Editing Moral realism (section)

== Ethical objectivism ==
Moral objectivism is the view that what is right or wrong does not depend on what anyone thinks is right or wrong.<ref name=":0">{{cite journal |last1=Rescher |first1=Nicholas |date=January 2008 |title=Moral Objectivity |journal=Social Philosophy and Policy |volume=25 |issue=1 |pages=393–409 |doi=10.1017/S0265052508080151 |s2cid=233358084}}</ref> Moral objectivism allows for moral codes to be compared to each other through a set of universal facts. Nicholas Reschar says that moral codes cannot derive from one's personal moral compass.<ref name=":0" /> An example is [[Immanuel Kant]]'s [[categorical imperative]]: "Act only according to that maxim [i.e., rule] whereby you can at the same time will that it become a universal law." [[John Stuart Mill]] proposed [[utilitarianism]], which asserts that in any situation, the right thing to do is whatever is likely to produce the most happiness overall.

According to the ethical objectivist, the [[truth]] or falsehood of typical moral judgments does not depend upon any person's or group of persons' beliefs or feelings. This view holds that moral propositions are analogous to propositions about [[chemistry]], [[biology]], or [[history]], insomuch as they are true despite what anyone believes, hopes, wishes, or feels. When they fail to describe this mind-independent moral reality, they are false—no matter what anyone believes, hopes, wishes, or feels.

There are many versions of ethical objectivism, including various religious views of morality, Platonistic intuitionism, [[Kantianism]], [[utilitarianism]], and certain forms of [[ethical egoism]] and [[contractualism]]. Platonists define ethical objectivism even more narrowly, so that it requires the existence of intrinsic value. Consequently, they reject the idea that contractualists or egoists could be ethical objectivists. Objectivism, in turn, places primacy on the origin of the frame of reference and considers any arbitrary frame of reference a form of ethical subjectivism by a transitive property, even when the frame incidentally coincides with reality.