Editing Nuremberg trials (section)

==Establishment==
===Nuremberg charter===
[[File:A.N. Trainin speaks at the War Crimes Executive Committee.jpg|thumb|[[Aron Trainin]] (center, with moustache) speaks at the London Conference.]]
[[File:The Palace of Justice in Nurnberg.jpg|thumb|Aerial view of the Palace of Justice in 1945, with the prison attached behind it]]
[[File:Ruins of Nuremberg after World War II.jpg|thumb|Ruins of [[Nuremberg]], {{Circa|1945}}]]

At the London Conference, held from 26 June to 2 August 1945, representatives of [[France]], the [[Soviet Union]], the [[United Kingdom]], and the [[United States]] negotiated the form that the trial would take. Until the end of the negotiations, it was not clear that any trial would be held at all.{{sfn|Sellars|2013|p=84}}

The offences that would be prosecuted were crimes against peace, [[crimes against humanity]], and war crimes.{{sfn|Sellars|2013|pp=85–86}} At the conference, it was debated whether wars of aggression were prohibited in existing [[customary international law]]; regardless, before the charter was adopted there was no law providing for criminal responsibility for aggression.{{sfn|Sellars|2013|pp=87–88}}{{sfn|Tomuschat|2006|pp=832–833}} Despite misgivings from other Allies, American negotiator and [[Supreme Court (United States)|Supreme Court]] justice [[Robert H. Jackson]] threatened the United States' withdrawal if aggression was not prosecuted because it had been the rationale for [[Military history of the United States during World War II#Origins|American entry into World War II]].{{sfn|Sellars|2013|pp=84–85, 88–89}} However, Jackson conceded on defining crimes against peace; the other three Allies were opposed because it would undermine the freedom of action of the [[United Nations Security Council]].{{sfn|Sellars|2013|pp=98–100}}

War crimes already existed in international law as criminal violations of the [[international humanitarian law|laws and customs of war]], but these did not apply to a government's treatment of its own citizens.{{sfn|Tomuschat|2006|p=834}}{{sfn|Hirsch|2020|pp=30, 34}} Legal experts sought a way to try crimes against German citizens, such as the [[The Holocaust in Germany|German Jews]].{{sfn|Hirsch|2020|p=34}} A Soviet proposal for a charge of "crimes against civilians" was renamed "crimes against humanity" at Jackson's suggestion{{sfn|Hirsch|2020|pp=68, 73}} after previous uses of the term in the [[Aftermath of World War I|post-World War I]] [[Commission of Responsibilities]] and in failed efforts to prosecute the perpetrators of the [[Armenian genocide]].{{sfn|Bassiouni|2011|pp=xxx–xxxi, 94}} The British proposal to define crimes against humanity was largely accepted, with the final wording being "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population".{{sfn|Bassiouni|2011|pp=xxxi, 33}}{{sfn|Musa|2016|p=373}} The final version of the charter limited the tribunal's jurisdiction over crimes against humanity to those committed as part of a war of aggression.{{sfn|Hirsch|2020|p=73}}{{sfn|Acquaviva|2011|pp=884–885}} Both the United States—concerned that its "[[Jim Crow]]" system of [[Racial segregation in the United States|racial segregation]] not be labeled a crime against humanity—and the Soviet Union wanted to avoid giving an international court jurisdiction over a government's treatment of its own citizens.{{sfn|Mouralis|2019|pp=102–103, 114, 120, 135}}{{sfn|Hirsch|2020|p=70}}

The charter upended the traditional view of [[international law]] by holding individuals, [[state responsibility|rather than states]], responsible for breaches.{{sfn|Tomuschat|2006|pp=839–840}}{{sfn|Sellars|2013|pp=85–86}} The other three Allies' proposal to limit the definition of the crimes to acts committed by the defeated Axis was rejected by Jackson. Instead, the charter limited the jurisdiction of the court to Germany's actions.{{sfn|Hirsch|2020|pp=9–10}}{{sfn|Sellars|2013|p=101}} Article 7 prevented the defendants from claiming [[sovereign immunity]],{{sfn|Sellars|2013|p=87}} and the plea of acting under [[superior orders]] was left for the judges to decide.{{sfn|Heller|2011|p=11}} The trial was held under modified [[common law]].{{sfn|Sellars|2013|p=85}}  The negotiators decided that the tribunal's permanent seat would be in Berlin, while the trial would be held at the [[Palace of Justice, Nuremberg|Palace of Justice]] in [[Nuremberg]].{{sfn|Hirsch|2020|p=73}}{{sfn|Priemel|2016|p=76}} Located in the [[American occupation zone]], Nuremberg was a symbolic location as the site of [[Nuremberg rallies|Nazi rallies]]. The Palace of Justice was relatively intact but needed to be renovated for the trial due to [[bombing of Nuremberg in World War II|bomb damage]]; it had an attached prison where the defendants could be held.{{sfn|Weinke|2006|p=31}}{{sfn|Priemel|2016|p=76}} On 8 August, the Nuremberg Charter was signed in London.{{sfn|Hirsch|2020|p=74}}

===Judges and prosecutors===
In early 1946, there were a thousand employees from the four countries' delegations in Nuremberg, of which about two thirds were from the United States.{{sfn|Mouralis|2019|p=21}} Besides legal professionals, there were many social-science researchers, psychologists, translators, and interpreters, and [[graphic designer]]s, the last to make the many charts used during the trial.{{sfn|Mouralis|2019|p=22}} Each state appointed a prosecution team and two judges, one being a deputy without voting rights.{{sfn|Hirsch|2020|pp=2, 112}}{{sfn|Priemel|2016|p=100}}

Jackson was appointed the United States' chief prosecutor, whom historian [[Kim Christian Priemel]] describes as "a versatile politician and a remarkable orator, if not a great legal thinker".{{sfn|Priemel|2016|pp=71, 90}} The United States prosecution believed that [[Nazism]] was the product of a German deviation from the West (the ''[[Sonderweg]]'' thesis) and sought to correct this deviation with a trial that would serve both retributive and educational purposes.{{sfn|Priemel|2016|pp=3, 6}} As the largest delegation, it would take on the bulk of the prosecutorial effort.{{sfn|Priemel|2016|p=91}} At Jackson's recommendation, the United States appointed judges [[Francis Biddle]] and [[John J. Parker|John Parker]].{{sfn|Priemel|2016|p=90}} The British chief prosecutor was [[Hartley Shawcross]], [[Attorney General for England and Wales]], assisted by his predecessor [[David Maxwell Fyfe]].{{sfn|Hirsch|2020|pp=53, 73–74}}{{sfn|Priemel|2016|p=88}}{{sfn|Sellars|2013|p=115}} Although the chief British judge, [[Geoffrey Lawrence, 1st Baron Oaksey|Sir Geoffrey Lawrence]] ([[Lord Justice of Appeal]]), was the nominal president of the tribunal, in practice Biddle exercised more authority.{{sfn|Priemel|2016|p=90}}

The French prosecutor, [[François de Menthon]], had just overseen trials of the leaders of [[Vichy France]];{{sfn|Hirsch|2020|p=74}} he resigned in January 1946 and was replaced by [[Auguste Champetier de Ribes]].{{sfn|Gemählich|2019|loc=paragraph 10}} The French judges were [[Henri Donnedieu de Vabres]], a professor of criminal law, and deputy [[Robert Falco]], a judge of the [[Cour de Cassation]] who had represented France at the London Conference.{{sfn|Priemel|2016|pp=75, 89}}{{sfn|Gemählich|2019|loc=paragraph 10}} The French government tried to appoint staff who were not tainted by collaboration with the Vichy regime; some appointments, including Champetier de Ribes, were of those who had been in the [[French resistance]].{{sfn|Gemählich|2019|loc=paragraphs 11–12}}{{sfn|Priemel|2016|p=87}}{{sfn|Hirsch|2020|p=204}} Expecting a show trial, the Soviet Union{{sfn|Hirsch|2020|p=9}} initially appointed as chief prosecutor [[Iona Nikitchenko]], who had presided over the Moscow trials, but he was made a judge and replaced by [[Roman Rudenko]], a show trial prosecutor{{sfn|Hirsch|2020|pp=9, 78}} chosen for his skill as an orator.{{sfn|Hirsch|2020|p=217}} The Soviet judges and prosecutors were not permitted to make any major decisions without consulting a commission in Moscow led by Soviet politician [[Andrei Vyshinsky]]; the resulting delays hampered the Soviet effort to set the agenda.{{sfn|Hirsch|2020|p=9}}{{sfn|Priemel|2016|p=90}} The influence of the Soviet delegation was also constrained by limited English proficiency, lack of interpreters, and unfamiliarity with diplomacy and international institutions.{{sfn|Hirsch|2020|pp=88–89}}

Requests by [[Chaim Weizmann]], the president of the [[World Zionist Organization]], as well as the [[Provisional Government of National Unity]] in Poland, for an active role in the trial justified by their representation of victims of Nazi crimes were rejected.{{sfn|Priemel|2016|p=117}} The Soviet Union invited prosecutors from its allies, including Poland, [[Third Czechoslovak Republic|Czechoslovakia]], and [[Yugoslavia]]; Denmark and Norway also sent a delegation.{{sfn|Fleming|2022|p=209}} Although the Polish delegation was not empowered to intervene in the proceedings, it submitted evidence and an indictment, succeeding at drawing some attention to crimes committed against Polish Jews and non-Jews.{{sfn|Fleming|2022|pp=209, 220}}

===Indictment===
[[File:At a solemn session in Berlin, the representatives of the various nations handed over to the Tribunal their indictments for the Nuremberg Trials.jpg|thumb|Handing over the indictment to the tribunal, 18 October 1945]]

The work of drafting the indictment was divided up by the national delegations. The British worked on aggressive war; the other delegations were assigned the task of covering crimes against humanity and war crimes committed on the [[Western Front (World War II)|Western Front]] (France) and the [[Eastern Front (World War II)|Eastern Front]] (the Soviet Union). The United States delegation outlined the overall Nazi conspiracy and criminality of Nazi organizations.{{sfn|Hirsch|2020|p=80}}{{sfn|Priemel|2016|p=101}} The British and American delegations decided to work jointly in drafting the charges of conspiracy to wage aggressive war. On 17 September, the various delegations met to discuss the indictment.{{sfn|Hirsch|2020|pp=80–81}}

The charge of [[conspiracy (criminal)|conspiracy]], absent from the charter, held together the wide array of charges and defendants{{sfn|Priemel|2016|p=102}} and was used to charge the top Nazi leaders, as well as bureaucrats who had never killed anyone or perhaps even directly ordered killing. It was also an end run on the charter's limits on charging crimes committed before the beginning of World War II.{{sfn|Priemel|2016|p=111}} Conspiracy charges were central to the cases against propagandists and industrialists: the former were charged with providing the ideological justification for war and other crimes, while the latter were accused of enabling Germany's war effort.{{sfn|Priemel|2016|pp=112–113}} The charge, a brainchild of [[War Department]] lawyer [[Murray C. Bernays]], and perhaps inspired by his previous work prosecuting [[securities fraud]],{{sfn|Priemel|2016|pp=18, 69, 111}}{{sfn|Sellars|2013|p=69}} was spearheaded by the United States and less popular with the other delegations, particularly France.{{sfn|Priemel|2016|p=99}}

The problem of translating the indictment and evidence into the three official languages of the tribunal—English, French, and Russian—as well as German was severe due to the scale of the task and difficulty of recruiting interpreters, especially in the Soviet Union.{{sfn|Hirsch|2020|pp=82–83}} Vyshinsky demanded extensive corrections to the charges of crimes against peace, especially regarding the role of the [[German–Soviet pact]] in starting World War II.{{sfn|Hirsch|2020|pp=84–86}} Jackson also separated out an overall conspiracy charge from the other three charges, aiming that the American prosecution would cover the overall Nazi conspiracy while the other delegations would flesh out the details of Nazi crimes.{{sfn|Hirsch|2020|p=87}} The division of labor, and the haste with which the indictment was prepared, resulted in duplication, imprecise language, and lack of attribution of specific charges to individual defendants.{{sfn|Priemel|2016|pp=100–101}}

===Defendants===
{{main|List of defendants at the International Military Tribunal}}
[[File:Defendants in the dock at nuremberg trials.jpg|thumb|The defendants in the dock]]

Some of the most prominent Nazis—[[Adolf Hitler]], [[Heinrich Himmler]], and [[Joseph Goebbels]]—had committed suicide and therefore could not be tried.{{sfn|Weinke|2006|p=27}}{{sfn|Priemel|2016|p=81}} The prosecutors wanted to try representative leaders of German politics, economy, and military.{{sfn|Weinke|2006|pp=28–29}} Most of the defendants had surrendered to the United States or United Kingdom.{{sfn|Priemel|2016|pp=81–82}}{{sfn|Hirsch|2020|p=74}}

The defendants, who were largely unrepentant,{{sfn|Hirsch|2020|p=5}} included former cabinet ministers: [[Franz von Papen]] (who had [[Adolf Hitler's rise to power|brought Hitler to power]]), [[Joachim von Ribbentrop]] ([[Reich Foreign Ministry|foreign minister]]), [[Konstantin von Neurath]] ([[Reich Foreign Ministry|foreign minister]]),  [[Wilhelm Frick]] ([[Reich Interior Ministry|interior minister]]), and [[Alfred Rosenberg]] (minister for the occupied eastern territories).{{sfn|Priemel|2016|p=81}} Also prosecuted were leaders of the German economy, such as [[Gustav Krupp]] (of the conglomerate [[Krupp AG]]), former [[Reichsbank]] president [[Hjalmar Schacht]], and economic planners [[Albert Speer]] and [[Walther Funk]], along with Speer's subordinate and head of the [[forced labor in Nazi Germany|forced labor program]], [[Fritz Sauckel]].{{sfn|Hirsch|2020|p=76}}{{sfn|Priemel|2016|pp=82, 139}} While the British were skeptical of prosecuting economic leaders, the French had a strong interest in highlighting German economic imperialism.{{sfn|Priemel|2016|p=82}}  The military leaders were [[Hermann Göring]]—the most infamous surviving Nazi and the main target of the trial{{sfn|Priemel|2016|p=81}}—[[Wilhelm Keitel]], [[Alfred Jodl]], [[Erich Raeder]], and [[Karl Dönitz]].{{sfn|Priemel|2016|p=82}} Also on trial were propagandists [[Julius Streicher]] and [[Hans Fritzsche]]; [[Rudolf Hess]], Hitler's deputy who had flown to Britain in 1941; [[Hans Frank]], governor-general of the [[General Governorate]] of Poland; [[Hitler Youth]] leader [[Baldur von Schirach]]; [[Arthur Seyss-Inquart]], [[Reichskommissariat Niederlande|Reich Commissioner for the Netherlands]]; and [[Ernst Kaltenbrunner]], the leader of Himmler's [[Reich Security Main Office]].{{sfn|Priemel|2016|pp=82, 127}} Observers of the trial found the defendants mediocre and contemptible.{{sfn|Priemel|2016|pp=121–122}}

Although the list of defendants was finalized on 29 August,{{sfn|Weinke|2006|p=29}} as late as October, Jackson demanded the addition of new names, but this was rejected.{{sfn|Priemel|2016|pp=83–84}} Of the 24 men indicted, [[Martin Bormann]] was [[tried in absentia|tried ''in absentia'']], as the Allies were unaware of his death; Krupp was too ill to stand trial; and [[Robert Ley]] had committed suicide before the start of the trial.{{sfn|Priemel|2016|pp=83, 106, 133}} Former Nazis were allowed to serve as counsel{{sfn|Priemel|2016|p=91}} and by mid-November all defendants had lawyers. The defendants' lawyers jointly appealed to the court, claiming it did not have jurisdiction against the accused; but this motion was rejected. The defense lawyers saw themselves as acting on behalf of their clients, but also the German nation.{{sfn|Priemel|2016|pp=92–93}} All the defendants entered "not guilty" pleas except for Hess, who refused to enter a plea at all, and Kaltenbrunner, who was hospitalized and unable to attend the early weeks of the proceedings; von Neurath also gave an ambiguous response that could have been interpreted either as his pleading "not guilty" or refusing to enter a plea. "Not guilty" pleas were therefore entered on their behalf, as well as that of Bormann, and no-one pleaded otherwise at any point in the trial.<ref>{{cite web |title=Transcript for IMT: Trial of Major War Criminals |url=https://nuremberg.law.harvard.edu/transcripts/7-transcript-for-imt-trial-of-major-war-criminals?seq=97 |website=HSL Nuremberg Trials Project |publisher=Harvard Law School |access-date=19 January 2025}}</ref>

Initially, the Americans had planned to try fourteen organizations and their leaders, but this was narrowed to six: the [[Hitler cabinet|Reich Cabinet]], the Leadership Corps of the [[Nazi Party]], the [[Gestapo]], the [[Nazi SA|SA]], the [[Schutzstaffel|SS]] and the [[Sicherheitsdienst|SD]], and the [[Generalstab|General Staff]] and [[Oberkommando der Wehrmacht|High Command]] of the [[Wehrmacht|German military]] (Wehrmacht).{{sfn|Weinke|2006|pp=27–28}}{{sfn|Tomuschat|2006|p=841}} The aim was to have these organizations declared criminal, so that their members could be tried expeditiously for membership in a criminal organization.{{sfn|Tomuschat|2006|p=841}} Senior American officials believed that convicting organizations was a good way of showing that not just the top German leaders were responsible for crimes, without condemning the entire German people.{{sfn|Hirsch|2020|p=205}}

===Evidence===
[[File:Evidence in Nuremberg trials.jpg|thumb|[[United States Army]] clerks with evidence]]

Over the summer, all of the national delegations struggled to gather evidence for the upcoming trial.{{sfn|Weinke|2006|pp=24–26}} The American and British prosecutors focused on documentary evidence and affidavits rather than testimony from survivors. This strategy increased the credibility of their case, since survivor testimony was considered less reliable and more vulnerable to accusations of bias, but reduced public interest in the proceedings.{{sfn|Sharples|2013|p=39}}{{sfn|Priemel|2016|p=105}} The American prosecution drew on reports of the [[Office of Strategic Services]], an American intelligence agency, and information provided by the [[YIVO Institute for Jewish Research]] and the [[American Jewish Committee]],{{sfn|Priemel|2016|pp=116–117}} while the French prosecution presented many documents that it had obtained from the [[Center of Contemporary Jewish Documentation]].{{sfn|Gemählich|2019|loc=paragraph 19}} [[List of witnesses to the International Military Tribunal|The prosecution called 37 witnesses compared to the defense's 83]], not including 19 defendants who testified on their own behalf.{{sfn|Priemel|2016|p=105}} The prosecution examined 110,000 captured German documents{{sfn|Mouralis|2019|p=22}} and entered 4,600 into evidence,{{sfn|Priemel|2016|p=148}} along with {{convert|30|km}} of film and 25,000 photographs.{{sfn|Mouralis|2016|loc= fn 82}}

The charter allowed the [[Admissible evidence|admissibility]] of any evidence deemed to have [[Relevance (law)|probative]] value, including [[Deposition (law)|deposition]]s.{{sfn|Douglas|2001|p=30}} Because of the loose evidentiary rules, photographs, charts, maps, and films played an important role in making incredible crimes believable.{{sfn|Priemel|2016|p=105}} After the American prosecution submitted many documents at the beginning of the trial, the judges insisted that all of the evidence be read into the record, which slowed the trial.{{sfn|Priemel|2016|p=104}}{{sfn|Douglas|2001|p=18}} The structure of the charges also caused delays as the same evidence ended up being read out multiple times, when it was relevant to both conspiracy and the other charges.{{sfn|Douglas|2001|p=16}}