Editing Neutral monism (section)

===Dualism===
{{Main|Dualism (philosophy of mind)}}
Neutral monism is similar to [[Mind–body dualism|dualism]] in that both take reality to have both mental and physical properties irreducible to one another. Unlike dualism however, neutral monism does not take these properties to be fundamental or separate from one another from any meaningful sense.<ref name=":1">{{Citation|last=Irvine|first=Andrew David|title=Bertrand Russell|date=2020|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/russell/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Summer 2020|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2020-08-30}}</ref> Dualism is the view that reality is, broadly speaking, made up of two distinct substances or properties: physical substances/properties and mental substances/properties. Neutral monism, in contrast, takes both mind and matter to supervene on a neutral third substance, which is neither mental nor physical. According to [[Baruch Spinoza]], the mind and the body are dual aspects of Nature or God, which he identified as the only real substance.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Vacariu|first=Gabriel|title=Illusions of Human Thinking: On Concepts of Mind, Reality, and Universe in Psychology, Neuroscience, and Physics|publisher=Springer|year=2015|isbn=978-3-658-10443-6|location=Wiesbaden|pages=626}}</ref>

While schematic differences and neutral monism are quite stark, contemporary conceptions of the theories overlap in certain key areas. For instance, Chalmers (1996) maintains that the difference between neutral monism and his preferred [[property dualism]] can, at times, be mostly semantic.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|last=Chalmers, David John, 1966-|url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/33101543|title=The conscious mind : in search of a fundamental theory|date=1996|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=0-19-510553-2|location=New York|oclc=33101543}}</ref>