Editing Metaethics (section)

==Moral semantics<!--'Moral semantics' redirects here-->==

'''Moral semantics'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> attempts to answer the question, "What is the meaning of moral terms or judgments?" Answers may have implications for answers to the other two questions as well.

=== Cognitivist theories ===
''[[Cognitivism (ethics)|Cognitivist]]'' theories hold that evaluative moral sentences express [[proposition]]s (i.e., they are 'truth-apt' or '[[Truth-bearer|truth bearers]]', capable of being true or false), as opposed to [[non-cognitivism]]. Most forms of cognitivism hold that some such propositions are true (including moral realism and ethical subjectivism), as opposed to [[error theory]], which asserts that all are erroneous.

==== Moral realism ====
[[Moral realism]] (in the ''robust'' sense; see [[moral universalism]] for the minimalist sense) holds that such propositions are about ''robust'' or mind-independent facts, that is, not facts about any person or group's subjective opinion, but about objective features of the world. Metaethical theories are commonly categorized as either a form of realism or as one of three forms of "[[anti-realism]]" regarding moral facts: [[ethical subjectivism]], [[error theory]], or [[non-cognitivism]]. Realism comes in two main varieties:

# ''[[Ethical naturalism]]'' holds that there are objective moral properties and that these properties are [[reductionism|reducible]] or stand in some metaphysical relation (such as [[supervenience]]) to entirely non-ethical properties. Most ethical naturalists hold that we have [[empiricism|empirical]] knowledge of moral truths. Ethical naturalism was implicitly assumed by many [[modern philosophy|modern]] ethical theorists, particularly [[utilitarianism|utilitarians]].
# ''[[Ethical non-naturalism]]'', as put forward by [[G. E. Moore]], holds that there are objective and ''irreducible'' moral properties (such as the property of 'goodness'), and that we sometimes have [[ethical intuitionism|intuitive]] or otherwise ''[[A priori and a posteriori|a priori]]'' awareness of moral properties or of moral truths. Moore's [[open question argument]] against what he considered the [[naturalistic fallacy]] was largely responsible for the birth of metaethical research in contemporary [[analytic philosophy]].

==== Ethical subjectivism ====
[[Ethical subjectivism]] is one form of moral anti-realism. It holds that moral statements are made true or false by the attitudes and/or conventions of people, either those of each society, those of each individual, or those of some particular individual. Most forms of ethical subjectivism are [[moral relativism|relativist]], but there are notable forms that are [[moral universalism|universalist]]:
* [[Ideal observer theory]] holds that what is right is determined by the [[Attitude (psychology)|attitudes]] that a hypothetical ''ideal observer'' would have. An ideal observer is usually characterized as a being who is perfectly rational, imaginative, and informed, among other things. Though a subjectivist theory due to its reference to a particular (albeit hypothetical) subject, Ideal Observer Theory still purports to provide [[Moral universalism|universal]] answers to moral questions.
* [[Divine command theory]] holds that for a thing to be right is for a unique being, God, to approve of it, and that what is right for non-God beings is obedience to the divine will. This view was criticized by Plato in the ''[[Euthyphro]]'' (see the [[Euthyphro problem]]) but retains some modern defenders ([[Robert Merrihew Adams|Robert Adams]], [[Philip L. Quinn|Philip Quinn]], and others). Like ideal observer theory, divine command theory purports to be [[Moral universalism|universalist]] despite its subjectivism.

==== Error theory ====
[[Error theory]], another form of moral anti-realism, holds that although ethical claims do express propositions, all such propositions are false. Thus, both the statement "Murder is morally wrong" and the statement "Murder is morally permissible" are false, according to error theory. [[J. L. Mackie]] is probably the best-known proponent of this view. Since error theory denies that there are moral truths, error theory entails [[moral nihilism]] and, thus, [[moral skepticism]]; however, neither moral nihilism nor moral skepticism conversely entail error theory.

=== Non-cognitivist theories ===
[[Non-cognitivism|Non-cognitivist]] theories hold that ethical sentences are neither true nor false because they do not express genuine [[proposition]]s. Non-cognitivism is another form of moral anti-realism. Most forms of non-cognitivism are also forms of [[expressivism]], however some such as Mark Timmons and Terrence Horgan distinguish the two and allow the possibility of cognitivist forms of expressivism. Non-cognitivism includes:
* [[Emotivism]], defended by [[A. J. Ayer]] and [[Charles Stevenson (philosopher)|Charles Stevenson]], holds that ethical sentences serve merely to express emotions. Ayer argues that ethical sentences are expressions of approval or disapproval, not assertions. So "Killing is wrong" means something like "Boo on killing!".
* [[Quasi-realism]], defended by [[Simon Blackburn]], holds that ethical statements behave linguistically like factual claims and can be appropriately called "true" or "false", even though there are no ethical facts for them to correspond to. [[Projectivism]] and [[moral fictionalism]] are related theories.
* [[Universal prescriptivism]], defended by [[R. M. Hare]], holds that moral statements function like universalized [[Imperative mood|imperative]] sentences. So "Killing is wrong" means something like "Don't kill!" Hare's version of prescriptivism requires that moral prescriptions be [[Moral universalism|universalizable]], and hence actually have objective values, in spite of failing to be [[indicative]] statements with [[truth-value]]s per se.

===Centralism and non-centralism<!--'Moral centralism', 'Moral non-centralism', and 'Non-centralism' redirect here-->===

Yet another way of categorizing metaethical theories is to distinguish between '''centralist'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> and '''non-centralist'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> moral theories. The debate between centralism and non-centralism revolves around the relationship between the so-called "thin" and "thick" concepts of morality: thin moral concepts are those such as good, bad, right, and wrong; thick moral concepts are those such as courageous, inequitable, just, or dishonest.<ref>[[Frank Jackson (philosopher)|Jackson, Frank]]. 1992. "Critical Notice." ''[[Australasian Journal of Philosophy]]'' 70(4):475–488.</ref> While both sides agree that the thin concepts are more general and the thick more specific, centralists hold that the thin concepts are antecedent to the thick ones and that the latter are therefore dependent on the former. That is, centralists argue that one must understand words like "right" and "ought" before understanding words like "just" and "unkind." Non-centralism rejects this view, holding that thin and thick concepts are on par with one another and even that the thick concepts are a sufficient starting point for understanding the thin ones.<ref>Hurley, S.L. (1989). ''Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity''. Oxford: [[Oxford University Press]].</ref><ref>Hurley, S.L. (1985). "Objectivity and Disagreement." in ''Morality and Objectivity'', [[Ted Honderich]] (ed.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 54–97.</ref>

Non-centralism has been of particular importance to ethical naturalists in the late 20th and early 21st centuries as part of their argument that normativity is a non-excisable aspect of language and that there is no way of analyzing thick moral concepts into a purely descriptive element attached to a thin moral evaluation, thus undermining any fundamental division between facts and norms. [[Allan Gibbard]], [[R. M. Hare]], and [[Simon Blackburn]] have argued in favor of the fact/norm distinction, meanwhile, with Gibbard going so far as to argue that, even if conventional English has only mixed normative terms (that is, terms that are neither purely descriptive nor purely normative), we could develop a nominally English metalanguage that still allowed us to maintain the division between factual descriptions and normative evaluations.<ref>[[Jocelyne Couture-Nowak|Couture, Jocelyne]], and [[Kai Nielsen (philosopher)|Kai Nielsen]]. 1995. "Introduction: The Ages of Metaethics." Pp. 1–30 in ''On the Relevance of Metaethics: New Essays in Metaethics'', edited by J. Couture and K. Nielsen. Calgary: [[University of Calgary Press]].</ref><ref>{{cite journal | author-link = Allan Gibbard | last = Gibbard | first = Allan | date = 1993 | title =Reply to Railton | volume = 4 | pages = 52–59 | journal = Naturalism and Normativity | editor = E. Villanueva | location = Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview | doi = 10.2307/1522826 | jstor = 1522826 | publisher = Ridgeview Publishing Company}}</ref>