Editing Nuclear warfare (section)

===Sub-strategic use===
{{see also|Nuclear bunker buster|Edward Teller#Decision to drop the bombs}}
The above examples envisage nuclear warfare at a strategic level, i.e., [[total war]]. However, nuclear powers have the ability to undertake more limited engagements.

"Sub-strategic use" includes the use of either "low-yield" tactical nuclear weapons, or of [[variable yield]] [[strategic nuclear weapon]]s in a very limited role, as compared to exchanges of larger-yield [[strategic nuclear weapon]]s over major [[population center]]s. This was described by the UK Parliamentary [[Defence Select Committee]] as "the launch of one or a limited number of missiles against an adversary as a means of conveying a political message, warning or demonstration of resolve".<ref>UK Parliament, House of Commons, "Select Committee on Defence, Eighth Report", ''[https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmdfence/986/98605.htm]'', 20 June 2006.  Fetched from URL on 23 December 2012.</ref> It is believed that all current nuclear weapons states possess tactical nuclear weapons, with the exception of the [[United Kingdom]], which decommissioned its tactical warheads in 1998. However, the UK does possess scalable-yield strategic warheads, and this technology tends to blur the difference between "strategic", "sub-strategic", and "tactical" use or weapons. American, French and British nuclear submarines are believed to carry at least ''some'' missiles with [[dial-a-yield]] warheads for this purpose, potentially allowing a strike as low as one [[kiloton]] (or less) against a single target. Only the [[People's Republic of China]] and the [[Republic of India]] have declarative, unqualified, unconditional "[[no first use]]" nuclear weapons policies. India and Pakistan maintain only a [[credible minimum deterrence]].

Commodore [[Tim Hare]], former Director of Nuclear Policy at the [[British Ministry of Defence]], has described "sub-strategic use" as offering the Government "an extra option in the escalatory process before it goes for an all-out strategic strike which would deliver unacceptable damage".<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmdfence/986/98605.htm#a11|title=House of Commons - Defence - Eighth Report}}</ref> However, this sub-strategic capacity has been criticized as potentially increasing the "acceptability" of using nuclear weapons. Combined with the trend in the reduction in the worldwide nuclear arsenal as of 2007 is the warhead miniaturization and modernization of the remaining strategic weapons that is presently occurring in all the declared nuclear weapon states, into more "usable" configurations. The [[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]] suggests that this is creating a culture where use of these weapons is more acceptable and therefore is increasing the risk of war, as these modern weapons do not possess the same psychological deterrent value as the large Cold-War era, multi-megaton warheads.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Ritter |first=Karl |date=June 12, 2007 |title=Study: World powers risk atomic war |url=https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/nation_world/20070612_Study__World_powers_risk_atomic_war.html |access-date=2022-03-07 |website=[[The Philadelphia Inquirer]] |language=en}}</ref>

In many ways, this present change in the [[balance of terror]] can be seen as the complete embracement of the switch from the 1950s [[Eisenhower|Eisenhower doctrine]] of "[[massive retaliation]]"<ref>{{cite journal|first=Matthew|last=Jones|title=Targeting China: U.S. Nuclear Planning and 'Massive Retaliation' in East Asia, 1953–1955|journal=Journal of Cold War Studies|year=2008|volume=10|issue=4|pages=37–65|doi=10.1162/jcws.2008.10.4.37|s2cid=57564482}}</ref> to one of "[[flexible response]]", which has been growing in importance in the US nuclear war fighting plan/[[Single Integrated Operational Plan|SIOP]] every decade since.

For example, the United States adopted a policy in 1996 of allowing the targeting of its nuclear weapons at non-state actors ("[[terrorists]]") armed with [[weapons of mass destruction]].<ref>{{citation|author1=Daniel Plesch|author2=Stephen Young|title=Senseless policy|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=sgsAAAAAMBAJ|journal=[[Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists]]|year=1998|volume=54|issue=6|publisher=Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, Inc.|page=4|doi=10.1080/00963402.1998.11456892|bibcode=1998BuAtS..54f...4P}}</ref>

Another dimension to the tactical use of nuclear weapons is that of such weapons deployed at sea for use against surface and submarine vessels. Until 1992, vessels of the [[United States Navy]] (and their aircraft) deployed various such weapons as bombs, rockets (guided and unguided), torpedoes, and depth charges. Such tactical naval nuclear weapons were considered more acceptable to use early in a conflict because there would be few civilian casualties. It was feared by many planners that such use would probably quickly have escalated into a large-scale nuclear war.<ref>{{cite web|title=Declassified: Nuclear Weapons at Sea, Conclusions and Recommendations|url=https://fas.org/blogs/security/2016/02/nuclear-weapons-at-sea/|website=Federation of American Scientists|access-date=2016-04-19}}</ref> This situation was particularly exacerbated by the fact that such weapons at sea were not constrained by the safeguards provided by the [[Permissive Action Link]] attached to U.S. Air Force and Army nuclear weapons. It is unknown if the navies of the other nuclear powers yet today deploy tactical nuclear weapons at sea.

The [[Nuclear Posture Review|2018 US Nuclear Posture Review]] emphasised the need for the US to have sub-strategic nuclear weapons as additional layers for its nuclear deterrence.<ref>{{cite web|title=2018 Nuclear Posture Review|url=https://www.defense.gov/News/SpecialReports/2018NuclearPostureReview.aspx|website=US Defense Department|access-date=2018-06-26}}</ref>