Editing Moral relativism (section)

===Descriptive===
Descriptive moral relativism is merely the [[positivism|positive]] or descriptive position that there exist, in fact, fundamental disagreements about the right course of action even when the same facts hold true and the same consequences seem likely to arise.<ref name=stanford>{{Cite web
  | last = Swoyer
  | first = Chris
  | date = February 22, 2003
  | title = Relativism
  | url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relativism/#1.2
  | access-date = May 10, 2010}}</ref> It is the observation that different cultures have different moral standards.

Descriptive relativists do not necessarily advocate the tolerance of all behavior in light of such disagreement; that is to say, they are not necessarily normative relativists. Likewise, they do not necessarily make any commitments to the semantics, [[ontology]], or [[epistemology]] of moral judgement; that is, not all descriptive relativists are meta-ethical relativists.

Descriptive relativism is a widespread position in academic fields such as [[anthropology]] and [[sociology]], which simply admit that it is incorrect to assume that the same moral or ethical frameworks are always in play in all historical and cultural circumstances.<ref>{{cite web
 |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relativism/
 |title=Relativism
 |last1=Baghramian
 |first1=Maria
 |last2=Carter
 |first2=J.Adam
 |date=2020-09-21
 |editor-last=Zalta
 |editor-first=Edward N.
 |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
 |access-date=2020-12-13
 }}</ref>