Isaac Bernays]] in clerical vestments. The ministerial style of dress seen here was ubiquitous among Central and Western European (neo)-Orthodox Jews.]]
The combination of religious conservatism and modernity in everything else was emulated elsewhere, earning the label "[[Torah im Derech Eretz|Neo-Orthodoxy]]". Bernays and his like-minded followers, such as Rabbi [[Jacob Ettlinger]], fully accepted the platform of the moderate ''[[Haskalah]]'', taking away its progressive edge. While old-style traditional life continued in Germany until the 1840s, secularization and acculturation turned Neo-Orthodoxy into the strict right-wing of German Jewry. It was fully articulated by Bernays' mid-century disciples [[Samson Raphael Hirsch]] and [[Azriel Hildesheimer]]. Hirsch, a Hamburg native who was ten during the Temple dispute, combined Orthodox dogmatism and militancy against rival interpretations of Judaism, granting leniency on many cultural issues and embraced German culture. The novel mixture termed Neo-Orthodoxy spread.

While insisting on strict observance, the movement both tolerated and advocated modernization: Traditionally rare formal religious education for girls was introduced; modesty and gender separation were relaxed to match German society; men went clean-shaven and dressed like Gentiles; and exclusive Torah study virtually disappeared. Basic religious studies incorporating German {{Lang|de|[[Bildung]]}} provided children with practical ''halakhic'' knowledge for thriving in modern society. Ritual was reformed to match prevalent aesthetic conceptions, much like non-Orthodox synagogues though without the ideological undertone, and the liturgy was often abbreviated. Neo-Orthodoxy mostly did not attempt to reconcile its conduct and ''halakhic'' or moral norms. Instead it adopted compartmentalization, de facto limiting Judaism to the private and religious spheres, while otherwise yielding to outer society.<ref>David Ellenson. ''Rabbi Esriel Hildesheimer and the Creation of a Modern Jewish Orthodoxy''. University of Alabama Press, 2003. pp. 17–19.</ref><ref>For a concise introduction: Michael K. Silber, ''[http://www.yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Orthodoxy Orthodoxy]'', [[YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe]].</ref> While conservative Rabbis in Hungary still thought in terms of the now-lost communal autonomy, the Neo-Orthodox turned Judaism from an all-encompassing practice into a private religious conviction.

===''Wissenschaft des Judentums''===
[[File:David-zvi-hofmann.png|thumb|[[David Zvi Hoffmann]], the single most prominent Orthodox theoretician who dealt with the critical-historical method.]]
In the late 1830s, modernist pressures in Germany shifted from the secularization debate, moving into the "purely religious" sphere of theology and liturgy. A new generation of university-trained rabbis (many German states required communal rabbis to possess such education) sought to reconcile Judaism with the [[Historical-critical method|historical-critical study of scripture]] and the dominant philosophies of the day, especially [[Kant]] and [[Hegel]]. Influenced by the critical "[[Science of Judaism]]" (''Wissenschaft des Judentums'') pioneered by [[Leopold Zunz]], and often in emulation of the [[Liberal Protestant]] milieu, they reexamined and undermined beliefs held as sacred in traditional circles, especially the notion of an unbroken chain from [[Sinai Peninsula|Sinai]] to the [[Chazal|Sages]]. The more radical among the ''Wissenschaft'' rabbis, unwilling to limit critical analysis or its practical application, coalesced around Rabbi [[Abraham Geiger]] to establish [[Reform Judaism]]. Between 1844 and 1846, Geiger organized three rabbinical synods in [[Braunschweig]], [[Frankfurt]] and [[Breslau]], to determine how to refashion Judaism for present times.

The Reform conferences were met with uproar by the Orthodox. Warden [[Hirsch Lehren]] of [[Amsterdam]] and Rabbi [[Jacob Ettlinger]] of [[Altona, Hamburg|Altona]] both organized anti-Reform manifestos, denouncing the new initiatives, signed by scores of rabbis from Europe and the Middle East. The tone of the signatories varied considerably along geographic lines: letters from traditional societies in [[Eastern Europe]] and the [[Ottoman Empire]] implored local leaders to petition the authorities and have them ban the movement. Signers from Central and Western Europe used terms commensurate with the liberal age. All were implored by the petitioners to be brief and accessible; complex ''halakhic'' arguments, intended to convince the rabbinic elite in past generations, were replaced by an appeal to the secularized masses.

The struggle with ''Wissenschaft'' criticism shaped the Orthodox. For centuries, [[Ashkenazi]] rabbinic authorities espoused [[Nahmanides]]' position that [[Midrash halakha|the Talmudic exegesis]], which derived laws from the [[Torah]]'s text by employing [[Talmudical hermeneutics|hermeneutics]], was binding ''[[d'Oraita]]''. Geiger and others presented exegesis as an arbitrary, illogical process, and consequently defenders of tradition embraced [[Maimonides]]' claim that the Sages merely buttressed already received laws with biblical citations, rather than actually deriving them. 

Jay Harris commented, "An insulated orthodox, ''or, rather, traditional'' rabbinate, feeling no pressing need to defend the validity of the Oral Law, could confidently appropriate the vision of most medieval rabbinic scholars; a defensive German Orthodoxy, by contrast, could not. ... Thus began a shift in understanding that led Orthodox rabbis and historians in the modern period to insist that the ''entire'' Oral Law was revealed by God to Moses at Sinai." 19th-Century Orthodox commentaries, like those authored by [[Malbim]], attempted to amplify the notion that the Oral and Written Law were intertwined and inseparable.<ref>Jay Harris, ''How Do We Know This?: Midrash and the Fragmentation of Modern Judaism''. [[SUNY Press]], 1994. pp. 161–167.</ref>

''Wissenschaft'' posed a greater challenge to the modernized neo-Orthodox than to the traditionalist. [[Samson Raphael Hirsch|Hirsch]] and [[Azriel Hildesheimer|Hildesheimer]] divided on the matter, anticipating modernist Orthodox attitudes to the historical-critical method. Hirsch argued that analyzing minutiae of tradition as products of their historical context was akin to denying its divine origin and timeless relevance. Hildesheimer consented to research under limits, subjugating it to the predetermined sanctity of the subject matter and accepting its results only when they accorded with the latter. More importantly, while he was content to engage academically, he opposed its practical application in religious questions, requiring traditional methods to be used. Hildesheimer's approach was emulated by his disciple Rabbi [[David Zvi Hoffmann]], a scholar and apologetic.<ref>David J. Fine, ''Abraham Geiger and the Hamburg Gebetbuchstreit of 1842'', in: Christian Wiese, ''Jüdische Existenz in der Moderne: Abraham Geiger und die Wissenschaft des Judentums''. Walter de Gruyter, 2013. pp. 161–178</ref> His polemic against the [[Graf-Wellhausen hypothesis]] formed the classical Orthodox response to Higher Criticism. Hoffman declared that for him, the unity of the Pentateuch was a given, regardless of research. Hirsch often lambasted Hoffman for contextualizing rabbinic literature.<ref>Ellenson, ''Hildesheimer''. p. 148-149.</ref>

All of them stressed the importance of dogmatic adherence to ''Torah min ha-Shamayim'', which led them to conflict with Rabbi [[Zecharias Frankel]], Chancellor of the [[Jewish Theological Seminary of Breslau]]. Unlike the Reform camp, Frankel insisted on strict observance and displayed great reverence towards tradition. But though appreciated by conservatives, his practice of ''Wissenschaft'' left him suspect to Hirsch and Hildesheimer. They demanded again and again that he state his beliefs concerning the nature of revelation. In 1859, Frankel published a critical study of the [[Mishnah]], and added that all commandments classified as "[[Law given to Moses at Sinai]]" were merely customs (he broadened [[Asher ben Jehiel]]'s opinion). Hirsch and Hildesheimer seized the opportunity and launched a public campaign against him, accusing him of heresy. Concerned that public opinion regarded both neo-Orthodoxy and Frankel's "Positive-Historical School" centered at Breslau as similarly observant and traditionalist, the two stressed that the difference was dogmatic and not ''halakhic''. They managed to tarnish Frankel's reputation in the traditional camp and delegitimized him for many. The Positive-Historical School is regarded by [[Conservative Judaism]] as an intellectual forerunner.<ref>Michael K. Silber, ''[https://www.academia.edu/1829696/ The Emergence of Ultra-Orthodoxy: The Invention of Tradition]''. Harvard University Press, 1992. pp. 35–36; Chaim Landerer, ''[http://www.hakirah.org/Vol%208%20Landerer.pdf R’ Shlomo Yehuda Rapoport (Shir), Champion of Jewish Unity in the Modern Era]''. Hakira 8, 2009.</ref> While Hildesheimer distinguished Frankel's observant disciples from Reform proponents, he wrote in his diary: ''how meager is the principal difference between the Breslau School, who don silk gloves at their work, and Geiger who wields a sledgehammer''.<ref>Ellenson, ''Hildesheimer''. p. 78.</ref>

===Communal schism===
[[File:Samson Raphael Hirsch (ZR002).jpg|thumb|Young [[Samson Raphael Hirsch]], the ideologue of Orthodox secession in Germany.]]
During the 1840s in Germany, as traditionalists became a clear minority, some Orthodox rabbis, such as Salomo Eger of [[Poznań|Posen]], urged the adoption of [[Moses Sofer]]'s position and to anathemize the principally nonobservant. Eating, worshipping or marrying with them were to be banned. Rabbi [[Jacob Ettlinger]], whose journal ''Treue Zionswächter'' was the first regular Orthodox newspaper (signifying the coalescence of a distinct Orthodox mindset), rejected their call. Ettlinger, and German neo-Orthodoxy in his wake, chose to regard the modern secularized Jew as a transgressor rather than a schismatic. He adopted Maimonides' interpretation of the Talmudic concept ''[[tinok shenishba]]'' (captured infant), a Jew by birth who was not raised as such and therefore could be absolved for not practicing, and greatly expanded it to serve the Orthodox need to tolerate the nonobservant majority (many of their own congregants ignored strict practice). For example, he allowed congregants to drink wine poured by Sabbath desecrators, and to ignore other ''halakhic'' sanctions. Yet German neo-Orthodoxy could not legitimize nonobservance, and adopted a hierarchical approach, softer than traditional sanctions, but no less intent on differentiating sinners and righteous. Reform rabbis or lay leaders, considered ideological opponents, were castigated, while the common mass was to be carefully handled.<ref>Adam Ferziger, ''Exclusion and Hierarchy: Orthodoxy, Nonobservance and the Emergence of Modern Jewish Identity''. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005. pp. 92–99, 168, 188.</ref>

Some German neo-Orthodox believed that while doomed to minority status in their native country, their ideology could successfully confront modernity and unify Judaism in more traditional communities to the east. In 1847, Hirsch was elected Chief Rabbi of [[Moravia]], where old rabbinic culture and ''yeshiva''s operated. His expectations were dashed as traditionalist rabbis scorned him for his European manners and lack of Talmudic acumen. They became enraged by his attempts to reform synagogues and to establish a rabbinical seminary including secular studies. The progressives viewed him as too conservative. After four years of constant strife, he lost faith in the possibility of reuniting the Jewish public. In 1851, a group in [[Frankfurt am Main]] that opposed the Reform character of the Jewish community turned to Hirsch. He led them for the remainder of his life, finding Frankfurt a hospitable site for his unique ideology, which amalgamated acculturation, dogmatic theology, thorough observance, and strict secession from the non-Orthodox.

[[File:Chaim Sofer.jpg|thumb|[[Chaim Sofer]], the leading ''halakhic'' authority of the Hungarian "zealots" during the Orthodox-Neolog schism.]]
That year, Hildesheimer visited Hungary. Confounded by urbanization and acculturation – and the rise of [[Neolog Judaism|Neology]], a nonobservant laity served by rabbis who mostly favoured the Positive-Historical approach – the elderly local rabbis at first welcomed Hildesheimer. He opened a modern school in [[Eisenstadt]] that combined secular and religious studies. Traditionalists such as [[Moshe Schick]] and Yehudah Aszód sent their sons to study there. [[Samuel Benjamin Sofer]], the heir of late Hatam Sofer, considered appointing Hildesheimer as his assistant-rabbi in [[Pressburg]] and instituting secular studies in the city's great ''yeshiva''. The rabbi of Eisenstadt believed that only a full-fledged modern rabbinical seminary could fulfill his neo-Orthodox agenda. In the 1850s and 1860s, however, a radical reactionary Orthodox party coalesced in the [[Unterlander Jews|northeastern regions of Hungary]]. Led by Rabbi [[Hillel Lichtenstein]], his son-in-law [[Akiva Yosef Schlesinger]] and decisor [[Chaim Sofer]], the "zealots" were shocked by the demise of the traditional world into which they had been born. Like Moses Sofer a generation before them, these Orthodox émigrés moved east, to a pre-modern environment that they were determined to safeguard. Lichtenstein ruled out any compromise with modernity, insisting on maintaining [[Yiddish]] and traditional dress. They considered the Neologs as moving outside of Judaism, and were more concerned with neo-Orthodoxy, which they regarded as a thinly-veiled gateway for a similar fate. Chaim Sofer summarized their view of Hildesheimer: "The wicked Hildesheimer is the horse and chariot of the [[Yetzer hara|Evil Inclination]]... All the heretics in the last century did not seek to undermine the Law and the Faith as he does."

In their struggle against acculturation, the Hungarian ultra-Orthodox struggled to provide strong ''halakhic'' arguments. Michael Silber wrote: "These issues, even most of the religious reforms, fell into gray areas not easily treated within Halakha. It was often too flexible or ambiguous, at times silent, or worse yet, embarrassingly lenient." Schlesinger was forced to venture outside of normative law, into mystical writings and other fringe sources, to buttress his ideology. Most Hungarian Orthodox rabbis, while sympathetic to the "zealots"' cause, dismissed their legal arguments. In 1865, the ultra-Orthodox convened in [[Nagymihály]] and issued a ban on various synagogue reforms, intended not against the Neologs but against developments in the Orthodox camp, especially after Samuel Sofer violated his father's expressed ban and instituted vernacular sermons in Pressburg. Schick, the country's most prominent decisor, and other leading rabbis refused to sign, though they did not publicly oppose the decree. Hildesheimer's planned seminary was too radical for the mainstream rabbis, and he became marginalized and isolated by 1864.<ref>Michael K. Silber, ''The Invention of Tradition]''. pp. 55–62, quote from p. 59.</ref>

The internal Orthodox division was complicated by growing tension with the Neologs. In 1869, the [[Schism in Hungarian Jewry|Hungarian government convened a General Jewish Congress]] that was aimed at creating a national representative body. Fearing Neolog domination, the Orthodox seceded from the Congress and appealed to Parliament in the name of religious freedom. This demonstrated the internalization of the new circumstances. In 1851, Orthodox leader [[Meir Eisenstaedter]] petitioned the authorities to restore the coercive powers of the communities. In 1871 the government recognized a separate Orthodox national committee. Communities that refused to join either side, labeled "Status Quo", were subject to Orthodox condemnation. However, the Orthodox tolerated nonobservant Jews as long as they affiliated with the national committee: [[Adam Ferziger]] claimed that membership and loyalty, rather than beliefs and ritual behavior, emerged as the definitive manifestation of Jewish identity. The Hungarian schism was the most radical internal separation among the Jews of Europe. Hildesheimer returned to Germany soon after, disillusioned though not as pessimistic as Hirsch. He was appointed rabbi of the Orthodox sub-community in Berlin (which had separate religious institutions but was not formally independent of the Liberal majority), where he finally [[Hildesheimer Rabbinical Seminary|established his seminary.]]<ref>Jacob Katz, ''A House Divided: Orthodoxy and Schism in Nineteenth-Century Central European Jewry''.  Brandeis University Press, 2005. pp. 210–245.</ref>

In 1877, a law enabling Jews to secede from their communities without conversion was passed in Germany. It was a stark example that Judaism was now confessional, not corporate. Hirsch withdrew his congregation from the Frankfurt community and decreed that all Orthodox should do the same. However, unlike the heterogeneous communities of Hungary, which often consisted of recent immigrants, Frankfurt and most German communities were close-knit. The majority of Hirsch's congregants enlisted Rabbi [[Seligman Baer Bamberger]], who was older and more conservative. Bamberger was concerned with the principal of unity among the People Israel and dismissive of Hirsch, whom he regarded as unlearned and overly assimilated. He decreed that since the mother community was willing to finance Orthodox services and allow them religious freedom, secession was unwarranted. Eventually, less than 80 families from Hirsch's 300-strong congregation followed their rabbi. The vast majority of the 15%–20% of German Jews affiliated with Orthodox institutions cared little for the polemics. They did not secede over reasons of finance and familial relations. Only a handful of Secessionist, ''Austrittorthodox'', communities were established in the Reich; almost everyone remained Communal Orthodox, ''Gemeindeortodox'', within Liberal mother congregations. The Communal Orthodox argued that their approach was true to Jewish unity and decisive in maintaining public standards of observance and traditional education in Liberal communities. They claimed that Secessionists viewed them as hypocritical middle-of-the-roaders.<ref>''A House Divided'', pp. 257–280.</ref>

The conflicts in Hungary and Germany, and the emergence of distinctly Orthodox communities and ideologies, were the exception rather than the rule in Central and Western Europe. France, Britain, Bohemia, Austria and other countries saw both a virtual disappearance of observance and serious interest in bridging Judaism and modernity. The official rabbinate remained technically traditional, not introducing ideological change.<ref>Michael A. Meyer, ''Response to Modernity: A History of the Reform Movement in Judaism'', Wayne State University Press, 1995. pp. 154–160.</ref> The organ – a symbol of Reform in Germany since 1818, so much that Hildesheimer seminarians had to sign a declaration that they would never serve in a synagogue that introduced one – was accepted with little qualm by the [[Central Consistory|French Consistoire]] in 1856. It was part of a series of synagogue regulations passed by Chief Rabbi [[Salomon Ulmann]]. Even Rabbi [[Solomon Klein]] of [[Colmar]], the leader of [[Alsace|Alsatian]] conservatives who partook in the castigation of Zecharias Frankel, allowed the instrument in his community.<ref>Salmon, Ravitzky, Ferziger. ''New Perspectives'', pp. 389–390.</ref> In England, Rabbi [[Nathan Marcus Adler]]'s [[United Synagogue]] shared a similar approach: It was vehemently conservative in principle and combated [[David Woolf Marks|ideological reformers]], yet served a nonobservant public – as [[Todd Endelman]] noted, "While respectful of tradition, most English-born Jews were not orthodox in terms of personal practice. Nonetheless they were content to remain within an orthodox congregational framework" – and introduced considerable synagogue reforms.<ref>Todd M. Endelman, ''The Jews of Britain, 1656 to 2000''. University of California Press, 2002. p. 167</ref>

===Eastern Europe===
The much belated pace of modernization in Russia, [[Congress Poland]] and the Romanian principalities, where harsh discrimination and active persecution of the Jews continued until 1917, delayed the crisis of traditional society for decades. Old-style education in the ''[[heder]]'' and ''[[yeshiva]]'' remained the norm, retaining [[Hebrew language|Hebrew]] as the language of the elite and [[Yiddish]] as the vernacular. The defining fault-line of Eastern European Jews was between the [[Hasidic Judaism|Hasidim]] and the ''[[Misnagdic]]'' reaction against them. Reform attempts by the [[Czar of Russia|Czar]]'s government, like the school modernization under [[Max Lilienthal]] or the foundation of rabbinical seminaries and the mandating of communities to appoint clerks known as [[Crown rabbi (Russia)|"official rabbis"]], all had little influence. Communal autonomy and the rabbinic courts' jurisdiction were abolished in 1844, but economic and social seclusion remained, ensuring the authority of Jewish institutions and traditions de facto. In 1880, there were only 21,308 Jewish pupils in government schools, out of some 5&nbsp;million Jews in total; In 1897, 97% of the 5.2&nbsp;million Jews in the [[Pale of Settlement]] and Congress Poland declared Yiddish their mother tongue, and only 26% possessed any literacy in Russian. Though the Eastern European ''[[Haskalah]]'' challenged the traditional establishment – unlike its western counterpart, no acculturation process turned it irrelevant; it flourished from the 1820s until the 1890s – the latter's hegemony over the vast majority was self-evident. The leading rabbis maintained the old conception of communal unity: In 1882, when an Orthodox party in [[Austrian Poland|Galicia]] appealed for the right of secession, the [[Netziv]] and other Russian rabbis declared it forbidden and contradicting the idea of Israel's oneness.<ref name="BBR">Benjamin Brown, [https://www.academia.edu/5121242 "As Swords in the Body of the Nation": East-European Rabbis against the Separation of Communities]. In:  
''Yosef Da‘at: Studies in Modern Jewish History in Honor of Yosef Salmon''. [[Ben-Gurion University of the Negev]] Press, 2010.</ref>

While slow, change was by no means absent. In the 1860s and 1870s, anticipating a communal disintegration like the one in the west, moderate ''maskilic'' rabbis like [[Yitzchak Yaacov Reines]] and [[Yechiel Michel Pines]] called for inclusion of secular studies in the ''heder''s and ''yeshiva''s, a careful modernization, and an ecumenical attempt to form a consensus on necessary adaptation of ''halakha'' to novel times. Their initiative was thwarted by a combination of strong anti-traditional invective on behalf of the radical, secularist ''maskilim'' and conservative intransigence from the leading rabbis, especially during the bitter polemic which erupted after [[Moshe Leib Lilienblum]]'s 1868 call for a reconsideration of Talmudic strictures. Reines, Pines and their associates would gradually form the nucleus of [[Religious Zionism]], while their conservative opponents would eventually adopt the epithet ''[[Haredim]]'' (then, and also much later, still a generic term for the observant and the pious).<ref>Joseph Salmon, ''Enlightened Rabbis as Reformers in Russian Jewish Society.'' in: David Sorkin, ed. ''New Perspectives on the Haskalah''. Litmann (2001). esp. pp. 166–168, 172–173, 181–183.</ref>

The attitude toward Jewish nationalism, particularly [[Zionism]], and its nonobservant if not staunchly secularist leaders and partisans, was the key question facing the traditionalists of Eastern Europe. Closely intertwined were issues of modernization in general: As noted by Joseph Salmon, the future religious Zionists (organized in the [[Mizrachi (religious Zionism)|Mizrahi]] since 1902) were not only supportive of the national agenda per se, but deeply motivated by criticism of the prevalent Jewish society, a positive reaction to modernity and a willingness to tolerate nonobservance while affirming traditional faith and practice. Their proto-''Haredi'' opponents sharply rejected all of the former positions and espoused staunch conservatism, which idealized existing norms. Any illusion that differences could be blanded and a united observant pro-Zionist front would be formed, were dashed between 1897 and 1899, as both the Eastern European nationalist intellectuals and [[Theodor Herzl]] himself revealed an uncompromising secularist agenda, forcing traditionalist leaders to pick sides. In 1900, the anti-Zionist pamphlet ''Or la-Yesharim'', endorsed by many Russian and Polish rabbis, largely demarcated the lines between the proto-''Haredi'' majority and the Mizrahi minority, and terminated dialogue; in 1911, when the 10th [[World Zionist Congress]] voted in favour of propagating non-religious cultural work and education, a large segment of the Mizrahi seceded and joined the anti-Zionists.<ref>Joseph Salmon, ''Zionism and Anti-Zionism in Traditional Judaism in Eastern Europe'', in: Jehuda Reinharz, ed. ''Zionism and Religion''. University Press of New England, 1998. pp. 25–26, 30–32.</ref>

In 1907, Eastern European proto-''Haredi'' elements formed the Knesseth Israel party, a modern framework created in recognition of the deficiencies of existing institutions. It dissipated within a year. German Neo-Orthodoxy, in the meantime, developed a keen interest in the traditional Jewish masses of Russia and Poland; if at the past they were considered primitive, a disillusionment with emancipation and enlightenment made many young assimilated German Orthodox youth embark on journeys to East European ''yeshivot'', in search of authenticity. The German secessionists already possessed a platform of their own, the ''Freie Vereinigung für die Interessen des Orthodoxen Judentums'', founded by [[Samson Raphael Hirsch]] in 1885. In 1912, two German FVIOJ leaders, [[Isaac Breuer]] and [[Jacob Rosenheim]], managed to organize a meeting of 300 seceding Mizrahi, proto-''Haredi'' and secessionist Neo-Orthodox delegate in [[Katowice]], creating the ''[[World Agudath Israel|Agudath Israel]]'' party. While the Germans were a tiny minority in comparison to the Eastern Europeans, their modern education made them a prominent elite in the new organization, which strove to provide a comprehensive response to world Jewry's challenges in a strictly observant spirit. The Agudah immediately formed its [[Council of Torah Sages]] as supreme rabbinic leadership body. Many ultra-traditionalist elements in Eastern Europe, like the Belz and Lubavitch Hasidim, refused to join, viewing the movement as a dangerous innovation; and the organized Orthodox in Hungary rejected it as well, especially after it did not affirm a commitment to communal secession in 1923.

In the [[Interwar period]], sweeping secularization and acculturation deracinated old Jewish society in Eastern Europe. The [[October Revolution]] granted civil equality and imposed anti-religious persecutions, radically transforming Russian Jewry within a decade; the lifting of formal discrimination also strongly affected the Jews of [[Second Polish Republic|independent Poland]], [[Lithuania]] and other states. In the 1930s, it was estimated that no more than 20%–33% of Poland's Jews, the last stronghold of traditionalism where many were still living in rural and culturally-secluded communities, could be considered strictly observant.<ref>Jaff Schatz, ''Jews and the Communist Movement in Interwar Poland'', in: ''Dark Times, Dire Decisions : Jews and Communism''. Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry. Oxford University Press, 2005. p. 35.</ref> Only upon having become an embattled (though still quite large) minority, did the local traditionalists complete their transformation into Orthodox, albeit never as starkly as in Hungary or Germany. Eastern European Orthodoxy, whether Agudah or Mizrahi, always preferred cultural and educational independence to communal secession, and maintained strong ties and self-identification with the general Jewish public.<ref name="BBR"/> Within its ranks, the 150-years-long struggle between [[Hasidim]] and [[Misnagdim]] was largely subsided; the latter were even dubbed henceforth as "Litvaks", as the anti-Hasidic component in their identity was marginalized. In the interwar period, Rabbi [[Yisrael Meir Kagan]] emerged as the popular leader of the Eastern European Orthodox, particularly the Agudah-leaning.

===United States===
[[File:First National Meeting of American Orthodox Rabbis. ca 1920.jpg|thumb|An assembly of American Orthodox rabbis, 1920.|320px]]
American Jewry of the 19th century was small and immigrant-based, lacking traditional institutions or strong rabbinic presence. Voluntary congregations, rather than corporate communities, were the norm; separation of church and state, and dynamic religiosity of the independent Protestant model, shaped synagogue life. In the mid-19th century, [[Reform Judaism]] spread rapidly, advocating a formal relinquishment of traditions very few in the secularized, open environment observed anyhow; the United States would be derisively named the ''Treife Medina'', or "Profane Country", in [[Yiddish]]. Conservative elements, concerned mainly with public standards of observance in critical fields like marriage, rallied around [[Isaac Leeser]]. Lacking a rabbinic ordination and little knowledgeable by European standards, Leeser was an ultra-traditionalist in his American milieu. In 1845 he introduced the words "Orthodox" and "Orthodoxy" into the American Jewish discourse, in the sense of opposing Reform;<ref>[[Jonathan D. Sarna]], ''American Judaism: A History''. [[Yale University Press]], 2019. pp. 85–88.</ref> while admiring [[Samson Raphael Hirsch]], Leeser was an even stauncher proponent of [[Zecharias Frankel]], whom he considered the "leader of the Orthodox party" at a time when Positive-Historical and Orthodox positions were barely discernible from each other to most observers (in 1861, Leeser defended Frankel in the polemic instigated by Hirsch).<ref>Ze'ev Eleff, ''[http://traditionarchive.org/news/_pdfs/0035-0053.pdf American Orthodoxy's Lukewarm. Embrace of the Hirschian Legacy, 1850–1939]''. [[Tradition (journal)|Tradition]] 45:3, 2012. pp. 38–40.</ref>

A broad non-Reform camp slowly coalesced as the minority within American Jewry; while strict in relation to their progressive opponents, they served a nonobservant public and instituted thorough synagogue reforms – omission of ''[[piyyut]]im'' from the liturgy, English-language sermons and secular education for the clergy were the norm in most,<ref>Ze'ev Eleff, ''Modern Orthodox Judaism: A Documentary History''. [[University of Nebraska Press]], 2016. pp. xxxiv–xxxv.</ref> and many Orthodox synagogues in America did not [[Mechitza|partition]] men and women.<ref name="Seating"/> In 1885, the antinomian [[Pittsburgh Platform]] moved a broad coalition of conservative religious leaders to found the [[Jewish Theological Seminary of America]]. They variously termed their ideology, which was never consistent and mainly motivated by a rejection of Reform, as "Enlightened Orthodoxy" or "[[Conservative Judaism]]". The latter term would only gradually assume a clearly distinct meaning.

To their right, strictly traditionalist Eastern European immigrants formed the [[Union of Orthodox Rabbis]] in 1902, in direct opposition to the Americanized character of the OU and JTS. The UOR frowned upon English-language sermons, secular education, and acculturation in general. Even before that, in 1897, an old-style ''[[yeshiva]]'', [[RIETS]], was founded in New York. Eventually, its students rebelled in 1908, demanding a modern rabbinic training much like that of their peers in JTS. In 1915, RIETS was reorganized as a decidedly Modern Orthodox institution, and a merger with the JTS was discussed.<ref>Sarna, ''American Judaism: A History'', pp. 188–193.</ref> In 1923, the [[Rabbinical Council of America]] was established as the clerical association of the OU.

Only in the postwar era, did the vague traditional coalition come to a definite end. During and after the [[Holocaust]], a new wave of strictly observant refugees arrived from Eastern and Central Europe. They often regarded even the UOR as too lenient and Americanized. Typical of these was Rabbi [[Aaron Kotler]], who established [[Lakewood Yeshiva]] in New Jersey during 1943. Alarmed by the enticing American environment, Kotler turned his institution into an enclave, around which an entire community slowly evolved. It was very different from his prewar ''yeshiva'' at [[Kletsk]], [[Interwar Poland|Poland]], the students of which were but a segment of the general Jewish population and mingled with the rest. Lakewood pioneered the homogeneous, voluntary and enclavist model of postwar ''Haredi'' communities, which were independent entities with their own developing subculture.<ref>Joel Finkelman, ''[https://www.jstor.org/stable/1396734 Haredi Isolation in Changing Environments: A Case Study in Yeshiva Immigration]''. [[Modern Judaism]], Vol. 22, No. 1 (February 2002).</ref> The new arrivals soon dominated the traditionalist wing of American Jewry, forcing the locals to adopt more rigorous positions. Concurrently, the younger generation in the JTS and the [[Rabbinical Assembly]] demanded greater clarity, theological unambiguity and ''halakhic'' independence from the Orthodox veto on serious innovations — in 1935, for example, the RA yielded to such pressures and shelved its proposal for a solution to the [[agunah]] predicament. "Conservative Judaism", now adopted as an exclusive label by most JTS graduates and RA members, became a truly distinct movement. In 1950, the Conservatives signaled their break with Orthodox ''halakhic'' authorities, with the acceptance of a far-reaching legal decision, which allowed one to drive to the synagogue and to use electricity on Sabbath.<ref>Michael R. Cohen, ''The Birth of Conservative Judaism: Solomon Schechter's Disciples and the Creation of an American Religious Movement''. Columbia University Press, 2012. pp. 137–140, 157.</ref>

Between the ultra-Orthodox and Conservatives, Modern Orthodoxy in America also coalesced, becoming less a generic term and more a distinct movement. Its leader in the postwar era, Rabbi [[Joseph B. Soloveitchik]], left Agudas Israel to adopt both pro-Zionist positions and a positive, if reserved, attitude toward Western culture. As dean of RIETS and honorary chair of RCA's ''halakha'' committee, Soloveitchik shaped Modern Orthodoxy for decades.<ref>Jeffrey S. Gurock. ''American Jewish Orthodoxy in Historical Perspective''. KTAV Publishing House, 1996. pp. 43–47.</ref> While principled differences with the Conservatives were clear, as the RCA stressed the divinely revealed status of the Torah and a strict observance of ''halakha'', sociological boundaries were less so. Many members of the Modern Orthodox public were barely observant, and a considerable number of communities did not install a [[Mechitza|gender partition]] in their synagogues – physically separate seating became the distinguishing mark of Orthodox/Conservative affiliation in the 1950s, and was strongly promulgated by the RCA – for many years.<ref>For example: Deborah D. Moore, ''American Jewish Identity Politics''. University of Michigan Press, 2009. pp. 185–189.</ref> As late as 1997, seven OU congregations still lacked a partition.<ref name="Seating">[[Jonathan D. Sarna]], ''[https://www.brandeis.edu/hornstein/sarna/synagoguehistory/Archive/TheDebateoverMixedSeatingintheAmericanSynagogue.pdf The Debate over Mixed Seating in the American Synagogue]''.</ref>