Editing Nihilism (section)

== Ethics and value theory ==
[[File:Nietzsche1882.jpg|thumb|alt=Black-and-white photo showing a man with a thick mustache from the side, wearing a dark suit and resting is his head on his hand|[[Friedrich Nietzsche]] described nihilism as the process in which "the highest values devaluate themselves".<ref>{{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|p=1}}</ref>]]

Various forms of nihilism belong to the fields of [[ethics]] and [[value theory]], questioning the existence of values, [[morality]], and the [[meaning of life]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=671}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Cowan|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_2jDDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA25 25]}} | {{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=§ Are Value Claims Truth Evaluable?, § Quasi-Realism and Creeping Minimalism}} | {{harvnb|Groothuis|2020|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_2jDDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA165 165–169]}} }}</ref>

=== Existential nihilism ===
{{main|Existential nihilism}}
Existential nihilism asserts that life is meaningless. It is not limited to the idea that some people fail to find meaning in their lives but makes the broader claim that human existence in general or the world as a whole lacks a higher purpose. This view suggests that it is not possible to live a genuinely meaningful life, that there is no higher reason to continue living, and that all efforts, achievements, happiness, and suffering are ultimately pointless.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 3. Existential Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ Existential Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Groothuis|2020|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_2jDDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA165 165–169]}} }}</ref> 

Existential nihilism has diverse practical implications since people usually act with a purpose in mind, sometimes with the explicit goal of making their lives meaningful. As a result, the belief that there is no higher meaning or purpose can bring about [[Apathy|indifference]], a [[Motivation#Amotivation_and_akrasia|lack of motivation]], and [[anxiety]]. In extreme cases, this can result in [[Depression (mood)|depression]] and despair or trigger an [[existential crisis]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Joyce|2013}} | {{harvnb|Tartaglia|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=acazCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA25 25–27]}} | {{harvnb|Yalom|2020|pp=423–428}} | {{harvnb|Sommers-Flanagan|Sommers-Flanagan|2012|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=RMclh6zR3LEC&pg=PA131 131]}} }}</ref>{{efn|Existential crises are inner conflicts in which individuals struggle to find meaning in their lifes. Some authors suggest that nihilistic beliefs can trigger existential crises. Others propose nihilism as one way to resolve them by learning to accept meaninglessness rather than finding a source of meaning.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carr|1992|pp=125–126}} | {{harvnb|Yalom|2020|pp=423–428}} | {{harvnb|Davis|Hicks|2013|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=HcxEAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA166 166, 171–172 ]}} | {{harvnb|American Psychological Association|2023}} }}</ref>}} Some philosophers, such as [[Martin Heidegger]] (1889–1976), highlight the connection to [[boredom]], arguing that the lack of engagement and goals experienced in this [[Mood (psychology)|mood]] makes life appear pointless.<ref>{{harvnb|Tartaglia|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=acazCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA25 25–27]}}</ref>

[[File:Flickr - Government Press Office (GPO) - Jean Paul Sartre and Simone De Beauvoir welcomed by Avraham Shlonsky and Leah Goldberg (cropped).jpg|thumb|alt=Black-and-white photo of a man with glasses wearing a dark suit with a tie|Considering the problem of existential nihilism, [[Jean Paul Sartre]] proposed that people can make their lives meaningful by inventing themselves and their values.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 3. Existential nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=82–85}} }}</ref>]]

Various possible reactions to existential nihilism have been proposed.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Tartaglia|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=acazCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA41 41–42]}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ Existential Nihilism}} }}</ref> Inspired by [[Indian philosophy]], [[Arthur Schopenhauer]] (1788–1860) suggested a [[Philosophical pessimism|pessimistic]] and [[ascetic]] response, advocating detachment from the world by [[Renunciation|renouncing]] desires and stopping to affirm life.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ Existential Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Stewart|2023|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oImzEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA147 147]}} }}</ref> [[Friedrich Nietzsche]] (1844–1900) proposed using the disruptive force of nihilism to [[Transvaluation of values|re-interpret or re-evaluate all established ideals and values]] in an attempt to overcome nihilism and replace it with an [[Nietzschean affirmation|affirmative attitude toward life]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=Lead section, § 2. Friedrich Nietzsche and Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Diken|2008|pp=5, 31}} }}</ref>{{efn|In this context, Nietzsche contrasted passive with active nihilism. Passive nihilism is a form of resignation characterized by pessimism, hopelessness, and disengagement while refusing to acknowledge the absence of meaning. Active nihilism openly accepts meaninglessness and uses its negativity as a force to destroy established values and ideologies.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Vattimo|1989|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=G-1YV3x6yakC&pg=PA15 15–17]}} | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=r4Itb0Zc2hUC&pg=PA179 179–180]}} }}</ref>}} [[Jean-Paul Sartre]] (1905–1980) suggested that people can create their own values through the free choices they make, despite the cosmic lack of meaning. After considering the possibility of committing suicide, [[Albert Camus]] (1913–1960) argued instead for a defiant attitude in which individuals rebel against meaninglessness.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ Existential Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 3. Existential Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Joyce|2013}} }}</ref> Other responses include a destructive attitude aiming to violently tear down political authorities and social institutions, attempts to undermine nihilism by identifying genuine sources of meaning, and a passive [[resignation]] or quiet acceptance.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Diken|2008|pp=3–4, 15–16, 28}} | {{harvnb|Tartaglia|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=acazCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA48 48–49]}} }}</ref>

Various arguments for and against existential nihilism are discussed in the academic discourse. Arguments from a [[cosmological]] perspective assert that human existence is a minor and insignificant aspect of the [[universe]] as a whole, which is indifferent to human concerns and aspirations. This outlook aligns with an [[atheistic]] view, stating that, without a God, there is no source of higher values that transcend the natural world. Another viewpoint highlights the pervasiveness of senseless suffering and violence while emphasizing the fleeting nature of happiness. Some theorists link this view to human mortality, suggesting that the inevitability of [[death]] renders all human accomplishments transient and ultimately futile.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ Critical comment}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA38 38–40, 46–47, 53, 55–58]}} | {{harvnb|Tartaglia|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=acazCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA21 21–25]}}  | {{harvnb|Stewart|2023|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oImzEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA2 2–4]}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=aU6qDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA81 81, 87]}} }}</ref> A different perspective from biology argues that life is driven by blind [[natural selection]] on a large scale and the satisfaction of innate [[need]]s on an individual scale, neither of which aims at a higher purpose.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ Critical comment}} | {{harvnb|Tartaglia|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=acazCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA21 21–22]}} }}</ref> Subjectivists, by contrast, focus on the [[Subjectivity and objectivity (philosophy)|subjective]] nature of all value experiences, asserting that they lack any objective ground.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ Critical comment}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA41 41–42]}} }}</ref>

Opponents of existential nihilism have responded with counterarguments to these statements. For example, some reject the pessimistic outlook that life is primarily characterized by suffering, violence, and death, claiming instead that these negative phenomena are counterbalanced by positive phenomena such as happiness and love.<ref>{{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA352 352–357]}}</ref> Many non-nihilistic theories of the meaning of life are examined in the academic discourse. [[Supernaturalistic]] views focus on God or the soul as sources of meaning. [[Ethical naturalism|Naturalistic]] views, by contrast, assert that subjective or objective values are inherent in the physical world. They include the discussion of fields where humans actively find meaning, such as exercising [[freedom]], committing oneself to a cause, pursuing [[altruism]], and engaging in positive [[social relationships]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA364 364–367, 369–370]}} | {{harvnb|Metz|2023|loc=§ 2. Supernaturalism, § 3. Naturalism}} | {{harvnb|Seachris|loc=§ 3. Theories of Meaning ''in'' Life}} | {{harvnb|Yalom|2020|pp=431–435}} }}</ref>

=== Moral nihilism ===
{{main|Moral nihilism}}
Unlike existential nihilism, moral nihilism focuses specifically on moral phenomena rather than a higher meaning or purpose. In its broadest form, it is the [[metaethics|metaethical]] view that there are no moral facts. Also called ''amoralism'' and ''error theory'', it denies the objective existence of morality, arguing that the theories and practices categorized under this label rest on misguided assumptions without any substantial link to reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA11 11–12]}} | {{harvnb|Joyce|2013}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=673}} | {{harvnb|Dreier|2007|pp=240–242}} }}</ref> On a practical level, some moral nihilists, such as [[Friedrich Nietzsche]], conclude from this observation that anything is permitted, suggesting that people are allowed to act however they want without any social restrictions. Other moral nihilists reject this conclusion and argue that the denial of morality affects not only moral obligations, or what people are required to do, but also moral permissions, or what people are allowed to do.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dreier|2007|pp=240–242}} | {{harvnb|Krellenstein|2017|pp=[https://www.jstor.org/stable/44631529 75–90]}} | {{harvnb|Joyce|2013}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=673}} }}</ref> Axiological nihilism, a related view, denies the objective existence of values in general. This rejection is not limited to moral values and also concerns other types, like aesthetic and religious values.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Mulligan|2009|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Bt99AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA401 401–402]}} | {{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=Lead section, § Do Value Claims Have Truth Makers?}} }}</ref>

One motivation for denying the existence of morality rests on the idea that moral properties are odd compared to other properties, like shape and size. This view is sometimes combined with the claim that scientific inquiry does not reveal objective moral facts or that humans lack a [[Epistemology#Sources|source]] of moral knowledge. A related argument for moral nihilism focuses on the conventional aspects of moral evaluations and the difficulties in resolving moral disagreements.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=673}} | {{harvnb|Dreier|2007|pp=242–249}} | {{harvnb|Krellenstein|2017|pp=76–80}} }}</ref> Another line of thought emphasizes the [[evolution]]ary origin of morality, viewing it as a mere product of natural selection without a deeper metaphysical foundation.<ref>{{harvnb|Krellenstein|2017|pp=76–80}}</ref>

[[Moral realism|Moral realists]] have raised various objections to moral nihilism. Naturalists argue that moral facts belong to the natural world and can be empirically observed. [[Ethical non-naturalism|Non-naturalists]] assert that moral phenomena are different from natural phenomena, but are real nonetheless.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Sayre-McCord|2023|loc=§ 2. Metaphysics}} | {{harvnb|Lutz|2023|loc=Lead section, § 1. What Is Moral Naturalism?}} | {{harvnb|DeLapp|loc=§ 4a. Moral Realisms}} | {{harvnb|FitzPatrick|2011|pp=[https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230294899_2 7–8]}} | {{harvnb|Ridge|2019|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> Another perspective highlights the deep gap between moral nihilism and the fields of [[common sense]] and moral experience. Some viewpoints emphasize the negative practical consequences of abandoning moral beliefs or assert that moral nihilism is incoherent because it rests on a misunderstanding of moral language.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Sinnott-Armstrong|2007|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5pzCOHmcDocC&pg=PA59 53–59]}} | {{harvnb|Krellenstein|2017|pp=80–82}} }}</ref>

The term ''moral nihilism'' is sometimes used with a different meaning. In one sense, it is the same as moral subjectivism, arguing that moral evaluations are purely subjective and lack rational objective justification. As a result, moral judgments are seen as [[Expressivism|expressions of arbitrary individual preferences]], which vary between individuals, making moral disagreements rationally unresolvable.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA11 11–14]}} | {{harvnb|Weller|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=TEZ9DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA10 10]}} }}</ref> In another sense, moral nihilism refers to [[ethical egoism]], the theory that morality is determined by self-interest. This view denies that the [[well-being]] of others has moral implications unless it has external consequences for one's own well-being.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA11 11, 14–15]}} | {{harvnb|Weller|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=TEZ9DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA10 10]}} }}</ref>